MR URATORIU'S CONTENTIONS
81 Mr Uratoriu concedes that his taxable income for each of the following years includes the following amounts:
1997 - $38,901;
1998 - $436,767;
1999 - $273,934;
2000 - $460,062.44;
2001 - $1,248,100;
2002 - $412,098;
2003 - $140,776; and
2004 - $91,814
82 These sums include initially declared amounts of:
1997 - $19,400
1998 - $19,500
1999 - $19,500
2000 - $25,740
2001 - $20,900
2002 - $21,200
2003 - $885
83 For Mr Uratoriu it was submitted that while he was confused on many occasions in his cross-examination and unable to remember the facts on which he intended to rely, the documents which support his case should be preferred. It was submitted that many of the events concerned occurred many years ago and Mr Uratoriu's medical condition made it difficult for him to remember the details.
84 In relation to the repayment to Mr Uratoriu by Briqueterre, it was submitted that the funds deposited into Mr Uratoriu's bank account from Briqueterre were not salary and wages but rather were payments to be applied against equal payments to or from 'some entity'.
85 It was said that the deposited funds could not be salary and wages in the ordinary sense as Mr Uratoriu's association with Briqueterre was only that he was a director and shareholder.
86 He was not employed by Briqueterre and he did not provide personal services to Briqueterre nor did he exert himself personally for the benefit of Briqueterre. Additionally, the deposited funds were not incidental to employment services or personal services provided to Briqueterre and the deposited funds were not related to any activity or occupation. These submissions were repeated in relation to the other companies from which payments of 'income' were in issue.
87 He says that the payment of funds of $42,000 to him were applied against funds paid to PLI by him as can be seen by payments made by Mr Uratoriu in various documents in which he advanced $686,000 of his own funds to PLI and Briqueterre repaid the amount of $42,000 in the same year (1999).
88 In relation to PLI, it was submitted that the inference was that the funds deposited into Mr Uratoriu's bank account by PLI were not salary and wages but rather were payments to be applied against prior payments to PLI. Again, it was submitted that the deposited funds could not be salary and wages in the ordinary sense as Mr Uratoriu's association with PLI was that he was a director and shareholder for two months during the 1998 year, the whole of the 1999 year and for eleven months during the 2000 year.
89 He argued he was not employed by PLI, he did not provide personal services to PLI nor did he exert himself personally for the benefit of PLI. Additionally, the deposited funds were not incidental to employment services or personal services provided to PLI and were not related to any activity or occupation.
90 Reliance was placed on the evidence of Mr Heaney that Mr Uratoriu had not been involved with the operation of PLI. Accordingly it was said that the various payments to Mr Uratoriu by PLI were applied against payments made to PLI. It was said, however, that the amount of $34,000 received by Mr Uratoriu in 2001 from PLI had been inadvertently omitted from the flowchart at LAU13 and should be included in the amounts from PLI to Mr Uratoriu.
91 In relation to 'repayment' to Mr Uratoriu by Rocket, Mr Uratoriu argues that the inference is that the funds deposited into his bank account by Rocket were not salary and wages 'but rather were applied against funds that [Mr Uratoriu] paid Vicwal and Vicwal had paid to Rocket or Vicwal had paid Rocket and [Mr Uratoriu] paid to Vicwal and also payments of funds that [Mr Uratoriu] had personally paid to Rocket'. He argues that an inference can be drawn from the documents that the funds received earlier by Mr Uratoriu were to be applied against amounts paid by Mr Uratoriu as the funds from Mr Uratoriu moved from Mr Uratoriu directly to Rocket or Vicwal, then to Rocket and back to Mr Uratoriu. Alternatively, it is said that it might be inferred that the funds moved from Vicwal to Rocket and after Mr Uratoriu received those amounts from Rocket they were paid back to Vicwal. It is argued that both these inferences arrive at the same conclusion, namely that Mr Uratoriu received funds from Rocket and those funds should be applied to the funds provided earlier by Mr Uratoriu to Rocket and Vicwal. It is again argued that the deposited funds cannot be salary and wages in the ordinary sense as Mr Uratoriu's association with Rocket is only that he was a director for six months during the 2002 year; the whole of the 2003 year; and the whole of the 2004 year; he was not a shareholder of Rocket; he was not employed by Rocket; he did not provide personal services to Rocket, nor did he exert himself personally for the benefit of Rocket; the deposited funds were not incidental to employment services or personal services provided to Rocket; and the deposited funds were not related to any activity or occupation.
92 For the same reasons, Mr Uratoriu argues the deposited funds cannot be deemed dividends.
93 Mr Uratoriu argues that the payments by Rocket to Mr Uratoriu to the extent of $25,000 in 2001; $22,000 in 2002; and $56,000 in 2003 were applied against funds paid to Rocket by Mr Uratoriu of the same amounts in the same years.
