Woolworths Limited v Wyong Shire Council & Ors

Woolworths Limited v Wyong Shire Council & Ors - [2005] NSWLEC 400 - NSWLEC 2005 case summary — Zoe

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58 The Council argued that cl 59(1) was not a protectionist provision. Rather it operated to enable a retail centre to be established in Wadalba to prevent the expansion of retail centres that might exceed the environmental capacity of the land. In any event, councils have the power to make delegated legislation that has an anti-competitive outcome. If they did not, then all business or shopping centre zones would be invalid. Secondly, the Council submitted that even if the effect of cl 59(1) is protectionist, the purpose of cl 59(1) is not. Relying on Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Limited v Gantidis (1979) 140 CLR 675 at 687 the Council argued that it is not the operation of the clause that matters, but rather whether an irrelevant consideration was taken into account when making the planned amendment to the LEP. Thirdly, the Council submitted that if the question is whether the purpose for making the LEP was anti-competitive, that question is directed to the Minister's conduct, not the Council's, as it is the Minister who has made the plan pursuant to s 70 of the EP&A Act. In the absence of any evidence in relation to the Minister's decision, the Applicant must fail. Finally, the Council argued that the establishment of a local shopping centre and the protection of the local shopping centre from competition was a legitimate purpose. The Council submitted that it was in the public interest that such prohibitions are available to ensure that the local shopping centre consent is implemented for the benefit of the locality. (ii) Clause 59(1) does not relate to the subject matter of the legislation 59 The Council argued that cl 59(1) is entirely within the subject matter, scope and purpose of the EP&A Act particularly having regard to the objects stated in s 5(a)(i), s 5(a)(ii) and s 5(a)(vii). On its face, cl 59(1) controls development by prohibiting the Council from granting consent to more than one local shopping centre in Wadalba. The operation and effect of cl 59(1), therefore, related to the control of the expansion of retail uses within the Wadalba area. (iii) Clause 59(1) is not reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the decision-maker 60 For similar reasons, the Council submitted that cl 59(1) of the LEP is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the decision-maker. This power is contained in s 70 of the EP&A Act which authorises the Minister to make a local environmental plan. The Council argued that it might be offended if the Minister made the wrong plan, or the wrong Minister made the plan, but there is nothing on its face which suggests that the amending LEP was not made in accordance with or pursuant to s 70 of the EP&A Act. Equally, cl 59(1) is clearly capable of reference to the power of the Council to prepare a draft LEP pursuant to s 54.

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72 Errol Investments relied on Gantidis per Stephen J (with whom Gibbs, Mason and Aickin JJ agreed) at 687 as follows: If the shopping facilities presently enjoyed by a community or planned for it in the future are put in jeopardy by some proposed development, whether that jeopardy be due to physical or financial causes, and if the resultant community detriment will not be made good by the proposed development itself, that appears to me to be a consideration proper to be taken into account as a matter of town planning. 73 Stephen J also stated at 687: However, the mere threat of competition to existing businesses if not accompanied by a prospect of a resultant overall adverse effect upon the extent and adequacy of facilities available to the local community if the development be proceeded with, will not be a relevant town planning consideration. 74 Fabcot Pty Limited v Hawkesbury City Council (1997) 93 LGERA 373, relied on by the Applicant, concerned circumstances where the Court was considering whether to grant development consent in a merit appeal before this Court. Lloyd J held at 378 that: "… economic competition between individual trade competitors is not an environmental or planning consideration to which the economic effect described in s 90(1)(d) [now s 79C(1)(b)] is directed." I note that Lloyd J at 378 - 379 also adopted the above passage of Stephen J in Gantidis. Gantidis is an appeal from the merits review by the Victorian Planning Tribunal about a particular proposal. The two Shell decisions relied on above were also made in the context of whether a particular development ought be approved. 75 The arguments in all these cases need to be considered carefully in the circumstance here. The issue is what the Council has chosen to put in the planning instrument which will regulate future development, a quite different scenario to a planning appeal about an individual development. Arguably the rational use of land which here includes consideration of the appropriate supply of retail outlets across the Wyong Shire is a legitimate matter about which Council can make provisions in their LEPs under s 24 of the EP&A Act. The considerations in this context are not the same as those required to be considered under s 79C in relation to a development application. In my view, s 24 of the EP&A Act, which requires a council to have regard to the objects of the EP&A Act when making environmental planning instruments, means a council has very broad powers when making an LEP. The cases at par 70 - 73 provide authority for the point that in certain circumstances it will be appropriate to consider as a town planning matter the appropriate level of retail outlets in a particular area when assessing the merits of an application. This confirms that it is even more appropriate for a council to consider such matters as town planning issues when exercising its power under s 24 in making an LEP. 76 I accept the Council's arguments that cl 59(1) considered in the context of the LEP and the Council's attempts to define and implement a retail hierarchy strategy for Wyong Shire is within power and not directed at a protectionist objective. Applying the three step process identified in par 67 I consider cl 59(1) does seek to achieve the objects of the EP&A Act as required by s 24, its operation and legal effect are within the scope of the EP&A Act and it is an environmental planning instrument within the meaning of the Act. In terms of the Hickman principles, cl 59(1) is a valid exercise of power, does clearly relate to the EP&A Act and its objects and is clearly capable of reference to the power under s 24 of the EP&A Act to make an LEP. There is no manifest "defect" and the Hickman principles are not offended by cl 59(1).

