Ward v Westpac Banking Corporation Limited

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2024-11-05|Before: Mitchelmore JA, McHugh JA, Kunc J

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

JUDGMENT

THE COURT: This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of Kunc J in which his Honour struck out the applicants' defence to a cross-claim filed by the first respondent, Westpac Banking Corporation Limited (Westpac), without leave to replead: Ward v Westpac Banking Corporation Limited [2024] NSWSC 669. Having struck out the defence, his Honour dismissed a notice of motion the applicants had filed by which, relevantly, they sought to strike out the second respondent's defence to the cross-claim and appoint the second applicant, Peter Shah Mahommed, to represent the beneficiaries in relation to the cross-claim.

Background to the primary decision

The background to the application for leave to appeal may conveniently be addressed by reference to the reasons of the primary judge at [9]-[16]. In 2020, the applicants commenced proceedings against Westpac and the Registrar-General of New South Wales. On 31 May 2021, Ms Cox was joined pursuant to an amended statement of claim by which the applicants added claims against the estate of the late Mr Dixon.
In Ward (CA), Griffiths AJA (with whom Ward P and Adamson JA agreed) identified, in [13], a number of features of the amended statement of claim, which totalled 112 pages. Contrary to the applicants' written and oral submissions on the present application, Griffiths AJA did not there make any findings of fact in respect of what was pleaded. Rather, his Honour was seeking only to summarise aspects of the pleading, having earlier observed, at [10], that "the prolixity and opaqueness of large parts of the pleading partly underpinned the primary judge's description of the proceeding as 'oppressive'." It is convenient to reproduce Griffiths AJA's summary, which the primary judge in the present case adopted at [9]: "In summary terms, the following features of the amended statement of claim should be noted: (1) Mr Ward claims security over a property (Lovedale property) under an unregistered mortgage. (2) Mr Mahommed claims as a creditor under a guarantee in a Deed of Assignment dated 22 December 2014 pursuant to which Mr Dixon had allegedly undertaken to guarantee the payment of all moneys due, owing and payable by a company called Loire Consultants Pty Ltd. (3) Mr Mahommed also claims as the assignee of certain other rights of action identified in other documents. (4) Mr Mahommed also claims to have been appointed as the sole trustee of the Lovedale Ranch Unit Trust on 20 June 2018. Prior to that time, Loire was the trustee of the Lovedale Ranch Unit Trust. (5) Mr Mahommed contends, in relation to the latter claim, that an officer of Westpac fraudulently and dishonestly entered into a registered mortgage over the Lovedale property and a property at 49 Bruce Street, East Maitland (Maitland property), knowing at the time that both properties were owned under trusts held by (respectively) Loire as trustee of the Lovedale Ranch Unit Trust and Greenhills Securities Pty Limited as trustee of the Greenhills Finance Trust. (6) Mr Mahommed claims that, in relation to the Lovedale property, Mr Dixon obtained a Rocket Home Loan in about September 2010 and on 24 November 2010 executed a mortgage in favour of Westpac over the property for $1,160,000, ostensibly to complete a purchase of the Lovedale property for $1,800,000. At the same time, an allegedly fraudulent transfer of the property from Loire to Mr Dixon was executed. The alleged purpose was to enable Mr Dixon to settle the purchase. He refinanced the property for $680,000. (7) On 7 December 2010, Mr Dixon presented the forged title documents to Westpac in order to obtain the $1,160,000 loan. The bank manager at Westpac, and Mr Unicomb, a tax adviser, are said to have conspired to arrange for Mr Dixon to obtain the property. Mr Dixon did not pay the balance of the purchase price. (8) Westpac settled the advance to Mr Dixon and thereafter Mr Unicomb made payments to Westpac to conceal the alleged fraud. (9) Similar allegations are made in respect of the Maitland property owned by Mr Dixon. The plaintiffs contend that a loan of $195,000 was advanced directly to Mr Dixon in about July 2011 purportedly to purchase the Maitland property as an investment property. Mr Dixon is said to have executed a declaration of trust in favour of Greenhills as trustee of the Greenhills Finance Trust, being a trust put in place as a discretionary family trust for Mr Mohammed and his family. It is alleged that the Westpac loans manager and loan broker knew that Mr Dixon only held the property as trustee. (10) The causes of action relied on include fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and breaches of both the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) and the National Consumer Credit Code."
On 2 March 2021, Westpac filed a cross claim that, relevantly, sought judgment for possession of the properties. Griffiths AJA made the following observations about the cross-claim in Ward (CA) at [14]: "Westpac filed a cross-claim against Ms Cox in her capacity as administratrix of Mr Dixon's estate. Relevantly: (1) Westpac seeks judgment for possession of the Lovedale property, an order that Ms Cox make restitution to Westpac in the amount of $1,160,000 and other orders. (2) Westpac claims that Mr Dixon entered into a loan agreement for that amount secured by a mortgage over the Lovedale property. It contends that on 15 April 2013 Westpac issued a notice of default, and that Mr Dixon made no payment. A demand was served in March 2015 for the full amount owing under the loan agreement, being $1,269,824, which has never been paid. (3) Ms Cox admitted the allegations made by Westpac as outlined above, with the result that she concedes that possession should be given to Westpac. The applicants complain that this has thwarted their claims."
On 31 May 2021, Darke J made orders by consent including that the applicants file the amended statement of claim and be joined as cross-defendants to the cross-claim. The applicants were also ordered to file their defence to the cross-claim by 31 May 2021, a form of which had been circulated in draft to Westpac's solicitors on 19 May 2021. The applicants ultimately filed that defence on 20 September 2021. As Senior Counsel for Westpac submitted orally in this Court, by reference to particular paragraphs of the amended statement of claim and the defence to the cross-claim, the applicants reagitated in the latter the positive claims they advanced in the former. The primary judge noted that the defence to the cross-claim incorporated by reference many paragraphs of the amended statement of claim.
On 4 April 2022, pursuant to the Court's inherent jurisdiction, Lindsay J ordered that by 4 August 2022 the applicants jointly provide security for Westpac's costs in the sum of $150,000 and Ms Cox's costs in the sum of $125,000; and stayed the proceedings until such time as the security was provided. The deadline for providing the security was extended twice, first to 2 December 2022 and then to 17 February 2023. As noted above the appeal from the security for costs order was unsuccessful.
On 16 June 2023, Ms Cox filed a notice of motion, which was amended on two occasions. The relief sought in her further amended notice of motion, dated 1 August 2023, relevantly included that the amended statement of claim be dismissed and the applicants' defence to the cross-claim be struck out. According to the primary judge, Westpac also filed a notice of motion to dismiss the amended statement of claim for want of provision of security: at [20].
On 18 August 2023, the respondents' notices of motion, together with the applicants' notice of motion referred to in [1] above, came before the primary judge for directions. According to his Honour, on that occasion the solicitor for the applicants "candidly accepted that he could not articulate any basis for opposing the dismissal of the [amended statement of claim]": at [20]. The orders his Honour made on that occasion thus included an order dismissing the amended statement of claim, noting that the applicants had failed to give the security for costs ordered on 4 April 2022. His Honour also listed the balance of the Ms Cox's further amended notice of motion, and the applicants' notice of motion, for hearing on 7 September 2023.
In the course of the hearing of the motions, the applicants' solicitor submitted that his clients could defend the cross-claim without relying on the positive allegations in the (dismissed) amended statement of claim. The parties accepted that the applicants should be given an opportunity to propound such amendments in draft. The applicants provided a further version of the defence to the cross-claim (the draft defence) as an attachment to written submissions dated 9 November 2023. As is apparent from a comparison of the applicants' filed defence and the draft defence, for the greater part the amendments involved striking through most (albeit not all) references to the amended statement of claim. The effect of removing the cross-references was to leave conclusory assertions apparently unsupported by allegations of material fact. Additional positive claims were also advanced, including a claim by Mr Mahommed for adverse possession of the Maitland property.
Following receipt of the draft defence, the parties agreed that the Court could determine the motions with further written submissions, including from Westpac (which had been excused from the further hearing of the motions upon dismissal of the amended statement of claim but had an interest in some of the amendments proposed in the draft defence): at [22].

