consideration
128 Section 283HB(1) of the Act relevantly provides:
283HB Specific Court powers
(1) If the trustee or ASIC applies to the Court, the Court may make any or all of the following orders:
…
(b) an order restraining the borrower from paying any money to the debenture holders or any holders of any other class of debentures;
…
(f) an order restricting borrowing by the borrower;
(g) any other order that the Court considers appropriate to protect the interests of existing or prospective debenture holders.
129 The principal orders that the plaintiff seeks are that the defendant be restrained from paying any money to debenture holders until, at least, 20 February 2015 (the freeze period), save for certain "permitted" payments (s 283HB(1)(b)); that the defendant be restrained, in the freeze period, from borrowing (including by accepting, under the trust deed, investments in debentures) and from reinvesting any existing investments in debentures issued under the trust deed (s 283HB(1)(f)); and that the defendant be restrained, in the freeze period, from paying money to or for the benefit of any related body corporate of the defendant or related entity, and, further, that the defendant be ordered to return any funds for investment in debentures issued under the trust deed, received in the freeze period (s 283HB(1)(g)).
130 Relevantly to the present case, s 283HB(2) of the Act provides that, in deciding whether to make an order under s 283HB(1), the Court must have regard to:
the ability of the borrower (here, the defendant) to repay the amount deposited or lent as and when it becomes due; and
the interests of the borrower's creditors.
131 The principal question arising on this application is whether the "freeze" now sought by the plaintiff should be granted.
132 On the evidence before me, I am not persuaded that such a "freeze" is, at the present time, justified or in the best interests of debenture holders.
133 I am persuaded, on the present evidence, that the defendant is solvent and will remain solvent in the foreseeable future and, specifically, that the defendant will have sufficient liquidity to meet its obligations to debenture holders as and when those obligations fall due. This is the conclusion of the Edwards Marshall report. On the other hand, the PPB Advisory report rises no higher than to say that, as at 12 December 2014, PPB Advisory had not been able to properly consider the defendant's solvency.
134 Both parties acknowledge that the conclusion of the Edwards Marshall report depends critically on the assumptions made in that report - in particular the assumption that the defendant will retain the level of investor support that prevailed in the period prior to 31 October 2014. Lack of investor support is the principal risk to the defendant's solvency, although the other assumptions in the Edwards Marshall report should also continue to be a focus of attention. The point of present importance is that all assumptions in the report are capable of being monitored closely, particularly in the immediate future.
135 Nevertheless, as the defendant has stressed, its present cash position is three times greater than that required under the trust deed, and it has not been shown that it is, or ever has been, in breach of the trust deed or of any other statutory or regulatory provision required to be observed by it in the conduct of its business. It also emphasises that PPB Advisory's own conclusion is that, for the four months ended 31 October 2014, the defendant has a surplus of assets over liabilities of $27.7 million.
136 The defendant's view is that, if such a "freeze" were to be granted - indeed, if the current "freeze" were to continue beyond 31 December 2014 - adverse publicity will arise, which is highly likely to lead to the perception that the defendant is unable to pay its debenture liabilities as and when those liabilities fall due. This would result in loss of investor support - manifested by a possible collapse in reinvestment in respect of matured debentures - that, according to the defendant, would lead, inevitably, to the defendant's insolvency. Both Mr Luckhurst-Smith and Mr Morris have given evidence as to the possibility of that scenario.
137 The plaintiff's evidence, on the other hand, does not address the possibility that the relief it seeks will precipitate a loss in investor support or the consequences of that loss of support. Nevertheless, in submissions, the plaintiff accepted the possibility that a continuation of the "freeze" may well result in a loss of investor support.
138 I am persuaded that if the "freeze" that is sought were to be granted, or if the current "freeze" were to continue, there is a real likelihood that investors would perceive this to mean that the defendant is unable to pay its debenture liabilities as and when those liabilities fall due, even though, as I have said, the present evidence does not justify that conclusion. In this connection, I accept Mr Morris' evidence that, if the freeze were to continue, the defendant will not have funds with which to continue to operate its lending business and will be forced to call in loans and/or realise securities earlier than it may have intended. This is likely to lead to a loss of investor confidence and losses on the realisation of its assets by reason of the need for the forced realisation of securities. I also accept Mr Morris' evidence that any freeze on repaying matured debentures will likely cause investor disharmony and a loss of investor support that, inevitably, would lead to a decline in debenture funding that would materially undermine the defendant's solvency. Indeed, if that were to happen, it is likely that the defendant would then be placed into external administration. In that eventuality, the debenture holders may well be worse off than if loans were to be discharged in the ordinary course of the defendant's business, as revealed in the evidence, or even if loan securities were to be realised by the defendant as mortgagee in possession or through its own appointment of a receiver to the secured property: see, for example, the observations of Rares J in Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd (2012) 203 FCR 461 at [65]. This potential damage must weigh heavily in the balance.
