THE REASONING OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT
7 On 24 March 2010 the applicant filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court claiming compensation for losses incurred by the applicant as a result of the respondent's failure to the implement the "relevant legislation" (namely, the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)) (the Social Security Act) and loss of entitlements as a result of the respondent's negligent refusal to comply with the relevant legislation, as well as punitive damages for the "repeated and negligent refusals" of the respondent to "implement the terms or conditions stipulated in the relevant legislation for an adequate service by the employment service provider".
8 On or about 17 August 2010 the respondent filed an application seeking summary dismissal of the application pursuant to s 17A(2) of the Federal Magistrates Act. As noted, on 31 May 2011 the Federal Magistrates Court summarily dismissed the application. The questions in the present application for leave to appeal are whether the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court is "attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by a Full Court" and whether "substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong".
9 As set out in the reasons for judgment in Vatarescu v Commonwealth of Australia for the Agency of Centrelink (No 2) [2011] FMCA 376 at [2], many of the circumstances underpinning the applicant's application in 2010 were considered in an earlier decision of that Court in Vatarescu v Commonwealth of Australia [2009] FMCA 1041, which was the subject of an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal (Vatarescu v The Commonwealth of Australia for the Agency of Centrelink [2009] FCA 1539).
10 The reasons for judgment in Vatarescu v Commonwealth of Australia for the Agency of Centrelink (No 2) [2011] FMCA 376 included the following:
(1) "…the current application is presented in terms that confirm a generalised complaint against the Respondent, Centrelink" (at [3]).
(2) "…, in the current matter he [the applicant] alleges a breach of duty on Centrelink's part "for negligent implementation of relevant legislation". His complaints relate most particularly to his Centrelink entitlements being suspended for failing to comply with a Newstart Activity Agreement, and the requirement that he attend a Job Network Member for a reasonable purpose that was notified to him pursuant to s.624(1)(a) of the Social Security Act 1991" (at [3]).
(3) "Dr Vatarescu contends that he is entitled to relief due to the following [alleged] negligence of Centrelink:
(i) The Respondent acted negligently by failing to monitor the quality and content of services provided by the Job Network Member;
(ii) The Respondent acted negligently by failing to ensure the implementation of the relevant legislation and related terms of the activity test;
(iii) The Respondent refused to comply with the terms of the activity test after these were brought to their attention, particularly, in the letter dated 17 March 2009" (at [4]).
(4) "I have considerable difficulty seeing (a) what duty was owed by Centrelink to the Applicant, (b) what breach may have occurred in relation to any such duty, and in consequence, (c) what 'damage' has been suffered by Dr Vatarescu which he could recover from Centrelink. Certainly, there are no particulars of 'damage' other than Dr Vatarescu's generalised claim that "[h]ad the Respondent implemented the elements of the legislation stipulating a constructive service, the applicant's commercialisation of a high-tech project would have reached an advanced stage"" (at [5]).
11 After identifying the principles applicable to an application for summary dismissal in orthodox terms (at [40] - [45]), the reasons for judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court continued with an observation at [47] noting "significant concerns about the way in which, and the lack of relevant particularity with which, the Applicant has claimed relief against the Respondent".
12 At [50], the reasons continued as follows:
In my view, in the circumstances of this case, I do not see that there was any legal duty owed to the Applicant by the Respondent. It is not made out on the materials before the Court. Disgruntlement, even for good cause (which I do not necessarily find here), should not automatically transform into legal entitlement.
13 After quoting aspects of the decision of Stone J in the earlier application for leave at [11] and [12] to the effect that the applicant's complaints against Centrelink were based on his perception of their administrative incompetence rather than any demonstrable legal error, the Federal Magistrates Court said (at [53]):
Although stated in the context of the then application for judicial review, it seems to me that, in a similar vein, there is no legal basis for the Applicant's claim in tort.
14 At [54] of the reasons for judgment the following comment appears:
And, by way of comment only, it may be that, following the intimation by the Respondent, either estoppel and or res judicata principles would have not unreasonable prospects of success if the matter was to proceed. In this regard I simply note that there is substantial congruence between the relief sought and the parties in the earlier proceedings, and the matter that is currently before the Court.
15 At [55] of the reasons for judgment the Federal Magistrates Court concluded in these terms:
In forming a 'practical judgment' of the facts and documents put before the Court, and having regard to the principles set out by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Jefferson Ford [Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372; [2008] FCAFC 60] and by Sundberg J in Adnunat [Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499] in the light of the High Court's comments in Spencer [Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28], in my view, there is no reasonable prospect of Dr Vatarescu's application succeeding. In the words of Lord Woolf, quoted by Lord Hope, and cited with approval by the High Court in Spencer, unfortunately, the current matter falls into the category of those that are "not fit for trial at all."