5.1 The law of inventive step
74 Section 7(2) of the Patents Act provides:
For the purposes of this Act, an invention is to be taken to involve an inventive step when compared with the prior art base unless the invention would have been obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art in the light of the common general knowledge as it existed (whether in or out of the patent area) before the priority date of the relevant claim, whether that knowledge is considered separately or together with the information mentioned in subsection (3).
75 The 'common general knowledge' is information that forms the background knowledge and experience of, and which is available to, all in the trade, when considering the making of new products or the making of improvements in old products, and it must be treated as being used by an individual as a general body of knowledge: Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd [1980] HCA 9; 144 CLR 253 at 292 (Aickin J).
76 The text of s 7(2) in effect deems that an invention claimed contains an inventive step, unless the party asserting its absence establishes that it does not contain such a step: AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 30; 257 CLR 356 at [18] (French CJ). Whether or not a claim lacks an inventive step involves a rich factual enquiry. At its heart lies a qualitative assessment of whether there is sufficient invention in a combination, or a thing claimed, to arrive at the conclusion that it is obvious: Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] HCA 21; 235 CLR 173 at [124] and [126]. The question of determining whether a patent involves an inventive step is one of degree, and is often by no means easy, because ingenuity is relative, depending as it does on relevant states of common general knowledge. This difficulty is complicated by the need to consider, as here, s 7(3) information (to which I refer below), as well as the common general knowledge: Lockwood at [51].
77 In AstraZeneca, French CJ noted (at [15]) that relevant content was given to the term 'obvious' by Aickin J in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 12; 148 CLR 262 at 286:
The test is whether the hypothetical addressee faced with the same problem would have taken as a matter of routine whatever steps might have led from the prior art to the invention, whether they be the steps of the inventor or not.
78 French CJ went on to explain (at [15], citations omitted and square brackets in the original):
The idea of steps taken "as a matter of routine" did not, as was pointed out in AB Hässle, include "a course of action which was complex and detailed, as well as laborious, with a good deal of trial and error, with dead ends and the retracing of steps". The question posed in AB Hässle was whether, in relation to a particular patent, putative experiments, leading from the relevant prior art base to the invention as claimed, are part of the inventive step claimed or are "of a routine character" to be tried "as a matter of course". That way of approaching the matter was said to have an affinity with the question posed by Graham J in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v Biorex Laboratories Ltd. The question, stripped of references specific to the case before Graham J, can be framed as follows:
"Would the notional research group at the relevant date, in all the circumstances, which include a knowledge of all the relevant prior art and of the facts of the nature and success of [the existing compound], directly be led as a matter of course to try [the claimed inventive step] in the expectation that it might well produce a useful alternative to or better drug than [the existing compound]?"
That question does not import, as a criterion of obviousness, that the inventive step claimed would be perceived by the hypothetical addressee as "worth a try" or "obvious to try". As was said in AB Hässle, the adoption of a criterion of validity expressed in those terms begs the question presented by the statute.
79 The approach proposed by Graham J in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v Biorex Laboratories Ltd [1970] RPC 157 to which French CJ refers is often referred to as the 'modified Cripps question'. As the Full Court noted in Generic Health Pty Ltd v Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft [2014] FCAFC 73; 222 FCR 336 (Besanko, Middleton and Nicholas JJ) at [70] and [71], it not a question of universal application in the context of determining whether or not there is a lack of inventive step. That enquiry may be considered by reference to whether there was 'some difficulty overcome, some barrier crossed' or whether what is claimed is 'beyond the skill of the calling': Lockwood at [52], citing RD Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd [1989] FCA 57; 25 FCR 565 at 574 (Lockhart J). It has often said that a 'scintilla of invention' can sustain a valid invention, although this proposition is somewhat circular, because the requirement of the qualitative assessment remains that the scintilla so identified must be inventive. In any event, it is to be noted that the component of inventiveness may be but a spark.
80 As noted above at [25], there is no dispute that the person whose knowledge and approach is relevant for the consideration of inventive step in the present case is a team comprised of a person who has a practical interest in and knowledge of parking practices, equipment and technology, and an electrical or electronics engineer familiar with sensing devices, radio frequency communications and the communication of data. However, it is recognised that the question of whether or not an invention lacks an inventive step is for the Court to determine: AstraZeneca at [43]. In this regard the notional person skilled in the art is not an avatar for expert witnesses whose testimony is accepted by the Court. It is a tool of analysis 'which guides the Court in determining, by reference to expert and other evidence, whether an invention as claimed does not involve an inventive step': AstraZeneca at [23].
