Issue 1 - Sham transaction
116 In Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471 at 486-487 [46], the High Court explained "sham" as steps which take the form of a legally effective transaction but which the parties intend should not have the apparent, or any, legal consequences.
117 In Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee (1988) 18 FCR 449, the Full Court gave detailed consideration to the meaning of "sham". At 454, Lockhart J said that a "sham" was something that is intended to be mistaken for something else or that is not really what it purports to be. It is something which is not genuine or true - something made to appear to be something which it is not. His Honour went on to consider (at 454-458) particular elements of "sham" transactions.
118 The High Court looked at the matter again in Raftland Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 238 CLR 516 (at 531-532 [33]-[36] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ) where their Honours said:
33 It was not contended by the appellant that the amounts referred to above were misappropriated. Yet it is central to the argument for the appellant that they were amounts to which the E & M Unit Trust and, through that trust, its beneficiaries were entitled. The apparent discrepancy between the entitlements appearing on the face of the documents and the way in which the funds were applied gave rise to a question whether the documents were to be taken at face value. In various situations [See Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471 at 484 [36]; Hadijiloucas v Crean [1988] 1 WLR 1006 at 1019; [1987] 3 All ER 1008 at 1019], the court may take an agreement or other instrument, such as a settlement on trust, as not fully disclosing the legal rights and entitlements for which it provides on its face. If that be so, the parol evidence rule in Australia identified with Hoyt's Pty Ltd v Spencer [(1919) 27 CLR 133 at 144] does not apply.
34 One such case is where other evidence of the intentions of the relevant actors shows that the document was brought into existence "as a mere piece of machinery" for serving some purpose other than that of constituting the whole of the arrangement [Hawke v Edwards (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 21 and 23 per Jordan CJ. See also the remarks of Windeyer J in Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [No 2] (1966) 40 ALJR 265 at 279]. That, in essence, is the respondent's case with respect to the alleged existence of the "present entitlement" of the trustee of the E & M Unit Trust to the income of the Raftland Trust.
35 The term "sham" may be employed here, but as Lockhart J emphasised in Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [(1988) 18 FCR 449 at 453] the term is ambiguous and uncertainty surrounds its meaning and application. With reference to remarks of Diplock LJ in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd, [[1967] 2 QB 786 at 802], Mustill LJ later identified [Hadjiloucas v Crean [1988] 1 WLR 1006 at 1019; [1987] 3 All ER 1008 at 1019] as one of several situations where an agreement may be taken otherwise than at its face value, that where there was a "sham"; the term, when "[c]orrectly employed", denoted an objective of deliberate deception of third parties.
36 The presence of an objective of deliberate deception indicates fraud. This suggests the need for caution in adoption of the description "sham". However, in the present litigation it may be used in a sense which is less pejorative but still apt to deny the critical step in the appellant's case. The absence of a present entitlement within the meaning of s 100A(1)(a) of the Act may appear from an examination of the whole of the relevant circumstances, and these are not confined to the terms of the Raftland Trust instrument.
119 A sham allegation is akin to an allegation of fraud. The allegation must be firmly alleged and cogently proved. It is essential to the notion of a sham in Australian law that the parties do not intend to give effect to the legal arrangements set out in their apparent agreement. It is the parties' subjective intentions which must be determined. In order to justify a conclusion that a transaction or set of documents constitutes a sham, the requisite intention to mislead must be a common intention of all of the parties to the transaction. In analysing whether a transaction is a sham, the Court is not confined to examining the documents alone, but may examine and draw inferences from other evidence, including the parties' explanations as to their dealings and evidence describing their subsequent conduct.
120 Balaji submitted that Traxys has fallen short of that which is required to establish that the sale of the shares by Balaji to Concast was a sham.
121 Traxys submitted that the share sale transaction was a sham for the following reasons:
(a) Given that the hearing of the arbitration had concluded by March 2011, and that the arbitrators had adjourned to consider their decision, Balaji should be taken to have appreciated that an award might be forthcoming within the next couple of months after March 2011.
(b) On 11 April 2011, the arbitrators asked for submissions on costs.
(c) No serious endeavour was made by Balaji or Mr Sharma to find an arms-length buyer for Balaji shares in Booyan. According to Mr Sharma, he happened to run into Mr Sureka and the sale simply developed from there. This is an extraordinary coincidence. The sale of the shares to Concast made no commercial sense for either party. It was against Balaji's commercial interests and of no real benefit to Concast.
(d) There was no explanation as to how the price was struck or how either party arrived at its various negotiating positions.
(e) Negotiations were conducted in Hindi or Rajasthani but were minuted in English in a stilted and somewhat artificial manner.
(f) By reason of its conduct in the proceeding itself, Concast must be taken to have admitted the allegations made against it by Traxys concerning the share sale transaction.
(g) Balaji has not complied with the Court's orders concerning the production of documents and other items.
(h) Notwithstanding a significant number of communications emanating from Balaji to Mr Grainger, Mr Grainger was never told of the sale.
(i) Concast never participated in any of the business activities of Booyan or the running of Booyan at any time.
(j) Mr Sharma's endeavours to distance himself from the attempted sale to Guilford Coal are unconvincing and should be regarded as constituting a serious dent in his credit.
(k) No steps were taken to prepare or register a transfer of the shares promptly after 16 July 2011.