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Applicant's submissions 81 The Applicant submitted that the development consent granted in relation to the Errol DA was invalid because the Council did not have jurisdiction to grant the consent having already granted development consent once. Clause 59(1) of the LEP states that the Council shall not grant consent for more than one local shopping centre on areas of land zoned 2(e) in Wadalba. On a proper construction of the effect of cl 59(1) of the LEP the Council only had power to grant consent for one local shopping centre, and had no jurisdiction to grant consent to any further applications. Clause 59(1) operates in this way irrespective of whether the consent granted is taken up, completed, lapses or is surrendered and clearly has "absurd" results. The intentions of the Council in making cl 59(1) are not relevant, what must be considered is its effect. Council's and Errol Investments' submissions 82 The Council and Errol Investments submitted that the Council was entitled to grant consent to the Errol DA in circumstances where there was no local shopping centre in the relevant zone. On the proper construction of cl 59(1) of the LEP, the Council's power to grant consent lapsed only when a local shopping centre had been established, or when a consent had commenced. The Council and Errol Investments relied on s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 ("the Interpretation Act") and the cases of Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1980) 147 CLR 297, Kingston & Anor v Keprose Pty Limited (1987) 11 NSWLR 404, Minister for Resources & Anor v Dover Fisheries Pty Limited (1993) 116 ALR 54 at 63 per Gummow J and Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 385 to argue that the underlying purpose of the clause must govern its construction and that the Court should favour a construction of cl 59(1) that is consistent with the intent of the LEP and avoids absurdity and impractical results. Finding 83 If the literal interpretation argued for by the Applicant is applied this would mean that even if a development consent is not proceeded with and no shopping centre built, then the Council is unable to approve another shopping centre in Wadalba. In making this point the Applicant relied on cases that considered the grant of consent as distinct in fact and law from the implementation of the consent (Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] AC 132 at 144; Hayden Theatres Pty Limited v Penrith City Council and Ors (Bignold J, NSWLEC, 1 April 1998, unreported)). That distinction I do not consider to be material in the context of interpreting this LEP. 84 It is clearly the intention of the instrument that there be one operational local shopping centre in Wadalba. I agree with the Council and Errol Investments that cl 59(1) means that the Council must not grant consent so as to permit the development of more than one local shopping centre. While there are two possible interpretations of cl 59(1) the latter interpretation is clearly more consistent with the intent of the LEP. I consider that the "absurd results" argument put forward by the Applicant confirms the latter interpretation is appropriate. The Applicant argued that on one "bizarre" construction of cl 59(1) of the LEP, a developer could deliberately obtain consent for a local shopping centre and fail to utilise the consent, thereby exhausting the operation of cl 59(1). I agree that this would be a bizarre operation of cl 59(1) and consider that, for this reason also, the Applicant's interpretation of cl 59(1) should not be applied. It is clearly not the intention of the LEP that a developer could exhaust the operation of cl 59(1) in this fashion. 85 Further support for this approach is found in the Interpretation Act which was amended by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Infrastructure and Other Planning Reform) Act 2005 on 16 June 2005 to specifically provide that an environmental planning instrument is an instrument within the meaning of the Interpretation Act. Section 33 of the Interpretation Act states: In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or statutory rule or, in the case of a statutory rule, in the Act under which the rule was made) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. 86 In Cooper Brookes, Mason and Wilson JJ stated at 320 that: Generally speaking, mere inconvenience of result in itself is not a ground for departing from the natural and ordinary sense of the language read in its context. But there are cases in which inconvenience of result or improbability of result assists the court in concluding that an alternative construction which is reasonably open is to be preferred to the literal meaning because the alternative interpretation more closely conforms to the legislative intent discernible from other provisions in the statute…

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99 The meaning of development standard has been considered in the Court of Appeal in Mayoh, Poynting, Lowy v The Land and Environment Court of NSW & Ors (2003) 123 LGERA 179 and the more recent decision of this Court in Georgakis v North Sydney [2004] NSWLEC 123. In Mayoh, Mahoney JA stated at 234: I do not think that cl 14A(a) is a provision 'in relation to the carrying out of development ...'. There is, in my opinion, a distinction in the provisions between a provision which in form provides: 'On land of characteristic X no development may be carried out' and a provision which in form provides: 'On such land development may be carried out in a particular way or to a particular extent.' The provision in cl 14A(2) is, I think, of the latter kind. If cl 14A(1)(a) provided merely that 'no building shall be erected on land in Zone No 2(c) if ...' the position would, in my opinion, be clear. In fact cl 14A(1)(a) prohibits erection on the land described in par (a) not of all buildings but only of 'a residential flat building'. But it remains correct, I think, to say that, in respect of the land referred to in par (a) what is done is to prohibit the erection of the relevant kind of building, not to make a provision in relation to 'the carrying out of' development of that or any other kind. If regard be had to purpose, the purpose of the provision was, I think, to proscribe development by buildings which would overshadow smaller buildings at the particular place. This is not a matter relating to 'development standards' but to the carrying out of development at all. 100 In the Court of Appeal decision in Poynting, Giles JA considered a number of decisions in his judgment and at 343 [96] - [98] set out two steps as follows: A provision prohibiting the development in question (the use of land, subdivision of land, erection of a building etc, see the definition of "development" in the Act) under any circumstances will be a provision controlling development, but it will not be a development standard. The availability of SEPP No 1 will fail at the first step. Beyond this, the debate should be over the second step, whether the provision specifies a requirement or fixes a standard in relation to an aspect of the (non-prohibited) development. I consider one can profitably return to the observations of McHugh JA in Woollahra Municipal Council v Carr , to his Honour's reminder of the need to define the development and its aspects before it can be determined whether the provision in question is a development standard. Referring again to the definition of `development standards', there must be a provision in relation to the carrying out of development, and then the provision must specify a requirement or fix a standard in respect of an aspect of that development. Having identified the development in relation to which there is the provision, the aspects of that development must be considered in order to say whether the provision specifies a requirement or fixes a standard in respect of an aspect of the development.

