The factual and evidentiary background
19 Before considering any of these questions it is necessary to provide the factual context for the dispute. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account is uncontroversial, at least for present purposes.
20 The TPG group provides a variety of services to business and government. Those services include allocating to a customer a portion of a server controlled by Trusted Cloud known as a "virtual server". Ms de Ville explained the nature of those services in her affidavit of 19 August 2014 ("first affidavit"):
The customer's data and software applications (for example, Microsoft Office for documents, Outlook Express for emails, Internet Explorer for searching the Internet) are installed on and run off that virtual server. A customer is able to connect remotely to the virtual server (for example from a desktop or laptop computer) using a software program such as Citrix which requires the customer to provide a unique identifier and password. Once the customer has connected to the virtual server, the screen of the remote desktop or laptop computer will display the customer's software applications (which are running on the virtual server) and allow the customer to access their data (which is stored on a portion of a shared storage device owned by Trusted Cloud that has been allocated to the customer).
21 The services include responsibility for maintaining the security and operation of the virtual desktop and its connection to the customer's remote computers. The applicants also offer "cloud storage", which enables customers to store data remotely and to access and manage that data. I shall refer to the cloud services provided by the first three applicants collectively as the "Trusted Cloud business".
22 In the course of providing those services the applicants create and use a significant quantity of documents which contain commercially valuable and sensitive information, such as pricing information and customer preferences. They also keep confidential documents relating to their employees including details of their remuneration. The applicants take a number of steps to protect the information in these documents by, for example, including confidentiality provisions in employment agreements and restricting access to computer networks and information.
23 Trusted Cloud was first registered in 1998. At the time it was called "Wavenet Pty Ltd" ("Wavenet") and Mr Amira was its sole shareholder and director. It was he who established the business. The name of the company was changed to "Trusted Cloud Pty Limited" in 2010. In about February 2008 Intrapower purchased 51% of the issued share capital in Wavenet and in 2011 Intrapower was acquired by the TPG group. By 1 January 2013, Trusted Cloud became a wholly owned subsidiary of Intrapower.
24 After Mr Amira sold the Wavenet business to Intrapower in 2008, he became an employee of Trusted Cloud, serving first as managing director and later in two other senior management capacities. In the course of his employment with Trusted Cloud he was afforded access to a significant amount of information relating to the Trusted Cloud business (including commercially sensitive and confidential information). He had a contractual duty to protect the confidentiality of the information and not to misuse it. His contract of employment also contained a restraint of trade covenant and one of the causes of action alleged against him is that he breached that covenant by reason of his activities in connection with Core Desktop.
25 Mr Chen worked for the Trusted Cloud business from about April 2005 until February 2013, and Mr Papaconstantinou from about April 2010 until December 2012 with a hiatus of four or five months in the first half of 2012. As I have already indicated, both Mr Chen and Mr Papaconstantinou were employed by Intrapower Terrestrial. Both held managerial positions. Both were contractually bound to deliver up their employer's "confidential information, documentation of any description (whether in physical or electronic form) relating to the business of the Company and all other property of any description belonging to the Company … in [their] possession, power or control …". Both were prohibited from participating in any business activity outside their employment with Intrapower Terrestrial which could affect their duties or obligation to the company, from enticing or attempting to entice away from the company customers, employees or consultants, and from undertaking any activity which might conflict with the interests or business of the company.
26 Core Desktop was registered on 1 November 2012. The same day Mr Papaconstantinou was appointed secretary and sole director. The shares in Core Desktop are owned by three companies controlled by Mr Amira, Mr Chen and Mr Papaconstantinou. On 21 December 2012 - some seven weeks after he acquired the shares in Core Desktop - Mr Papaconstantinou tendered his resignation to Intrapower Terrestrial. Mr Chen followed suit on 7 January 2013, and Mr Amira, on about 14 January 2013.
27 Kyle Fraser worked for the Trusted Cloud business (employed by Intrapower Terrestrial) from about September 2010 to April 2013. He was employed first as a support engineer, and then as infrastructure engineer. In this latter role he was a member of the team managed by Mr Chen and was responsible for designing and developing computing and storage capabilities of Trusted Cloud. He tendered his resignation on 20 March 2013, giving four weeks' notice. Since he left Intrapower Terrestrial he has been employed by Core Desktop. The applicants allege, amongst other things, that Mr Papaconstantinou enticed both Mr Chen and Mr Fraser to leave Intrapower Terrestrial.
28 Each of Messrs Amira, Chen and Fraser had administrator access which enabled them to see and copy any information stored in the Trusted Cloud system. Mr Fraser's contract contained the same obligations in relation to confidential information and the same restrictions on the undertaking of business activities outside the Trusted Cloud business as those contained in the contracts of Messrs Chen and Papaconstantinou.
29 Andrew Quach's contract also contained those obligations. Mr Quach worked as a field network engineer for the Trusted Cloud business from about 19 September 2007 until 2 May 2014. His employer was TPG Holdings. Three days after he left the employ of TPG Holdings, he began working for Core Desktop as an onsite technical engineer.