94 Further, the payments by Rocket to Mr Uratoriu to the extent of $25,000 in 2002 and $66,234 in 2003 were applied against funds paid to Vicwal by Mr Uratoriu. Mr Uratoriu paid funds to Vicwal in the amount of $150,000 in 2002 and $25,000 in 2003 and Vicwal paid funds to Rocket in the amounts of $25,000 in 2002 and $66,234 in 2003 and Mr Uratoriu received these funds from Rocket to the extent of the amounts of $25,000 in 2002 and $66,234 in 2003.
95 On this basis, Mr Uratoriu says he has discharged the burden of proof that exists under s 14ZZK of the TA Act that he did not derive any salary or wages from Rocket during the relevant period as alleged by the Commissioner or at all.
96 In relation to the 'repayment' to Mr Uratoriu by Winmarley, again, Mr Uratoriu relies upon inferences to be drawn from documents and circumstances in addition to his own denial that the funds were salary and wages. Mr Uratoriu says there is an inference that can be drawn from the documents that the funds received earlier by Mr Uratoriu were to be applied against amounts paid by Mr Uratoriu as the funds from Mr Uratoriu moved from Mr Uratoriu directly to Winmarley or to Vicwal, then to Winmarley and back to Mr Uratoriu. In the alternative, the other inference that could possibly be drawn is that the funds moved from Vicwal to Winmarley and after Mr Uratoriu received these amounts from Winmarley, they were paid back to Vicwal. Both these inferences result in the same conclusion, being that Mr Uratoriu received funds from Winmarley and those funds should be applied to the funds provided earlier by Mr Uratoriu to Winmarley and Vicwal.
97 In addition, Mr Uratoriu submits for the same reason advanced in relation to the other payments, that they cannot be salary and wages in the ordinary sense or deemed dividends due to the distancing of Mr Uratoriu from any employment relationship with Winmarley.
98 As to the particular amounts, it is said that the payments by Winmarley to Mr Uratoriu to the extent of $29,000 in 1998 and $60,000 in 1999 were applied against funds paid to Winmarley by Mr Uratoriu. Mr Uratoriu advanced funds in the amount of $29,000 in 1998 and $60,000 in 1999 and received repayments of these funds from Winmarley in the same years.
99 Further, the payments by Rocket to Mr Uratoriu to the extent of $9,000 in 1998; $2,000 in 1999; and $31,000 in 2001 were applied against funds paid to Vicwal by Mr Uratoriu. Mr Uratoriu paid funds to Vicwal in the amount of $9,000 in 1998; $4,000 in 1999; and $31,000 in 2001 and Vicwal paid funds to Winmarley in the amounts of $125,000 in 1998; $2,000 in 1999; and $151,000 in 2000 and Mr Uratoriu received these funds from Winmarley in the amounts of $9,000 in 1998; $2,000 in 1999; and $31,000 in 2001.
100 The argument in relation to the 'repayment' to Mr Uratoriu by PLI and MainFreight is similar. Mr Uratoriu argues that the funds deposited into his account by MainFreight to the extent of $385,621.56 were for the purposes of using the sale proceeds of the sale of the business of PLI to MainFreight to attend to the outstanding taxation obligations of PLI as part of the sale of its business. On 9 May 2000, $385,621.56 was transferred to the Commissioner to attend to the taxation liabilities of PLI. Rather than that payment being for a Director's Penalty Notice (DPN), in fact, it is argued it was the amount for PLI's taxation liability. It is argued that there is no evidence that a DPN was actually issued to Mr Uratoriu and that the Commissioner did not tender a DPN.
101 It is also argued for similar reasons that the deposited funds cannot be salary and wages in the ordinary sense for the usual reasons; namely, Mr Uratoriu's association with PLI is that he was a director and shareholder for 2 months during the 1998 year, the whole 1999 year and for 11 months during the 2000 year; Mr Uratoriu has no association with MainFreight Ltd; Mr Uratoriu was not employed by PLI; Mr Uratoriu did not provide personal services to PLI nor did he exert himself personally for the benefit of PLI; the deposited funds were not incidental to employment services or personal services provided to PLI; and the deposited funds were not related to any activity or occupation.
102 For the same reasons it should also be inferred according to Mr Uratoriu that the funds deposited into his bank account from PLI were not deemed dividends but rather were repayments to be applied against payments from Mr Uratoriu to PLI.
