(See also Chan v Zacharia [1984] HCA 35; (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 193; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Everett [1980] hca 6; (1980) 143 CLR 440 at 446-7; Fletcher at [5.40]).
28 The corollary of the fact that partners have beneficial interests in each partnership asset is that partners who hold legal title to partnership property do so subject to trust obligations to hold and apply the property in accordance with the rights and entitlements of all of the partners (Chan v Zacharia at 193-4 per Deane J). It follows that the first and third respondents, who held the legal title to the Branch Lane property and who were members of the partnership, were subject to trust obligations of that character.
29 I return then to the Heads of Agreement.
30 As plainly indicated by clause 1, and as is implicit in the remainder of the document, the Heads of Agreement constituted an agreement between the four partners of the partnership relating to the two rural properties to dissolve that partnership.
31 Agreements for dissolution of partnerships are of course a commonly encountered and necessary part of commercial activity. As would be expected, the Courts have been prepared to give effect to them. Where otherwise appropriate the Court will order specific performance and grant injunctions. (R C Anson Banks, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 18th ed (2002) Sweet & Maxwell at [23-48, 49; 23-147]). The partners must adhere to their fiduciary duties in making such dissolution agreements. Thus the ordinary obligations not to mislead each other and to make full disclosure of relevant matters are applicable (Partnership Act 1892, s 28; Fletcher [4.15]; Lindley & Banks [16-01, 02, 06]. It was not contended on the appeal that either of these duties was breached by any of the partners.
32 Case authority does not suggest that the duties of partners to each other applicable on the making of dissolution agreements go beyond the duties not to mislead and to make full disclosure. In particular, there is no basis in the authorities relating to partnership law for a principle that a partnership dissolution agreement may be rescinded by a partner if "full value" is not given to the partner for his or her partnership interest. Such a principle would impose a substantial limitation upon the ability of partners to put an end to their arrangements in the most efficient and cost effective manner. It would enable a partner who had contracted for dissolution of the partnership with partners who had not misled him or her and had made full and frank disclosure to revisit the commercial arrangements freely entered into. This is what the appellant has sought to do in the present case.
33 The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Law v Law (1905) 1 Ch 140 is inconsistent with such a principle. That was a case of a sale by one partner to another of a share in the partnership business. The court held that there was a duty to make full disclosure and not to mislead resting on each of the partners but there was no suggestion by the court that the selling partner could subsequently complain if it transpired that he did not receive a fair price for his share of all of the partnership assets which existed. In that case, the purchasing partner was aware of the existence of more partnership assets than those of which the selling partner was aware. The selling partner's complaint of non disclosure was defeated by what was held to be an election on his part not to insist on his right of full disclosure.
34 To like effect is the statement in Lindley & Banks at [23-56]:
"It is, perhaps, self evident that the rescission of a dissolution or other agreement cannot be obtained merely because it turns out to be disadvantageous to one or more of the partners. As Lord Lindley explained:
'Supposing every member of a firm to be sui juris , any one may retire upon any terms to which he and his co-partners may choose to assent; and if there is no fraud, misrepresentation or concealment on either side, all will be bound by any agreement into which he and they may enter, although it may ultimately turn out that a bad bargain has been made.'
35 Subclause 2(b) of the Heads of Agreement in this case provided inter alia for "any interest" or "claim to beneficial interest" which the appellant had "in the Branch Lane" to be "surrendered or transferred" to the second respondent. The words "the Branch Lane" were a reference to the Branch Lane property. They were so defined in clause 1.
36 Prior to the execution of the Heads of Agreement, the interests of the appellant in respect of the Branch Lane property stemmed from the fact that he and his nominee company Clemelle Way Pty Ltd comprised two of the four partners of the partnership which beneficially owned the property. Ultimately he would therefore be entitled, directly or indirectly, to one-half of the proceeds of sale of the property after discharge of relevant liabilities. The effect of subclause 2(b) of the Heads of Agreement was that in respect of his own partnership share the appellant forewent any claim to an interest in the Branch Lane property. As no trust was involved in the holding of this partnership share, there can be no doubt that the disposition (or surrender) of this interest was not subject to the "fair-dealing" rules. There was thus no obligation on the acquirer, the second respondent, to show that "full value" was given to the respondent in respect of this disposition, although as a partner, and therefore fiduciary, the second respondent was required to make full disclosure and to refrain from any misrepresentation. He adhered to these requirements.
37 The remainder of the appellant's effective interest in the Branch Lane property flowed from the fact that his nominee company, Clemelle Way Pty Ltd (the sole share in which was held by the second respondent on trust for him), was a partner in the property partnership. It would be surprising if the incidental fact that this part of the appellant's effective interest in the Branch Lane property was held not by himself but by a nominee on his behalf required a radically different principle to be applied in relation to the disposition of this part than applied in respect of the disposition of the other part of the appellant's effective interest in the property.
38 The appellant's use of a company to hold part of his interest in the venture was related to a divorce settlement of his and to an obligation on his part to pay maintenance to his second wife. As the primary judge found, the appellant's first wife was to be the sole shareholder and director of Clemelle Way Pty Ltd but she changed her mind. This circumstance, which was purely incidental, and indeed accidental, so far as the partnership and the second respondent were concerned, resulted in the second respondent becoming the sole shareholder and director.
39 Unlike the trust in Associated Alloys Pty Ltd v ACN 001452106 Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 25; (2000) 202 CLR 588, a case strongly relied upon by the appellant, the trust which was utilised by the appellant in the present case was not intended to, and did not, play any role in the commercial arrangements between the parties. The appellant utilised it purely for the purpose of holding part of his interest. In contrast, the commercial arrangements between the buyer and seller of goods in Associated Alloys incorporated a retention of ownership clause designed to protect the interests of the seller. The clause provided that if the goods were used in a manufacturing or construction process the proceeds of such process were to be held in trust for the seller. The High Court found no reason not to give effect to the trust according to its terms and to apply the principles ordinarily applicable to trusts.
40 In the present case, there was however an agreement by partners to dissolve their partnership. The agreement was of a conventional character. The principles applicable to such dissolution agreements would not entitle the partner to resist enforcement of such an agreement simply upon the basis of a contention that the other partner or partners had not given "full value" for his or her interest. To conclude that a different result should in part follow in the present case because of the way in which one half of the appellant's effective interests in the partnership were, purely for his own convenience, held, would in my view result in a triumph of form over substance and arbitrarily and unnecessarily derogate from partners' freedom to contract for dissolution of their arrangements in such manner as they thought appropriate. Whilst the maxim that "equity looks to the intent rather than to the form" has, as pointed out in Meagher Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines & Remedies 4th ed (2002) Butterworths at [3-190] been "much misunderstood and misapplied", the present is in my view a case where it is applicable. The agreement constituted by the Heads of Agreement was in substance one for the dissolution of partnership. The fact that a trust was involved in an incidental way did not change the essential character of the relationship between the parties and of the partnership dissolution agreement into which they entered. It was not a case like Associated Alloys where the parties chose to utilise a trust to assist in regulating their relationship.
41 Consistent with this approach are the statements of Deane J in Chan v Zacharia at 205:
"… one cannot but be conscious of the danger that the over-enthusiastic and unnecessary statement of broad general principles of equity in terms of inflexibility may destroy the vigour which it is intended to promote in that it will exclude the ordinary interplay of the doctrines of equity and the adjustment of general principles to particular facts and changing circumstances and convert equity into an instrument of hardship and injustice in individual cases: see Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley ((1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371, at p 383); Cretney, (loc. cit., pp 168ff); Oaklley, Constructive Trusts ((1978), pp 57ff). There is 'no better mode of undermining the sound doctrines of equity than to make unreasonable and inequitable applications of them': per Lord Selborne LC, Barnes v Addy ((1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 at p 251)."
42 Also relevant in this context are the comments of the High Court in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544 made in connection with the obligation of a fiduciary to account for profits made within the scope and ambit of his or her duty:
"It is necessary to keep steadily in mind the cardinal principle of equity that the remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case and the particular facts. As Fletcher Moulton LJ observed in In re Coomber; Coomber v. Coomber ((1911) 1 Ch 723 at 728-729):
'Fiduciary relations are of many different types ... and the Courts have again and again, in cases where there has been a fiduciary relation, interfered and set aside acts which, between persons in a wholly independent position, would have been perfectly valid. Thereupon in some minds there arises the idea that if there is any fiduciary relation whatever any of these types of interference is warranted by it. They conclude that every kind of fiduciary relation justifies every kind of interference. Of course that is absurd. The nature of the fiduciary relation must be such that it justifies the interference. There is no class of case in which one ought more carefully to bear in mind the facts of the case ... than cases which relate to fiduciary and confidential relations and the action of the Court with regard to them.
…
… the stringent rule requiring a fiduciary to account for profits can be carried to extremes and that in cases outside the realm of specific assets, the liability of the fiduciary should not be transformed into a vehicle for the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.'
43 Taken to its logical conclusion the appellant's argument would open many partnership dissolution agreements to challenge by former partners. It frequently happens, as occurred in the present case, that the legal title to partnership property is held by some, but not all, of the partners. The appellant's argument would require any partners who held the legal title to partnership property, and who were therefore trustees for the partnership, to show that they gave full value if a partnership dissolution involved their retaining some of that property beneficially.
44 A reason why particular caution needs to be exercised in applying trust principles to the relations between partners is that fiduciary duties are owed by each partner to each other. The confidence which exists between them is a mutual one (Chan v Zacharia ibid at 196). There is thus in this respect not necessarily an imbalance of position which usually exists in fiduciary relationships.
45 In Hospital Products Limited v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64; (1984) 156 CLR 41, Mason J said that the critical feature of traditional fiduciary relations:
"[I]s that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position" (at 96-7).
46 These comments apply to the relationship of partners as well as to the other accepted fiduciary relationships referred to by his Honour, namely, "trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, solicitor and client, employee and employer [and] director and company" (at 96). The distinguishing feature of the partnership relationship is however that in that relationship the duties are mutual. Therefore unlike the position with the other relationships, there is not one person who is "vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position" and one who is not. Rather, both parties are in a sense at the same time both vulnerable and ascendant. There is thus a greater equality in the relationship.
47 The courts should in my view be loath to permit a person who was a party to a relationship which was in substance and effect of this character to disclaim a bargain freely entered into. The requirements to disclose and not to mislead are in ordinary circumstances sufficient protection for the parties. In particular, where a trust is only an incidental and accidental part of the relationship, there is in my view no warrant for imposing a requirement that in an objective sense parties receive "full value" for their interests if they decide to terminate their relationship. Rather, effect should be given to the parties' own bargain.