The appellant complains of a judgment of the Full Court of New South Wales which set aside a verdict awarding him £800 damages in an action of libel and entered a verdict for the defendant. The libel was contained in a publication called Turf Life and related to a circular issued from the office of another publication called The Turf Bystander and subscribed "H. M. Marlowe, per E. G." The appellant, who sued in the action under the name of Langley Wilkinson, claims to be known by the name of Eric Gordon in his capacity as controller of the Turf Bystander and to be the E. G. by whom the subscription H. M. Marlowe was attached to the circular. At any rate it is not denied that piercing through the mysteries of this nomenclature it is open to the jury to hold that the libel condemning the circular and its author was published of and concerning the plaintiff. The Turf Bystander appears to be a slender journal containing information intended for the votaries of starting price betting. The circular issued from its office states, with the customary phrases of confidential half disclosure, the peculiar opportunity which the writer has obtained of enabling the clients of the Turf Bystander to share the benefits which will arise from the unexpected win of an unnamed horse. That opportunity is stated to consist in the arrangement of a specified pony trainer of "an S.P. commission for one of his charges that will be released in the near future." The circular candidly asserts that if it were not for the fact that the horse "has no chance of being beaten when let loose" the writer "would not fall in with the suggestion that Bystander clients should be in." It proceeds to guard against any misplaced cynicism on the part of the reader by stating that although really acting on behalf of the trainer the author will have enough interest in it to protect the interests of his followers. Further, the readers are assured that the diplomatic task will be attempted of weakening the opposition to the horse without impairing the odds. The cryptic statement follows "Keeping this at good odds is where you come in, and if we get your support very little money will be on the course." The apparent lack of logic in this non sequitur might, perhaps, be mitigated by exclusive recourse to starting price bookmakers. After this prefatory optimism the circular comes to the real point. "The terms for letting you in on this are not heavy. You must send us 10s. and a plainly worded promise to give us the odds to another 10s. at the starting price returned for this candidate." This statement is not in itself an example of plain wording, but no doubt those for whom it was intended would understand well enough that they were required to pay a fee of 10s. in exchange for the name of the horse in the race and also undertake to pay the Bystander office if the horse won an additional amount which a bet of 10s. at starting price odds would produce. The circular then terminates in some platitudes about the secrecy and urgency of the matter. The perusal of this circular appears to have aroused in those conducting the rival journal a righteous wrath which overflowed in the next issue in vituperative indignation. The defendant's newspaper set out the circular after introductory observations expressed in intemperate turf slang to the effect that Sydney contained too many unscrupulous persons who sought a living in inciting the citizens to bet and obtaining their money for racing tips. The article was styled an exposure in the heading and the sub-heading ran "Tip-slinger improperly uses pony trainer's name. Turf Bystander's Circular." After the circular had been set out the article proceeded to state that the trainer referred to "is desirous that we publish the above letter, which was sent him by the person who received it by post, and is most anxious to deny the lying claims made in the catchpenny circular. He does not know the said tip-slinging firm and never at any time has he been associated with parasites who make a speciality of cheating the public with false propaganda. The above letter, combined with the trainer's denial should put people on their guard against such imposition, for if this is not an attempt to get money by false pretences, then it would be interesting to learn the legal definition of fraud." This article constitutes the libel complained of. The jury's verdict means that a plea of "truth and for the public benefit" was not made out. The ground upon which the Full Court set the verdict aside was that the whole transaction to which the libel related was illegal under the Gaming and Betting Act 1912, particularly sec. 47 (b). The Court considered that the imputation of fraud contained in the libel was not an imputation of fraud ultra the illegal transaction. Street C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court, said[1]: - "It is not an imputation on the plaintiff on a topic dehors the illegal transaction. It is an allegation, defamatory in normal circumstances, touching something which is part and parcel of the scheme for carrying out the illegal and dishonest transactions set forth in the circular, and which cannot be dissociated or severed from the proposals for making money by illegal practices, as outlined in the circular. The article complained of is devoted entirely to criticism of the plaintiff's circular, and everything that is said of him is based upon that circular. It is tainted with illegality, and that illegality is, in our opinion, a complete answer to the plaintiff's claim." These views are based upon the language employed by Best C.J. in Yrisarri v. Clement[2]. In such a case as the present I should feel much satisfaction in the result produced by the judgment of the Full Court. However precious to him may be the appellant's private character and reputation for veracity one cannot feel that the author of such a circular should be encouraged to occupy the time of the Courts in defending his reputation from the aspersions which the circular is so calculated to provoke. But we must remember the question is not of the comparative deserts of the parties or of the demerits of the plaintiff. The plea of illegality is not allowed in the interests of either party but arises from the necessity of vindicating the law in the general interest. The question is to what extent does the illegality of the plaintiff's conduct disqualify him from the legal redress which otherwise would be available. In my opinion the judgment of the Full Court does not correctly apply the doctrine which Best C.J. attempted to formulate. What he said was (Yrisarri v. Clement[3]): "I think that where a man complains of a libel written respecting an illegal transaction in which he is engaged, the illegality of that transaction is an answer to his complaints; but it appeared to me at the trial, and my opinion is now confirmed by that of my learned brothers on the bench, that if a man is guilty of an illegal transaction, fraud ultra that transaction is not on that account to be imputed to him; or, in other words, if a man is guilty of borrowing money in a manner which the law has forbidden, he is not, therefore, to be charged with committing a fraud upon the English nation." When his Lordship spoke of fraud ultra that transaction he referred to the illegality of which the plaintiff was said to be guilty. The general rule is that no course of illegality can found rights. What I understand Best C.J. to mean is that in so far as the illegal transaction is the basis upon which the plaintiff asserts his rights he cannot succeed but if the slander imputes to him misconduct of another order which may be complained of without setting up the illegality his unlawful conduct does not bar his action. In Smith's Newspapers Ltd. v. Becker[4] the doctrine was much discussed. I merely summed up the result of the cases at p. 288: "The plea of illegality, however relevant on the question of damages, must fail both because the libel is not confined to conduct arising in the course of committing the unlawful acts or to disparaging a reputation derived from unlawful practices, and it is not defamatory merely because it reflects upon the respondent in the way of his trade or vocation." But the matter will be found more fully treated in that case at p. 291, per Starke J.; pp. 296-298, per Dixon J.; pp. 305-312, per Evatt J.; p. 314, per McTiernan J. The language employed by the members of the Court differs but I do not think that any expressions used were intended to authorize the view that if a wrongdoer pursues a course of illegal conduct, false and defamatory statements may be made with impunity about him so long as they assert that he was guilty of the conduct imputed whilst he was performing illegal acts. On the one hand it may seem absurd to allow a burglar to sue for libel because it is falsely published of him that he committed an indecency in the course of the burglary, but on the other hand it would be more astonishing if a citizen could not complain of an imputation that he committed some atrocity whilst walking down the wrong side of the footpath. In both cases it may be said that the imputation is of conduct in the course of an illegality but in neither case is the conduct which was in fact illegal relied upon as the foundation for the assertion of any right or claim. For these reasons I think the judgment of the Full Court is erroneous. The appeal to the Full Court was, however, a new trial motion and I am clearly of opinion that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. The summing up made no discrimination between the parts of the libel which related to the illegal conduct and those which imputed fraud. The damages were heavy. It is true the jury endeavoured to sever them and it is clear that the plaintiff cannot recover the damages awarded under the head of "business," but how far the sum awarded for character is made up of inadmissible elements no one can say. I think the appeal should be allowed, the judgment appealed from discharged, and a new trial should be ordered.