The applicant's case
39 The applicant's first ground for review was that Mr Flanigan did not take account of the 'adverse impacts the Isaac Plains Coal Project and the Sonoma Coal Project are likely to have on the matters protected by Part 3 of the EPBC Act due to the mining, transport and use of the coal from the mines emitting a large amount of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming.' The second ground was that in making the decision Mr Flanigan erred in law in that he treated the expression "all adverse impacts the action is likely to have on the matter protected by each provision of Part 3", in s 75(2) of the EPBC Act as not including the adverse impacts the [proposals] are likely to have on the matters protected by Part 3 of the EPBC Act due to the mining, transport and use of the coal from the mines emitting a large amount of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming …'.
40 In its submissions the applicant had focussed on the effect of greenhouse gas emission and climate change on the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area and Ramsar wetlands. However, in its application for review, the applicant did not identify which of the protected matters identified in Part 3 were likely to suffer significant impact as a result of either development. Argument proceeded on the basis that s 12 was the relevant controlling provision. It relates to World Heritage properties of which the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area is one. Section 16 concerns Ramsar wetlands. The applicant's submissions focussed on greenhouse gas emission, leading to climate change but, as in the application, it paid little or no attention to the actual effect on any identified protected matter. Part 3 focuses upon impact on such matters. The likely significance of the impact of any action will vary, depending upon which protected matter is being considered. In other words, it will usually be erroneous to speak of a "significant impact" for the purposes of Part 3 as if a particular action and its consequences might affect all protected matters in the same way and to the same extent. Mr Flanigan did not adopt this potentially erroneous approach in his reasons, but he did so, to some extent, in his affidavit, presumably influenced by the form of the application for review. In argument the parties all addressed the matter on that basis. Whilst such an approach has the potential capacity to cause error, there is no suggestion that any such error infected Mr Flanigan's decisions.
41 The applicant's first ground of review (outlined above) is somewhat misleading. It purports to rely on subpars 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act which concern failure to take account of relevant considerations. However the applicant's complaint seems to be that Mr Flanigan failed to consider whether either project would have, or was likely to have, a significant impact upon any protected matter: in other words, that he failed to address the proper question, rather than that he failed to take account of relevant considerations in so doing. The second ground alleges that Mr Flanigan acted on a misconstruction of s 75 in that he did not consider the adverse impacts of greenhouse gas generation and climate change 'on the matters protected by Part 3 of the EPBC Act'. The two grounds raise the same issue, namely whether Mr Flanigan addressed the question posed by s 75.
42 The alleged error is said to be disclosed by the absence from Mr Flanigan's reasons of any detailed discussion of the greenhouse gas and climate change issues. The applicant, at least tacitly, submitted that I should reject Mr Flanigan's affidavit as an ex post facto rationalization of his decisions rather than as an honest account of his reasons. However it is clear that in each case the Departmental officer raised the greenhouse gas issue for his consideration, although limited to the consequences of burning the coal. Mr Flanigan asserted that he also considered greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the mining and transportation processes. Given his training and experience in the area, it would be surprising if he were not aware of all of these potential sources of greenhouse gases. I accept that Mr Flanigan's reference in his reasons to the so-called "indirect" impacts on World Heritage values were to greenhouse gas emission from all sources and its potential for causing climate change. In other words he considered the possibility that greenhouse gas emission might cause climate change and consequential effects upon protected matters.
43 Understandably, the applicant sought to advance its case by pointing to the paucity of detail concerning these matters in the reasons. It may well have been better had Mr Flanigan said rather more than he did. However, as I have previously observed, the applicant raised the matter as one of general concern. Mr Flanigan concluded that the possibility of increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere resulting from each project was speculative and merely 'theoretically possible'. There was no suggestion that the mining of coal pursuant to these proposals would increase the amount of coal burnt in any particular year, or cumulatively. It was not suggested that in the absence of coal from these sources, less coal would be burnt. Mr Flanigan also considered that if there were any such increased emissions, the additional impact on protected matters would be very small and therefore not significant.
44 Given my acceptance of Mr Flanigan's evidence, it follows that I accept that he considered the possible impact of greenhouse gases generated in the extraction, transportation and burning of coal won from each proposed mine and concluded that there was no significant impact for the purposes of Part 3. The applicant must fail on each of its first two grounds.
45 The other grounds of review are somewhat garbled. One suspects that they were drafted so as to utilize as many as possible of the individual grounds identified in s 5 of the ADJR Act, regardless of whether they were fairly applicable in this case. The applicant also sought to colour its argument concerning those grounds by reference to five factors said to indicate the proper approach to the task prescribed by s 75.
46 Firstly, the applicant referred to par 15AB(2)(d) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (the "Acts Interpretation Act"). That section, in effect, provides that in construing an act a court may have regard to 'any treaty or other international agreement that is referred to in the Act'. By subs 520(3) of the EPBC Act, the Governor-General is authorized to make regulations 'for and in relation to giving effect to any of the following agreements …'. Relevantly, such "agreements" include the World Heritage Convention, the Ramsar Convention, the Biodiversity Convention and the Framework Convention on Climate Change done at New York on 9 May 1992. The applicant relies primarily upon the last-mentioned Convention, article 3, par 3 of which provides:
'The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried co-operatively by interested Parties.'