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104 It is necessary as emphasised in Lowy and several other cases to consider the relevant provision in the context of the LEP as a whole when considering the two step process identified by Giles JA in Poynting. In the 2(e) zone of the LEP a general store is permissible development but shops are prohibited. By virtue of cl 59(1) only one local shopping centre is allowed in Wadalba and other specified centres. 105 The Applicant has argued that cl 59(1) is not a prohibition within the first step identified in Poynting so that the second step applies. As cl 59(1) fixes a standard in respect of an aspect of the development it is a development standard. If the Applicant is correct and cl 59(1) is not a prohibition within the first step in Poynting I do not agree that cl 59(1) fixes a standard in relation to an aspect of the development under the second step. Limiting an entire development to only one in number does not relate to an aspect of the development in my view nor is it a standard for a development, rather it is a strict limitation of the number of developments to one. In the context of the LEP it is clearly not intended that cl 59(1) fix a standard nor is it a matter falling under the definition of "development standard" in s 4 of the EP&A Act. 106 I consider there is also an approach to the two step process in Poynting which is different to the Applicant's arguments at par 96 above. If the development is characterised as a second local shopping centre in Wadalba, then applying the first step in Poynting the answer is clearly that cl 59(1) prohibits such development under all circumstances so that it is not necessary to consider the second step in Poynting. 107 I consider that cl 59(1) is not a provision of an environmental planning instrument in relation to carrying out an aspect of development and that it is a prohibition directed to the grant of consent for development. Clause 59(1) does not concern itself with any aspect of development, but to development as a whole. Accordingly, cl 59(1) is not a development standard. The effect of cl 59(1) is that if a local shopping centre already exists in Wadalba a second local shopping centre is prohibited. 108 The Applicant is unsuccessful in relation to all its arguments regarding cl 59(1). It is therefore necessary to consider the issues raised in relation to the validity of the Errol development consent. Validity of Errol development consent 109 The validity of the consent granted by the Council to the Errol DA on 28 October 2004 is challenged on the following bases: (5) The Council failed to consider the Woolworths DA in granting consent; (6) The Council did not delegate its power to grant consent to Mr Butt; (7) The Council did not properly undertaken the exercise in relation to the SEPP 1 objection; (8) The Council failed to consider cl 10(3) of the LEP in granting consent; (9) The Council failed to consider the requirements of DCP 49 in granting consent; (10) The Council took into account an irrelevant consideration by considering proposals to amend the LEP and DCP 49 in granting consent; (11) The Council failed to consider acoustic impacts of the Errol DA; (12) The Council failed to consider traffic impacts of the Errol DA. (Issue 5) The Council failed to consider the Woolworths DA in granting consent to the Errol DA (APOC par 35-41) 110 The Woolworths DA lodged on 7 October 2003 sought approval for a supermarket of 3,565sq m GFA and a service station, requiring a rezoning application to be lodged ("the rezoning application"). Between 24 November 2003 and 23 August 2004 various issues concerning the Woolworths DA and the rezoning application were communicated by the Council to the Applicant.

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(ii) Refusing to consider the Woolworths DA was manifestly unreasonable 132 The Council submitted that its conduct could not be said to be manifestly unreasonable as it was not devoid of plausible justification. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 Mason CJ and Deane J stated at 290 that: Just as a power is exercised in an improper manner if it is, upon the material before the decision-maker, a decision to which no reasonable person could come, so it is exercised in an improper manner if the decision-maker makes his or her decision in a manner so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course. The plausible justification was that Errol investments was entitled to have its application determined on the merits without further delay. Finding 133 In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, Mason J stated at 39 to 40 that: What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors -- and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider -- are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard: see Reg v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd, adopting the earlier formulations of Dixon J in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury, and Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning. 134 Where a statute prescribes certain matters which must be taken into account then those matters must be given weight as a fundamental element of a decision. The Applicant argued that these unique circumstances, being cl 59(1), whereby only one local shopping centre could be approved and the lodgement of two DAs for a local shopping centre in Wadalba, suggest that there was a mandatory requirement to consider the Woolworths DA at the same time as the Errol DA. 135 There is no specific requirement under the EP&A Act that requires the Council to take into account the Woolworths DA in the circumstances here. It is therefore necessary as decided in Peko-Wallsend to consider the relevant provisions of the EP&A Act and the LEP provisions to determine if this is a mandatory relevant matter which the Council should have complied with in the circumstances of this case. The provisions of s 79C of the EP&A Act are broadly phrased to require the Court to take into account specific matters such as the public interest. A large number of matters can therefore be validly considered by the Council, if it so chooses. Whether matters are mandatory relevant considerations in this context are harder to identify. 136 Section 79C(1) of the EP&A Act did not require the Council to consider the Woolworths DA, nor did it require a comparative evaluation of the competing development applications. Rather s 79C(1) directs the decision-maker's attention to the merits of the Errol DA. The Council was not obliged to postpone the decision to consider the Errol DA in order to consider the Woolworths DA. This is particularly highlighted in circumstances where the Woolworths DA was only in final form the day before the Errol DA was determined, making it particularly difficult for there to be a simultaneous consideration had the Council been so minded. 137 In Hayden Theatres v Penrith City Council Bignold J considered the submission raised by the applicant that the council had erred by failing to consider a development application for a cinema lodged by the applicant when determining to grant consent to a development application for a cinema lodged by a third party. Bignold J stated at 27 that: In my judgment this argument is entirely misguided and most especially so in relation to s90(1)(d) which directs attention to "the social effect and the economic effect of that development (ie the development the subject of the development application) in the locality" and not to the social and economic effect of some other development While the planning instrument in Hayden Theatres did not have a provision such as cl 59(1) I consider this reasoning applies to s 79C and its application in this case. 138 The Council's decision on 25 August 2004 to rescind an earlier motion to consider together the Errol DA and Woolworths DA (at that stage a 3,565sq m supermarket proposal) was made because it was inconsistent with the Council's goal of developing a local level town centre for Wadalba, amongst other reasons (see par 116 above). These reasons are perfectly consistent with the Council's responsibilities for planning under the EP&A Act. That leads to a consideration of a further difference between the two DAs that needs to be borne in mind. The Errol DA relates to Block D which pursuant to cl 10.4 of DCP 49 is identified as a site for retail, commercial and residential use in the Wadalba town centre. The Woolworths DA relates to Block B, which was not proposed for retail activity but rather for motel use. In terms of the planning for the Wadalba Town Centre the two blocks were identified as having different purposes. I do not consider it was therefore a matter of the Council being required to consider two similar applications for a shopping centre in order to choose between them as there was an important difference between the two different sites to which the DAs related.

