7C The Second Defendant was negligent in and about the performance of his duties relating to the First Defendant's retainer.
11 In addition to the Statement of Claim, an agreed bundle of documents was tendered before his Honour, but it was for the purpose of further informing his Honour of the facts in the Statement of Claim. The facts as alleged were to be understood by reference to the additional documentation.
12 In a case such as this, in my opinion, the distinction between "assumed facts" and "agreed facts" is an important one. It would be appropriate in another case to determine the existence of duty as a separate and preliminary issue, so long as the Court knew the range of materials upon which the parties relied on the question of duty, notwithstanding the possibility of overlap between those facts and questions of breach, causation, reliance and remoteness of damage and other matters to which the same facts may go. (Note however Woolcock Street Investments Pty Limited v CDG Pty Limited (2004) 216 CLR 515 at [7].) However, in this case, what was put before the District Court, and is pursued in this Court, was a set of assumed facts, not agreed facts.
13 In a context such as this, where the existence of duty is a mixed question of fact and law, in my opinion it would be necessary to agree such facts as are capable of being agreed and to put such further evidence before the Court as is material, or as the parties believe to be material, to determine the existence of the duty, perhaps requiring some fact finding exercise on the part of the judge. In a case involving a novel duty it may be that that can be done largely on documents, but that was not the case in the present proceedings. What we have here are assumed facts and both parties retain the right to challenge the finding on existence of duty should other factual findings be made contrary to the assumed facts.
14 The determination of a question as a separate question, in the form that I have set out above, does contain one possible difficulty that others may find determinative. It is possible in a context of agreeing facts for the purpose of determining duty that, eventually when, say, the issue of breach is to be determined, overlapping as it so often does with the question of duty, that a fact that was agreed for purposes of duty is found not to be so for purposes of breach or causation or reliance or some other aspect of the negligence decision making process.
15 I do not find anything particularly incoherent that parties who engage in litigation ought be permitted to, and in circumstances such as those before the Court encouraged to, agree to facts for a purpose such as duty, even though it may be that those facts are found ultimately not to be the case. I do not find anything particularly anomalous about such an agreement. Parties can agree in the course of litigation to conduct that litigation on a basis that is in some respects contested and proves to be wrong. Nevertheless that is not the position in the present case.
16 What we have is a matter that, notwithstanding the desirability of having something like this determined separately, was put before the District Court and is put before this Court on a basis that leaves much too much open to disputation and does not allow the Court to resolve either way the matter in a final and determinative manner. In my opinion, this was not an appropriate case for a separate question.
17 The issue that was considered by Rein DCJ is a matter of significance. There are a number of cases, particularly overseas authorities, which are considered by Rein DCJ in his judgment. I refer, for example to Trevor Ivory v Anderson (1992) 2 NZLR 517; Williams v Natural Life Healthfoods Limited (1998) 1 WLR 830; Sealand of the Pacific v Robert C McHaffie Limited (1974) 51 DLR (3d) 702, and other authorities referred to. One of the issues before this Court would have been whether or not the references that appear to be to the contrary of certain of the submissions in this Court's judgment in Rexstraw v Johnson [2003] NSWCA 287 were either directly or indirectly determinative of the issue before this Court.
18 I notice, however, that there are a number of authorities relevant to this matter in Australia that are not referred to in the submissions, particularly from Queensland. See the judgment of Chesterman J in Council of the Shire of Noosa v J E Farr Pty Limited [2001] QSC 60; the judgment of White J in Robt Jones (363 Adelaide Street) Pty Limited v First Abbott Corporation [1997] QSC 210, affirmed on appeal but with no reference to this point in [1999] QCA 49. I also refer to the observations in Interchase Corporation Limited v ACN 010087573 Pty Limited [2001] QCA 191, [2003] 1 QLR, Qd R 26 esp at [77]. The matter is also considered in the text S Walmsley et al, Professional Liability in Australia (2002) esp at [1.750] and in the article by K Tapsell, "Turning the Negligence Juggernaut" (2002) 76 ALJ 581 esp at 592-593. There are also the observations of McPherson JA in the Interchase Corporation case supra referring to the note by P Watts, "The Company's Alter Ego - an Impostor in Private Law" (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 525. Also see Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59 at [40].
19 The issue is one of considerable significance. Alternative views have been expressed both overseas and within Australia. I should indicate my own view that it is, of course, important that this is being dealt with in the context of economic loss, rather than personal injury. I will say no more about that for present purposes.
20 The matter was appropriate for leave to be granted because of its significance. However, when leave was granted by Hodgson and Bryson JJA on 4 July 2006, each of their Honours expressed doubts about the appropriateness of this being one case for the separate determination of the issue. Leave was granted, notwithstanding that, by reason of the significance of the legal issue that has arisen. However, the possibility of the course that I propose be taken by this Court was expressly left open by their Honours.
21 I regret that, notwithstanding the significance of the issue, the way the case has been presented as a separate issue it is not, in my opinion, an appropriate question to answer. It is not sufficient for this Court simply to withdraw the leave it has given, because that would leave the answer to the question given by Rein DCJ on foot and binding on the parties.
22 Accordingly the orders I propose are: