The framework of legal analysis
35 There was no substantive dispute between the parties as to the legal principles applying. The dispute concerned their application. The starting point was agreed to be the reasons of Dixon J (as he then was) in Sun Newspapers Limited v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation; Associated Newspapers Limited v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1938) 61 CLR 337 at 359-363. A number of passages in that classic analysis at 359, 360, 361, 362 and 363 are worthy of repetition in this case:
The distinction between expenditure and outgoings on revenue account and on capital account corresponds with the distinction between the business entity, structure, or organization set up or established for the earning of profit and the process by which such an organization operates to obtain regular returns by means of regular outlay, the difference between the outlay and returns representing profit or loss. The business structure or entity or organization may assume any of an almost infinite variety of shapes and it may be difficult to comprehend under one description all the forms in which it may be manifested. In a trade or pursuit where little or no plant is required, it may be represented by no more than the intangible elements constituting what is commonly called goodwill, that is, widespread or general reputation, habitual patronage by clients or customers and an organized method of serving their needs. At the other extreme it may consist in a great aggregate of buildings, machinery and plant all assembled and systematized as the material means by which an organized body of men produce and distribute commodities or perform services. But in spite of the entirely different forms, material and immaterial, in which it may be expressed, such sources of income contain or consist in what has been called a "profit-yielding subject," the phrase of Lord Blackburnn United Collieries Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners... As general conceptions it may not be difficult to distinguish between the profit-yielding subject and the process of operating it. In the same way expenditure and outlay upon establishing, replacing and enlarging the profit-yielding subject may in a general way appear to be of a nature entirely different from the continual flow of working expenses which are or ought to be supplied continually out of the returns or revenue. … But the practical application of such general notions is another matter. The basal difficulty in applying them lies in the fact that the extent, condition and efficiency of the profit-yielding subject is often as much the product of the course of operations as it is of a clear and definable outlay of work or money by way of establishment, replacement or enlargement. … But for the same or a like reason it is even harder to maintain the distinction in relation to the intangible elements forming so important a part of many profit-yielding subjects. For example, a profitable enterprise such as the sale of a patent medicine may depend almost entirely on advertisement. In the beginning the goodwill may have been established by a great initial outlay upon a widespread advertising campaign carried out upon a scale which it was not intended to maintain or repeat. The outlay might properly be considered to be of a capital nature. On the other hand the goodwill may have been gradually established by continual advertisement over a period of years growing in extent as it proved successful. In that case the expenditure upon advertising might be regarded as an ordinary business outgoing on account of revenue.
…
In the attempt, by no means successful, to find some test or standard by the application of which expenditure or outgoings may be referred to capital account or to revenue account the courts have relied to some extent upon the difference between an outlay which is recurrent, repeated or continual and that which is final or made "once for all", and to a still greater extent upon a distinction to be discovered in the nature of the asset or advantage obtained by the outlay. If what is commonly understood as a fixed capital asset is acquired the question answers itself. But the distinction goes further. The result or purpose of the expenditure may be to bring into existence or procure some asset or advantage of a lasting character which will enure for the benefit of the organization or system or "profit-earning subject." It will thus be distinguished from the expenditure which should be recouped by circulating capital or by working capital.
…
But the idea of recurrence and the idea of endurance or continuance over a duration of time both depend on degree and comparison. As to the first it has been said it is not a question of recurring every year or every accounting period; but "the real test is between expenditure which is made to meet a continuous demand, as opposed to an expenditure which is made once for all" … By this I understand that the expenditure is to be considered of a revenue nature if its purpose brings it within the very wide class of things which in the aggregate form the constant demand which must be answered out of the returns of a trade or its circulating capital and that actual recurrence of the specific thing need not take place or be expected as likely. Thus, in Anglo-Persian Oil Co. Ltd. v. Dale… the establishment and reorganization of agencies formed part of the class of things making the continuous or constant demand for expenditure, but the given transaction was of a magnitude and precise description unlikely again to be encountered. Recurrence is not a test, it is no more than a consideration the weight of which depends upon the nature of the expenditure.
…
There are, I think, three matters to be considered, (a) the character of the advantage sought, and in this its lasting qualities may play a part, (b) the manner in which it is to be used, relied upon or enjoyed, and in this and under the former head recurrence may play its part, and (c) the means adopted to obtain it; that is, by providing a periodical reward or outlay to cover its use or enjoyment for periods commensurate with the payment or by making a final provision or payment so as to secure future use or enjoyment.