Primary judgment

The primary judge approached the abuse of process argument on the basis that the applicants' case as pleaded in the amended statement of claim, "while oppressive, presented at least an arguable case" (at [10]), and expressly adopted the same approach in relation to the defence to the cross-claim: at [26]. Accordingly, it was not necessary to make further reference to what his Honour described as "the extensive primary evidence relied on by Mr Smits going to demonstrate what he said was the strength of his clients' case" (at [10]), although his Honour summarised the "lengthy submissions" put by the applicants' representative in [27] of the reasons.
The primary judge's ultimate conclusion on Ms Cox's application to strike out the applicants' defence to the cross-claim was as follows (at [46]): "For the reasons which follow, the Court has concluded that for the plaintiffs to maintain their defence to the [cross-claim] or to propound the draft defence would be an abuse of process insofar as it involves an assertion of an in rem claim to the properties superior to that of Westpac, including a claim to possession (including, presumably if it came to it, to the proceeds of sale of the properties), or otherwise seeks to defeat Westpac's indefeasible position as registered mortgagee of the properties with a right to a money judgment and the proceeds of sale. The abuse is that to permit those claims would be to circumvent the Court's process as given effect by both the making of the order for security for costs in respect of the [amended statement of claim] and its subsequent dismissal for failure to provide the security."
His Honour characterised the making of the security for costs order, based on an assessment that the amended statement of claim was oppressive, and the subsequent striking out of the amended statement of claim, as representing a determination by the Court that the respondents "should not be vexed by the applicants' allegations without the protection of security for costs". Permitting the defence to the cross-claim would permit the oppression that the security for costs order had sought to ameliorate, as well as defeating the public interest in the timely and efficient administration of justice "by permitting the ventilation of allegations foreclosed to the plaintiffs by the dismissal of the [amended statement of claim] for failure to provide security": at [48]. On the assumption that the applicants could properly advance their central allegations of entitlement to the two properties against Westpac's otherwise indefeasible rights in a defence to Westpac's cross-claim (as opposed to a statement of claim), his Honour considered that to do so would "permit by the back door what has been forbidden through the front door": at [49].
His Honour had earlier expressed the view that the applicants could not advance their claims to priority over Westpac's registered mortgages by way of defence to the amended cross-claim, without more. Read as a whole and as a matter of substance, the draft defence to the cross-claim involved claims of debt, fraud, trust and possession of land. His Honour considered that such claims would require relief including for possession and declarations of right, and yet were presented in the pleading at a level of assertion: at [40]. His Honour stated at [41]: "If what [the applicants] assert in the draft defence is correct, then they are entitled to possession of the properties (among other things). It would be inconceivable as a matter of law and practice for that conclusion to be reached without relief to give effect to that conclusion being sought and granted. Otherwise the true ownership of the properties would be left unresolved and, importantly, the register left in a state where it did not reflect the correct position as determined by the Court after a contested hearing."
Importantly for the present application, his Honour also made it clear that his conclusion as to abuse of process did not depend on this analysis: at [45]. What was critical to his Honour's conclusion as to abuse of process was that the overall burden of the applicant's defence and (draft defence) was "to seek to make out an in rem claim to the properties superior to that of Westpac, including a claim to possession…or otherwise to defeat Westpac's indefeasible position as registered mortgagee of the properties with a right to a money judgment and the proceeds of sale": at [50]. This had been the subject of the amended statement of claim, which the applicants had accepted was necessarily dismissed given their non-payment of the security.
In the circumstances, his Honour considered that it was not practicable or consistent with the Court's conclusions, or the overriding purpose under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), to pick through the defence or the draft defence to see what may survive as properly defensive: at [50]. The only practical course, in his Honour's opinion, was to strike out the entire defence: at [51]. His Honour confirmed that he would not grant leave to replead by filing the draft defence, or allow any further opportunity in that regard: at [51].