103 In relation to Albergo and personal usage of alcohol stock, Mr Uratoriu relies upon his denials.
104 In relation to East-West share sale, Mr Uratoriu has conceded that there was a net capital gain and the Commissioner has conceded that the 50% discount must be applied to the net capital gain pursuant to subdiv 115A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the 1997 Act).
105 Accordingly, Mr Uratoriu argues that the appeal against the objection decision in respect of the Commissioner's amended assessment dated 9 June 2006 to Mr Uratoriu for the year ended 30 June 2001 (the 2001 income assessment) and the Commissioner's notice of assessment and liability to pay penalty dated 16 June 2006 to Mr Uratoriu for the year ended 30 June 2001 (the 2001 penalty assessment) should be allowed to the extent that the objection decision as to the 2001 income assessment and the 2001 penalty assessment be varied in this way. Mr Uratoriu argues that the matter should be remitted to the Commissioner with directions that Mr Uratoriu's objection be allowed by varying the 2001 income assessment and the 2001 penalty assessment by excising from Mr Uratoriu's taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2001 the amount of $948,497 and remitting the imposed penalties on the excised amount to nil.
106 In relation to the Rose Bay Property and the net capital gain, Mr Uratoriu relies upon his evidence to the effect that during the period of ownership of the Rose Bay Property he was not a registered proprietor of any other residential property or dwelling; he attended to renovations on the Rose Bay Property from 1986 to 1990; whilst initially purchasing the Rose Bay Property with a view to renovating and disposing of the Rose Bay Property for gain, intervening circumstances compelled him to further expend $242,500 in 1996 to gain full ownership of the Rose Bay Property; and he expended $80,000 in legal fees to protect and preserve his ownership interest of the Rose Bay Property, of which he argues he can demonstrate by documentation of the amount of $44,818.60.
107 On that basis it is argued that the Commissioner has failed to allow the further expenditure to gain full ownership of the Rose Bay Property or allow the legal costs incurred and paid by Mr Uratoriu to protect and preserve his ownership interest in the Rose Bay Property being included in the cost base of the Rose Bay Property and thereby reducing the net capital gain of $369,250 to $225,590.70.
108 In relation to the 'repayment' to Mr Uratoriu by PLI and MainFreight, Mr Uratoriu argues that the amount of $385,621.56 was not for the payment of a penalty under a DPN, as alleged by the Commissioner. But rather in referring to the narrative annexed to the affidavit of Ms Betty Jane Logue, the officer of the ATO dealing with Mr Uratoriu and Mr Heaney concerning the DPNs, it has simply been recorded that on 16 February 2000 a DPN was issued but the narrative does not state to whom the DPN was issued or for what amount it was issued. It is stated that 'he [Mr Heaney] is concerned about the DPNs expiring' but does not state whether the DPN in fact expired. It is argued that the narrative simply shows that a DPN was issued on 1 May 2000 but there is no evidence as to who the DPN was issued to or for what amount. There is no evidence, it is asserted, that the DPN was served on Mr Uratoriu.
109 Sections 222AOB, 222AOC, 222AOE and 222AOG of the 1936 Act provide:
222AOB Directors to cause company to remit or to go into voluntary administration or liquidation - deductions and amounts withheld
(1) The persons who are directors of the company from time to time on or after the first deduction day must cause the company to do at least one of the following on or before the due date:
(a) comply with its obligations in relation to deductions (if any) and amounts withheld (if any) whose due date is the same as the due date;
(b) make an agreement with the Commissioner under section 222ALA in relation to the company's liability under a remittance provision in respect of such deductions (if any) and amounts withheld (if any);
(c) appoint an administrator of the company under section 436A of the Corporations Act 2001;
(d) begin to be wound up within the meaning of that Act.
(1A) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the obligations are:
(a) to comply with Division 1AAA, 3B or 4, as the case may be, in relation to each deduction (if any):
(i) that the company has made for the purposes of Division 1AAA, 3B or 4; and
(ii) whose due date is the same as the due date; and
(b) to comply with Subdivision 16B in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in relation to each amount that the company has withheld (if any):
(i) for the purposes of Division 12 of that Schedule; and
(ii) whose due date is the same as the due date.
(2) This section is complied with when:
(a) the company complies as mentioned in paragraph (1)(a); or
(b) the company makes an agreement as mentioned in paragraph (1)(b); or
(c) an administrator of the company is appointed under section 436A, 436B or 436C of the Corporations Act 2001; or
(d) the company begins to be wound up within the meaning of that Act;
whichever first happens, even if the directors did not cause the event to happen.
(3) If this section is not complied with on or before the due date, the persons who are directors of the company from time to time after the due date continue to be under the obligation imposed by subsection (1) until this section is complied with.
