The coverage clause
82 Counsel for QBE raised two issues in respect of the coverage clause in the broadform liability policy. The first was whether there had been an "Occurrence", as defined that had caused the loss claimed. The second issue was whether the loss claimed by Siegwerk against Nuplex was entirely economic loss, and not compensation for "Property Damage" as defined.
83 Authorities dealing with insurance policies containing the same or similar wording make it clear that the event constituting the occurrence is something different from the suffering of the property damage to which the coverage clause attaches. The occurrence is the mishap that causes the damage. See Distillers Company Bio-Chemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974) 130 CLR 1 at 18-19 per Stephen J, GIO General Ltd v Newcastle City Council (1996) 38 NSWLR 558 at 567 per Kirby P (with whom Powell JA agreed), Windsurf Pty Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd [1999] QCA 360 at [7]-[13] per de Jersey CJ (with whom White and Muir JJ agreed) and Selected Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 70 at [20], upheld by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Selected Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 286 at [16] per Fraser JA (with whom Holmes JA and White J agreed) (the issue was not dealt with by the High Court in Selected Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 37). It is also clear that, in a case in which there is a supply of a product, the relevant occurrence is not that supply itself. For instance, in Windsurf, the relevant occurrence was not the negligent laying of carpet on stairs, it was the subsequent shifting of that carpet, which caused a person walking on it to fall and suffer injury.
84 In the present case, the property damage from which the loss was claimed to follow was the corrosion of cans, resulting from the contents coming into contact with the metal of the can ends, with the consequent corrosion of the cans and deterioration of the products within them. Between Nuplex supplying to Siegwerk resin containing Epikote 1009 and the corrosion of cans there lay any number of events, each of which could amount to a relevant "Occurrence", for the purposes of the coverage clause of the broadform liability policy. They included Siegwerk mixing that resin with other ingredients to make lacquer, Siegwerk supplying that lacquer to Visy, Visy applying that lacquer to can ends, Visy scoring the can ends to which the lacquer had been applied, Visy supplying the can ends with cans to fish canners, and fish canners using those can ends to seal cans in which they had placed their fish products. Each of these events lies along a chain of causation, alleged to lead from the supply by Nuplex of resin containing Epikote 1009 to the corrosion of some cans of fish. If Siegwerk's claim against Nuplex had been successful, it would have been because of that chain of causation and the events that were part of it. It follows that any of those events can constitute an "Occurrence" as defined in cl 1.11 of the policy. Of course, each of those events was itself more than one event. Siegwerk used resin from a number of different batches containing Epikote 1009 to make lacquer. It sold a number of different batches of lacquer to Visy. Visy applied those different batches of lacquer to many different can ends, which it then scored and supplied to the fish canners. The fish canners filled a number of different cans with fish and sealed them, using the can ends. In each case, however, these events amounted to "continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions", within the meaning of the second sentence of cl 1.11, so they are to be construed as a single occurrence.
85 It is of no consequence that many of these events in the chain of causation did, or might have, fallen outside the period of insurance covered by the broadform liability policy (which began on 1 April 2004). It is not the occurrence that must happen within that period, in order to give rise to liability under the policy. By cl 2.1, it is the property damage that must first happen during that period. By reason of the chain of causation, it is also apparent that whatever is chosen as the relevant occurrence was in connection with "Your Business", ie the business of Nuplex. The connection is supplied by the allegation that it was Nuplex's supply of resin with the substituted Epikote 1009 that began the chain of causation.
86 Counsel for QBE also contended that there had been no "Property Damage", but only pure economic loss resulting from the recall and withdrawal from sale of large numbers of cans of fish. Clearly, this argument cannot be accepted. The definition of "Property Damage" in cl 1.17 of the policy is in two parts. The first refers to physical damage to tangible property. The corrosion of some cans containing fish, and the consequent deterioration of the contents of those cans clearly amount to physical damage to tangible property. The second part of the definition concerns loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically damaged, lost or destroyed, where the loss of use is caused by physical damage to other tangible property. The undamaged cans of fish recalled and withdrawn from sale (the use of which was thereby lost) were caused to be recalled and withdrawn from sale by the physical damage to the cans that were damaged and their contents. The claim by Siegwerk against Nuplex is therefore one "in respect of" property damage, within the meaning of cl 2.1 of the policy, whichever of the two limbs of the definition of "Property Damage" is applied. There was physical damage to some property, being the damage to cans and their contents. There was loss of use of other property, consequent upon that physical damage. In either case, any liability Nuplex might have incurred to pay compensation to Siegwerk, if the claim against Nuplex had succeeded, would have been a liability "in respect of…Property Damage" within clause 2.1 of the policy. Either the whole claim was "in respect of", ie causally related to the physical damage, or the claim was partly in respect of loss of use of undamaged property consequent upon damage to other property.
87 The property damage unquestionably first occurred during the period of insurance. It follows that, if Siegwerk had succeeded on its cross-claim against Nuplex, QBE would have been liable (subject to its right to deduct $500,000) to indemnify Nuplex for the amount claimed by Siegwerk and all costs awarded against Nuplex. In those circumstances, cl 2.2.1 of the policy required QBE to defend the proceeding in Nuplex's name and on Nuplex's behalf. Subject to the application of any of the exclusion clauses upon which QBE relied, QBE was liable to defend Siegwerk's claim against Nuplex, even though that claim was unsuccessful.
88 Although, in its defence to Nuplex's cross-claim, QBE pleaded reliance on the contractual liability exception in cl 3.5 of the policy, at the trial QBE conceded that the proviso to that clause precluded the application of the exclusion. Either any liability of Nuplex to Siegwerk would have been implied by law, within cl 3.5.1 of the policy, or the liability would have been assumed by Nuplex under a warranty of fitness or quality as regards Nuplex's product.
89 The loss of use exclusion in cl 3.13 of the policy requires closer examination. There is no question that the claim made by Visy against Siegwerk was predominantly (although not entirely) a claim in respect of loss of use of tangible property which had not been physically damaged, lost or destroyed. By far the largest element of Visy's claim was in respect of amounts it had paid to PLTP and Simplot in respect of "loss of stock on hand". The figures are shown in [26] above. Because the settlement between Visy and Siegwerk was for a lump sum, there has been no specification of the form or forms of loss for which Siegwerk was compensating Visy. The total of the amounts claimed by Visy other than "loss of stock on hand" would be more than enough to cover the entire sum of $2,250,000 paid by Siegwerk to Visy in settlement of the claim, which is the amount of the claim against Nuplex. This fact places QBE in some difficulty when it attempts to bring the claim within the opening words of the exclusion in cl 3.13.
90 Even if it can be assumed that the claim against Nuplex is a claim in respect of loss of use of tangible property not itself damaged, lost or destroyed, the claim would not fall within cl 3.13.1. It was not a claim that resulted from any delay in or lack of performance by Nuplex of any agreement. There is no issue at all of delay. There was performance of the toll manufacturing agreement between Nuplex and Siegwerk, in the sense that there was a supply of epoxy-phenolic resin each time an order for a further batch was placed. In respect of some batches, the performance involved the substitution of one epoxy resin for another, so that the batch did not conform to the agreed specifications, but this was not a lack of performance.
91 Any loss of use of tangible property which had not been physically damaged, lost or destroyed did result from the failure of Nuplex's products to meet the level of performance, quality fitness or durability expressed or implied, warranted or represented by Nuplex, within the meaning of cl 3.13.2 of the policy. It is therefore necessary to look at the proviso to the exclusion. The question is whether the loss of use of other tangible property resulted from "the sudden and accidental physical damage" of Nuplex's resin, after it had been put to use by any person or organisation other than Nuplex. Plainly, the resin had been put to use by Siegwerk, by being mixed with other ingredients to make a lacquer. It had also been put to use by Visy, which applied two coats of the lacquer to can ends, cured each coat, and then subjected the can ends to the scoring process. Nuplex's resin was also put to use by the fish canners to whom Visy supplied the can ends, when they used those can ends to seal the cans after they had been filled with fish and other products. The question is whether, as the claim has been put, there was "sudden and accidental physical damage" to the resin. The claim is based on the proposition that the lower molecular weight resulting from the substitution of epoxy resin in Nuplex's epoxy-phenolic resin gave rise to a lacquer which had less flexibility than that required, and was therefore less able to withstand the rigors of the scoring process carried out by Visy. It was the damage to the lacquer, which included Nuplex's product, that caused the contents of some cans to come into contact with the metal of the cans. The question is whether that damage can properly be described as "sudden and accidental".
92 It is clear that these words are intended to have their ordinary meanings when used in the policy. They are not technical terms. The Macquarie Dictionary provides two alternative meanings of the word "sudden", being "happening, coming, made, or done quickly, without warning or unexpectedly" or "sharp; abrupt". In construing the meaning of the word "sudden" in an insurance policy in Sun Alliance & London Insurance Group v North West Iron Co Ltd (1974) 2 NSWLR 625 at 631-633, Sheppard J adopted the "unforeseen and unexpected" meaning of the word. The Macquarie Dictionary defines "accidental" as "happening by chance or accident, or unexpectedly". Again, in an insurance context, the High Court in Australian Casualty Co Ltd v Federico (1986) 160 CLR 513 adopted the meaning of "accident" involving its unintended and unforeseen elements. At 527, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ said:
As a matter of ordinary language in this country, an "accident" (from the Latin accidens) means very much what the etymologist would expect. It is something which happens without intention or design. When used with reference to something which causes injury, it means an unexpected and unintended mishap.
93 The focus on the unexpected element of both "sudden" and "accidental" means that there is considerable overlap between the two words. It is not surprising in a document like an insurance policy to find an element of tautology in expressions chosen. "[S]udden and accidental" is a composite phrase, and must be interpreted as such. In the present case, the damage to Nuplex's resin, after it had been used by others, was undoubtedly sudden and accidental. It was unintended and unexpected. As the claim is put, it was the sudden and accidental physical damage to the resin, as a component of the lacquer, that caused the loss of use of the tangible property being the undamaged cans that were recalled and withdrawn from sale. The claim therefore falls within the proviso in cl 3.13.2 of the policy, and consequently is not excluded by cl 3.13.