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142 If the Council were required to afford procedural fairness to the Applicant, a matter I make no conclusive finding about, sufficient opportunity was provided to the Applicant to discharge any such duty. It is clear from the Council file in evidence that the Applicant was kept fully informed of how its DA and the Errol DA were proceeding, was invited to address relevant Council meetings and availed itself of those opportunities. 143 There has been no failure to consider the Woolworths DA nor did the Council misdirect itself about the need to do so. Further, there is simply no basis for a finding that the Council has acted manifestly unreasonably in approving the Errol DA without undertaking at the same time a direct comparison with the Woolworths DA. To succeed, the Applicant has to establish that the Council's decision was unreasonable within the principle established in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. In Weal Mason P said at 188 [27]: The test is stringent. When, "the ground of asserted unreasonableness is giving too much or too little weight to one consideration or another 'a court should proceed with caution… lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on its merits' ( Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 627 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, quoting Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 42). The decision must amount to an abuse of power ( Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 36) or be so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course ( Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 290). See also Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1996) 91 LGERA 31. This test has not been satisfied in the circumstances of this case. Clearly there was also a plausible justification for the Council to make the decision to approve the Errol DA as identified in Teoh at 290.

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(Issue 6) Delegation by the Council to Mr Butt (APOC par 42-44) 144 On 1 October 2004, the Council's General Manager, Kerry Yates delegated his authority to determine certain development applications, to Mr Butt, the Director, Health and Development ("the delegation"). The delegation stated that the Director had delegated power to:

Determine Development Applications, including modifications, in accordance with Council's policies except as follows: a. a value exceeding $2 million…
…
Vary Council's policies and codes relating to Health & Development matters to an extent not exceeding 20%.
With the formal concurrence of the Mayor and General Manager, vary Council's codes and policies relating to the Director's field of expertise exceeding 20%.
In accordance with the decisions of the Development Management Panel: a. Determine application for Development Consent up to a value of $7 million where: i. the application largely complies with the Council's Codes and Policies… e. Variation of the Council's Codes and Policies relating to Health and Development matters that do not exceed 25%
With formal concurrence of the Mayor and the General Manager, determine application for Development Consent with a value in excess of $7 million
…
…
Determine construction certificates/development applications referred to the General Manager by Council for determination… 145 On 13 October 2004, the Council resolved that the Errol DA be referred to the General Manager for determination and favoured approval of the application subject to appropriate conditions. The General Manager referred the Errol DA to Mr Butt, Council's Director of Health and Development and on 28 October 2004, Mr Butt determined the Errol DA by the grant of consent. Applicant's submissions 146 The Applicant submitted that the grant of consent by the Council was invalid on the basis that there was an improper exercise of his delegated power by the Council officer Mr Butt. Firstly, the value of the proposed Errol DA exceeded $2,000,000, the limit of Mr Butt's delegation power in cl 1. The application form for the Errol DA stated that the total project value of the proposed development was $2,300,000. 147 Secondly, Mr Butt could not have possibly known whether the SEPP 1 variation of cl 59(3)(a) of the LEP exceeded 20 per cent as required by cl 3 and cl 4 or 25 per cent as required by cl 5.

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148 Because there is a conflict between cl 1, 5 and 9 of the delegation the Applicant argued that, pursuant to Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, cl 9 should be read with cl 1 of the delegation which states that the Director may only determine development applications up to $2,000,000. Accordingly, Mr Butt did not have power to grant consent to the Errol DA. Council's and Errol Investment's submissions 149 The Council submitted that Mr Butt had the authority to determine the Errol DA pursuant to cl 9 of the delegation. The Council argued that cl 9 operated to give the Director power to determine any development applications referred to the General Manager by resolution of the Council. The Council submitted that cl 9 provided a separate and independent source of authority to determine development applications. The authority to determine development applications under cl 9 was not expressed to be subject to cl 1 or any other clause of the delegation. Accordingly, the Council argued that Mr Butt did have the delegated power to determine the Errol DA. Finding 150 In Project Blue Sky McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ stated at 381 - 382 that: A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions. Reconciling conflicting provisions will often require the court "to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other". Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme. This passage relied on by the Applicant addresses circumstances where there appears to be conflict between different provisions in the same instrument. No such conflict arguably exists here where each clause of the delegate's authority authorises the delegate in different contexts specified in the delegation. Each clause of the delegation is separate from the other. 151 I agree with the Council's and Errol Investment's submissions that cl 9 of the delegation is a separate head of power pursuant to which Mr Butt was able to approve the Errol DA. This interpretation is reinforced by having regard to cl 5 and cl 6 of the delegation which gives the Director authority to determine development applications outside the limit of $2,000,000 in cl 1. Accordingly I consider that Mr Butt did have the delegated power to determine the Errol DA under cl 9 of his delegation. The Applicant fails on this ground.