[emphasis added; footnotes omitted]
36 In Hallstroms Proprietary Limited v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 72 CLR 634, Dixon J incorporated his reasons in Sun Newspapers 61 CLR at 359-363, and elaborated upon them, saying the following at 646, 647 and 648:
As a prefatory remark it may be useful to recall the general consideration that the contrast between the two forms of expenditure corresponds to the distinction between the acquisition of the means of production and the use of them; between establishing or extending a business organization and carrying on the business; between the implements employed in work and the regular performance of the work in which they are employed; between an enterprise itself and the sustained effort of those engaged in it.
…
What is an outgoing of capital and what is an outgoing on account of revenue depends on what the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and business point of view, rather than upon the juristic classification of the legal rights, if any, secured, employed or exhausted in the process.
[emphasis added]
37 To not dissimilar effect, see the judgment of the Privy Council in BP Australia Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1965) 112 CLR 386 at 399.
38 The character of the expenditure and the character of the advantage sought by the making of the expenditure is the chief, if not critical, factor in determining the character of what was paid: GP International Pipecoaters Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1990) 170 CLR 124 at 137; Mount Isa Mines Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 176 CLR 141 at 147-149; Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Melbourne Citylink Limited [2006] HCA 35 at [1], [3], [76], [77] and [148]; and BP Australia 112 CLR at 394 and 398.
39 Stopping at this point, it is important to appreciate the content of the approach of Dixon J in Sun Newspapers 61 CLR 337 and Hallstroms Case 72 CLR 634. It is not, as some of the respondent's submissions in this case seemed to state, that one "looks through" the legal or strict juridicial form of a transaction if "good cause" for so doing is shown. The analysis, that is the ascertainment of the character of the expenditure and what it is calculated to effect, is made from a practical and business point of view, though, of course, as part of that analysis, it is essential to understand the proper legal characterisation of what has occurred: Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v South Australian Battery Makers Pty Limited (1978) 140 CLR 645 at 657-60 and 661-662.
40 It is also helpful to reflect upon the revenue character of the payments made by the taxpayer and discussed in BP Australia 112 CLR 386. The payments were made to service station owners to tie them to selling BP's petrol. Shell and others had been tying up solo outlets, thereby threatening the business of BP and others. The Privy Council (in a judgment delivered by Lord Pearce) agreed with the approach of Dixon CJ and Kitto J who were in dissent in the High Court. The Privy Council set out with approval, at 112 CLR at 391-92, the following parts of the reasons of Dixon CJ and Kitto J:
(Dixon CJ)
"I do not think it was acquiring a capital asset or doing any more than so conducting its business on revenue account as to increase it and make as certain as it could that its business was continuing and also would continue, if possible, to expand. For my part I cannot think that all the course adopted changed the character of the transactions of the company from those of a continual attempt to establish its product in a consumers' market and to meet all the obstacles which arose in a long and rather troubled period to obtaining a reputation for its product."
(Kitto J)
"But a promise by a service station operator not to deal with oil companies other than the appellant or its allies was only the negative side of the substantial positive advantage which it was the purpose and practical effect of the agreement to produce, namely the advantage of a practical certainty that the whole of the custom of the service station, for motor spirit, would be given to the appellant or its allies for the agreed period; and what the appellant really paid its money for was that positive advantage. The purpose was not to create a situation in which to set about selling motor spirit; it was to secure the particular sales which would be necessary for the satisfaction of the service station's requirements of the period. The payment of the money was analagous to expenditure in sending a commercial traveller on his rounds to secure orders; it was part and parcel of the business of effecting sales ... The change in the organization of the wholesale trade in motor spirit from the old system of multiple pump service stations to the new `solo' system meant inevitably that every oil company, if it wanted to sell motor spirit to service stations in the future, had to accept the necessity of spending money, not at the beginning once and for all, but at the beginning and from time to time, to ensure that it would receive from as many service stations as possible the whole of their orders for limited periods"
…
"... the advantage was not the acquisition of a new market, not a new framework within which to carry on trade for the future, not an extension of the appellant's selling organization to include a regiment of resellers. It was not such an exclusion of competition as adds to goodwill a negative right and thus increases the value of goodwill. It consisted simply of the practical assurance of receiving bundles of orders for motor spirit, the circumstances being such that for the foreseeable future it would be only by getting similar bundles of orders that such a trade as the appellant's could be carried on"
[emphasis added]
41 As these passages reveal, the regular payment of sums to secure customers, to add incrementally to a customer base and thus to expand a business and to obtain revenue from such customers is easily able to be seen to be on revenue account.
