Turnbull v Clarence Valley Council

The motion

1. This judgment deals with the Council's August 2022 motion, which is supported by affidavits sworn by Mr Brothers, its solicitor; Mr Brenton, its regulatory services supervisor; and Ms Harre, its coordinator building services. It seeks orders: "1. That pursuant to Rule 13.4(1)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules the proceedings against the defendant herein be dismissed on the basis that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; 2. Alternatively, that pursuant to Rule 13.4(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules the proceedings against the defendant herein be dismissed on the basis that: (a) the pleadings disclose no cause of cause of action for personal injury or wrong against the second defendant; (b) the proceedings are an abuse of process: 3. Alternatively, that pursuant to Rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules the proceedings herein be struck out on the basis that they: (a) disclose no reasonable cause of action appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or (b) have a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or (c) are otherwise an abuse of the process of the court; 4. Any further order the Court considers necessary. 5. Costs of the Notice of Motion and of the subject proceedings."
2. Those orders were opposed, Mr Turnbull complaining that he had not had an adequate opportunity to put on all that he wished to rely on before the hearing, not having appeared when the orders for preparation of the matter for hearing were made, albeit unsuccessfully attempting to appear remotely. But he did not seek any adjournment of the hearing of the motion.
3. Then Mr Turnbull relied on affidavits and other documents and a USB which he had served before the hearing, as well as written and oral submissions in which he explained his case. That included his various beliefs and opinions and why he resisted the orders which the Council pursued. In the circumstances, I am satisfied both that he did have a reasonable opportunity to advance his case and that he took advantage of it, given all that he relied on.
4. That included, for example, claims such as that it was treachery for the State to enforce a stop work order using laws that contravened the Commonwealth Constitution; that there had been alleged intentional frauds and conspiracies pursued, including one that had been uncovered in the 1960s and involved secret IMF banking policies to control the global financial system and all governments under a world government; that other conspiracies had been pursued by Australian prime ministers, to remove the people from the Commonwealth of Australia; his understanding of God's laws; and that before the 1993 enactment of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), everyone who owned land had specified rights, including the right to build any dwelling or structure there, or any number of buildings and since then, the system had gone mad at the expense of peace, welfare and good government.
5. Mr Turnbull also advanced explanations for his conduct and events which had unfolded. They included, for example:

• a statement and declaration of truth affidavit, where Mr Turnbull states that his purpose (occupation) is "Galactic Emissary"; explains that he is the living man incarnated into Christopher Luke of the tribe/family/house/clan Turnbull; explains his various beliefs about matters such as the soul, the living man and competence; as well as various assertions, including about his own Universal sovereignty; deficiencies in his birth registration; that he is not lost at sea; claimed fictions; personage flowing from the Creator; and claimed violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which he relies, despite his rejection of the United Nations. It, he says is a false authority and fictitious entity of identified claimed governments, including of this State. He also explains the reclaimed rights of his living body; private property; privacy data; as well as presumptions of claimed law on which he relied, including as to contracts, legal liability and the consequences of claimed responses, including silence. This statement was said to be given in order to: "i. establish, signify, proclaim, and verify the status of this living being; and ii. to eliminate/deny any and all presumptions by any and all fictitious, corporate or private entities; and iii. to rebut any and all alleged claimed authority and/or jurisdiction of any and all fictitious, corporate or private entities, over the deponent, those entities being without standing upon the land";
• photographs of the building before and after Mr Turnbull began to erect it on the property, in addition to those taken by the Council on its inspection;
• a USB containing other documents and links to videos on which Mr Turnbull relies. They include videos which he has taken on occasions when he spoke and at times shouted at a Council ranger and another Council employee and others where someone is riding a motorbike around a campground, filming what is there to be seen; photographs of vehicles; as well as a link to a YouTube video, First Nation Mandamus. There people explain their call for an International Human Rights Abuse Tribunal to be conducted in relation to the genocide of Indigenous Australians, the oldest living culture on the planet and their reasons for that call. They include their sovereignty over the land which they have retaken; their need to protect their children, who they consider have been stolen from them and their call for a meeting with King Charles, for reasons which they explain;
• a notice issued to Council by the Velvet Revolution, which Mr Turnbull claims evidences service of a Moratorium on all Local Council members, charging them with misprision of treason, which rested on the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), UK legislation, the Nuremburg Code, Helsinki Code and Magna Carta, as well as claimed inalienable rights; and
• a statement by Ms Lascelles, a Council Ranger, about parking infringement notices issued to Mr Turnbull.