139 Further, I accept the real possibility, based on Mr Luckhurst-Smith's evidence, that if the "freeze" that is sought were to be granted, it would result in grave prejudice to the defendant's prospects of concluding a transaction with the prospective purchaser of its loan book. Mr Luckhurst-Smith has deposed to his concern that, if the freeze were to be continued, the prospective purchaser will withdraw from further discussions. Mr Luckhurst-Smith has deposed to his belief that, given what he has described as the "rapid deterioration" of the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff since early November 2014, the prospective purchase is in the best interests of debenture holders.
140 As I have noted, the plaintiff also seeks orders in relation to the provision of information by the defendant. This has two broad aspects. The first concerns the preparation by the defendant of a three-way cash flow model in respect of its business, incorporating its profit and loss, its balance sheet and its cash flow projected over the period up to and including 31 December 2013. The defendant does not regard the provision of this information as necessary, particularly in light of the Edwards Marshall report, but has nevertheless agreed to provide it.
141 The second aspect concerns the revaluation of certain properties. As developed in submissions, the plaintiff seeks to have the real property securities underlying 17 loans revalued because the valuation dates of the current valuations are now in excess of one year. Of these loans, six are non-performing loans. There is another non-performing loan, but as this is secured by a chattel mortgage, it can be put to one side for present purposes. The valuations in relation to these six non-performing loans have not been considered - because they were not required to be considered - in the Deloitte report.
142 The defendant has signified its preparedness to obtain new valuations in respect of these secured properties, on the basis that the valuations are undertaken by valuers appointed by it. However, the defendant objects to the other valuations being obtained. It does so on the basis that its affairs, in that regard, have already undergone a degree of examination which, in submissions, the defendant said is "astonishing". The defendant developed this submission as follows.
143 As at 3 April 2013, as part of the independent business review of the defendant's affairs commenced in November 2012, 333 Advisory had undertaken a loan portfolio review of the valuations supporting 50% of the defendant's loan book. The review undertaken in the Deloitte report was in respect of the valuations supporting the other 50% of the defendant's loan book. Of these, only six valuations were called into question, as I have already recorded. As I have also recorded, the conclusion expressed in the final draft of the Deloitte report, which is still subject to consultation with KordaMentha, is that no impairment provisioning is required. Thus, in the defendant's submission, since April 2013 - a period less than 2 years - the valuation of each secured property supporting the defendant's loan book has been the subject of review. Further, the defendant's assets are audited yearly and half-yearly by Deloitte. At no relevant time has Deloitte, as auditor, expressed the view that the holding value of the secured property in the defendant's accounts is inappropriate.
144 I am not persuaded on the evidence currently before me that there is any necessity to carry out revaluations on the secured properties supporting all loans other than the non-performing loans. The plaintiff's rationale for seeking these new valuations is that the present valuations are currently in excess of one year. However, that fact alone does not persuade me that the valuations are unreliable. No evidence leading to that conclusion has been placed before me.
145 The valuation of properties in relation to the non-performing loans stands in a different position, not least because the defendant has agreed - at least in concept - to undertake new valuations. I am not persuaded, however, that this should be left solely in the defendant's camp. The plaintiff submits that it is appropriate that it be involved in the selection and instruction of the valuers concerned. I think that is appropriate. In its originating process, the plaintiff sought a revaluation of properties according to a protocol. The defendant has not directed any criticism to that protocol, beyond its submission that it alone should appoint and instruct the valuer or valuers concerned.
146 There is a further matter I should note. The form of relief sought by the plaintiff in prayer 6 of the originating process goes beyond the question of new valuations. The submissions of the parties were nevertheless directed to the question of the need for revaluations. The plaintiff advanced the position that an order should be made that the defendant provide such access to its books and records as reasonably required by PPB Advisory for the purpose of it advising and reporting to the plaintiff. The basis for that wide form of order was not developed in submissions.
147 Under clause 6.5(d) of the trust deed, the defendant is obliged to give the plaintiff "such information as is reasonably required by it in relation to the business, property, affairs, accounting records or other records of the Group Members". I have not been taken to any material that would suggest that the defendant is in breach of that obligation. Further, it has not been suggested that this clause of the trust deed does not provide sufficient recourse to the plaintiff in relation to obtaining the information it might reasonably seek. For this reason, at the present time, I decline to grant any broader relief than that properly developed in submissions.
148 Finally, I should record that ASIC appeared at the hearing of this application by counsel. ASIC submitted that, on the material with which it has been served, it considers that the plaintiff has reasonable grounds to hold material concerns about the defendant's financial position. On that basis, it submits that the plaintiff should be given access to whatever books and records, and assistance from the defendant, it considers necessary in order to investigate and resolve its concerns. That position is understandable. However, as I have endeavoured to explain, the plaintiff's position appears to be covered by clause 6.5(d) of the trust deed and, at the present time, no satisfactory basis has been established for the provision of information extending beyond that already required to be provided under that clause, in addition to the three-way model and obtaining the new valuations to which I have referred.
149 With respect to the "freeze" that is sought, ASIC made clear its position that, in the time available to consider the affidavit evidence with which it has been served, it is not in a position to say to the Court one way or the other whether it considers such a "freeze" to be necessary or appropriate.
150 ASIC also referred to the defendant's obligations of continuous disclosure, but advised the Court that it did not seek, at the present time, any orders in that regard.