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(Issue 7) Failure to properly undertake the exercise in relation to the SEPP 1 objection (APOC par 45-52) 152 Clause 3 of SEPP 1 states: This Policy provides flexibility in the application of planning controls operating by virtue of development standards in circumstances where strict compliance with those standards would, in any particular case, be unreasonable or unnecessary or tend to hinder the attainment of the objects specified in section 5 (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act. 153 Clause 7 of SEPP 1 states: Where the consent authority is satisfied that the objection is well founded and is also of the opinion that granting of consent to that development application is consistent with the aims of this Policy as set out in clause 3, it may, with the concurrence of the Director, grant consent to that development application notwithstanding the development standard the subject of the objection… 154 Clause 59(3) of the LEP provides that: Notwithstanding any other provision of this plan, a person may, with the consent of the Council, carry out development for the purpose of a local shopping centre on land on which development is restricted by subclause (1) or (2) where: (a) the gross floor area of any building or buildings used for the purposes of a shop does not exceed 1,000 square metres, and (b) the gross floor area of any building or buildings used for the purposes of commercial premises does not exceed 200 square metres. 155 The definition of gross floor area is provided in cl 7 of the LEP: gross floor area means the sum of the areas of each floor of a building where the area of each floor is taken to be the area within the outer face of the external enclosing walls as measured at a height of 1,400 millimetres above each floor level, excluding: (a) columns, fin walls, sun control devices and any elements, projections or works outside the general lines of the outer face of the external wall, (b) lift towers, cooling towers, machinery and plant rooms and ancillary storage space and vertical air-conditioning ducts, (c) car parking needed to meet any requirements of the Council and any internal designated vehicular or pedestrian access to the car parking, and (d) space for the loading and unloading of goods. 156 In a series of emails dated 17 June 2004 from Mr Martin Johnson, an employee of the Council, to Mr John Dawson of the Stevens Group, a company related to Errol Investments, the Council officer stated that "toilets, storage and loading areas may be deducted from the total floor space".

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163 The Council submitted that even if the Applicant demonstrated some error in the exercise relating to the SEPP 1 objection, it could not be said that the error was material to the decision. Even if the Council considered the GFA to be 1,500sq m in light of the Council's resolution to amend the LEP to permit a supermarket with a GFA of 2,000sq m, it is unlikely that the Council would have declined to approve the Errol DA. Further, the Council submitted that the underlying purpose of the standard in cl 59(3) of the LEP was not to limit bulk or amenity but to provide for local retail facilities in Wadalba and to maintain the designated retail hierarchy, as recognised in the Director's Report. In those circumstances, it did not matter whether the extent of the variance was 20 per cent or 50 per cent, where the Council officer had reached the opinion on reasonable grounds that the proposed development would not undermine the purpose of the standard. Errol Investments' submissions 164 Errol Investments submitted that the Council did not misdirect itself in its consideration of the SEPP 1 objection. Errol Investments noted that its SEPP 1 objection dated 19 August 2004 specified a retail floor space of 1,500sq m, and that the proposal exceeded the development standard by 500sq m. Errol Investments argued that the Director's Report stated that the objection was well founded and that consideration was based upon there being a variation of 500sq m (this statement is incorrect as the Director's Report states that the GFA is 1,200sq m, representing a variation of 200sq m). In these circumstances the Council did not fail to properly inform itself about the amount of the variation, nor did the Council misdirect itself as to the amount of the SEPP 1 variation. Finding (i) admissibility of expert evidence 165 As the parties have sought to rely on expert town planning evidence on this and other issues it is necessary to consider whether such evidence is admissible in judicial review proceedings.

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169 Applying the first five criteria in Caldera set out above to the evidence of the two town planners, the evidence does not go to a failure to make inquiries, to achieve an understanding of the environmental consequences of the Council's behaviour or explain principles relevant to the determination. The only basis on which the town planners' evidence could possibly be included is to show what a council acting reasonably ought to have done. In order to satisfy criterion (v) in Caldera it is necessary that all relevant material before the Council is in the witness' possession. As pointed out in Errol Investment's submissions that does not appear to be the case for Mr Darroch as there were further explanations of the back of house area before the Council not referred to by him. I do not consider that criterion (v) in Caldera has been satisfied and do not consider this evidence should be admitted. Given that two qualified experts arrived at contrary views on whether the Council acted reasonably, it is of limited assistance in any event if the evidence is admitted. It follows that I will not have regard to Mr Stewart's evidence. (ii) Finding on SEPP 1 objection 170 The SEPP 1 objection relied on by Errol sought (accurately) a variation from the 1,000sq m size limit in cl 59(3)(a) by 500sq m. The Director's Report however changes this to state that a 200sq m variation only was sought because he did not consider the "back of house" area needed to be counted. It was clear however that the whole building was 1,500sq m and that the retail area was 1,200sq m. The Council must have been well aware of this fact. There is no evidence that the Director's conclusion that the GFA was 1,200sq m was incorrect as he does not refer to toilet areas being excluded, the only obvious error in the email from the Council employee of 17 June 2004. Even if toilet areas are excluded from the GFA calculation under cl 7 of the LEP the difference in the GFA between the SEPP 1 application and the Director's Report, if that is incorrect, is somewhere between 200sq m and 500sq m but is likely to be much closer to 200sq m. 171 In the circumstances I consider it cannot be sensibly argued that the Council was misdirected in any material way. It was very clear what the Errol DA before the Council related to. Whether the variation of the development standard in cl 59(3)(a) was 20 per cent or closer to 50 per cent (which is unlikely) was not material in the circumstances for the reasons articulated by the Council in par 163. Nor was the Council's decision to grant the variation under SEPP 1 manifestly unreasonable in these circumstances. The relevant test of manifest unreasonableness is set out at par 143 above and is stringent. This test has not been satisfied in the circumstances of this case. The Applicant fails on this ground.

[66]

(Issue 8) The Council failed to consider cl 10(3) of the LEP (APOC par 53-55) 172 Clause 10(3) of the LEP states that: Except as otherwise provided by this plan, the Council must not grant consent to the carrying out of development on land to which this plan applies unless, in the opinion of the Council, the proposed development is compatible with the objectives of the zone within which the development is proposed to be carried out. 173 The objectives of the 2(e) zone are: (a) to cater for a range of housing types appropriate to a greenfield urban release area and not exceeding a height of 2 storeys, and (b) to provide for other uses which: (i) are compatible with the residential environment and afford services to residents at a local level, and (ii) are unlikely to adversely affect residential amenity or place demands on services beyond the level reasonably required for residential uses, and (c) to provide home-based employment where such will not: (i) involve exposure to view from any public place of any unsightly matter, or any raw material, equipment, machinery, product or stored finished goods, or (ii) have a material adverse impact on residents, and (d) to ensure development includes appropriate water sensitive urban design. Applicant's submissions 174 The Applicant submitted that the determination to grant consent to the Errol DA was invalid because as a pre-condition to the granting of consent, the Council was required to form an opinion that the proposed development was compatible with the objectives of the 2(e) zone as required by cl 10(3) of the LEP. The obligation under cl 10(3) requires the Council to take the zone objectives into consideration when determining a development application. The Applicant noted that the Director's Report made no reference to the zone objectives of the LEP and that there was no evidence that the Director otherwise formed an opinion that the development was compatible with the objectives. Relying on the decisions of Currey v Sutherland Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365, Franklins Limited v Penrith City Council & Anor [1999] NSWCA 134 and Manly Council v Hortis (2001) 113 LGERA 221, the Applicant argued that the absence of any reference to the clause or opinion required to be formed requires the inference to be drawn that the Council gave no consideration to cl 10(3) or the pre-condition it contained. Council's and Errol Investment's submissions 175 The Council submitted that it was not required to form an opinion that the proposed development was compatible with the objectives of the 2(e) zone because cl 10(3) is subordinate to cl 59(3) of the LEP. The Council argued that as cl 10(3) operates "except as otherwise provided in this plan", the formation of the requisite opinion is only a pre-condition to the exercise of the power of the Council where the LEP does not otherwise provide. The clear intention of the LEP is that where the pre-conditions set out in cl 59(3)(a) and (b) are satisfied the Council may grant consent without forming an opinion under cl 10(3).

[75]

191 Errol Investments submitted that while it was true that a consent authority must apply the law in force at the time of a decision, this was irrelevant to the present circumstances. Errol Investments argued that the Council did apply the law in force at the time of the decision. Finding on (9) and (10) 192 I consider grounds (9) and (10) are closely connected and should be considered together. It is clear from the extract from the Director's Report set out at par 182 above that the major reason why cl 10.4 of DCP 49 was not applied was because of the Council resolution on 11 August 2004 to amend cl 59 of the LEP to allow a larger supermarket of 2,000sq m, service station and retail shops in the Wadalba town centre. It is clear that giving effect to such a resolution would require changes also to cl 10.4 of DCP 49 because the areas for retail activity would need to be expanded beyond Block D. Accordingly the Errol DA was likely to conform to the LEP and DCP 49 if so amended in the future. During the Ordinary Meeting of Council on 13 October 2004, the Council resolved: That the Development Control Plan No 49 be amended in conjunction with the preparation of the draft LEP, including the development of a new Masterplan to reflect the previous resolution of Council. 193 The Health and Development Report to the Council's Development Management Panel dated 6 September 2004 and the Director's Report dated 13 October 2004 provide evidence of the Council's rationale for departing from DCP 49. These reports note that a local shopping centre as envisaged under DCP 49 would struggle financially and, therefore, in keeping with the resolution to amend cl 59 of the LEP, the Errol DA was supported despite its inconsistency with the built form envisaged in cl 10.4 of DCP 49. In addition the reports note that while the Errol DA did not comply with the design requirements of DCP 49, an attempt had been made to integrate the shopping centre with the future development within the town centre and the proposed design was in keeping with the character of the area. 194 The Director's Report dated 13 October 2004 as detailed in par 92 of the Council's written submissions clearly demonstrates that the Council was fully informed and able to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to DCP 49. Ultimately it concluded that cl 10.4 would not be followed in large part, although some parts of DCP 49 were said to be applied in relation to incorporating building features sympathetic to the school site. 195 The Council having considered DCP 49 clearly gave parts of DCP 49 less weight than this Court or the Court of Appeal gave in Zhang, Stockland and Ligon. Zhang, Stockland, Ligon all have facts which are materially different so that applying the reasoning in those cases does not lead to a conclusion that there has been a failure to adequately consider DCP 49 in this case. In Stockland McClellan J at 272 [87] refers to the situation where a DCP which can be demonstrated, either inherently or by the passage of time, to bring about inappropriate planning solutions should be given less weight. His Honour said at 272 [87]: A development control plan which can be demonstrated, either inherently or perhaps by the passing of time, to bring about an inappropriate planning solution, especially an outcome which conflicts with other policy outcomes adopted at a State, regional or local level, will be given less weight than a development control plan which provides a sensible planning outcome consistent with other policies. 196 Here the Council has arguably made considerable efforts over a long period to endeavour to get the "right" retail hierarchy in place and as part of that process has come to the view that the retail plan for Block D of the Wadalba Town Centre as set down in cl 10.4 of DCP 49 will not work in its entirety because it will not produce an economically viable retail mix. Its resolution of 11 August 2004 is the first step in a process to bring about a change in the LEP and then, presumably, DCP 49 to reflect the Council's view of a better retail mix for Wadalba. 197 The Council has undertaken a lengthy and detailed analysis of the retail needs, and developed a retail strategy for, Wyong Shire (see par 53 - 55 above). This process is continuing to evolve, as demonstrated by the decision making in relation to the Errol DA. That process is likely to result in DCP 49 requiring change in relation to the form of retail development envisaged for the Wadalba Town Centre.