1. Mr Turnbull claimed in his extensive submissions, that what he relies on, including late served documents to which objection was taken based on relevance and in one case, disputed authenticity, establishes the illegality and wrongfulness of the Council's actions, which he would be able to prove at trial.
2. The disputed documents were received on the motion on the basis that the weight which they could be given would have to be determined, given their contents and the cases which the parties advanced.
3. In the case of the document claimed to be a copy of a letter written by the former Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs, said to have been published in May 2021 by "TrueBlue Observer", I am satisfied, having considered it, that it can be given no real weight. That is because the document does not take the form of a letter; is headed "Explanatory Statement"; contains a photograph of Sir Harry; is not printed on letterhead; and is neither dated nor signed. That it is a copy of the letter which Mr Turnbull understands it to be, is thus not apparent.
4. Shortly before the hearing Mr Turnbull had also served what he claimed to be an interlocutory application brought to this people's Court under the common law, which serves the interest of this land, Terra Australis, which he considered had to be determined before the motion. What he thereby sought to pursue was allegations that the Council had not served evidence about matters such as its authority to conduct business on this land; ownership of buildings, caravan parks and reserves; and authority over him as a living man.
5. I am satisfied that what is sought to be pursued by this application does not require consideration before the motion is heard and determined, the motion having been listed for hearing as it was, and the parties having complied as they had with the Court's orders as to the service of their evidence and submissions. But I have taken into account what Mr Turnbull thereby sought to advance, the document being in evidence, in coming to a conclusion about the matters over which the parties joined issue.

Issues

1. In issue on the motion was whether the orders which the Council sought would be made, given the claims that Mr Turnbull sought to pursue by his pleadings and the evidence and application on which he relied.
2. On his case this established that, contrary to decided cases on matters in issue, on which the Council relied, he would prove his claims at trial, given the applicable law, as he claimed it to be, including maxims of claimed applicable law which he read out during his oral submissions. Thereby he contended that he would prove the illegality he pursued and that the Council's actions, which resulted in the landowners seeking and obtaining its approval for his building, were illegal.
3. What is in issue thus turns on questions of law, including on the Council's case, on binding authority. That is disputed. Mr Turnbull's position was that such cases had not only been wrongly decided, but by Courts which had acted beyond their jurisdiction.

Compliance with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 and the Unform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

The parties' cases

1. The Council's case is that Mr Turnbull advances baseless claims against it which are frivolous and vexatious; have no conceivable prospects of success and so should be struck out. Further, that the proceedings should be dismissed, constituting as they do an abuse of the Court's process which has a tendency to cause prejudice and embarrassment, given various scandalous and irrelevant claims advanced by Mr Turnbull in his affidavits and submissions.
2. Mr Turnbull's case rests on his claimed oral agreement with the landowners, permitting him to erect and use the shed which the Council considered required approval as a dwelling, as a workshop where he would build motor homes. That was brought to an end by the Council's wrongful actions, which interfered in his agreement, with the resulting damage he claims and that he was then further damaged by Council's wrongful harassment.
3. Those claims would, of course, all be for him to prove on the balance of probabilities, by admissible evidence. The onus also falls on him to establish that the Court has the power to make the orders which he seeks.

The pleadings do not comply with the requirements of the Rules

1. I am satisfied that there are real problems with the case which Mr Turnbull has pleaded, as well as with what he advanced in his submissions on the motion and real force in the Council's case.
2. Certainly Mr Turnbull's pleadings do not adhere to the requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), which apply to all litigants, whether legally advised or not: see rr 14.4, 14.7, 15.1 and 15.3. The latter, for example, requires particulars of alleged fraud to be given. Instead the amended statement of claim provides a lengthy narrative of claimed events, allegations and losses.
3. Further, the case which Mr Turnbull advanced by his affidavits, written and oral submissions travelled even beyond what was so pleaded. Without further amendment of his pleadings, such claims cannot be pursued in these proceedings.
4. I am thus satisfied that it would not accord with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which I will further discuss, to permit the case to proceed on the basis of Mr Turnbull's inadequate pleadings.

