Discount for assistance
23 As I have already said, the sentencing judge allowed a combined discount of 30% for the pleas of guilty and the assistance which the applicant provided to authorities. Although his Honour did not quantify the discount which he allowed for the pleas of guilty he did, as I have said, indicate that he would reduce the otherwise appropriate sentence "by a figure at the top of the range as identified … in R v Thomson and Houlton". From that remark the applicant infers that a discount of 25% was extended to him for the pleas of guilty and that therefore a discount of only 5% was allowed for his assistance to authorities. That discount, it was submitted, was insufficient to reflect the fact that the applicant had provided information which led to the arrest of his cannabis supplier, as a direct result of which, he asserted, he had been assaulted.
24 The sentencing judge's approach in providing a combined discount for the two aspects of the matter, namely the plea of guilty and the assistance to authorities, was not only appropriate but it was in conformity with well-established authority.
25 In R v Gallagher (1991) 23 NSWLR 220 Gleeson CJ said:
It must often be the case that an offender's conduct in pleading guilty, his expressions of contrition, his willingness to co-operate with the authorities, and the personal risks to which he thereby exposes himself, will form a complex of inter-related considerations, and an attempt to separate out one or more of those considerations will not only be artificial and contrived, but will also be illogical. (at 228)
26 Accordingly, the ultimate question is thus whether it has been demonstrated that the overall discount of 30% is manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge had careful regard, in assessing the weight to be allowed for the applicant's assistance, to the matters set out in s 23 of the Act. Due allowance had to be made for the fact that the applicant provided information to the police about his cannabis supplier, and that he had apparently suffered retribution for doing so. However, the applicant was not entitled to the type of leniency that he would have attracted had he been prepared to give information about what he also knew concerning the activities of other persons in the drug distribution business. Nor was there any suggestion that he had undertaken to give evidence against any other persons. Nor, as the sentencing judge pointed out, was there any evidence that as a result of providing this information the applicant would be required to serve his sentence in harsher conditions than would normally be the case. In short, the present circumstances were well removed from the type of case in which a combined discount of 40% to 50% is called for. I would reject this complaint.