42 Lord Pearce explained the matter as follows at 112 CLR at 398:
Its real object however was not the tie but the orders which would flow from the tie. To obtain ties it had to satisfy the appetite of the retailers by paying out sums for a period of years, whose amount was dependent on the estimated value of the retailer as a customer and the length of the period. The payment of such sums became part of the regular conduct of the business. It became one of the current necessities of the trade.
The test of whether these sums were payable out of fixed or circulating capital, … tends in the present case in favour of regarding these payments as revenue expenditure. Fixed capital is prima facie that on which you look to get a return by your trading operations. Circulating capital is that which comes back in your trading operations. The sums in question were sums which had to come back penny by penny with every order during the period in order to reimburse and justify the particular outlay. If one imagines a B.P. agent justifying the price of petrol to a retailer or discussing whether price reduction was possible, it is hard to imagine him omitting the lump sum so paid (divided by the estimated gallonage) as an item in the cost per gallon. It is doubtful if he would even relegate it to overheads since it was in the forefront of the wholesaler's selling costs. Nor can one imagine the retailer demurring at such a calculation. Prima facie therefore the lump sums were circulating capital which is turned over and in the process of being turned over yields a profit or loss; they were part of the constant demand which must be answered out of the returns of the trade. This however is merely one indication and by no means concludes the matter.
[emphasis added]
43 Lord Pearce in the first part of the passage cited above approached the question in a similar, if not identical, way to Dixon CJ and, especially, Kitto J: the real object of each payment was to receive orders that would flow from the tie and, as such, the payments became part of the regular conduct of BP's business. In the next paragraph, Lord Pearce refers to the distinction between fixed and circulating capital. Using that distinction, his Lordship characterised the lump sum payments as circulating capital which was turned over in the process of yielding a profit or a loss by the returns on the sales of gallonage. It is to be noticed also that Dixon J in Sun Newspapers 61 CLR at 361 (cited and emphasised above) referred to the same distinction.
44 The distinction between fixed and circulating capital, which has been said to be "obscure": Mason J (as he then was) in Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567 at 576, and "debatable": Jenkins LJ in Reynolds and Gibson v Crompton (1950) 33 Tax Cas 288 at 303, was discussed by Lockhart J in QBE Insurance Group Limited v Australian Securities Commission (1992) 38 FCR 270 at 287-288 and by the Full Court in GRE Insurance Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 34 FCR 160 at 162-163. See also Commercial and General Acceptance Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1976) 137 CLR 373 at 377 and 384 and Coles Myer Finance Limited v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 176 CLR 640 at 663-664, 668-669 and 681-682.
45 At present, I am dealing with the legal framework of the case. I will deal with the submissions of the parties shortly. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to explore the concepts of fixed and circulating capital beyond the relevant elements of the notions seen as important to the Privy Council in BP Australia 112 CLR 386 and to Dixon J in Sun Newspapers 61 CLR 337. That is, here, whether the Assignment Fees would come back, to use Lord Pearce's words, "penny by penny with every order during the period in order to reimburse and justify the particular outlay": BP Australia 112 CLR at 398.
46 It is also important to recognise that the analysis requires "both a wide survey and an exact scrutiny of the taxpayer's activities": Western Gold Mines (NL) v Commissioner of Taxation (WA) (1938) 59 CLR 729 at 740. That is, one must examine the whole business context of what was done: BP Australia 112 CLR at 399 (the "whole picture"); and see also National Australia Bank Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 80 FCR 352 at 363.
47 The mere identification of the correct description of the legal rights obtained or transferred by any transaction is generally too narrow a focus for the answering of the question. This is especially so once it is recognised that almost every commercial arrangement based on contract can be analysed jurisprudentially from the perspective of buying and selling rights or choses in action. Such rights are merely the legal or juridicial building blocks of relationships built from business and practical activity. The enquiry as to whether an outgoing is on capital or revenue account looks to the business and practical effects and advantages sought in the whole context: Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Raymor (NSW) Pty Limited (1990) 24 FCR 90 at 99 and National Australia Bank 80 FCR at 363-364.
48 The above is a sufficient identification of the legal framework in which to analyse the submissions. Before doing that, it is necessary to identify some additional factual matters highlighted by TAPL in address.