Extension of time relief pursuant to s 1322(4)(d)
23 The first proposed order in the plaintiff's originating process is:
Pursuant to section 1322(4)(d) of the Act, the period set out in sub-sections 723(3)(b) and 724(1)(b)(ii) of the Act for the admission to quotation by ASX of securities of the Plaintiff issued pursuant to the Prospectus, be extended to the date which is 15 business days after the making of this order.
24 The plaintiff submits, and I accept, that the statutory requirements of ss 1322(4)(d) and 1322(6) are met, as follows.
(a) The plaintiff is an interested person who may seek relief, as required by s 1322(4), and as is consistent with earlier authorities.
(b) The order sought is an order extending the period for the doing of any act, matter or thing or taking any proceeding under the Corporations Act or in relation to a corporation for the purpose of s 1322(4)(d) in that the time for admission to quotation under each of sub-sections 723(3)(b) and 724(1)(b)(ii) of the Corporations Act is being extended.
(c) The period to be extended can be extended even if expired, as provided for by s 1322(4)(d), as is the case here where the period expired on 16 May 2017.
(d) In that regard the purported refresh document of 15 May 2017, as was issued in an attempt to utilise the provisions of the LI2016/70, did not have the effect of extending the period for admission to quotation for the Prospectus as, on its proper construction, an extension under LI2016/70 was not available to the plaintiff. Relevantly:
(1) As a matter of language, the need to lodge a "refresh document" in LI2016/70, s 724(3G)(a), which meets the requirement in s 724(3H) of allowing an applicant to withdraw their application and be repaid monies, cannot be met if shares have been issued. The shares cannot be unissued; the applicant has received reciprocal value of shares in exchange for their money.
(2) Contextually, the focus in Chapter 6D on updated disclosure for any discovered misleading information or new information circumstances (s 724(1)(c)-(d)), the time limit on expiry of prospectus and replacement prospectus (s 711(6)) and express rights to withdraw or avoid offers (ss 723(3), 724(2)) suggest that an investor ought not be bound irrevocably and indefinitely prior to admission of shares for quotation. For example, the initial investors who are issued shares first could be subject to considerable uncertainty and market changes, and be unable to trade their shares.
(3) The Explanatory Statement to LI2016/70 (at [2] on p 3) confirms this reading, which is permissible to be taken into account: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ss 2B ("legislative instrument"), 15AA, 15AB(1), 15AB(2)(e), 46(1) and Legislation Act 2003 (Cth), s 8).
25 The plaintiff also submits, and I accept, that the pre-condition and requirement in s 1322(6)(c) that no substantial injustice has been or is likely to be caused to any person is also satisfied:
(a) As to the plaintiff, the evidence of Mr Steinepreis confirms that if no extension were granted, then it would have to refund the capital it has raised and incur significant corporate and legal expense (estimated at $450,000), as well as delay in a replacement capital raising, which would be substantial injustice if no curative orders were made: Taruga at [13] applied in Re G8 Communications at [24(1)].
(b) As to the existing shareholders of the plaintiff (those prior to the capital raising under the Prospectus), it may be inferred that they would be affected as their shares in the plaintiff would not be reinstated for trading and their shares in the plaintiff would be affected by the absence of the immediate capital raised in order to purchase and pursue the new oil and gas projects of the plaintiff, which would be substantial injustice if no curative orders were made: Re G8 Communications at [24(2)].
(c) As to the applicants for securities in the plaintiff (under the Prospectus):
(i) they presently have the option of requiring repayment of their money under s 723(3)(c)-(d) of the Corporations Act - and they have had that right since 16 May 2017 and have been informed of their rights since 22 June 2017 by letter from the plaintiff (it must be noted, however, that those applicants who reside interstate or overseas may not yet have received this letter);
(ii) the plaintiff intends to repay money to any applicant who requests return in accordance with the written communication from the plaintiff to each applicant informing them of their rights and dispatched on 23 June 2017; and
(iii) some have made contact asking when the shares will be admitted for quotation. Thus, it may be assumed that such applicants generally desire the admission of their issued shares or shares to be issued for quotation. Without the orders, these applicants will not get the shares applied for immediately or at all, which could cause them substantial injustice.
(d) As to all of the above, in the event that the curative orders that are sought are made, then substantial injustice will not be caused. Securities will be issued as applied for, although quotation will have to be slightly delayed. But that delay has not caused the applicants to seek repayment notwithstanding that they have been informed of their right to do so.
26 As to the discretion to extend the time the plaintiff further submits and I accept that the following circumstances favour such an extension:
(a) the extension order is for a relatively short period of time. It is a period of about 61 days from 16 May 2017 to approximately 16 July 2017. Longer extensions have been sought and granted (see Golden Gate at 667 orders 5-7 (10-11 months) and Solco at [35] (8 months));
(b) there is a genuine and good reason for an extension. That is, as explained above, the plaintiff and its advisors have mistakenly relied upon a new legislative instrument, LI2016/70, when that instrument does not allow an extension of time for admission to quotation in the plaintiff's circumstances, where securities had been issued under the Prospectus. Regrettably, those involved made a genuine error as to the interpretation of LI2016/70, which is an otherwise new and complex document;
(c) the conduct of the plaintiff is not disentitling. The plaintiff had done all that it was required to do to obtain admission to quotation other than complete the spread requirements for the ASX. It had raised substantial capital and met the minimum subscription condition for the Prospectus.
(d) the additional proposed orders 3, 4 and 5, provide an extension on terms such that there is notice to all persons potentially affected and the capacity for them to return before the Court under liberty to apply to raise any matters they see fit;
(e) as said in Solco, at [33], "[t]he making of the extension order is consistent with facilitating the conduct of commerce generally, including by maintaining market confidence that technical difficulties will not necessarily prevent or unduly hinder the raising of capital by the issue of securities to be admitted to quotation"; and
(f) the ASX does not oppose the extension order, nor does ASIC oppose the extension order.
27 I will for the above reasons make an order for an extension of the period for admission to quotation.