[86]

Applicant's submissions 215 The Applicant submitted that (i) in determining to grant consent to the Errol DA, the Council failed to consider the acoustic impacts of the Errol DA which were a relevant consideration under s 79C(1)(b) of the EP&A Act. The Health and Development Department Report dated 6 September 2004 and the Director's Report dated 13 October 2004 recommended that the hours of operation, deliveries, loading and unloading should be restricted to between 7.00am and 10.00pm. No conditions of consent were imposed by the Council to limit the level of noise, the hours of operation or the hours of deliveries. The Council failed to obtain an assessment of the likely acoustic impacts of the Errol DA. Alternatively, (ii) the determination to grant consent without any conditions regulating the hours of operation and deliveries to the supermarket was manifestly unreasonable. 216 The Applicant sought to rely on the affidavit of Mr Graham Atkins, acoustic engineer, sworn 13 April 2005. Mr Atkins gave evidence in relation to the assessment and consideration of acoustic issues by the Council in relation to the Errol DA. In his affidavit, Mr Atkins referred to the Environment Protection Agency's Industrial Noise Policy, Environmental Criteria for Road Traffic Noise, Environmental Noise Control Manual and Noise Guide for Local Government as the relevant documents setting out the noise criteria designed to control noise impacts from development. Mr Atkins noted that while the amended Development Report and Statement of Environmental Effects dated 26 August 2004 stated that the Errol DA complied with the requirements of the Industrial Noise Policy in relation to plant, the report failed to address the noise impacts associated with 24 hour use of mechanical plant, car park, road traffic, deliveries, garbage pickups and on-site customers. Mr Atkins concluded that the Errol DA did not contain a detailed assessment of noise impacts and was inadequate for determining the extent of noise impacts likely to result from the proposed development. In his affidavit he stated that: …[T]here is insufficient fact and data in the DA and supporting materials considered in the Council Report for any person to determine the extent of noise impact that would arise from the Development. The information I have reviewed fails to address and quantify background noise levels, sources of noise from the proposed Development, identify existing and future noise receptor locations or quantify the extent of likely noise impacts.

[93]

224 While I consider there was a failure to take into account some aspects of potential noise impacts from the proposed supermarket I do not consider it is an issue which goes fundamentally to whether development consent ought to have been granted on this site. I consider the Council could be presumed to have sufficient knowledge of the site and its surrounds, and the nature of the development to be able to determine its suitability for a supermarket with normal operating hours in light of the school opposite and future neighbouring residential property. I also take into account that the Council was aware that an acoustic wall around the loading area was proposed as part of the development and that the school buildings opposite have largely blank walls on the side opposite the supermarket. 225 I consider, taking into account Mr Atkins' evidence, that there was insufficient information about the impacts of the 24 hour operation of the supermarket on neighbouring residential properties to enable an adequate consideration of the impact on those properties. Essentially this concerns the issue of whether the supermarket should operate 24 hours or have more limited hours. As is clear from the case law above, it is necessary that the Council have before it sufficient information to enable it to properly assess the matter. While the Director's Report did refer to the potential noise impacts from a 24 hour operation on neighbouring property there was no noise assessment of that impact before the Council in order to understand the magnitude of that impact. Further, the Council imposed no conditions which would ameliorate the impact in relation to deliveries and hours of operation despite the Director's Report recommending that such operations should be restricted to between 7.00am and 10.00pm, apart from requiring in condition 71 that deliveries should be made outside school peak usage periods. This condition appears more directed to amelioration of traffic impacts than noise impacts. The only other condition dealing with noise concerns hours for construction works (condition 47). 226 I consider the Applicant is successful on this ground in relation to the 24 hour operation of the supermarket proposed in the Errol DA. This is an issue which pertains to the adequacy of development consent conditions rather than whether development consent ought be granted at all.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Woolworths Limited

Respondent/Defendant:

Wyong Shire Council & Ors

Legislation Cited (3)

Migration Act 1958(Cth)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901(Cth)

Interpretation Act 1987(NSW)

Cases Cited (53)

CITATION : Woolworths Limited v Wyong Shire Council & Ors [2005] NSWLEC 400

Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v GSF Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 215 ALR 385; Anambah Homes v Maitland City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 421; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; Breitkopf v Wyong Shire Council (1996) 90 LGERA 269; Caldera Environment Centre Incorporated v Tweed Shire Council (Talbot J, NSWLEC, 13, July 1993, unreported); Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 257; Centro Properties Ltd v Warringah Council (No 2) (2003) 132 LGERA 45; Cobden-Jones v Woollahra Municipal Council (2002) 118 LGERA 41; Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1980) 147 CLR 297; Currey v Sutherland Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365; Dubler Group v Minister (2004) 137 LGERA 178; Esmonds Motors Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1970) 120 CLR 463; Fabcot Pty Limited v Hawkesbury City Council (1997) 93 LGERA 373; Franklins Limited v Penrith City Council & Anor [1999] NSWCA 134; Georgakis v North Sydney [2004] NSWLEC 123; Glowpace Pty Ltd v South Sydney City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 84; Hayden Theatres Pty Limited v Penrith City Council and Ors (Bignold J, NSWLEC, 1 April 1998, unreported); Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Limited v Gantidis (1979) 140 CLR 675; King v Great Lakes Council (1985) 58 LGRA 366; Kingston & Anor v Keprose Pty Limited (1987) 11 NSWLR 404; Lesnewski v Mosman Municipal Council (2005) 138 LGERA 207; Lowy v The Land and Environment Court of NSW & Ors (2003) 123 LGERA 179; Manly Council v Hortis (2001) 113 LGERA 221; McEldowney v Ford [1971] AC 632; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; CASES CITED: Minister for Resources & Anor v Dover Fisheries Pty Limited (1993) 116 ALR 54; Mitchforce Pty Ltd v The Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) (2003) 57 NSWLR 212; Nalor Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (1980) 42 LGERA 111; Nedoni Pty Ltd v NSW Minister for Roads [2004] NSWLEC 56; North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Limited (1996) 93 LGERA 23; North Sydney Municipal Council v P D Mayoh (No 2) (1990) 71 LGRA 222; Parramatta City Council v Hale (1983) 47 LGRA 319; Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] AC 132; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155; Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598; R v Metal Trades Employers' Association; ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208; Sericott Pty Limited v Snowy River Shire Council (1999) 108 LGERA 66; Shell Company v Manly Muncipal Council (1961) 7 LGRA 87; Shell Company v Randwick Municipal Council (1959) 4 LGRA 348; Smith v Wyong Shire Council (2003) 132 LGERA 148; Sofi v Wollondilly Shire Council [1975] 2 NSWLR 614; South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161; Strathfield Municipal Council v Poynting (2001) 116 LGERA 319; Stockland Development v Manly Council (2004) 136 LGERA 254; ULV Pty Ltd v Scott & Ors (1990) 19 NSWLR 190; Vanmeld Pty Limited v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78; Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181; Woolworths Ltd v Pallas Newco Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 707; WRF Property Pty Ltd v Armidale Dumaresq Council [2003] NSWLEC 223; Yadle Investments Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW (1989) 72 LGRA 409; Zhang v Canterbury City Council (2001) 51 NSWLR 589