The application for leave to appeal

Leave applications in this Court attract a general obligation on the applicant to establish that there is an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable: PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48 at [6], citing Jaycar Pty Limited v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284 at [46]; Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164 ("Be Financial") at [32]-[38]; The Age Company Ltd v Liu (2013) 82 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCA 26 at [13]; Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 597; [2017] NSWCA 206 at [28]. As Kirk and McHugh JJA stated recently in Mohareb v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWCA 235 at [26], [31], a range of considerations may be relevant, including the matters addressed in ss 56-58 of the Civil Procedure Act, emphasising in that context the reasons of Basten JA in Be Financial at [35]-[37].
Central to the applicants' submissions in support of leave to appeal was the contention that dismissing their defence to the cross-claim without leave to replead "should not have been allowed to prevail over the injustice of shutting the applicants out from raising an arguable defence". The applicants submitted that the decision of the primary judge created substantial injustice by imposing "effectively punitive sanctions" which extended beyond the usual or intended effects of an order for security for costs. The preclusion of a right to defend the cross-claim resulted, in their submission, in the involuntary alienation and dispossession of proprietary or beneficial interests in property, which was not an intended incident or byproduct of the security for costs orders.
The focus of the applicants' summary of argument and oral submissions was the merits of the claims they had made in the amended statement of claim and in the defence to the cross-claim, which were the subject of proposed grounds 7 and 8 of the draft notice of appeal. The applicants submitted that the case was really concerned with the indefeasibility of the registered mortgages that Westpac held over the two properties in circumstances where Mr Mahommed was the beneficial owner of the two properties and the first applicant, Roger Ward, held a security interest over one of the properties. They submitted that the primary judge should have made findings about the circumstances in which Mr Dixon came to be the registered proprietor of the properties and Westpac came to hold mortgages over them. They submitted that instead, his Honour had erroneously adopted findings from the earlier decision (of the Court of Appeal). The applicants further submitted that both applicants would suffer "extreme injustice" if they did not have their day in court to advance these claims by way of defence of the cross-claim.
Contrary to the applicants' preoccupation with the merits of those claims, the primary judge assumed they were arguable without needing to evaluate them. What was dispositive to his Honour's decision was that claims of that same kind were the subject of the amended statement of claim, the applicants' prosecution of which was subject to an order for security for costs which they failed to satisfy, an appeal from that order having been dismissed. As both respondents submitted orally, the applicants' preoccupation with their claims for priority of their interests in the properties over Westpac's registered mortgages served only to highlight the correctness of the primary judge's conclusion that it would be oppressive to the respondents, and defeat the public interest in the timely and efficient administration of justice, to permit the positive allegations in the dismissed amended statement of claim to be agitated by way of defence to the cross-claim.
Critically, as Westpac pointed out, the applicants did not challenge the correctness of that key conclusion, on the assumption that correctness is the standard of appellate review in respect of the finding of abuse of process: GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32; 414 ALR 635 at [16]-[17]. Proposed ground 3 in the draft notice of appeal asserted that the primary judge erred in reaching that conclusion. However, no basis was articulated for that error, and the submissions on that ground, and proposed ground 2, were directed to the primary judge's analysis of whether it was open to the applicants to raise matters of this nature by way of a defence.
The applicants submitted in that respect that the primary judge failed to consider that they had the same rights in respect of their defence to the cross-claim as they would have in separate proceedings constituted by the cross-claim, relying on s 22(3) of the Civil Procedure Act. The applicants submitted that their defence to the cross-claim satisfied most pleading requirements and the test of an arguable or reasonable defence and was sufficient to constitute a defence. The primary judge erred, they submitted, in attempting to limit material facts and issues required to be stated in the defence to the cross-claim. The difficulty with these arguments for the purposes of leave to appeal is that as noted above, the primary judge made it clear that his Honour's conclusion as to abuse of process did not rest on that analysis.
