(7) Plea of guilty, the significance of which is limited by a strong Crown case.
36 Spigelman CJ stated in Henry (supra) that sentences for an offence of the kind identified by the above characteristics should generally fall between four and five years for the full term. In this respect, however, the Chief Justice observed that the seven characteristics identified above did not represent the full range of factors relevant in the sentencing exercise and that many of the characteristics contained within themselves an inherent variability.
37 In the present case, the applicant was, as earlier noted, aged 24 years at the time of the offence and, although not unknown to the criminal justice system, had not previously been involved in offending of the kind in question in the present application. It was contended on his behalf that the robberies did not involve more than a limited degree of planning. I consider, however, that there is some merit in the submission made on behalf of the Crown that although there was a finding that the offences were not part of a planned or organised criminal activity, nonetheless the applicant and his co-offender would appear to have travelled on trains for the purpose of robbing travellers and, in respect of the two armed robbery offences, doing so whilst armed with a knife for the purpose.
38 Mr Lange, in his written submissions (paragraph 5), observed that the Henry guideline was predicated upon the assumption that the offender entered a late plea of limited utilitarian value. He stated:-
"… it is now accepted doctrine that the seventh characteristic identified by the Chief Justice refers to a late plea in respect of which the guideline range in Henry has been taken as having allowed a discount of only 10%." ( Regina v Sundar [2005] NSWCCA 93 at [17] per Tobias JA, citing Regina v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228 at [30]
39 The submission was that where the offender, as in the present case, entered a plea of guilty at the earliest reasonable opportunity, the significant utilitarian value was such that the appropriate range based on the Henry guideline was between three years and four months (40 months) and four years and two months (50 months). These figures were arrived at by removing the 10% discount from the range specified in Henry (supra) and instead applying a discount of 25%.
40 The submissions for the applicant acknowledged that the reference to the direct applicability of Henry (supra) by the sentencing judge indicated that he was aware of the need to adjust the range of four to five years' imprisonment. In that respect, reference was made to a passage in the remarks on sentence at 17 as follows:-
"I take into account, however, that the guideline applies to a late plea of guilty, and as I have already said, the offender pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity in the Local Court. That means there must therefore be an appropriate adjustment to the guideline."
41 Mr Lange contended that it was, accordingly, plain that the sentencing judge envisaged a sentence of imprisonment of between 40 and 50 months in respect of the second charge.
42 In consequence the submission was the sentencing judge must have increased the sentencing range by between 10 months and 20 months in considering the Form 1 matter and that this approach demonstrated error. This inferred increase in the sentence was arrived at by calculating the difference between the starting sentence (of between 40 and 50 months) and the term of imprisonment ultimately imposed in respect of Count 2 (that being five years or 60 months).
43 Accordingly the submission was:-
"9. At the very least, his Honour increased the sentence imposed upon by [sic] the applicant by 10 months, which was inappropriate where the offence was merely placed on a Form 1. See Attorney-General's Application under s.37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 (2002) 56 NSWLR 146, 162 at [66] per Spigelman CJ. (emphasis added):
'The effect of inclusion on a Form 1 is to give the offences so included a significantly lower salience in the sentencing process. There will be an obvious advantage, and hence a greater incentive to admit guilt, where the Form 1 procedure is employed.'"
44 However, it is also to be noted that the Chief Justice in Attorney-General's Application under s.37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (No 1 of 2002) (2002) 56 NSWLR 146, also observed:-
"The position, in my opinion, is that, although a Court is sentencing for a particular offence, it takes into account the matters for which guilt has been admitted, with a view to increasing the penalty that would otherwise be appropriate for the particular offence. The Court does so by giving greater weight to two elements which are always material in the sentencing process. The first is the need for personal deterrence, which the commission of the other offences will frequently indicate, ought to be given greater weight by reason of the course of conduct in which the accused has engaged . The second is the community's entitlement to extract retribution for serious offences when there are other offences for which no punishment has, in fact, been imposed. These elements are entitled to greater weight than they may otherwise be given when sentencing for the primary offence …" (emphasis added)
45 The Form 1 matter and the first and the second charges all occurred within a few days of one another. The Form 1 matters, as noted above, occurred on Saturday 17 February 2007 and the two armed robbery offences occurred some two days later, 19 February 2007. It is clear that these events all occurred as a course of conduct by the applicant. That is not a matter without significance in evaluating the first ground of appeal.
46 I consider that this is a case in which specific or personal deterrence was an issue of importance to the sentences imposed. The commission of the three offences by the applicant amounted to a course of conduct by the applicant and the sentencing judge was, accordingly, entitled, by reason of that conduct, to give greater weight to the question of personal deterrence than might otherwise have been the case.
47 Accordingly, I do not consider that it has been established that his Honour did give undue weight to the matter on the Form 1 as contended on behalf of the applicant. The objective seriousness of the offence in Count 2 was at a high level and when the circumstances of the Form 1 matter are taken into account, I do not consider that the sentence imposed in respect of that offence was, on the bases argued, manifestly excessive. The sentence was, in my opinion, within the sentencing range. Ground 1 should be rejected.