94 Counsel for QBE argued that the product recall exclusion in cl 3.17 of the policy operated to exclude the whole of the claim, because the vast majority of the cans of fish of which there was a loss of use had been withdrawn from the market because of a suspected defect. In my view, this argument is based on a false assumption. Clause 3.17 does not exclude claims for loss of use of Nuplex's products or any property of which they form a part. The clause excludes claims "arising out of or resulting from any loss, cost or expense incurred by [Nuplex] for the loss of use" etc of the products. The exclusion is directed to the expenses of the process of withdrawal from the market or from use. Thus, a claim for loss, cost or expense of acquiring a temporary substitute for a product, during a period of loss of use would be excluded. Likewise, it is the loss, cost or expense involved in withdrawing from the market, recalling, inspecting, repairing, replacing, adjusting, removing or disposing of property that is covered, not the loss of the value of the property itself. Reading the exclusion in cl 3.17 in this way makes sense of the clause itself, as the phrase "loss of use" is used in conjunction with the word "withdrawal" and the other words that follow, indicating that the target of the exclusion is not the loss of use of the property itself, but the cost and expense associated with the loss of use by reason of withdrawal from the market or from use of the item in question. Further, reading the clause in this way makes it consistent with cl 2.1 of the policy and the definition of "Property Damage", particularly that part of it in cl 1.17.2. To regard cl 3.17 as excluding any claim for loss of use of products withdrawn from the market because of a suspected defect, suspected because of physical damage to other property, would amount to a substantial negation of the intention of the policy.
95 In any event, the attempt to rely on cl 3.17 encounters the same difficulty as beset QBE in relation to the attempt to rely on cl 3.13 in relation to loss of use. Parts of Visy's original claim related to loss of stock. Other parts could be said to fall within cl 3.17, particularly items like "labour costs in replacing stock", "pallet hire costs wasted", "costs of disposal of condemned stock", "finance costs on condemned stock" and "costs of recalling stock". Because of the nature of the settlement between Visy and Siegwerk, QBE cannot identify to which items the sum claimed by Siegwerk against Nuplex relates. QBE cannot therefore bring the claim within the exclusion in cl 3.17. It cannot apply the principle derived from Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd v Employers Liability Assurance Corporation Ltd [1974] 1 QB 57. That principle relates to insurance claims in which the relevant insurance policy excludes indemnity in respect of loss from a particular cause. If there are two causes, one of which falls within the exclusion and the other outside it, the principle is that the exclusion applies. In the present case, Siegwerk's claim is brought in respect of a single cause and that cause is not the subject of the exclusion in cl 3.17. The original claim by Visy involved more than one head of damage. The principle in Wayne Tank does not apply to exclude an entire claim because it involves more than one head of damage, some falling within and some falling outside an exclusion clause in the relevant insurance policy. The undifferentiated nature of the settlement sum claimed by Siegwerk deprives QBE of the opportunity of arguing that the claim falls within the exclusion in cl 3.17.
96 The final exclusion relied on is found in Endorsement 3 to the policy. It is a difficult provision to construe. There is no doubt that the claim in the present case is in respect of the alleged failure of Nuplex's products to perform the function or serve the purpose intended by Nuplex. The intended function or purpose of Nuplex's resin was to form part of a lacquer that would prevent the contents of the cans coming into contact with the metal of the can ends. The claim is that the lacquer containing the resin failed to perform this function. The difficulty is in construing the proviso to Endorsement 3, that the exclusion does not apply to property damage resulting from "the Active Malfunctioning" of the products. The phrase "Active Malfunctioning" would be difficult to construe by itself. It is made even more difficult by the definition of that phrase as meaning "the failure to function in its normal manner (for which it was designed) and such failure was active." The ordinary meaning of "failure" connotes a passive event. The Macquarie Dictionary refers to "proving unsuccessful", "lack of success", "non-performance of something due or required", "running short", or "insufficiency". To couple the word "failure" with the word "active" invites a question as to the intended meaning of the word "active". Of the collection of meanings of "active" in the Macquarie Dictionary, the only one that appears to give sense to the notion of an active failure is "causing change; capable of exerting influence". Thus, a failure that brings about change appears to be regarded as an active failure, and therefore as "Active Malfunctioning".
97 Applying that meaning to the facts of the present case, it is clear that Siegwerk's claim depends upon the allegation that Nuplex's resin failed to function in the normal manner, for which it was designed, and that, in doing so, it brought about change in the form of corrosion of the cans. It follows that the proviso to Endorsement 3 of the policy prevents the exclusion in that endorsement from applying.
98 For the foregoing reasons, Siegwerk's claim against Nuplex falls within the coverage clause of Nuplex's broadform liability policy with QBE and is not excluded from that coverage by any of the exclusions on which QBE relied. Even though Siegwerk's claim has failed, cl 2.2 of the policy required QBE to defend in Nuplex's name the proceeding. QBE is obliged to bear the costs of that defence.