The applicants also did not articulate with precision any error in the exercise of the primary judge's discretion to refuse them leave to replead, which would need to satisfy the criteria in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5; [1936] HCA 40. The applicants referred to the powers of the Court under s 64 of the Civil Procedure Act, which permits repleading. As Westpac submitted, that provision confers a discretion on the Court, to be exercised in accordance with the dictates of justice, including s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act. As Westpac further submitted, it is of significance in this context that the primary judge gave the applicants an opportunity to replead the defence to the cross-claim without relying on the positive claims pleaded in the amended statement of claim, which they took up albeit in a manner that did not address the critical concern (see [14] above). As the primary judge said at [44], the draft defence which the applicants put forward would have been liable to be struck out as asserting conclusions without material facts. That the primary judge gave the applicants this opportunity answers the argument the applicants advanced on this application, that his Honour had a broad power to grant leave to amend and could have permitted amendment of their defence subject to conditions.
The applicants also submitted that as a matter of substance, the primary judge's decision involved the revocation of the consent orders that Darke J made on 31 May 2021, pursuant to which they were permitted to file the defence to the cross-claim. In their summary of argument, the applicants submitted that his Honour's decision to strike out their defence to the cross-claim wrongly permitted the respondents to depart from those consent orders, going so far as to submit that they were bound by what was described as an election made in the proceedings. The orders of Darke J, even if by consent, were concerned with the filing of pleadings. They did not preclude the respondents from taking other procedural steps to protect their interests, in particular making applications for security for costs, which they respectively filed on 29 June 2021 (Ms Cox) and 19 October 2021 (Westpac). It was the dismissal of the applicants' statement of claim, consequential upon their failure to provide the ordered security, that gave rise to the abuse of process that the primary judge ultimately found. No arguable error arises in this respect.
Proposed grounds 4, 5 and 6 of the draft notice of appeal raised issues that arose on the applicants' notice of motion, which the primary judge did not deal with as it was superseded by his Honour's striking out of the applicants' defence to the cross-claim. There was no error in taking that approach in light of the conclusions his Honour reached.
The applicants also contended that the primary judge should have found that the orders for security for costs and the dismissal of the amended statement of claim were either liable to be set aside or should not have constrained the defence to the cross-claim. As the Court noted at the outset of these reasons, the applicants did not seek an extension of time to challenge the dismissal of the amended statement of claim, against which they did not seek to be heard at the time it was made.
Finally, the Court notes that the applicants submitted that the primary judge erred in failing to take into account the effects of a complaint that Mr Mahommed had lodged against Westpac with the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA), in circumstances where the rules of AFCA precluded Westpac from taking any action in respect of the loan securities. No proposed ground of appeal was directed to this complaint, the validity of which Westpac took issue with in its response. In any event, the existence of a complaint made to AFCA, whether valid or not, did not relevantly bear upon the applications that the primary judge was determining.

Conclusion

The Court acknowledges that the primary judge's decision has effectively brought the proceedings to an end. However, the applicants have not identified a clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable such as would warrant a grant of leave to appeal. The summons should be dismissed. It follows that the stay that the primary judge granted, referred to in [4] above, should be discharged.
The respondents sought costs in the event that the Court refused leave to appeal. The applicants submitted that no order for costs should be made, on the basis that their appeal had reasonable prospects of success, and the challenge to the right to maintain the defence to the cross-claim arose three years after consent orders were made and "in the context of preclusions created by interlocutory orders that were obtained irregularly". The first reason does not displace the ordinary rule, and there is no substance in the second reason. The applicants will be ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 12 November 2024

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