legal principles
43 The relevant legal principles to a stay application were not in dispute between the parties. I adopt the parties' summary of those principles.
44 A leading authority in this area is Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v The Boots Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287 (Sterling Pharmaceuticals). Lockhart J observed at 290 - 291:
The court has a general power to control its own proceedings, and that power extends to enable it to order a temporary stay of proceedings in various circumstances including the case where proceedings are pending in another court and it is desirable that those proceedings should proceed to their conclusion first: see L Grollo Danvin Management Pty Ltd v Victor Plaster Products Pty Ltd (1978) 33 FLR 170 at 177; Hughes Motor Service Pty Ltd v Wang Computer Pty Ltd (1978) 35 FLR 346 at 351-354, per Bowen CJ; Muller v Fencott (1981) 53 FLR 184 at 189, per Toohey J; Bond Corporation Ply Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 193 at 203, per French J.
45 Lockhart J held at 291, that the following considerations apply to such a case:
which proceeding was commenced first;
whether the termination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other;
the public interest;
the undesirability of two courts competing to see which of them determines common facts first;
consideration of circumstances relating to witnesses;
whether work done on pleadings, particulars, discovery, interrogatories and preparation might be wasted;
how far advanced the proceedings are in each court;
the law should strive against permitting multiplicity of proceedings in relation to similar issues;
generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party; and
the undesirability of substantial waste of time and effort if it becomes a common practice to bring actions in two courts involving substantially the same issues;
46 Sterling Pharmaceuticals was cited with approval in Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal [2011] FCA 424 (Burrup) at [9] - [10] per McKerracher J, and was approved in Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCAFC 117; 85 ACSR 531 at [29] per Mansfield and Foster JJ (with whom Dowsett J agreed).
47 In Burrup, McKerracher J cited the observations of Dixon J in Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (1937) 56 CLR 277, who observed at 281:
[t]he inconvenience and embarrassment of allowing two independent actions involving the same question of liability to proceed contemporaneously in different courts needs no elaboration.
48 In Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 6) [2012] FCA 745 (Apotex) at [8]-[10], Bennett J identified five key guidelines in assessing whether a stay ought be granted:
(a) prima facie a plaintiff is entitled to have their action tried in the ordinary course of the procedure and business of the Court (citing Rochfort v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1972] 1 NSWLR 16 (Rochfort));
(b) it is a grave matter to interfere with this entitlement by a stay of proceedings, which requires justification of proper grounds: Rochfort at [19]
(c) the burden is on the defendant in a civil action to show that it is just and convenient that the plaintiff's ordinary rights should be interfered with (Jefferson Ltd v Bhetcha [1979] 2 All ER 1108 (Jefferson) at [1113];
(d) the Court's task involves "the balancing of justice between the parties", taking account of all relevant factors: Jefferson at [1113]; and
(e) each case must be judged on its own merits, and it would be wrong and undesirable to attempt to define in the abstract what are the relevant factors: Jefferson at [1113].
49 In Apotex at [16], her Honour also noted that the issue of whether different jurisdictions were involved should be taken into consideration (citing Hughes Motor Services Pty Ltd v Wang Computer Pty Ltd (1978) 35 FLR 346 at 351-353, per Bowen CJ).
50 In Clorox Australia Pty Ltd v International Consolidated Business Pty Ltd (2005) 66 IPR 506 (Clorox), Sundberg J observed at [5] that "to obtain a stay, an applicant must show that the interest of justice would be best served by its grant". In that case, a later filed proceeding was stayed pending the outcome of the first filed proceeding, which is the opposite to the case now before this Court.
51 In Clorox, Sundberg J found that a stay was in the interests of justice. This was because the actions involved the same parties, the same subject matter and success of the first proceeding, would mean that the applicant claimed all the same relief as sought in the second proceeding.
52 In FA Faulding & Co Ltd v Bristol-Myers Squibb Co (1997) 40 IPR 511 (Faulding), a factor militating against the grant of a stay was the potential for the other proceeding to be weighed down in interlocutory disputes and delays due to other cases in the docket. Heerey J declined the grant of a stay in circumstances that amounted to "indefinite postponement of the trial to await hypothetical litigation". His Honour further noted (at 512) that "someone who brings a legitimate, genuinely arguable claim to the court is entitled to have that claim heard as soon as the court can conveniently arrange it, consistently with the demands of other litigants".
53 In Shaw v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Australian Financial Security Authority [2022] FCA 775, Cheeseman J cited Burrup and Apotex, and held at [24] - [25]:
In exercising the available discretion, each case turns on its own facts. As Bennett J observed in Apotex (at [16]), little direct assistance is gained from analysing other cases, save than to observe that some general principles apply when two proceedings form the basis for an application for a stay of one of them, including the right of an applicant to have its proceedings determined. The burden is on the applicant contending for the stay to show that it is just and convenient to interfere with the other party's ordinary rights. The Court will look to the factors that, generally, balance the advantages and disadvantages to each party and to the Court. A stay will be appropriate where there are two separate proceedings between the same parties with related subject matter and where the hearing of one of the proceedings may dispose of the need for the second. Another factor which is relevant for the Court to consider in exercising the discretion to temporarily stay one proceeding until another is determined is the risk of inconsistent findings in the two proceedings in respect of related or overlapping subject matter. The Court may exercise its discretion where the interests of justice would be served by a stay of the proceedings: Clorox Australia Pty Ltd v International Consolidated Business Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1135; 66 IPR 506, 507 to 508 at [5] (Sundberg J).
The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions in s 37M of the FCA Act must also be borne in mind. While the authorities concerning the exercise of the Court's discretion to stay proceedings have generally focussed on s 23 of the FCA Act, s 37M is also relevant. In exercising its discretion, the Court will consider the efficiency and costs implications involved in the duplication of proceedings, including with respect to the efficient use of the administrative resources available to the Court: Porter at [30]; Apotex at [8] to [10].