Vexatious litigant
42 Mr Rana also seeks leave to appeal against the order declaring him a vexatious litigant.
43 The first step in Mr Rana's submissions is that the Federal Magistrate erred in his treatment of the deeds of release that were produced by Mr Rana. Mr Rana produced the deeds of release as evidence that many of the cases referred to by Deakin University were settled by deeds of release, and therefore the decisions related to those deeds of release should not be relied upon for the purposes of declaring Mr Rana a vexatious litigant.
44 The Federal Magistrate rejected this, stating at [207]:
In my view, these deeds of release show in many ways striking similarities. They show the enormous range of complaints and litigation brought by Mr Rana against each of the respondents. They involve settlements involving relatively small amounts of money (I think the largest cash sum paid to Mr Rana was $27,000) which were clearly paid by those institutions and parties to avoid the obvious further expenses that further litigation would involve. Some of the recitals expressly refer, accurately enough, to the long history of litigation that has been undertaken by Mr Rana against the party or parties with whom he is settling.
45 The Federal Magistrate concluded that "far from proving his point, [the deeds of release] only go to show the scope of and unending nature of Mr Rana's litigation activities": at [208].
46 Mr Rana now submits that those deeds of release should not have been used as the basis for an adverse finding against Mr Rana. Mr Rana submits this on the basis of public policy and/or ss 53A and 53B of the Federal Court of Australia Act and or ss 131 and 135(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
47 In my view, Mr Rana's submission in that respect is misguided. The Federal Magistrate's finding that Mr Rana habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in this Court or other Australian Courts was based on the 77 decisions of Courts in matters which Mr Rana has litigated. Barring "some wholly immaterial minor interlocutory exceptions", the analysis of those cases shows that Mr Rana was unsuccessful in each case. That is the basis of the Federal Magistrate's decision.
48 Mr Rana has not shown how the Federal Magistrate was incorrect in his statement of the law or the application to the facts. The deeds of release came into existence in order to deal with Mr Rana's case as pleaded. The Federal Magistrate did not accept the characterisation of the deeds as asserted by Mr Rana, and in fact considered that they supported the Federal Magistrate's findings. That analysis of the material was available to him.
49 Second, Mr Rana separately submitted that the Federal Magistrate's findings were incorrect in that the Federal Magistrate did not have proper regard to precedents, namely the decision of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of South Australia regarding Mr Rana's claim against Skycity Casino, and separately the decision of Rana v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1667.
50 The Federal Magistrate made no error in his discussion of the law regarding vexatious litigants, nor his treatment of the cited authorities. With respect to the latter case, this was dealt with by the Federal Magistrate at [183]-[185]. In that case Spender J dismissed the application made against Mr Rana for security of costs of an appeal he had brought "principally because of the significant delay between the filing of the appeal and the application for security of costs": at [18]. The Federal Magistrate noted "that although Mr Rana was successful, his Honour described Mr Rana's prospects of success in the appeal as 'quite poor'." In respect of the findings of the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of South Australia, the Federal Magistrate considered that "Mr Rana was largely unsuccessful. His claim against three respondents was effectively dismissed and he was granted leave to re-plead as against a fourth": at [107].
51 In relation to the Federal Magistrate's reasoning on this aspect, the Federal Magistrate correctly identified the correct rule of the FMC Rules (Rule 13.11) and correctly identified the relevant principles as discussed in Kowalski v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 153 at [141] and earlier by Stone J in Soden v Kowalski [2011] FCA 318 at [35]-[36].
52 His Honour then took the steps required by those authorities of:
(a) asking whether the claims of Mr Rana in the subject proceeding had been instituted vexatiously, in the sense that term is used, and he decided that the proceeding had been instituted vexatiously; and
(b) asking whether Mr Rana habitually and persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court and other Australian Courts, and he decided that he had.
53 In my view, the Federal Magistrate is not shown to have erred in understanding how to go about addressing those issues, or to have erred in reaching the factual findings which he made in relation to those two issues. Nor do I think that Mr Rana has shown that he has any real arguable case that the Federal Magistrate erred in either his understanding of the questions he had to address, of the material upon which those questions should be addressed, or in the answers he gave to those questions.
54 Consequently, in relation to the orders declaring Mr Rana to be a vexatious litigant, and that any existing proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court may not be continued without leave of that Court, and that Mr Rana may not institute a proceeding in that Court without its leave, I am not persuaded that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its consideration by the Full Court. It again follows that there is no real injustice to Mr Rana by the making of those orders. If he has a claim which is properly expressed, and which has apparent merit in law and on the facts as expressed, he may seek leave to bring that claim.
55 Finally I note the two separate interlocutory applications filed in this matter.
56 By the first, dated 20 August 2012, Mr Rana sought to tender fresh evidence regarding the deeds of release, including, in support that "Thomas Martin had given legal advice to the applicant as an inducement to sign the deed that he and his employers Minter Ellison will never use materials involving my past litigation in other cases". I have concluded that the Federal Magistrate's decision was based on the analysis of the 77 decisions to which his Honour referred; the deeds of release were of incidental significance only. Accordingly, the further evidence sought to be tendered would not assist me in determining the current application. Moreover, on these leave applications, it is not appropriate to address fresh evidence of an argumentative character. I accordingly do not accede to that application.
57 By the second application, filed on 13 September 2012, Mr Rana sought to tender exhibits A, B, C, CA, F, I, J, M of his affidavit of 20 August 2012, as well as the remaining exhibits as were before the Federal Magistrate.
58 Exhibits A, B, C and CA do not go to any of the pleaded matters. Exhibit F is a letter from Dr Albert Chan to Mr Thomas Martin dated 20 July 2012. The terms of the letter are unclear and in any event do not go towards establishing any of the proposed grounds of appeal. Exhibit I is incomprehensible; it does not assist with the interpretation of Mr Rana's transcript, which is Exhibit IA. Exhibit J appears to set out the admission requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy at Flinders University.
59 Exhibit J states that a requirement of admission is that students who have completed a Masters by coursework require an average grade of a Distinction or better. That might demonstrate injustice to Mr Rana by showing that any erroneous marking may have precluded him from undertaking Doctoral studies, so that that evidence is admitted. However, in the particular circumstances, it does not show injustice firstly because, even assuming he had passed that subject, it is not shown that would have made any real difference to him being admitted to Doctoral studies, and secondly because (as noted above) he had no arguable case to make so not being allowed to take his arguments to the Full Court cannot cause injustice.
60 Exhibit M is a letter from the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board to Mr Rana of 26 July 2012, enclosing a copy of Mr Rana's initial complaint. The letter from the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board does not add anything to Mr Rana's claim, and the attached letter from Mr Rana merely repeats matters claimed by Mr Rana in the current application.
61 The proposed appeals have no prospect of success. The applications for leave to appeal from the orders of the Federal Magistrate made on 20 July 2012 are refused. Mr Rana must pay the costs of Deakin University of the applications.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Mansfield.