30 One of Wavenet's and later Trusted Cloud's customers was the Melbourne Institute of Plastic Surgery ("MIPS"). Trusted Cloud provided virtual servers for MIPS to operate its software applications and on which to store its data. In hosting virtual servers for MIPS, Trusted Cloud maintained the security of the stored data, including restricting access to those virtual servers by requiring the use of usernames and passwords.
31 On about 24 July 2014 MIPS advised Trusted Cloud that it no longer wished to use Trusted Cloud's services. It appears from Ms de Ville's evidence that the position was confirmed on or about 12 August 2014. After that advice was given, Jonathon Mann, a project manager in the Trusted Cloud business, began to prepare to carry out disengagement services for MIPS. In accordance with Trusted Cloud's standard practice, he conducted an initial review of the MIPS virtual server hosted by Trusted Cloud in order to consider the scope of the disengagement process. Following that review he approached Ms de Ville about concerns he had about software installed on MIPS' virtual servers operated under the Trusted Cloud service.
32 The applicants did not file an affidavit from Mr Mann. The evidence concerning his conduct is hearsay, though admissible under s 75 of the Evidence Act as an exception to the hearsay rule. It was given by Ms de Ville on the basis of information and belief.
33 Mr Mann told Ms de Ville that he saw that a synchronisation software program, called "Super Flexible File Synchronizer" ("SFFS"), was installed on MIPS' virtual servers. It had been installed on 6 August 2014 - about a fortnight after MIPS had informed Trusted Cloud that it no longer wished to use its services. Synchronisation software is used to synchronise or copy files from one server to another. Trusted Cloud had not installed the software on MIPS' server. The synchroniser software appeared to be syncing data to a server with a remote IP address ("the remote server"). It turns out that was a Core Desktop server.
34 Mr Mann took screenshots which revealed a list of files awaiting transfer (synchronisation) from the Trusted Cloud administered server to the remote server. He also accessed the synchroniser software and programmed it to set up a reverse synchronisation of the files on the remote server. This generated a "job report" listing all the files on the remote server. At least 19 folders included Mr Amira's name in their title, 29 included Mr Chen's and 13 included "Kyle". Many of the files in these folders carried dates that preceded the resignations of Mr Amira and Mr Chen from the Trusted Cloud business. Ms de Ville expressed concern that they were documents upon which the two men worked during their employment in that business.
35 Amongst the titles to the files in folders bearing Mr Amira's name were "Cost Pricing", "Microsoft License Keys", "Employee plan" and "Copy of Wavenet revenue". Each of these titles corresponds to the titles of files belonging to the applicants and over which the applicants assert copyright. Ms de Ville's evidence was that these documents were also confidential. In the hands of a competitor, they posed a real threat to the applicants' business. One of Ms de Ville's concerns was that a competitor could use the information to target Trusted Cloud customers and undercut Trusted Cloud and she supplied a list of nine former Trusted Cloud customers whom she now understood to be Core Desktop customers.
36 Although she had not then had the opportunity to consider all the file names, Ms de Ville expressed concerns that material of the same kind might be found in other folders such as the "Yong Chen" folders.
37 There were also "pst" files, that is to say, Microsoft Outlook files which could include emails, contacts and calendar entries. Ms de Ville said she was concerned that Trusted Cloud emails including attachments could contain its confidential information.
38 Ms de Ville also provided some additional context for Mr Mann's conduct. She said that about four months before Mr Mann carried out his review, United Petroleum Pty Ltd ("United Petroleum"), another customer of Trusted Cloud, indeed, one of its largest, had asked Trusted Cloud to help it establish a connection between the United Petroleum virtual servers maintained by Trusted Cloud and a remote server used by United Petroleum, apparently maintained by a then unknown third party. The purpose of the connection was to enable United Petroleum to share information between the Trusted Cloud servers and the third party server. To establish the connection, TPG supplied an Ethernet connection and, with United Petroleum's agreement, assigned a number of IP addresses for the third party server. An IP address, Ms de Ville explained, is a unique numerical label assigned to a server that is connected to a computer network which uses the Internet Protocol for communication. One of the IP addresses assigned by TPG for the third party server was 10.50.254.251. This was the same IP address as that for the remote server to which MIPS files were being synchronised from the Trusted Cloud managed server. Mr Mann told Ms de Ville that he thought it was strange that the SFFS software installed on MIPS' server administered by Trusted Cloud was apparently syncing data to this remote IP address. No explanation was given for why he regarded it as strange, despite two separate requests from the respondents that the applicants provide it. The inference the applicants pressed upon the Court was that it was strange because it was the same remote IP address established for the use of United Petroleum, although there is no evidence that this information was known to Mr Mann. It is tolerably clear, however, as a result of Mr Mann's review, that the remote IP address was for a server being used by Core Desktop to store documents including documents, the copyright of which is allegedly owned by Trusted Cloud and which allegedly contain its confidential information.