Should Mr Turnbull have an opportunity to replead?

1. The real question to be determined in circumstances such as these is thus whether Mr Turnbull ought to be given an opportunity to replead, the Court having power to permit him to do so: s 64 of the Civil Procedure Act.
2. But Mr Turnbull may not be given such leave if any amended pleadings will be liable to be struck out. Thus his pleadings have to disclose that he has an arguable case on claims which he seeks and is entitled to advance. That is because the Court is required not only do justice to him, but also to the Council, as well as taking into account the public interest in the orderly conduct of the proceedings, in accordance with the legislative requirements which fall on all those who chose to litigate before it.
3. In exercising its powers the Court must thus always act in accordance with the requirements of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act, which there specifies the overriding purpose of the legislative scheme to be the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. It also imposes relevant obligations on the parties.
4. The Rules permit proceedings which have no prospects of success to be struck out or dismissed, as the Council seeks. Such applications must be approached in the way discussed in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69 at 129-130. Those powers must be exercised with caution, the power to strike out proceedings being an exceptional one.
5. Section 58(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act also requires the Court to act in accordance with the dictates of justice, having regard to: (i) the degree of difficulty or complexity to which the issues in the proceedings give rise, (ii) the degree of expedition with which the respective parties have approached the proceedings, including the degree to which they have been timely in their interlocutory activities, (iii) the degree to which any lack of expedition in approaching the proceedings has arisen from circumstances beyond the control of the respective parties, (iv) the degree to which the respective parties have fulfilled their duties under section 56 (3), (v) the use that any party has made, or could have made, of any opportunity that has been available to the party in the course of the proceedings, whether under rules of court, the practice of the court or any direction of a procedural nature given in the proceedings, (vi) the degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of any order or direction, (vii) such other matters as the court considers relevant in the circumstances of the case.
6. Proceedings should thus not be dismissed if there is a real question to be tried. But if there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome, if the proceedings were allowed to go to trial and it appears that there is no legally tenable cause of action, summary dismissal is the appropriate course: Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41 at [57]; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 at [44]-[46]; Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 at [24]; Bott v Carter [2012] NSWCA 89 at [13].

Orders dismissing the proceedings must be made.

1. Here relevant actions of Mr Turnbull, the landowners and Council and what unfolded as a result, do not seem to be in dispute.
2. They include Mr Turnbull's partial erection of the building on property which he did not own, pursuant to a claimed oral agreement with the landowners; Council's receipt and consideration of a complaint, which led it to the view after inspection that what was being erected was a dwelling which required its prior approval; Council's resulting actions, which led to the building work ceasing, despite Mr Turnbull's ongoing view that all that he was building was a shed, which did not require the Council's approval; the landowner's acceptance that approval should have been sought; their resulting application for the Council's consent to the erection of a dwelling and carport, which the Council gave; the falling out which resulted between the landowners and Mr Turnbull, which led to their agreement to purchase the partly erected building and his departure, even though Mr Turnbull remained of the view that Council approval was not necessary; his sale of his tools to an acquaintance; and later, fines imposed by Council when he parked at night, contrary to no parking signs.
3. The relevant law, which I will come to, is also well settled. Contrary to Mr Turnbull's case, binding authority is contrary to the claims which he seeks to litigate.
4. In the result, for reasons which I will explain, I am satisfied that the orders sought by the Council must be made, having approached what lies in issue between the parties in accordance with the authorities earlier referred to. On the evidence the Council has established, as it must, that the claims Mr Turnbull seeks to advance are untenable.