47 That provision, and the Convention generally, offer little assistance in the task of construing the EPBC Act. Part 3 of that Act is a mechanism adopted by the Parliament for the purposes of protecting certain aspects of the Australian environment and heritage. It chose to provide such protection in circumstances in which an action has, will have, or is likely to have, a significant impact upon a protected matter. I see no basis for undermining the requirement that there be, at least, a likely significant impact in order to engage Parts 8 and 9. The thrust of the applicant's argument in this regard, as in others, seemed to be that 'likely' in s 12 and the other proscriptive provisions of Part 3 should be read as "possible" or, perhaps, as "barely possible". I reject that approach to the construction of those sections.
48 The applicant also referred to subs 183(1) of the EPBC Act which provides:
'The Minister must, by instrument published in the Gazette, establish a list of threatening processes that are key threatening processes.'
49 Pursuant to subs 188(3):
'A process is a threatening process if it threatens, or may threaten, the survival, abundance or evolutionary development of a native species or ecological community.'
50 Subsection 188(4) defines the criteria for identifying a 'key threatening process'.
51 It seems that global warming has been nominated as a key threatening process pursuant to s 183. However that offers no justification for construing s 12 as prohibiting conduct which is not likely to have significant impact on a protected matter.
52 The third factor said to be relevant to the approach taken under the Act is the existence of Part 8. It provides various methods for assessing the impact of individual controlled actions. It was said that in deciding whether or not a particular action is a controlled action (that is, whether or not any provision of Part 3 controls it), regard should be had to the fact that in the event that it is a controlled action , it will be subject to a further process of assessment and evaluation pursuant to Part 8, prior to any approval being given pursuant to Part 9. All of that may be so, but as far as I can see it does not detract from the use, in the various controlling sections in Part 3, of the notion of 'likely' significant impact. Clearly, an action is only to be assessed pursuant to Part 8 if it is a controlled action. The criteria for the application of Parts 8 and 9 to a proposed action are those found in Part 3, not the views of the decision-maker as to the merits of applying Parts 8 and 9 to that action.
53 Fourthly, the applicant sought to rely upon the principles of ecologically sustainable development contained in s 3A of the EPBC Act, particularly that identified in par (b) which provides that it is a principle of ecologically sustainable development that:
'If there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation … .'
54 It is not clear that this "principle" can be applied to the decision-making process prescribed by s 75. In any event it has not been established that either project will cause serious or irreversible environmental damage. Mr Flanigan has decided that there is no likely significant impact.
55 Finally, the applicant sought to make much of the fact that the threats posed by the emission of greenhouse gases are cumulative. It was argued that it was inappropriate to seek to identify the actual effect attributable to the action in question, as opposed to the general threat posed by greenhouse gas emission and climate change. However the EPBC Act required Mr Flanigan to address the impact of the proposed action, not the impact of the world-wide burning of coal. Secondly it was said that the impact of each action ought not be assessed having regard to the whole history of greenhouse gas emissions, but rather in comparison only to other contemporary emissions. Thus small coal mines might be preferred to larger mines. I see no merit in this argument. The relevant impact must be the difference between the position if the action occurs and the position if it does not.
56 Having discussed these general matters, I turn to the remaining grounds for review. Ground 3 claims an error of law in that Mr Flanigan failed to take 'a common sense approach to causation of the greenhouse impacts appreciating that the purpose of the inquiry is to attribute legal responsibility for impacts to matters protected by Part 3 of the EPBC Act in light of the subject, scope and objects of the Act.'
57 I am not sure that the purpose of Part 3 is to attribute legal responsibility for the causation of adverse impacts. To my mind the purpose of the Act is to prevent or minimize such adverse impact. Be that as it may, there is no reason to believe that Mr Flanigan adopted other than a 'common sense approach' to the issue of causation. Causation is, of course, not mentioned in s 12 or the other analogous sections in Part 3. However it was submitted that there is necessarily a causal relationship between an action and any relevant impact. That is probably so, but I see no reason to introduce notions of causation into the process prescribed by s 75. It is not necessary to go beyond the language of the relevant sections. In any event Mr Flanigan accepted the possibility that the coal might be burnt, thereby producing additional greenhouse gases which might cause climate change. The point at which he disagreed with the applicant was as to the likelihood of any adverse impact upon a protected matter and the extent thereof.
58 Ground 4 claims an error of law in that Mr Flanigan 'failed to treat the issue of causation, generally, and failed to construe references to "a significant impact", in particular, in the context of the objects and purpose of the EPBC Act including the function of Part 3 and section 75 thereof in the statutory environmental impact assessment process established by the EPBC Act.' I have already indicated that I consider this argument to be misconceived.