81 Section 7(3) of the Patents Act provides:
The information for the purposes of subsection (2) is:
(a) any single piece of prior art information; or
(b) a combination of any 2 or more pieces of prior art information that the skilled person mentioned in subsection (2) could, before the priority date of the relevant claim, be reasonably expected to have combined.
82 The 'prior art base' is defined in Schedule 1, relevantly as follows:
"prior art base" means:
(a) in relation to deciding whether an invention does or does not involve an inventive step or an innovative step:
(i) information in a document that is publicly available, whether in or out of the patent area; and
(ii) information made publicly available through doing an act, whether in or out of the patent area.
83 The 'prior art information' is relevantly defined in Schedule 1 as follows:
(b) for the purposes of subsection 7(3) - information that is part of the prior art base in relation to deciding whether an invention does or does not involve an inventive step
84 As a matter of history, under the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) (now repealed), the question of whether or not an invention was obvious was determined having regard only to the common general knowledge. Documents not part of the common general knowledge were excluded from consideration: Minnesota Mining at 287 - 292. The enactment of subsections 7(2) and (3) in the present Patents Act opened the door for additional information to be considered. Several amendments have been made to these subsections since the Patents Act came into force. Only the current version and its immediate predecessor warrant attention at present.
85 Section 7(3)(a) enables any publicly available single item of prior art information to be added to the common general knowledge for the purpose of considering the application of s 7(2). Section 7(3)(b) facilitates the addition of a combination of two or more pieces of prior art information to supplement the common general knowledge, subject to the condition that the skilled person identified in s 7(2) could, before the priority date, be reasonably expected to have combined them.
86 These requirements represent a significant departure from the more rigorous requirements of s 7(3) as it existed before the Raising the Bar Act. The earlier provision stipulated that no prior art information could be added to the common general knowledge unless the skilled person could, before the priority date, be reasonably expected to ascertain, understand, regard as relevant and, in the case of a combination of any two or more pieces of prior art, combine them.
87 As French CJ observed in AstraZeneca at [18], prior art information which is publicly available in a single document is 'ascertained' if it is discovered or found out, and 'understood' means that, having discovered the information, the skilled person would have comprehended it or appreciated its meaning or import (see also Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) at [68], with whom Gageler and Keane JJ, and Nettle J agreed). His Honour considered that the 'relevance requirement is a threshold criterion for consideration, by the court, of a prior art publication in conjunction with common general knowledge for the purpose of determining obviousness' (at [22]). Keifel J noted at [68], citing Lockwood at [152], that the relevance requirement is directed to publicly available information, 'which the skilled person could be expected to have regarded as relevant to solving a particular problem, or meeting a long-felt want or need'.
88 The current form of s 7(3) was introduced into the Patents Act under the Raising the Bar Act in 2012. Item 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 states that the new Act amends sub-s 7(3) to remove the requirement that prior art information, for the purposes of the enquiry under s 7(2), must be first 'ascertained, understood and regarded as relevant' by a skilled person in the art. It identifies three problems with the previous form of the subsection. First, information that was clearly relevant could be excluded on the basis that the skilled person would not have 'ascertained' the information. It explains that this exclusion of relevant information, which nowadays is readily available through the internet, undermines the principle that patents should not be granted for routine modifications of what was already publicly available. Secondly, that the requirements that prior art information be 'understood' and 'regarded as relevant' are implicit in the prior tests for inventive step, and those being included as threshold limitations on the prior art base complicated the provision unnecessarily, without having any substantial effect on the outcome of the inventive step enquiry. Thirdly, the then current restrictions were 'out of alignment' with the patent systems of Australia's major trading partners.
89 The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to say (emphasis added):
Importantly, the changes are not intended to substantially change the operation of the existing tests for inventive step as applied to the prior art base or to permit hindsight analysis. While a skilled person is essentially deemed to be aware of and to have carefully read the publically available information, the inventive step tests are otherwise applied in the context of what the skilled person would have known and done before the priority date of the claims in question. The tests will therefore continue to take account of factors such as whether the skilled person would have understood and appreciated the relevance of the prior art to the problem the invention was seeking to solve and whether it would be considered a worthy starting point for further investigation or development.
