Consideration
25 The issue of claim splitting usually arises in inferior courts which have a monetary jurisdictional limit. Typically, legislation or rules relating to courts of limited financial jurisdiction include a prohibition on a litigant "dividing" or "splitting" a claim into two, commencing two proceedings in the one court, each for a part of the claim, and thereby avoiding the jurisdictional limit of the court. This would clearly be an abuse of process.
26 The critical question is whether, in the particular instance, a plaintiff has "divided" a single claim or cause of action. That question has been considered in a number of cases.
27 The general principles are that:
(a) a plaintiff does not contravene the rule by bringing two complaints where the claims arise out of distinct and independent transactions: Sollimano v Nolan [1921] VLR 389 at 393;
(b) in order to contravene the rule, the action said to be split must be "one and entire": Dealey v Clark (1831) 109 ER 936;
(c) if a second cause of action can be maintained without depriving the plaintiff of his remedy in the first cause of action, the rule will not be contravened: Dealey v Clark;
(d) the fact that the same causes of action could be joined in one proceeding in a superior court does not prevent the plaintiff from bringing separate proceedings in an inferior court: Wickham v Lee (1848) 12 QB 521; and
(e) the issue of goods supplied and delivered on a running account is a particular rule resting on whether the parties intended that the obligation to pay the pre-existing debt is extinguished each time a new balance is struck (thus giving rise to a new and singular obligation to pay: Melville v Dartmouth Projects Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Byrne J, 5 December 1997); Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473.
28 Upon the alleged facts, the Boxes would have alternative claims for breach of contract, tortious negligence and breach of statutory duty. Nonetheless, it is apparent that only one claim could be brought to FOS in respect of one complete set of facts. As I set out above, the Operational Guidelines provide under para 9.7 that FOS will not permit a joint claim in contract or tort to be "split" and treated as multiple claims (with a cap applying to each claim). However, that is not this case.
29 Section 945A of the Corporations Act, as it was prior to amendments made in July 2012, provides:
945A Requirement to have a reasonable basis for the advice
The providing entity must only provide the advice to the client if:
(a) the providing entity:
(i) determines the relevant personal circumstances in relation to giving the advice; and
(ii) makes reasonable inquiries in relation to those personal circumstances; and
(b) having regard to information obtained from the client in relation to those personal circumstances, the providing entity has given such consideration to, and conducted such investigation of, the subject matter of the advice as is reasonable in all the circumstances; and
(c) the advice is appropriate to the client, having regard to that consideration and investigation.
30 Accordingly, upon providing each separate SoA, Wealthsure owed a discrete statutory duty to the Boxes. It was obliged to satisfy the requirements of s 945A of the Corporations Act, and in the case of the 29 March 2007 SoA, s 947D of the Corporations Act. Each SoA recommended a particular investment course of action. Each course of action demanded that the requirement of s 945A were met.
31 Before providing each of the three separate SoAs, Mr Brown met with the Boxes in order to consider, amongst other things, the Boxes' "investment risk profile". Accordingly, their investment risk profile was revisited by Wealthsure, as it was obliged to do, on each separate occasion that a SoA was provided. The profile attributed to them by him on each separate occasion was that of "moderately aggressive" investors. This characterisation had implications for the kind of investments recommended in the several SoAs. The Boxes allege, in effect, that in respect of each SoA, they were given the wrong profile.
32 Whether or not there was a breach of each separate contractual or tortious duty of care or statutory duty would be measured in relation to each separate investment recommendation. Whether loss and damage was suffered would require a separate inquiry into the consequences of the client having followed each separate recommendation. The Boxes have submitted a claim calculation specifying the losses they suffered by reason of each investment recommendation.
33 The facts in this case are an actual example of "Scenario 2" set out under the Operational Guidelines at para 9.7 except that this case involves not two but three separate advices:
Advice
Where an Applicant has been to an FSP that gives financial advice and over a period of time has had a number of dealings with the FSP, resulting in the Applicant losing money in circumstances where the FSP is liable to pay compensation because the advice was unsuitable, FOS will consider the circumstances carefully to determine whether there has been one claim or multiple claims.
Scenario 1
If an FSP has given a statement of advice recommending a number of investments and the Applicant disputes the suitability of this investment advice, FOS is likely to treat this as one claim because there is one set of facts and circumstances giving rise to the Dispute claim, that is, the FSP providing the statement of advice.
Because there is only one claim, a cap applies in relation to that claim and the Applicant may not "split" the claim into separate components to avoid or reduce the impact of the cap. The Applicant cannot make a separate claim for each recommended investment.
Scenario 2
However, if the FSP has given advice recommending an investment and then given separate advice recommending another investment and the Applicant disputes the suitability of both sets of advice, FOS is likely to treat this Dispute as involving two claims with the effect that a cap applies in relation to each claim. This is so because there are two sets of facts and circumstances giving rise to the Dispute.
34 If there was negligence in the attribution of an inappropriate risk profile at the outset then the generic error was repeated on two further occasions. That it was an error in each case requires to be adjudged upon the personal circumstances of the Boxes at those different times. There would then have been not one but three errors, albeit the same generic error on each occasion.
35 That the duty of care or statutory duty might be similar in each instance does not alter the position that the giving of each SoA, and the related circumstances, constituted a discrete set of facts that gave the Boxes the right to ask for a remedy which is the language of a "claim" as expressed in the Operational Guidelines: see by analogy Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Proprietary Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234 at 245. Each SoA necessarily required a consideration of the Boxes' then financial circumstances.
36 There was no splitting of claims as contended by Wealthsure. It follows that FOS was correct in the approach it ultimately adopted in treating the Dispute as comprising three separate claims each subject to a monetary cap of $150,000.