8 The provisions of the Act that govern the present application are as follows:
5 (2) Where:
(a) a proceeding (in this subsection referred to as the relevant proceeding ) is pending in the Supreme Court (in this subsection referred to as the first court ), and
(b) it appears to the first court that:
…
(iii) it is otherwise in the interests of justice that the relevant proceeding be determined by the Supreme Court of another State or of a Territory,
the first court shall transfer the relevant proceeding to that other Supreme Court.
9 Section 8 of the Act provides the mechanism for removal of proceedings into this Court. Relevantly it provides:
8(1) Where:
(a) a proceeding (in this subsection referred to as the relevant proceeding ) is pending in:
…
(ii) a tribunal established by or under an Act, and
(b) it appears to the Supreme Court that:
…
(ii) an order should be made under this subsection in relation to the relevant proceeding so that consideration can be given to whether the relevant proceeding should be transferred to another court,
the Supreme Court may, on the application of a party to the relevant proceeding or of its own motion, make an order removing the relevant proceeding to the Supreme Court.
10 The High Court considered the principles to be applied in dealing with an application such as the present in BHP Billiton Limited v Schultz [2004] HCA 61; 221 CLR 400. In their joint reasons Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ at 421 [14] said this:
In the context of the Cross-vesting Act, one is not concerned with the problem of a court, with a prima facie duty to exercise a jurisdiction that has been regularly invoked, asking whether it is justified in refusing to perform that duty. Rather, the court is required by statute that cases are heard in the forum dictated by the interests of justice. An application for transfer under s 5 of the Cross-vesting Act is brought upon the hypotheses that the jurisdiction of the court to which the application is made has been regularly invoked. If it appears to that court that it is in the interests of justice that the proceedings be determined by another designated court, then the first court "shall transfer" the proceedings to that other court. There is a statutory requirement to exercise the power of transfer whenever it appears that it is in the interests of justice that it should be exercised. It is not necessary that it should appear that the first court is a "clearly inappropriate" forum. It is both necessary and sufficient that, in the interests of justice, the second court is more appropriate.
11 ARPD is classified as a divisible disease; each exposure to asbestos fibre constitutes a separate insult. Mr Gilchrist's condition is asserted to be the result of the accumulation of some hundreds or thousands of tortious exposures. The assessment of his damages will require that liability be apportioned between the defendants, taking into account both the length and the intensity of the exposure.