It also remains the case that individual pieces of prior art information can only be combined where the skilled person would have been reasonably expected to have combined them.
90 There was some dispute between the parties as to the approach to be taken under s 7(3)(b) to the combination of the prior art information upon which VMS relies. VMS first submits that the test to determine whether or not information is 'publicly available' under s 7(3) is answered simply by considering whether it is accessible to the public. A document that is available for inspection, or a speech delivered, anywhere in the world (the example it gives is in the basement of an obscure Russian library) is nonetheless publicly available. Next, it submits that once it is established that the information is publicly available, s 7(3) proceeds on the footing that the hypothetical skilled team is aware of and has carefully read that information. Thirdly, it submits that no single or rigid test should govern whether the skilled team could reasonably be expected to combine pieces of prior art information. It will depend on the circumstances of each case.
91 In response, SARB emphasises that once the information identified in s 7(3) has been added to the common general knowledge, it is likely that the questions of whether they would be understood and regarded as relevant is folded into the factual enquiry in s 7(2). More particularly, SARB submits that in order to establish that two or more pieces of prior art could have reasonably been expected to be combined by the skilled person for the purposes of s 7(3)(b), it is still necessary for VMS to demonstrate that the skilled addressee would have understood the pieces of prior art and regarded them as relevant, despite the fact that these words were excised from s 7(3). Furthermore, it submits that in order to conclude that it is reasonable to combine pieces of prior art within s 7(3)(b), it is necessary to canvass how and why the skilled person or team could come to do so. If the skilled person or team would not realistically combine the prior art (for instance, due to the prior art not being widely communicated or recorded), then it is not reasonable to do so.
92 As set out above, 'prior art information' is information in the 'prior art base' being information in a document that is publicly available and also information made publicly available through doing an act. Insofar as the definition concerns 'information' contained in a 'document', it is difficult to see a meaningful distinction between the two. For the most part, information in a document will be that which is written in it. A document that contains information will necessarily need to be considered in its context. If a document is made publicly available, then one may assume that all of the information in it is available to be added to the common general knowledge for the purpose of consideration by the notional skilled person.
93 The identification of any information made publicly available through doing an act, such as information imparted by the public use or demonstration of a product, or by a lecture presented in public, will be determined by proving whether the act was public or not and what was disclosed. That can be particularly challenging when it comes to ephemeral acts. However, once the Court is satisfied that identified information has been made publicly available, then that information is deemed to be available to the hypothetical skilled person for the purpose of the enquiry under s 7(2). Further, once the Court determines what information has been made publicly available, s 7(3)(a) operates such that that information is assumed to be supplied to the notional skilled person within s 7(2), for the purpose of understanding how he or she (or, in the case of a notional team, they) would consider it. Then it must be determined whether, in the light of the common general knowledge, this additional information reveals an absence of inventive step.
94 In practical terms, one may expect a party to proffer in evidence the subject matter of the information that it contends is the prior art information and, in many cases, supply that to an expert on the basis that this is assumed to be such information. That is what VMS correctly did here.
95 In relation to s 7(3)(b), when considering the combination of two pieces of prior art information, the Court must first decide what two or more pieces of prior art information were publicly disclosed. It is that prior art information that the notional person skilled in the art is deemed by the subsection to possess. Secondly, the Court must consider whether the skilled person or team could reasonably be expected to combine the two or more pieces of prior art. That enquiry is not undertaken in a vacuum, but is to be considered in the context of the task that the skilled person or team is to 'consider' as required under s 7(2), which is in moving from the common general knowledge to solving a particular problem, or meeting a long-felt want or need: see, by analogy, Lockwood at [152]; AstraZeneca at [68].
96 It follows that I do not accept that it is necessary for VMS to demonstrate any more for the purpose of s 7(3)(a) than that the prior art information has been made publicly available. Once it has done so, such information is notionally supplied to the person skilled in the art within s 7(2). For combining two or more pieces of prior art information, s 7(3)(b) deems that if those pieces of information are 'publicly available', they are be made available to the person skilled in the art. It will be a question of fact whether or not they may be reasonably be expected to be combined.