122 I accept the submissions made on behalf of Balaji that the strength of evidence necessary to establish a fact in issue on the balance of probabilities will vary according to what is sought to be proved (Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449-450 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deans and Guadron JJ) and that the evidence to be evaluated in respect of Traxys' allegations will need to be carefully considered and will need to be cogent.
123 Traxys accepts that the documents created by Balaji and Concast in the period from 11 April 2011 to late July 2011 were all created on or about the dates each of those documents purports to have been created. Indeed, Traxys relies upon that circumstance as supporting its fundamental proposition that the share sale transaction was a sham.
124 Balaji argued that, if Traxys is right, and the share sale transaction was a sham, it was an elaborate charade. Balaji said that it would involve the fabrication of a multitude of documents, the telling of significant lies about the extent of negotiations and the consideration paid, and the unnecessary obtaining of legal advice on the taxation implications of the deal. Balaji submitted that Traxys' theory required Concast, with no connection to Traxys, and no apparent motive for assisting Balaji, to be in on the charade. It must be found to have had a common intention to deceive Traxys. It requires a finding that Balaji had the intention to set up the sham at a time long before it knew that it was indebted to Traxys. Balaji also submitted that Traxys had failed to put squarely to Mr Sharma the elements of its sham case and, for that matter, the elements of its s 172 case. This last point cannot be made good. I am satisfied that, at Transcript p 156, the substance of Traxys' sham case was put to Mr Sharma.
125 I have come to the conclusion that the share sale transaction relied upon by Balaji to defeat Traxys' claim to have receivers appointed to the shares was, in truth, a sham at law. I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons:
(a) Concast did not come to court to defend its acquisition. Given that it apparently paid A$1.05 million for the shares in Booyan, if it had been a bona fide purchaser for value, it seems extraordinary that it would not come to court to justify the transaction. On the face of it, its failure to support Balaji leaves it out of pocket to the tune of A$1.05 million and no shares in Booyan. This is not the behaviour of a party who participated in a genuine share acquisition. In addition, and in any event, because it has not filed a Defence, Concast should be taken to have admitted the allegations made in Traxys' Statement of Claim. I should add that Concast's apparent lack of concern about having actually paid A$1.05 million to Balaji is not really surprising. As at 16 July 2011, it would have owed Balaji much more than that on its trading account.
(b) It is highly likely that Naresh Sharma was kept well informed of the progress of the arbitration proceedings in London. I find that he was kept informed in this way. It is also highly likely that those who represented Balaji in those proceedings and who provided advice to Balaji from time to time would have drawn to the attention of Balaji's executives the very real prospect that it might lose the arbitration and be found liable to Traxys in a very significant sum. I find that the prospect of an adverse award being handed down within a month or two of March 2011 was something that Naresh Sharma was well aware of as at April 2011.
(c) The share sale transaction made no sense commercially for either Balaji or Concast. If it were a real transaction, Balaji was arming Concast with the capacity to secure its own supply of coking coal in the future which, when joined with its capacity to purchase a coking oven in India, had the potential to allow Concast to manufacture its own coke from a steady supply of coking coal coming from Australia. On the other hand, from Concast's point of view, the project was a long term one with no immediate benefits.
(d) There is no evidence of either Balaji or Concast conducting a feasibility study or business assessment of the proposal. There is no evidence that any thought was given to the benefits and detriments of the proposal for either party.
(e) There is no evidence of any serious analysis being undertaken by either party directed to an appropriate price for the shares.
(f) From Balaji's point of view, there was no real explanation as to why it had suddenly decided to sell its shares in Booyan.
(g) Mr Sharma did not take any steps to engage with any other potential purchaser.
(h) To the outside world, nothing changed in the way in which Booyan was run or the way in which its exploration activities were undertaken after 16 July 2011. To the outside world, nothing at all changed. I do not accept that this was done in order to accommodate the wishes of Mr Sureka because the Freezing Order had caused Concast difficulty in dealing with the shares.
(i) Balaji took steps to sell the shares in Booyan to Guilford Coal. Those steps were undertaken immediately after it became aware of the present proceeding. I infer that Balaji believed that it would be able successfully to resist Traxys' claim for the appointment of receivers by bringing forward its argument that the shares had been sold to Concast thus freeing up the shares from the Freezing Orders which I had made and allowing them to be sold. Otherwise, any sale would have been in breach of those Freezing Orders.
(j) The contractual term in the share sale agreement to the effect that Naresh Sharma was to remain as a director of Booyan for as long as he chose was uncommercial and unusual. By way of contrast, Concast did not seek the appointment of a nominee of it as a director of Booyan and showed no interest in the affairs of Booyan.
(k) No attempt was ever made to formalise the share sale transaction by preparing, executing and registering a share transfer.
(l) In the end, I formed the impression that Mr Sharma was well aware of the issues in the case and, whenever possible, endeavoured to press upon me a version of events which he considered best suited Balaji's case. In expressing this view, I have taken into account the fact that English is not Mr Sharma's first language. However, I think that he had a good command of English and managed successfully most of the time to alert me to those occasions when he may have had some difficulty understanding a question or may have been confused so that, for the most part, questions were clarified then and there. In the end, I did not think that Mr Sharma was at any disadvantage by reason of the fact that English was not his first language.
(m) There is no reason to think that, upon the assumption that the share sale transaction was genuine, Concast now wished to extricate itself from the transaction because it considered the transaction no longer to be to its advantage.