The existence and authority of the Council

1. Mr Turnbull has provided answers to particulars which the Council sought, on which it relied in its case. For his part Mr Turnbull also relied on those particulars, expanding them by his written and oral submissions. In essence he contends that there is no legal basis for the Council's existence, claims which it contends are misconceived.
2. Mr Turnbull advanced his arguments as to the claimed illegality which he seeks to pursue in various ways. This includes that the Local Government Act involves a conspiracy to overthrow the Commonwealth Constitution at the instigation of international bankers. As well as claims such as that all Prime Ministers have been paedophiles, without morals or ethics and susceptible to corruption and blackmail; that since 1923 there has been treason pursued in government to overthrow the Constitution; and that there is an ongoing campaign to overthrow the country's political system, Constitution and money system. He also referred to an alleged conspiracy in relation to COVID-19.
3. The case so advanced and the evidence Mr Turnbull relies on, all explain the Council's submission that Mr Turnbull's claims are frivolous and vexatious and without prospects of success.
4. Some of what Mr Turnbull advances is unknown to the law and substantial aspects of the case he seeks to pursue have already been unsuccessfully pursued by others. Authorities by which the Court, as presently constituted, is bound, rejecting the kinds of case and arguments which he seeks to pursue, thus cannot be ignored.
5. Mr Turnbull relies on ss 5 and 51 of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). His case is that the Local Government Act is not lawful, given the failure in 1974 and 1988 of referenda which sought to amend the Commonwealth Constitution. In the result he contends that municipal institutions and local government such as the Council are a department of a State government. Further, he said in oral submissions the Council is itself a corporation and he relies on s 109 of the Constitution, which provides for Commonwealth laws to prevail over State laws in the event of inconsistency, to support his case as to the illegality of the Council and the actions which it pursued, which resulted in his departure from the property.
6. The claimed illegality on which Mr Turnbull relies underpins and is intertwined in the various ways he explained, in all aspects of the case which he seeks to pursue, including in respect of his agreements with the landowners.
7. Mr Turnbull thus does not accept that his departure having been the result of the written agreement which he entered with the landowners, he must pursue any resulting grievance which he has with them. He considers that they had been coerced by Council to seek the approval which they obtained unnecessarily, with the result his eviction, for which the Council is responsible.
8. I am satisfied that despite the way in which Mr Turnbull's arguments were variously advanced, there is no reasonably available argument that the Local Government Act is inconsistent with the Commonwealth Constitution, or that it or the Council suffer from any illegality. The Constitution makes no reference to local government. That referenda which sought to insert such references in the Constitution failed is irrelevant to the laws made by the NSW Parliament, as its Constitution Act permits.
9. Mr Turnbull does not rely on any Commonwealth legislation to advance his notions, on which his argument under s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution depends. That the Local Government Act is not a legislative scheme which the NSW Parliament was empowered by the Constitution Act to make, is thus not a tenable argument.
10. Further, what was decided in R v Vorhauer [2002] NSWCCA 483, where a number of similar claims were advanced, is binding and contrary to Mr Turnbull's claims.
11. There it was also contended that local Councils "are unconstitutional by reason of the failure of the constitutional referendum which would have included a reference in the Australian Constitution to local government": at [14]. This was rejected, Spigelman CJ observing "There is no logic in this. Local governments are created by State legislation under the respective State Constitutions. The absence of any reference to local government in the Australian Constitution is just irrelevant": at [14]. This conclusion was confirmed in Vorhauer v R [2007] NSWCCA 125 at [41].
12. The enactment of the Local Government Act has also been found to fall within the plenary power given the State Parliament by s 5 of the NSW Constitution: Hoxton Park Residents Action Group Inc v Liverpool City Council (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 363. There it was explained that "State laws may be invalid to the extent of any inconsistency with a valid law of the Commonwealth (Constitution, s 109) but a constraint on state legislative power must otherwise derive either from a specific provision of the Constitution or from an implication as to its operation, which necessarily impinges on state legislative power": at [40].
13. Mr Turnbull also claims the Council is a corporation, but in Hoxton Park it was also observed at [44] that before the commencement of the Local Government Amendment (Legal Status) Act 2008 (NSW) on 20 November 2008, a council was said to be a body corporate. But that this was altered by these 2008 amendments, which introduced a new s 220. It still provides: 220 Legal status of a council (1) A council is a body politic of the State with perpetual succession and the legal capacity and powers of an individual, both in and outside the State. (2) A council is not a body corporate (including a corporation). (3) A council does not have the status, privileges and immunities of the Crown (including the State and the Government of the State). (4) A law of the State applies to and in respect of a council in the same way as it applies to and in respect of a body corporate (including a corporation).
14. It was also observed at [48] of Hoxton Park: that the power to enact this provision came from s 5 of the Constitution Act, which provides for the making of laws "for the peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales in all cases whatsoever", subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution. While Mr Turnbull contends that the Council's conduct has been contrary to the peace, welfare, and good government there envisaged, such opinions provide no basis for the conclusion that the Local Government Act is infected by illegality.
15. The Constitution Act also provides in s 51: 51 Local government (1) There shall continue to be a system of local government for the State under which duly elected or duly appointed local government bodies are constituted with responsibilities for acting for the better government of those parts of the State that are from time to time subject to that system of local government. (2) The manner in which local government bodies are constituted and the nature and extent of their powers, authorities, duties and functions shall be as determined by or in accordance with laws of the Legislature. (3) The reference in subsection (2) to laws of the Legislature shall be read as a reference to laws that have been enacted by the Legislature, whether before or after the commencement of this section, and that are for the time being in force.
16. Thus it was concluded in Hoxton Park that "While there may remain real questions as to the legal status of a council for different purposes, it is not possible to contend that s 220 [of the Local Government Act] fails to establish a collective body capable of exercising statutory functions, and particularly the consideration of the development applications in respect of land within geographically defined boundaries": at [57].
17. In the result I am satisfied that it must be accepted that Mr Turnbull's claims, resting as they do on his understanding of the meaning and operation of the Australian Constitution and Constitution Act, the illegality of the Local Government Act and the non-existence and lack of relevant authority of the Council under that legislative scheme, which has been rejected in these cases, do not disclose that he has any legally tenable cause of action for the claims which he seeks to advance.
18. That includes his complaints about the Council's operation of its campgrounds and reserves and its regulation of parking there and the claims he advances about the three fines imposed upon him as the result of actions taken by its rangers.

