Ground 2: alleged giving of undue weight to the finding of future dangerousness
35The applicant placed particular emphasis on the following finding in the remarks on sentence:
"It is clear [the applicant] is a paedophile. These offences were committed at the age of sixty-five. In the Court's view, his prospects of rehabilitation are very very poor. The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he poses a danger to the public in the future."
36The applicant argued that his Honour erroneously made a finding of fact, rather than considering the degree of risk of re-offending. He relied on the following passage from R v McNamara [2004] NSWCCA 42 in which Grove J (Sully and Bell JJ agreeing) said:
"[27] Counsel for the respondent contended that the test is "whether the offender poses the risk of relevant future conduct" and that the correct approach is for a judge to determine whether he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that such risks exist. With respect to the contender, I do not find that formulation useful.
[28] In the span of human affairs risk can always be postulated and of its mere existence there can be no doubt. For example, there is risk . . . that a person of previously unblemished character may commit a crime, that a convict may offend again. The elimination of risk is something which is viewable only from hindsight. . . . The convict, to the end of his life, did not re-offend. What is of concern to a sentencing judge is, in my opinion, not the existence of risk - that I would see as a given - but a degree of risk. That does not require the certitude of proof beyond reasonable doubt nor the exercise of balance to determine what is more probable than not.
[29] On that approach, references to proof beyond reasonable doubt or proof on the balance of probabilities become otiose. . . . "
37The applicant contended that his Honour's finding led him to attribute undue significance to future dangerousness. The applicant also argued that his Honour did not adequately consider the applicant's advancing age and infirmity at the time of release when assessing the risk of future offending.
38The applicant argued that his Honour was dismissive of the benefit that could be derived from custody-based programmes for sex offenders or pharmacological treatment to reduce his sex drive, both of which affected the degree of risk. The applicant relied on statements made to the sentencing judge by his counsel that he had not previously had such treatment but was willing to engage in it.
39The passage set out above from R v McNamara does not assist the applicant. It was not necessary for the sentencing judge to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant "poses a danger to the public in the future" since that is not the relevant test. But there was no reason for the sentencing judge not to express the finding in those terms. That the applicant had not undergone custody-based programmes for sex offenders and re-offended does not provide a basis for optimism that if he undertook such a programme he would not re-offend. That he has not had pharmacological treatment in the past to reduce his levels of testosterone does not establish that, even if he were to consent to such treatment, it would be effective in the future to control his urges and prevent recidivism.
40To protect the community from the offender is a relevant consideration in sentencing: s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the Act). Whether the community requires protection requires an assessment of the offender's risk of re-offending. As Gleeson CJ said in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) [2004] HCA 46; 223 CLR 575 at [12]:
"No doubt, predictions of future danger may be unreliable, but, as the case of Veen [(No. 2) (1998) 164 CLR 465] shows, they may also be right. Common law sentencing principles, and some legislative regimes, permit or require such predictions at the time of sentencing, which will often be many years before possible release."
41The sentencing remarks indicate that his Honour considered the risk to be high. I do not discern any error in the finding, either in the terms in which it was expressed, or in its substance. That a 65-year-old man, who has already been incarcerated for a significant period for more serious, but otherwise similar, offences against children, would re-offend by committing the index offences, thereby exposing himself to the risk of a further lengthy term of incarceration is a powerful indication either that he was unable or unwilling to control his paedophilic sex drive. Although the past is not always repeated in the future, it is a guide to what may occur, particularly when past conduct, as in the present case, arises from a mental condition which, when acted on, necessarily results in criminal conduct.
42It was, in my view, open to the sentencing judge to regard as no more than speculative the prospect that there would be any substantial diminution in the risk of the applicant's re-offending by reason either of custody-based sex offender programmes or pharmacological treatment, neither of which had previously been tried, or of the applicant's increased age on release. It may be accepted that testosterone levels in younger men are generally considerably higher than in older men. However, one cannot infer from this truism that the applicant's risk of re-offending will be materially diminished by the increase in his age occasioned by the passage of the non-parole period.