39 Following the orders made on 22 August 2014, the respondents filed a number of affidavits. In his affidavit sworn on 2 September 2014 Mr Chen admitted to taking Trusted Cloud documents. He said at [5]-[6]:
5 In my former role as Infrastructure Manager at Trusted Cloud I was responsible for IT system integrity and had to be available at any time to manage system outage events. In order to achieve this I was required to keep a copy of IT system documents offsite and, if needed, use such files to help the Trusted Cloud system recover in the event of a catastrophic IT issue preventing access to on-site documents. I stored all such documents on a personal USB thumb drive which I generally carried with me. The USB thumb drive also included personal files of mine…
6 After I commenced work at Core Desktop, I needed to re-use the USB thumb drive for personal purposes and I offloaded all files from the USB thumb drive onto a NAS device in the Core Desktop office and I then reformatted the USB thumb drive. The NAS device was used for internal file sharing. Mostly it was used for off-loading files that were not needed to be stored on PCs. The NAS device was subsequently relocated to the Next DC data centre at Port Melbourne inside a rack used by Core Desktop in or around June 2013.
40 "NAS" is an acronym for Network Attached Storage device, which is a device used for internal file sharing.
41 Similarly, Mr Amira deposed in his affidavit of 12 September 2014 that all the data on his iMac computer, some of which dated back to his employment with Trusted Cloud, was moved across to the Core Desktop NAS device.
42 Mr Fraser, in an affidavit sworn on 2 September 2014, said that before he left Trusted Cloud he copied his personal folder from a directory on the Trusted Cloud NAS to a personal USB thumb drive and conceded that he might "inadvertently" have included files that he had created or worked on in the course of his employment with Trusted Cloud. He said that shortly after he started working for Core Desktop he uploaded the entire contents of this folder to the Core Desktop NAS.
43 Mr Quach, in an affidavit sworn on 17 October 2014, admitted to installing the SFFS software on 6 August 2014 in order to synchronise MIPS' data from the Trusted Cloud server to the Core Desktop NAS drive. He said that he did so with "vendor access" details supplied by Medical Wizard (a software supplier of MIPS) and documents annexed to his affidavit show that he obtained the "vendor access" details with the express authority of MIPS.
44 On 11 August 2014, Mr Quach tried to access the SFFS program installed on MIPS' server hosted by Trusted Cloud. Access was denied because the vendor access username and password had expired. It was the next day that Mr Mann conducted his initial review of the MIPS virtual server hosted by Trusted Cloud and saw that the SFFS software was apparently syncing data to a server with a remote IP address.
45 On 31 October 2014 Ms de Ville affirmed a second affidavit. Much of the evidence, if not all of it, was given in response to assertions, invitations or requests made on behalf of the respondents.
46 In that affidavit Ms de Ville gave the following additional evidence. Some of that evidence, it will be apparent, qualified or expanded upon the evidence given in her first affidavit.
47 The applicants allocated vendor (or administrator) access details to Medical Wizard to enable it to access the Trusted Cloud virtual server allocated to MIPS for the purpose of installing and maintaining the MediWiz software. The vendor access allocated to Medical Wizard was programed to expire automatically on 11 August 2014.
48 The applicants had used SFFS software to transfer data from customers' servers to the Trusted Cloud system but not to transfer data from one cloud service provider to another.
49 In conducting his review of the Trusted Cloud-hosted MIPS virtual server and in programming the SFFS to perform a reverse synchronisation, Mr Mann did not look at, copy or enter any passwords or login details for the SFFS software and any passwords in the SFFS software were hidden from his view. Ms de Ville explained with greater precision than appeared in the earlier affidavit what Mr Mann did to set up the reverse synchronisation process. She also said that Mr Mann cancelled the process before completion and deleted all files and partial files that had been transferred to the destination (that is, a Trusted Cloud storage device) without anyone viewing, opening or modifying them.
50 Annexed to the affidavit was a redacted copy of the managed services contract between MIPS and Wavenet dated 30 June 2009 under which Trusted Cloud provided its services to MIPS ("the MIPS contract").
51 Amongst other documents also annexed to the affidavit were:
emails disclosing that MIPS had informed Trusted Cloud on 24 July 2014 that it wished to disengage its services and confirming the following day that it wished to do so "after the next billing cycle (ie end 31 August 2014)";
correspondence passing between the solicitors for the parties; and
redacted letters sent by Trusted Cloud to three of the nine customers in the list exhibited to Ms de Ville's first affidavit who were said to have left Trusted Cloud for Core Desktop. In each of those letters Trusted Cloud noted that the current services agreement had expired and, in accordance with that agreement, Trusted Cloud was giving written notice of its intention to terminate the agreement. Trusted Cloud did offer a new agreement but at a higher cost than the amount fixed by the expired agreement. In one case, the cost was more than three times greater. Ms de Ville stated that none of the remaining customers whom she had identified as having left Trusted Cloud for Core Desktop received such letters. She said she did not include this information in her first affidavit because she did not believe it to be relevant to the concerns she expressed there. She indicated that she adhered to this belief.