Racketeering and other alleged offending

1. The claims advanced in respect of alleged racketeering, conspiracy and other alleged Commonwealth offences similarly disclose no tenable cause of action, advanced as they are by way of Mr Turnbull's opinions about the illegality of various laws and the conspiracies to which he referred.
2. These claims relate to Mr Turnbull's views about land usage; what can be built on real property; parking laws and fines imposed for breach of them; the regulation of camping grounds; claims advanced in relation to Councils' claimed responsibility for increases in land value over time, which Mr Turnbull believes has impoverished people and wrongly precluded them from land ownership; as well as the claimed wrongful issue of the stop work order.
3. Contrary to Mr Turnbull's understanding, what he seeks to pursue also does not depend on the prior authorisation by first nations people of steps which the Council pursued, about which Mr Turnbull complains. They are simply not given such powers, by either the Commonwealth or State Constitutions nor any laws made under them to which he referred, even if the Council has recognised such peoples to be traditional landowners of the land falling within its local council area.
4. Nor are the laws of God, as Mr Turnbull claims them to be, relevant to his claims. Australia's legal system is the product of the common law and the legislative actions of British, Commonwealth and State parliaments. All are the result of steps which human beings, not the divine, have taken over the course of centuries, no matter what opinions Mr Turnbull has about them.
5. In the result it must be accepted that these claims also have no tenable prospects of success.

Claimed breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1. Mr Turnbull also particularised his reliance on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its claimed breaches by the Council, to advance his claims. But what Mr Turnbull so claimed and what he submitted about the Declaration was somewhat contradictory.
2. But in so far as he relies on claimed breaches of the Declaration, I agree with the observations of Garling J in Rahman v Dubs [2012] NSWSC 1065 at [55]-[56].
3. Contrary to Mr Turnbull's case, I consider that his Honour was correct in observing that causes of action based on breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not justiciable in this Court. There being no domestic Commonwealth or State legislation which makes it part of the law of NSW, a claimed breach of the Declaration is not justiciable, applying Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; [1995] HCA 20.