222AOC Penalty for directors in office on or before due date
(1) If section 222AOB is not complied with on or before the due date, each person who was a director of the company at any time during the period beginning on the first deduction day and ending on the due date is liable to pay to the Commissioner, by way of penalty, an amount equal to the unpaid amount of the company's liability under a remittance provision in respect of deductions or amounts withheld:
(a) that the company has deducted for the purposes of Division 1AAA, 3B or 4 of this Act, or withheld for the purposes of Division 12 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (as the case requires); and
(b) whose due date is the same as the due date.
(1A) If section 222AOBAA is not complied with before the end of the payment day, each person who is a director of the company on the payment day is liable to pay to the Commissioner, by way of penalty, an amount equal to the unpaid amount or amounts that the company is required to pay under section 135 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in respect of the payment or payments relating to the payment day.
(2) If section 222AOBA is not complied with before the end of the benefit day, each person who is a director of the company on the benefit day is liable to pay to the Commissioner, by way of penalty, an amount equal to the unpaid amount or amounts that the company is required to pay under Subdivision 16B in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in respect of the benefit or benefits provided on the benefit day.
222AOE Commissioner must give 14 days' notice before recovering penalty
The Commissioner is not entitled to recover from a person a penalty payable under this Subdivision until the end of 14 days after the Commissioner gives to the person a notice that:
(a) sets out details of the unpaid amount of the liability referred to in subsection 222AOC(1), (1A) or (2) (whichever relates to the penalty); and
(b) states that the person is liable to pay to the Commissioner, by way of penalty, an amount equal to that unpaid amount, but that the penalty will be remitted if, at the end of 14 days after the notice is given:
(i) the liability has been discharged; or
(ii) an agreement relating to the liability is in force under section 222ALA; or
(iii) the company is under administration within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001; or
(iv) the company is being wound up.
222AOG Remission of penalty if section 222AOB, 222AOBAA or 222AOBA complied with before notice period ends
If:
(a) a penalty is payable by a person under this Subdivision; and
(b) section 222AOB, 222AOBAA or 222AOBA (whichever relates to the penalty) is complied with at a time when the Commissioner has not yet given the person a notice under section 222AOE, or within 14 days after the Commissioner gives the person such a notice;
the penalty is remitted because of this section.
110 Mr Uratoriu submits that pursuant to s 222AOB and s 222AOC of the 1936 Act, a director is held liable in specific circumstances, not for a taxation liability of a company, but rather a penalty in the amount of the taxation liability. The Commissioner must follow a specific procedure to make the penalty collectable. Section 222AOC only makes the director liable for a penalty. It does not allow for collection of the penalty. This is expressed in s 222AOE of the 1936 Act where it is said that 'The Commissioner is not entitled to recover from a person a penalty payable under this Subdivision until the end of 14 days after the Commissioner gives to the person a notice…'. Further, in accordance with s 222AOE of the 1936 Act, a DPN must be issued for a penalty to be collectable by the Commissioner. The DPN must set out and specify all of the details of the company's liability and state the person receiving the notice is liable to pay the penalty but that the penalty will be remitted if, inter alia, within 14 days 'after the notice is given' the liability of the company has been discharged. He argues that there is no evidence before the Court to show that the DPN was in fact issued to Mr Uratoriu and what was specified in the DPN.
111 Furthermore, Mr Uratoriu argues that if the DPN issued on 1 May 2000 was in fact issued to him for the amount of $385,621.56, s 222AOE of the 1936 Act applies. He contends the Commissioner was not authorised to 'receive monies' to pay the penalty amount prior to 15 May 2000, so the funds received by the Commissioner on 9 May 2000 should be taken to be payment of the taxation liability of PLI and not of a penalty amount under the DPN. It is argued that pursuant to s 222AOG the payment of the taxation liability for PLI extinguishes the liability for the penalty, not just the ability to collect the penalty.
112 In summary, Mr Uratoriu argues that the evidence in relation to the issuing of the DPNs to Mr Uratoriu is lacking due to the Commissioner not being able to produce the DPNs and should the Court find that a DPN was given on 1 May 2000, Mr Uratoriu could never be personally liable to pay an amount relating to the taxation liability of PLI unless that taxation liability had still not been paid at the end of 14 days after the DPN was given. In fact, Mr Uratoriu argues, payment for PLI's tax liability was received by the Commissioner on 9 May 2000, well inside any possible 14 day period.
113 In my view this argument places too broad a construction on 'entitled to recover'. I would take that expression when used in s 222AOE not to mean that the Commissioner is not 'entitled to bank' a payment made but rather not entitled to recover it in the sense of taking recovery proceedings. But whether this is correct or not, in my view, this claim fails for more basic reasons discussed below.