35 The Applicant raised three grounds of review (par 11). I agree with the Council's argument (see par 22(ii) above) that based on Lesnewski and Pallas Newco, broad ultra vires grounds of judicial review, such as manifest unreasonableness, are excluded by s 35. Accordingly, the Applicant's third ground of judicial review, that cl 59(1) is manifestly unreasonable (APOC par 14(c)), must fail as this ground of review is precluded by s 35. The first ground, that it is beyond the power conferred by the EP&A Act because it does not relate to the purpose and object, and the second ground, that cl 59 is beyond the power to make an LEP in the EP&A Act (especially s 26) potentially are matters which s 35 may not bar, subject to the operation of the Hickman principles. What does "manifest" defect require? 36 The Council argued that "manifest" means that the error must be clear on the "face of the record" so that s 35 does not protect "manifest" errors which are clear on the face of the instrument. The Council relied on Yadle Investments Pty Ltd v Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW (1989) 72 LGRA 409, Nedoni Pty Ltd v NSW Minister for Roads [2004] NSWLEC 56, R v Metal Trades Employers' Association; ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208, Mitchforce and Plaintiff S157 to argue that s 35 as a privative clause only protected errors that were obvious on the face of the document (see par 22(iv) above). In Yadle, Stein J stated at 413 that "such error must be evident and obvious. It must appear plainly on the face of the instrument". This statement was expressly approved by Bignold J in Nedoni at [134] - [137]. In Metal Trades Employers' Association, Dixon J stated at 247 - 248 that a privative clause only operated to protect an instrument if it did not exceed the expressed authority "upon its face".

48 In addition, the Applicant argued that cl 59(1) of the LEP was not a bona fide attempt to exercise power on the basis that the primary operation and effect of cl 59(1) is the protection of other retail development in the area from the threat of competition. The Applicant submitted that the protection of retailers from competition is not an end or object within the scope of the EP&A Act. (ii) Clause 59(1) does not relate to the subject matter of the legislation 49 The Applicant argued that the Court's task in determining whether cl 59(1) of the LEP is ultra vires involves three steps. The Court's task requires the determination of: (a) the meaning of the words used in the EP&A Act to describe subordinate environmental planning instruments which the subordinate authority is authorised to make; (b) the meaning of the environmental planning instrument itself, in this case the LEP; (c) whether the meaning of the environmental planning instrument complies with the description of an environmental planning instrument which is authorised to be made by the EP&A Act ( McEldowney v Ford [1971] AC 632 at 658, Esmonds Motors Pty Limited v Commonwealth (1970) 120 CLR 463 at 466 and South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 at 173).

(2005) 215 ALR 385

(2004) 135 LGERA 421

(1996) 90 LGERA 269

(2004) 135 LGERA 257

(2003) 132 LGERA 45

(2002) 118 LGERA 41

(1980) 147 CLR 297

(1998) 100 LGERA 365

(2004) 137 LGERA 178

(1970) 120 CLR 463

(1997) 93 LGERA 373

(2000) 111 LGERA 84

(1979) 140 CLR 675

(1987) 11 NSWLR 404

(2005) 138 LGERA 207

(2003) 123 LGERA 179

(2001) 113 LGERA 221

(1986) 162 CLR 24

(1995) 183 CLR 273

(2002) 209 CLR 597

(1993) 116 ALR 54

(2003) 57 NSWLR 212

(1980) 42 LGERA 111

(1996) 93 LGERA 23

(2003) 211 CLR 476

(1985) 6 FCR 155

(1998) 194 CLR 355

(1945) 70 CLR 598

(1951) 82 CLR 208

(1999) 108 LGERA 66

(2003) 132 LGERA 148

(1989) 166 CLR 161

(2001) 116 LGERA 319

(2004) 136 LGERA 254

(1990) 19 NSWLR 190

(1999) 46 NSWLR 78

(2000) 111 LGERA 181

(2004) 61 NSWLR 707

(2001) 51 NSWLR 589

(1996) 90 LGERA 341

(1998) 100 LGERA 27

(2003) 132 LGERA 122

(1999) 197 CLR 611

(1990) 170 CLR 1

(1996) 91 LGERA 31

(1965) 113 CLR 177

(1998) 94 FCR 28

[2004] NSWLEC 123

[2003] NSWLEC 223

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Randren House Pty Ltd v Water Administration Ministerial Corporation

Roden v Bandora Holdings Pty Ltd

Rossi v Living Choice Australia Ltd t/as Living Choice & Ors

Woolworths Limited v Wyong Shire Council & Ors

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (115 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (53)

Cited By (7)