Breaches of the Local Government Act

1. Mr Turnbull also claims that a stop work notice was issued to him, in breach of the Local Government Act, relying on s 124, which regulates the giving of various orders. His case is that he was not required to obtain Council approval or a development application, in order to erect the building he proposed to use as a workshop and that the Council was thus not empowered to stop his erection of the building.
2. It was the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) which regulated development assessment and consent, by reference to local environmental planning instruments: Pt 4. Councils and their inspectors are there given powers of investigation, entry and search and to issue various notices: Pt 9.
3. That Mr Turnbull was given a stop work notice is in issue, but the notice sent to the landowners, asking that work cease, approval be sought and giving advice as to the applicable requirements, is in evidence and he relies on it to advance his claims.
4. There is no issue that there had earlier been no development application lodged for a residential development. Mr Turnbull also took no issue with the zoning of the property, other than the overarching illegality on which his case depended.
5. The property was zoned RU2 Rural Landscape under the applicable Clarence Valley Local Environmental Plan 2011. That LEP contained relevant definitions and specified what was permitted, without consent. Approval for erection of a dwelling was required, that being defined to mean "a room or suite of rooms occupied or used or so constructed or adapted as to be capable of being occupied or used as a separate domicile": see definition of "dwelling" in the dictionary to the LEP. Whether the building fell into that definition was in issue.
6. Under the State Environmental Planning Policy (Exempt and Complying Development Codes) 2008 approval for the erection of some structures is not required. Erection of a shed was an exempt development, but only if, relevantly, it was not to be used "for habitable purposes" or was a "farm building": s 2.31 of the SEPP. Mr Turnbull did not claim to be erecting a farm building.
7. The use of the property for a "home business" also did not require Council consent. But such a business had to be carried on in a dwelling, a building ancillary to a dwelling and by residents of the dwelling: see definition of "home business", "home industry" and "home occupation" in dictionary to the LEP. Mr Turnbull also did not claim that he proposed to conduct such a business.
8. Photos explain what the Council found on inspection of the large, partly erected two storey building, which was considered to look like a house and eventually led to the letter it sent to the landowners, advising them of the views it had reached and what it considered their obligations to be.
9. On Mr Turnbull's case despite its size and design, what he was erecting was only a shed. But not only did he intend that building to be used as a workshop where he proposed to conduct a business manufacturing mobile homes, it was also designed to permit him to park his own mobile home inside, in one part of the building and on his own explanation, another part of it was already being used by a friend to sleep in, when he visited Mr Turnbull at the property. That explained the rug and mattresses to be seen in one of the rooms in photos taken by Council.
10. That explained the CounciI's attitude. If the building was being inhabited, it could not be a "shed". That is defined not to be used "for habitable purposes": s 2.31 of the SEPP. Despite this, in issue is whether the building which was being constructed was to be "capable of being occupied or used as a separate domicile". In which case it fell within the definition of a "dwelling".
11. Given the design, construction and use to which the building was already being put and that which Mr Turnbull intended, that the landowners accepted that it was a dwelling and applied for a development application before Mr Turnbull even sold the building to them, is understandable. That this is what the regulatory scheme required in the circumstances, contrary to Mr Turnbull's beliefs, is also apparent.
12. The building was not only capable of being occupied or used as a separate domicile on completion, or adapted for such use, it was already at times being occupied by one of Mr Turnbull's friends. He also intended to park the mobile home in which he lived inside the building.
13. Mr Turnbull also tendered text messages which he had exchanged with the landowners, about whether the approval they were pursuing with Council was necessary. There they discussed his alterations to the size of the building and the intended use of part of it for bedrooms. That explains the decision which the landowners then made to seek Council's approval. On all that evidence, what he was erecting fell within the definition of a "dwelling".
14. It follows that Mr Turnbull's case on alleged breaches of the Local Government Act and the Council wrongly issuing a cease work, or even the disputed stop work order, are not pursued by way of any reasonable cause of action which could conceivably result in his claims succeeding. They are, it must be accepted, also untenable.

Damages claims

1. The result is that Mr Turnbull's damages claims are also untenable, there being no conceivable basis on which such orders could be made in his favour.
2. Mr Turnbull pursues in excess of $25 million in the amended statement of claim, pleading: "75. The Clarence Valley Council has acted in a Racketeering manner with its unlawful 1993 local council act and went even further by taking control of all caravan parks and camping grounds and made permanent stays unlawful, and then focused all the council money and resources on upgrading these places for their own revenue, and increased the fees by 400%, and outlawed camping in any other areas, closing public access roads to the state forest, national parks, and crown land, and now they have outlawed homeless people sleeping in their cars during sleeping hours, and knowing that someone is homeless, they ruthlessly send out their empowered rangers in the wee hours of the morning to enforce their policies and do so multiple times on the known homeless. Particulars; a. Parking fines. b. Caravan and camping ground ABNs 75. Total claims for compensation and losses. a. Personal compensation Claim against this single crime called Local Council Act 1993 is $25000000 b. Claim for loss of income is $735000 c. Claim for loss of a stable place for my lifestyle, workshop and place to park my life $128700 d. Personal compensation for the harassment by CVC $100000 e. Loss of tools and belongings $15000."
3. Some of this is earlier explained by: "11. I had intended to build 2-3 motorhomes every year, and build Art Stars as a secondary business. The profit from the first motorhome was estimated to be $30000 12. With the extra profit, I intended to build more expensive motorhomes with the estimated profit from the second motorhome to be $50000, and $80000 as an average profit on each successive motorhome. 13. The total profit loss over a 5-year period is estimated to be $720000 14. The resulting loss of contract also resulted in me losing all my tools estimated at 10-$15000 15. And a loss of my workshop and lifestyle security and a place to live in my motorhome $128700".
4. But that there is any conceivable basis for the award of the claimed damages is not apparent, given what they rest on.
5. In so far as the claim relies on fines imposed on Mr Turnbull for breaching parking regulations, his breaches are not disputed. It is the legality of the fines which he puts in issue, on the bases earlier discussed, given that they were imposed by the Council. There is no tenable basis for those claims, or his claims that the Council's illegal actions resulted in increased land values, for which Mr Turnbull is entitled to be compensated.
6. Other damages Mr Turnbull claims rest on his oral agreement with the landowners, which on his case permitted him to erect the building and his resulting expectation that he would have projected income and a viable business once it was finished, with the possibility long term, he argued to employ and train his children. He also perceives that the claimed stop work order resulted in his eviction and the resulting damages he pursues.
7. On the evidence I have discussed, which includes Mr Turnbull's agreed departure as the result of the written agreement which he entered with the landowners, that is also untenable.
8. Mr Turnbull discussed with the landowners over text the significant size of the two-storey building he was erecting, its height and rooms which could be used as bedrooms, as well as his views and objections to the pursuit of development approval. That involved costs for the plans which were required to be created and submitted and the fees which had to be paid to Council, which he was not prepared to pay.
9. But the landowners accepted, as they plainly had to, given what Mr Turnbull had done, Council's views about the need for approval of the dwelling he was erecting. That was what required the submission of plans, the payment of applicable fees and Council giving its approval, which they then pursued and obtained. That there was a resulting falling out and agreement reached with Mr Turnbull about his sale of the building to the landowners and departure from the property, may have been unfortunate and no doubt regretted by him. But that does not result in any tenable basis for his damages claims against the Council.
10. In the result I am satisfied the Council's motion must succeed.

Costs

1. The usual costs order under the Rules is that costs follow the event: r 42.1. That is an order that Mr Turnbull pay the Council's costs as agreed or assessed.
2. Unless the parties approach to be heard within 14 days, that will be the Court's order. If there is a dispute, the parties should also file short submissions on what is in issue as to costs

Orders

1. For the reasons given I order that: 1. The proceedings are dismissed. 2. Unless the parties approach to be heard within 14 days, Mr Turnbull must pay the Council's costs, as agreed or assessed.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 14 February 2023