59 Ground 5 claims an error of law in that Mr Flanigan 'failed to consider the greenhouse impacts operating cumulatively with other contributors to global warming.' Mr Flanigan clearly addressed that issue. Indeed, it was the point of his decision.
60 Ground 6 claims error of law in that Mr Flanigan 'equated a finding that such an impact was extremely small, taken on its own, with its being insignificant.' While the adjectives "small" and "insignificant" have different meanings Mr Flanigan was clearly satisfied that any possible impact would be insignificant.
61 Ground 7 claims an error of law in that Mr Flanigan 'treated it as a prerequisite for such a conclusion that the greenhouse impacts "set in train climate change processes that may have impacts on matters protected by Part 3" when such processes are already in train and capable of being contributed to by the greenhouse impacts of the project.'
62 Mr Flanigan clearly understood the position. He did not accept that either project would do so. There is nothing in this point.
63 Ground 8 claims an error of law in that Mr Flanigan 'having found that the greenhouse impacts would be likely to increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, he ignored that finding to conclude that there was no possibility, in reality, that any impact on climate in the vicinity of matters protected by Part 3 could ensue.'
64 This is nothing more than a complaint that Mr Flanigan gave effect to the word "significant" in the section. He was obliged to do so.
65 Ground 9 claims an error of law in that Mr Flanigan 'treated as a prerequisite for such a finding that the particular impact on matters protected by Part 3 of the EPBC Act be measurable, specifically identifiable; and demonstrable.'
66 In my view he simply accepted that any impact had to be significant. Again, that is what the section required.
67 Ground 10 claims that the decisions were improper exercises of the relevant power because Mr Flanigan failed to take a relevant consideration into account, namely that global warming is included as a key threatening process on the list established under s 183 of the EPBC Act and therefore failed to consider the serious threat that global warming poses when assessing greenhouse impacts from the proposed mines.
68 I have already dealt with this argument. It is not necessary to say any more about it.
69 Ground 11 claims improper exercise of the power in that Mr Flanigan took into account an irrelevant consideration, namely uncertainty as to the manner in which the coal would be used. This criticism appears to assume that it would have been possible to find out how the coal would be used and to assess the consequent greenhouse gas emission effect, and/or to attach conditions to the development pursuant to Part 8 and 9. All of this may be true, but it seems to me that the matter was disposed of upon the basis that, on at least one scenario, all of the coal would be burnt. Whether or not contracts for the sale of the coal were already in place, I do not know. Nor do I know whether or not any potential, ultimate consumers would be less likely to produce greenhouse gases or likely to produce less greenhouse gases, than would others. One imagines that there is a possibility that the coal would be stockpiled rather than burnt, or perhaps burnt in circumstances in which greenhouse gas emission was reduced or eliminated, either by existing technology (if there is any such technology) or by technology yet to be developed. However I do not understand that Mr Flanigan placed any great weight upon the fact that the ultimate fate of the coal was unknown. In any event, it could not be said that such consideration was irrelevant to the task in hand.
70 Finally, ground 12 claims that there was no evidence upon which the delegate could have been reasonably satisfied that greenhouse gas emissions were not likely to have a significant impact on the protected matters. In his affidavit, Mr Flanigan gave some indication of the factual basis of his decision. As I understand it, counsel for the applicant did not seek to cross-examine him concerning that aspect. There was good reason for his not doing so. The applicant's primary case was that Mr Flanigan did not consider these matters at all. Cross-examination as to the factual basis of the decisions could well have undermined the applicant's prospects of succeeding on that primary ground. The ground of lack of evidence has not been established.
71 In the circumstances none of the grounds of review is established.
CONNECTION BETWEEN ACTION AND IMPACT
72 I have proceeded upon the basis that greenhouse gas emissions consequent upon the burning of coal mined in one of these projects might arguably cause an impact upon a protected matter, which impact could be said to be an impact of the proposed action. I have adopted this approach because it appears to have been the approach adopted by Mr Flanigan. However I am far from satisfied that the burning of coal at some unidentified place in the world, the production of greenhouse gases from such combustion, its contribution towards global warming and the impact of global warming upon a protected matter, can be so described. The applicant's concern is the possibility that at some unspecified future time, protected matters in Australia will be adversely and significantly affected by climate change of unidentified magnitude, such climate change having been caused by levels of greenhouse gases (derived from all sources) in the atmosphere. There has been no suggestion that the mining, transportation or burning of coal from either proposed mine would directly affect any such protected matter, nor was there any attempt to identify the extent (if any) to which emissions from such mining, transportation and burning might aggravate the greenhouse gas problem. The applicant's case is really based upon the assertion that greenhouse gas emission is bad, and that the Australian government should do whatever it can to stop it including, one assumes, banning new coal mines in Australia. This case is far removed from the factual situation in Minister for Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc (2004) 139 FCR 24.
ORDERS
73 In the circumstances the application must be dismissed. I will hear submissions as to costs.
I certify that the preceding seventy-three (73) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett.