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[1988] FCA 338
Federal Court of Australia
1988-07-15
Wilcox J, Mr J, Mr P
Original judgment source is linked above.
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NSW G.92 of 1988 )
Corrections to the judgment of his Honour Justice Wilcox of 15 July 1988: page 2 In the first line, please substitute "(Australasia)"
page 3 In the second last line, please substitute "sub-s.(1A)" in lieu of "sub-s.(2)" there appearing;
TRADE PRACTICES - Mergers - Acquisition by cattle abattoir operator of shares in competitor company - Whether acquiring company is, or is likely to be, dominant in the relevant market ~ Definition of product market - Geographical limits of market - Consideration of factors relevant to dominance - Jurisdiction of Court in case where vendors of shares were United Kingdom companies - Whether as a matter of discretion orders should be made against the vendor companies - Width of appropriate undertaking offered as an alternative to order for
Trade Practices Act 1974, ss.4E, 5, 50, 75B, 81. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (UK), s.5
NSW G.92 of 1988 TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION v AUSTRALIA MEAT HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED & ORS
page 62 In the second last line, please delete the words
Note: Appearances for the parties should be as follows:
Counsel for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents:
Solicitors for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents:
Mr C A Sweeney QC with Mr J S Hilton and Mr G S Charny
Mr A Goldberg QC with Mr A R Emmett QC and Mr P M Briscoe and
TRADE PRACTICES - Mergers - Acquisition by cattle abattoir operator of shares in competitor company - Whether acquiring company 18, or is likely to be, dominant in the relevant market - Definition of product market - Geographical limits of market - Consideration of factors relevant to dominance - Jurisdiction of Court in case where vendors of shares were United Kingdom companies - Whether as a matter of discretion orders should be made against the vendor companies - Width of appropriate undertaking offered as an alternative to order for
Trade Practices Act 1974, ss.4E, 5, 50, 75B, 81. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (UK), s.5
TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION v AUSTRALIA MEAT HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED & ORS
) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NSW G.92 of 1988 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The proceeding stand over for further hearing at 9.30
Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
) ) NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NSW G.92 of 1988 ) )
During the afternoon of Tuesday, 26 January 1988 (local time), whilst most Australians were sleeping off their Bicentennial celebrations, a series of meetings was held in London whereby an Australian company, Australia Meat Holdings
Pty Limited ("AMH") acquired the whole of the issued capital
of Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australia) Limited ("Borthwick"),
an English company which has long been involved in the
Australian meat trade. But, however appropriate the timing of
this "buy back the farm" transaction, a question arises
whether, in entering into the transaction, AMH -- which
already operated several abattoirs in Queensland - contravened
s.50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. That section relevantly
or indirectly, any shares in the capital, or any assets, of a body corporate if--
as a result of the acquisition, the corporation would be, or be likely to be, in a position to dominate a market for
in a case where the corporation is ina position to dominate a market for goods or services- - -
(i) the body corporate or another body corporate that is related to that body corporate is, or is likely to be, a competitor of the corporation or of a body corporate that is related to the corporation; and
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the power of the corporation to dominate that market.
a body corporate that is related to or associated with a corporation is, or two or more bodies corporate each of which is related to or associated with the one corporation together are, in a position to dominate a market for goods or services; or
a corporation, and a body corporate that is, or two or more bodies corporate each of which is, related to or associated with that corporation, together are ina position to dominate a market for goods or services,
the corporation shall be deemed for the purposes of this section to be in a position to dominate that market.
(a) a reference to a market for goods or services shall be construed as a reference to a substantial market for goods or services in Australia in a State or Territory; and
(b) a reference to dominating a market for goods or services shall be construed as a reference to dominating such a market either as a supplier or as an acquirer of goods or services in that market.
The Trade Practices Commission, the applicant herein, contends that, by 1ts acquisition of the Borthwick shares, AMH, the first respondent, was placed in a position where it would be, or would be likely to be, in a position to dominate the fat cattle market in northern Queensland -- or, alternatively, the separate fat cattle market in each of northern and central Queensland -- or, alternatively, the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially strengthen the existing power of AMH to dominate that market or those markets. The transaction having been completed, the Commission seeks an order under s.81 of the Act; either an order under sub-s.(1) for the divestiture by AMH of the acquired shares or else a declaration under sub-s.(2) that the
acquisition is void. To enable the latter order the
Commission has joined as additional respondents the vendors to - AMH of the relevant shares, Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Pacific Holdings) Limited ("Pacific Holdings") and Thomas Borthwick & Sons (UK) Limited ("UK"), and the parent of those two
companies, Borthwicks ple ("plc"). I shall refer to these
three respondents collectively as "the Borthwick respondents".
Borthwick itself, that is the company whose shares were
acquired by AMH, is not a respondent to this proceeding. The relevant provisions of s.81 are as follows:
"81. (1) The Court may, on the application of the Minister, the Commission or any other person, if it finds, or has in another proceeding instituted under this Part found, that a person has contravened section 50, by order, give directions for the purpose of securing the disposal by the person of all or any of the shares or assets acquired in contravention of that section.
(a) the Court finds, in a proceeding instituted under this Part, that a person (in this sub-section referred to as the 'acquirer') has acquired shares in the capital, or any assets, of a body corporate in contravention of section 50;
(b) the Court finds, whether in that Proceeding or any other proceeding instituted under this Part, that the person (in this section referred to as the 'vendor') from whom the acquirer acquired those shares or those assets, as the case may be, was involved in the contravention; and
{c) at the time when the finding referred to in paragraph (b) is made, any of those shares or those assets, as the case may be, are vested in the acquirer or, if the acquirer is a body corporate, in any body corporate that is related to the acquirer,
the Court may, on the application of the Minister or the Commission, declare that the acquisition, in so far as it relates to the shares or assets referred to in paragraph (c), is void as from the day on which it took place and, where the Court makes such a declaration - -
(d) the shares or the assets to which the declaration relates shall be deemed not
(e) the vendor shall refund to the acquirer any amount paid to the vendor in respect of the acquisition of the shares or assets to which the declaration relates.
(1C) Where an application is made to the Court for an order under sub-section (1) or a declaration under sub-section (1A), the Court may, instead of making an order under sub-section (1) for the purpose of securing the disposal by a person of shares or assets or an order under sub-section (1A) that the acquisition by a person of shares or assets is void, accept, upon such conditions (if any) as the Court thinks fit, an undertaking by the person to dispose of other shares or assets owned by the person,
(2) An application under sub-section (1), (1A), or (1B) may be made at any time within 3 years after the date on which the contravention occurred.
The Australian cattle herd amounts to some 25 million head, of which about 90% are cattle bred for meat production. In Queensland the proportion of beef cattle is even higher. The Australian Bureau of Statistics estimated that, at 31 March 1986, the Queensland herd contained 9,662,031 beasts, of
The Bureau's publication "Livestock and Livestock Products, Queensland, 1985-86" breaks up by breed the Queensland herd as at 31 March 1982; this apparently being
the most recent date for which figures were then available.
Of the total of 9,758,200 head, it was estimated that tropical ~- breeds accounted for 1,906,570, British and European breeds 2,635,460, dairy breeds 276,400 and cross-breeds 4,869,470. The dominant cross-breeds were Brahman/British and Other tropical/British, so that some 60% of all beef cattle were either straight or cross - -bred tropical cattle. There is no statistical evidence before the Court as to the distribution by breed of cattle in Queensland but it is common ground amongst the witnesses that tropical cattle, straight breeds and crosses, predominate in the north of the State and that most British and European breeds are to be found in the south. But their distribution is not defined only by latitudinal boundaries. There are tropical cattle in the arid south west of the State and there are pockets of British and European
There is no evidence as to the proportion of total sales constituted by cattle purchased for breeding purposes. Stud cattle are not relevant to this case. The remainder of the turn-off fall within one of three categories, the difference between which is only the degree of imminence of slaughter. "Fat cattle" are cattle in such a condition that there is no advantage in postponing slaughter. They may be in optimum condition. Alternatively, their condition may be such that, under the circumstances, there is no financial advantage in postponing slaughter; any improvement in condition being outweighed by the cost involved in obtaining that improvement.
The purchasers of "fat cattle" are almost always operators of
abattoirs. "Feed lot cattle" are cattle which are in near optimum condition but which would benefit at acceptable cost from a short stay -- up to 90 days -- 1n a feed lot where they can be intensively fed, usually with grain. "Feed lot cattle" are usually purchased by abattoir operators and housed in feed lots situated near the relevant abattoir. "Store cattle" are cattle purchased with an eye to long term, open pasture fattening. The purchaser may be an abattoir operator; but more often the purchaser will be a pastoralist anxious to put to good use his available grass. Some pastoralists do not breed cattle. They depend entirely upon the profits available from purchasing "store cattle", fattening them and reselling
Exports constitute a major component of the Queensland beef trade, more so in the north than in the south of the State. Ms Rhonda Smith, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Economics within the University of Melbourne, who has considerable experience in agricultural economics, particularly in Queensland, gave evidence on behalf of the applicant. During the course of this evidence she referred to, and adopted, industry estimates that between 80% and 90% of all beef produced in the north is exported compared to approximately 60% from the south. Although exports are made to many countries, the two most significant export markets are Japan and North America. However, there is some difference in the product predominantly exported to these markets. Japan
takes considerable quantities of prime cuts, that is high
quality cuts -- such as tenderloin, cube roll and strip loin -- which are likely to be served as such and without further processing, other than cooking. These cuts are taken from cattle designated in the trade as "Japanese ox". "Japanese ox" must comply with the specifications laid down by the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation relating to the export of meat to Japan. Those specifications require that the beast be not more than four years of age and that it have achieved a specified minimum weight. In practice it is easier for British and European breeds, especially those grown on good pastures, to meet these specifications than it is for tropical breeds pastured in arid areas. Consequently, the former tend to dominate the Japanese trade. By contrast, the North American market consists predominantly of "manufacturing meat", that is relatively lean meat intended to be processed by grinding or mincing before cooking. A proportion of most carcasses goes into manufacturing meat. Even in the case of top quality stock, slaughtered to produce prime cuts, much of the carcass can only be used for manufacturing meat. In other cases the predominant purpose of the slaughter is to obtain manufacturing meat. Generally speaking, the proportion of the carcass which is suitable only for manufacturing meat 1s greater in the parts of Queensland where tropical breeds
Frequent reference was made in the evidence to three separate regions of Queensland: the northern, central and
southern regions. Whether those regions each constitute a
separate "market" within the meaning of s.50 of the Trade
Practices Act is a question to which I shall return, but there appears to be widespread agreement upon the existence, and approximate boundaries, of the three regions. They are accepted by the Livestock and Meat Authority of Queensland ("LMAQ"), the Cattlemen's Union and the Australian Bureau of Statistics in defining its statistical divisions. The northern region constitutes that part of Queensland which lies north of a line drawn to follow shire boundaries approximately westerly from the coast just north of Mackay to the Northern Territory border. The northern region therefore includes the towns located on the railway line leading from Townsville to Mount Isa and the cattle stations served by those towns. The central region of the State is accepted as being the area which lies south of the northern region but north of a line drawn approximately westerly from a point a little north of Bundaberg. This region takes in Rockhampton and also the towns on the railway line linking Winton to Rockhampton through Longreach and Emerald. The southern region is the
The term "abattoir" has been used throughout this case so as to exclude slaughterhouses killing only small numbers of stock for local use; it being accepted on all hands that their existence has no effect upon the resolution of the issues in this case. In other words, all "abattoirs" are licensed export abattoirs. Using the word "abattoir" in this sense, there are presently ten abattoirs in the northern
region of Queensland, as defined above. Two of those
abattoirs, the AMH abattoirs at Mareeba and Mount Isa, are presently closed. AMH has three operating abattoirs in the region, at Cairns, Townsville and Cape River. Borthwick has an abattoir at Bowen and Queensland Meat Export Co Pty Limited -- a member of the Angliss, also called Vestey, group -- operates at Townsville. The remaining three abattoirs are an abattoir at Townsville owned by Tancred (NQ) Pty Limited ("Tancred (NQ)") and two small abattoirs at Innisfail
(Innisfail Butchering Company) and Tolga (Byrnes By-Products).
The central region contains six abattoirs: the Borthwick abattoir at Mackay, three abattoirs at Rockhampton -- owned respectively by AMH, Central Queensland Meat Export Co Pty Limited (Vestey) and Capricorn Meats -- the Teys Brothers (Biloela) Pty Limited abattoir at Biloela and the
In the southern region there are a further 25 abattoirs. Although three of these -- at Dinmore, at Beaudesert and at Bremer River (closed) -- are owned by AMH, and one other by Tancred Brothers Pty Limited ("Tancred"), it is not contended by the applicant that AMH is 1n a position to dominate the southern market. Furthermore, the applicant concedes that, if it is proper to treat the whole of Queensland as constituting, or being part of, a single market, AMH is not in a position to dominate that market. The applicant's case depends upon the proposition that two or more separate fat cattle markets exist within the State. Most of
the voluminous evidence in the case was directed to the
validity or otherwise of that proposition. I must deal with that evidence; but, before doing so, it is desirable to say something about the formation of AMH, the subject transaction
AMH was incorporated in 1986. The company has four equal shareholders, each of which is itself involved in the slaughter of cattle for the export trade: Elders IXL Limited ("Elders"), Metro Meat Limited ("Metro"), SCI Meat & Paper Pty
The discussions which preceded the formation of the company occupied several months. They involved not only the four ultimate participants but also both Borthwick and Vestey. Besides its two Queensland abattoirs, Borthwick has interests in both Victoria and New South Wales. The four ultimate participants in the new venture, which was code-named "Avocado", were interested only in the Queensland abattoirs and their initial proposal was to purchase only those two abattoirs. But Borthwick was unwilling to fragment its operations. So the discussion turned to the possibility of
Vestey decided not to participate in Avocado some time before May 1986. In that month the proposal came to the
attention of the Trade Practices Commission, which expressed
concern at the possibility that it would contravene ss.45 and 50 of the Trade Practices Act. Borthwick was then still a potential participant. The Commission suggested that the venturers lodge an application for authorisation. Instead, they entered into negotiations with the Commission, as a result of which the terms of their draft agreement were amended in such a manner as to cause the Commission to decide not to oppose the proposal. By that time Borthwick had decided not to become a shareholder in the new company. Nonetheless the four shareholders in AMH continued to entertain the hope that AMH would eventually acquire the
The four shareholders in AMH, together with various companies with which they were individually associated, entered into an agreement styled "Shareholders Agreement" on 29 July 1986. The first four recitals to that agreement made apparent the purpose behind the formation of the company:
"A. Each of Elders, Metro, Smorgon and Tancred (collectively referred to as the 'Participants') was, before the date hereof, independently engaged in Queensland, on its own account or through the operation of a related corporation, in the purchase and processing of livestock and the marketing of meat and meat by-products internationally.
B. Due to low utilisation of meat processing plants, owned or controlled by each of the Participants, the cost of meat processing is high, resulting in each of the Participants earning an inadequate return on its investment, and making the continued participation of each Participant in the meat processing industry in Queensland not viable within that industry's present structure.
C. Independent studies undertaken in relation to the Queensland meat processing industry indicate that rationalisation of existing meat processing plants must take place in order to ensure the future well-being of the industry in competitive domestic and international markets.
D. To ensure the continued participation of each of the Participants in the Queensland meat processing industry and to implement the proposals suggested by the independent studies referred to in recital C of this Agreement the Participants have agreed to become associated (on the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement) either directly or through a subsidiary as shareholders in a company called Australia Meat Holdings Pty. Limited ('Company'), which will acquire specified assets owned or controlled by each Participant."
The agreement provided for the acquisition by AMH of certain assets of the four shareholders. By this means AMH acquired 10 abattoirs -- nine in Queensland and one in the Northern Territory. AMH was also given the right of first refusal to acquire certain additional assets, including the Elders' abattoir at Toowoomba known as "Beef City" and the interests of Tancred, Tancred (NQ) and Foggitt Jones Pty
Limited in the abattoir at Bohle (Townsville) said in the
Part 5 of the agreement dealt with the acquisition by shareholders of cattle in Queensland. It provided that each of the shareholders "shall purchase the whole of their annual requirements of slaughter and feedlot cattle in Queensland in accordance with and subject to the procedures, terms and
conditions" set out in that Part "and not otherwise". By
para.5.01(a) each shareholder agreed to acquire "the first 35,000 of its annual requirements of slaughter or feedlot cattle in Queensland by purchasing the same itself in fat stock markets or by private treaty" at the rate of 1750 per month in each of the months January, February, November and December and at the rate of 3,500 in the other eight months of the year. If a shareholder purchased less than the agreed number in any two month period, the shortfall was not to be carried forward into subsequent months. Cattle acquired pursuant to the agreement by Tancred, for slaughter at Bohle, were to be acquired only "at markets within a radius of 160 kilometres or thereabouts" of Bohle "unless its requirements cannot be purchased by it at such markets due to seasonal
Para.5.02 went on to provide that AMH would purchase any additional fat cattle required by any member of the group, a procedure being specified. However, the agreement also prohibited the slaughter in Queensland of any cattle acquired pursuant to the agreement, whether by the shareholders themselves or through AMH, except by Elders at "Beef City" and by Tancred at Bohle or Oxley (Brisbane). The result was to limit the extent to which the shareholders could compete amongst themselves, and with AMH, for the purchase of fat
Part 6 of the agreement made provision for the allocation and sale of product. Generally speaking, sales
were to be undertaken by AMH itself rather than by individual
shareholders. For that purpose para.10.01 provided for the individual shareholders' export quotas, with some exceptions, to be transferred to AMH. Paragraph 11.01 provided: "Each of the parties agrees that the interests of the Company as provided for in this Agreement will take precedence over the individual interests of the Participants in relation to the
So far as appears there were no further negotiations with Borthwick, either for the sale of its Queensland abattoirs or of its shares, before November 1987. In that month Mr John Gunthorpe, the Executive Director of the Meat Division of Elders, who was one of the founders of AMH and who served as its Chief Executive from 29 July 1986 until April 1987 and who is now Elders' senior nominee on the AMH board of directors, happened to meet Mr Peter Cash, a director, and the Chief Executive, of Borthwick and a director of plc, at Melbourne airport. According to Mr Cash, Mr Gunthorpe made a comment that "it was a pity the Elders deal had not gone through" and that "AMH would have to buy" Borthwick. Mr Cash
replied that there were "lots of other fish in the water".
Despite this conversation AMH made no immediate approach to Borthwick. However, Borthwick became involved in discussions with Teys Brothers (Holdings) Limited ("Teys"), the parent of the companies which respectively operated
abattoirs at Biloela and Beenleigh. On 8 January 1988 an
agreement was made between pic and Teys for the sale to Teys of the whole of the issued share capital in Borthwick, together with the sale of the business of the Japanese branch of another Borthwick company: Thomas Borthwick & Sons International Limited. The consideration for the shares in Borthwick was agreed at $25 million. The agreement contained provisions designed to facilitate the continuance of the
The sale to Teys was made subject to certain conditions, including a condition that the sale be approved by the shareholders of plc. Accordingly, the directors of plc convened an Extraordinary General Meeting of shareholders to
Learning of the Teys' offer, some of the persons associated with AMH became interested in making to plc an alternative offer. But they did not do this immediately. On Friday 15 January 1988 Mr victor Smorgon contacted Mr Trevor Kennedy, Managing Director of Consolidated Press Holdings Limited ("CPH"), which company held a 55% interest in Teys. As a result Mr Donald Bourke, Financial Controller of CPH, spoke to Mr Smorgon. Mr Smorgon told Mr Bourke that AMH wished to discuss the possibility of CPH causing Teys to withdraw its offer, so as to clear the way for an AMH offer to plc. In the event Mr Bourke attended a meeting on the following Monday, 18 January, at the office of Elders. Four other persons were present: Mr Gunthorpe, representing Elders, Mr Jack Smorgon of Smorgon, Mr Geoffrey Tancred
representing Tancred and Mr Robert Wright of Metro.
During the course of this meeting Mr Tancred indicated to Mr Bourke the reason for AMH's interest in Borthwick. The note of the discussion taken by Mr Bourke, the accuracy of which was not challenged in cross-examination,
"Mr. Tancred acknowledged that I had had previous experience in the Meat Industry and was therefore fully aware there was need to rationalise the Industry.
Mr Tancred went on to explain that the AMH had been a very successful partnership and that they were now running a profitable meat processing operation in North Queensland. AMH Saw a new entry, such as Alan Teys, who they claim had no experience in North Queensland, as a real threat to the AMH being able to remain profitable and achieve further rationalisation in North Queensland."
{Mr Alan Teys is the Chairman and Managing Director of Teys
There was then discussion about either CPH or Teys becoming a one-fifth shareholder in AMH. Mr Bourke indicated that neither Teys nor CPH had any idea of the financial performance of AMH or of the investment involved. In response to a question, Mr Bourke said that CPH would normally expect a return of cash outlay within three years, to which Mr Gunthorpe responded that the investment from each AMH shareholder of $13 million had been -- or perhaps he said "would be" -- repaid in a little over two years. In response to a question from Mr Bourke, Mr Wright stated that AMH had
made $22 million in 11 months of operation, on a kill of
600,000 head of cattle. Mr Bourke calculated this out at $36 per head. Mr Tancred commented that AMH should have made an additional $4 per head. He added, according to Mr Bourke's note "that if they had not had competition from Borthwicks then they would have earned another $10 per head" -- taking the total profit to $46 per head. Although Mr Tancred did not refer to competition in respect of cattle purchases, Mr Bourke understood him at the time to be referring to such competition. However, he conceded in evidence that Mr Tancred might have had in mind the possibility of extra profit enuring from increased throughput occasioned by an absence of competition from Borthwick for livestock. As Mr Tancred was not called, there is no evidence as to what he did have in mind. Mr Bourke recorded that those present "also indicated that in the coming year probably the northern plants could
operate with only one of the Borthwick plants, ie Mackay or
No agreement was reached at this meeting. Later that day Mr Gunthorpe telephoned Mr Bourke to inform him that the members of AMH had decided to proceed with a counter bid. But he made a reference to continuing discussions and, a few minutes later, he telephoned again to say that the bid would be made conditional, so as to allow AMH to withdraw if suitable arrangements were made with Teys and CPH relative to Borthwick. Mr Tancred also telephoned Mr Bourke, speaking of
the possibility of compromise and of getting Teys into AMH.
On that same day, 1n London, AMH delivered a letter to the Chairman of plc, Mr Lewis Robertson. That letter contained an offer by AMH to purchase the share capital of Borthwick and the Japanese business upon the same terms as in the Teys agreement, but subject to a variation in the price of the shares from $25 million to $29 million. The offer was made subject to the Teys agreement not becoming unconditional and was stated to be open for acceptance until 31 March 1988 unless withdrawn by AMH in the meantime. However, on the following day -- and apparently as a result of Mr Bourke having, on 19 January, informed Mr Gunthorpe that he saw no point in further discussions -- the offer was varied by
deleting therefrom the reservation of the right of withdrawal.
The letter of offer requested Mr Robertson to communicate the AMH offer to the shareholders of ple before the scheduled Extraordinary General Meeting. But those in control of AMH were not content to leave the matter to the directors of plc. It happened that, at the time, Mr Michael Nugent, Chief Executive of Elders Agribusiness, was in London. He had arranged to lunch with Lord Vestey, the head of the Vestey group. In a move which throws light upon the nature of the relationship between AMH and Vestey at the most senior level, Mr Gunthorpe telephoned Mr Nugent and suggested that he raise with Lord Vestey the concern of AMH to acquire Borthwick. Mr Nugent did so. On 23 January he reported to Mr Gunthorpe Lord Vestey's advice that he (Mr Gunthorpe) contact Mr Bob Parker of Vestey, London. Mr Nugent's fax message went
on: "They are willing to talk. Also may be able to get to
some key Borthwick plc shareholders to get the directors to
slow up so AMH can get its offer unconditional in interests of
Mr Gunthorpe telephoned Mr Parker. Mr Gunthorpe told Mr Parker that AMH would not be in a position to get a board recommendation prior to the shareholders' meeting and that AMH would probably have to try to generate support from individual plc shareholders. Mr Parker said that he would see what he could do. Mr Gunthorpe took from this answer that Mr Parker "was intending to make sure that the shareholders were aware
of the tenets upon which our offer had been placed to them".
Back in Australia other discussions were occuring; these being discussions involving the Trade Practices Commission. On 20 January 1988 Mr Bourke reported to Mr Kerry Packer, the head of CPH, the substance of his discussions with AMH. It was decided to seek legal advice. Mr Bourke prepared a narrative of events and had a discussion with Mr Bruce McWilliam of Allen, Allen & Hemsley, solicitors. Apparently at Mc McWilliams' suggestion, the narrative of events was, on 21 January 1988, faxed to Mr W R McComas, the then Chairman of
As it happened, Allen, Allen & Hemsley were also acting for Borthwick in connection with the matter. At some stage -- the evidence does not indicate when -- it was decided in London that it would be desirable for Mr Ian Tonking of
that firm, in company with Mr Cash, to see Mr McComas in
Canberra in order to ascertain the Commission's likely reaction to the AMH offer. Mr Denis Carey, Group Chief Executive of plc, rang Mr Cash from London and asked him to attend that interview with Mr Tonking. The meeting was held on the afternoon of 21 January. Mr Cash gave Mr McComas some information regarding Queensland abattoirs, including kill levels and market shares. At the end of the meeting, according to Mr Cash, Mr McComas indicated that he could not say that there would not be a problem with the AMH offer. That position was confirmed, in more positive terms, in a fax sent to Mr Tonking later that same day. The fax read:
"I refer to my discussion this afternoon with you and Mr Cash and now confirm my advice that, on the basis of information presently available to the Trade Practices Commission, 1t would take the view that if Australia Meat Holdings Pty Limited proceeds further with its proposal to acquire the issued share capital of Thomas Borthwick & Sons (Australasia) Limited, that acquisition would be likely to contravene s.50 of the Trade Practices Act, in that it would place Australia Meat Holdings Pty Limited in a position where 1t would, or would be likely to, dominate the market for the purchase of cattle in the central and northern regions of Queensland for processing for export, and possibly for local consumption.
This view has been conveyed to Australia Meat Holdings Pty Limited with the request that within seven days of today's date it let me have an assurance that it will not proceed further with its proposal without consultation with the Trade Practices Commission. If this assurance is not forthcoming and Australia Meat Holdings Pty Limited intends to proceed with its proposal, that company has also been informed that the Commission will take such action as it might be advised to intervene in the proposal."
Mr Cash reported the position to Mr Carey; and it appears that Allen, Allen & Hemsley also had contact upon the matter
with both Mr Carey and with Borthwick's London solicitors.
On 24 January Mr Cash left Australia for London. Upon the following day, Monday 25 January, counsel for the Trade Practices Commission moved in this Court for a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring AMH forthwith to withdraw its offer to purchase the Borthwick shares, the claim being that the acquisition of those shares would contravene s.50 of the Trade Practices Act. Counsel for AMH resisted this application, arguing that the likely effect of such an order would be that the Teys' offer would be accepted by the shareholders in Borthwick so that, without any curial determination that the offer did contravene s.50, AMH would be eliminated from the contest for Borthwick. On behalf of AMH, counsel offered certain undertakings designed to ensure that, if AMH's bid were successful, pending final determination of the matter Borthwick's business would be maintained and conducted independently of, and in competition with, the
I thought that, particularly having regard to the undertakings which were offered, it would not be appropriate to make the order sought by the Trade Practices Commission. But I did not want there to be any misunderstanding by AMH as to its position, and particularly as to the risk which it would run if it proceeded with its offer; the possibility of a divestiture order under s.81(1) having already been raised by counsel for the Trade Practices Commission. After obtaining instructions, senior counsel for AMH made the
"If AMH were to be successful in its bid for the Borthwick shares and the TPC was of the view that that acquisition was a contravention of Section 50 of the Trade Practices Act, the TPC would be able to preserve its position by seeking a divestiture order under Section 81 of the Act. AMH understands that it may suffer severe financial losses 1f the Court were to make such a divestiture order and is prepared to accept the commercial risk of the consequences that may flow from a divestiture order."
In the result, I accepted AMH's undertakings and I declined to
As previously indicated, several relevant meetings were held in London on 26 January. The first was the Extraordinary General Meeting of the shareholders of plc. The Chairman, Mr Robertson, read a statement to the meeting in which he referred to the advantages to the Borthwick group of the sale of the Australian business and in which he justified the price negotiated with Teys. He then went on to refer to the AMH offer, and the board's thinking in relation thereto:
"On 18 January, however - ten days after the announcement of the Teys agreement - there arrived the offer from Australia Meat Holdings, 'AMH', which was the subject of the circular which your Board issued on 22 January. This offer was ~- for the Australian assets - in the amount of A$29mn as against the Teys agreement figure of A$25mn; both offers covered the ancillary Japanese business at approximately asset value. Naturally your directors saw important attractions in a price advantage of A$4mn ... and they sought urgently to satisfy themselves that the two offers were in other respects comparable, so that price could be the simple determining factor.
Unfortunately it proved that there was one point of difference, and a very important one. Both offers included, as a condition, that the necessary approvals should be forthcoming, both in Australia and in the UK. One of those approvals, crucial to any final deal, was that of the Trade Practices Commission ...
Assurances were received that the TPC would have no objection to the completion of the Teys transaction, and would take no steps to stop it; but Borthwicks' advisors received written intimation by the TPC that the acquisition of the Borthwicks Australian business by AME - as distinct from Teys - 'would be likely to contravene' the relevant section of the Trade Practices Act; that the TPC was requesting an assurance that AMH would not proceed further without consultation with the Commission; and that the Commission would, failing such assurance, take such action as it might be advised to intervene in the proposal.
The effect of this indication, unless it could be modified or Borthwicks could in some way be shielded from its implications, was to confront the Borthwicks Board with a choice between two substantially different proposals. One, the Teys agreement, offered A$25mn and was ~ subject to your agreement today - certain, and a firm commitment; but if the Borthwicks shareholders did not approve it, and if the whole procedure were not completed by 1 February, the offer would lapse. The other, the AMH offer, carried a higher price of A$29mn, but was at that moment not certain, in that not only did it not have TPC clearance, it had a clear indication that such clearance would not be granted - if at all - until after a period of investigation. Moreover, though Borthwicks might decide to accept the risk of the outcome of the TPC's enquiries, it seemed that it would probably be able to do so only on the basis that the Teys offer would lapse by reason of its time-limit, and that even a conditional agreement with AMH could be the subject of an injunction imposed by the TPC pending its investigations. In other words, Borthwicks might fall between two stools and find itself with no agreement at all - not even a conditional one - because Teys had lapsed, and AMH had been enjoined against entering into any agreement. It was felt that if this state of affairs were allowed to develop, Borthwicks' bargaining position thereafter would be very, very gravely weakened; even if AMH eventually
received clearance, Borthwicks would have no firm agreement and the buyer would be free to vary his conditions or his price; and meanwhile the effective value of the Borthwicks Australian business would have been damaged, not least by the very serious uncertainty and unease engendered among staff.
Your Board strove to secure from AMH terms that would surmount these difficulties, whether by obtaining some more positive assurance from the TPC, or by providing an AMH commitment to assume entirely for their own account the whole of any TPC risk and its consequences. Despite the most serious and determined efforts, no such assurance or commitment was forthcoming up to last Friday; and your Board came unanimously to the view that Borthwicks could not wisely accept the tisk of losing the certain and acceptable Teys transaction, in exchange for the uncertain - indeed, on TPC indications doubtful - though financially more favourable AMH offer.
Accordingly we recommended, in a circular issued on Friday, 22 January, (after allowing the maximum possible time for a more helpful response from AMH, or from the TPC, on the sought-for assurances and commitments) that the Teys sale should continue to be recommended to shareholders; and had there been no further development in the past four days, we would still so recommend.
But since Friday, and subsequent to the issue of the circular letter of that date, your
Board's efforts to resolve the uncertainties of the AMH offer have borne fruit.
Followang an unsuccessful application by the TPC to the Courts in Australia for a restraining injunction, AMH have given certain undertakings to the TPC to the effect that they will make no changes at all to the Borthwicks Australian businesses, pending the outcome of a TPC enquiry in February. On this basis the TPC will not now intervene to prohibit the sale of the businesses to AMH, and our advisors are now satisfied that we can enter into a firm commitment with AMH. AMH have sent us a signed agreement in essentially the same terms as the Teys agreement but conditional only on the Resolution approving the Teys agreement not being passed, and are able to make the purchase moneys available in London for an immediate completion.
Your directors believe that in these circumstances they can, and in the shareholders' interests they should conclude such an agreement with AMH, thus securing the more favourable price offered by them, whilst avoiding the earlier risks of uncertainty and possible frustration of the sale, to which I have referred. ...
I hope that this explanation has clarified the difficulty in which the Board was placed by the circumstances of the two offers, and the attitude of the TPC as stated to us last week; and I am sure that it will be agreed that a fully favourable transaction, at a price of AS$S4mn higher, is to be preferred if all obstacles can be and have been removed."
The shareholders did take that view. No formal resolution was put but, in an informal vote for the guidance of the directors, the shareholders unanimously indicated that they favoured the AMH offer. The meeting was then adjourned. During the adjournment a sale agreement with AMH was signed and exchanged. Upon resumption of the meeting the Chairman put to the meeting the resolution, of which notice had been given, to approve the sale to Teys. This was defeated; whereupon the Chairman announced that the agreement with AMH
had become unconditional and would be completed forthwith.
The agreement was completed that day, meetings of the directors of the vendor companies, Pacific Holdings and UK,
being held to authorize the relevant stock transfers.
On the following day, 27 January, the directors of ple met. In dealing with Mr Cash's position, Mr Robertson reported to the directors that Mr Cash "had played a
considerable part in the successful disposal negotiations".
When the matter was before the Court on 25 January 1988 AMH was the only respondent. I was informed that the only major issue would be the definition of the relevant market, that the parties could be ready to litigate the matter within three or four weeks and that the hearing would occupy about one week. Accordingly, and having regard to the desirability of minimising the period during which AMH would be bound by its undertakings, I directed that the final hearing commence on Monday 29 February 1988. I stood the
On 2 February I granted leave to the applicant to amend the Application which it had filed on 27 January so as to add as additional respondents Pacific Holdings and ple. At that time counsel for the additional respondents indicated that their clients would contest the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief against them and sought an opportunity to raise this as a preliminary issue before the commencement of the final hearing. I fixed 15 February for the consideration of that matter. I made directions for the exchange of proofs
On 15 February 1988 UK was added as a respondent, the applicant having in the meantime realized that this company was one of the vendors of the shares. The Borthwick
respondents then applied for an order setting aside service
upon each of them upon the basis that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant relief against any of them pursuant to
s.81(1A) of the Trade Practices Act. I heard some argument
that day upon the matter of jurisdiction but it quickly became apparent that the resolution of that question depended upon the determination of certain issues of fact. Counsel for the Borthwick respondents conceded that s.50 might apply to the acquisition of shares in a company incorporated outside Australia, and being shares registered outside Australia, provided that the company carried on business in Australia. But they argued that jurisdiction to make an order under s.81(1A) was not attracted merely by the circumstance that the vendor carried on business in Australia; a matter they put in issue in relation to each of their clients. They submitted that s.81(1A) could only be applied against the Borthwick companies if those companies had been involved in Australia in the breach of 5.50. For their part, counsel for the applicant contended not only that the Borthwick respondents, or some of them, carried on business in Australia. They also claimed that those respondents had been involved in the contravention of s.50 within Australia. Having regard to the disputes between the parties upon what were agreed to be critical questions of fact, I ruled that it was not appropriate to determine the matter of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and I adjourned the notice of motion until the trial. I directed that the Borthwick respondents file defences by 19 February 1988, but that such filing be without prejudice to their claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief
During the course of the trial a further notice of motion, to like effect, was filed by the Borthwick respondents. Both motions were considered together and evidence was adduced by both the applicant and the Borthwick respondents upon the question of jurisdiction. After hearing argument I indicated my view -- for reasons which I then shortly stated -- that, if the contravention of 5.50 were to be established, the Court would have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought; whether that jurisdiction ought, in all of the circumstances of the case, to be exercised being, of course, a separate question to be considered at the conclusion of the evidence. Accordingly, I dismissed the notices of motion. As the evidence which had been adduced on the motions was relevant both to the question of involvement and to the question whether the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, ought to refuse relief under s.81(1A), I admitted as evidence in the principal proceeding the whole of the evidence tendered in connection with the notices of motion. I also indicated that I would deal with the matter of jurisdiction more fully
Counsel for the Borthwick respondents sought leave to appeal against my order dismissing the notices of motion. I refused that application. It seemed to me that an appeal would not raise any question of general importance. My resolution of the matter of jurisdiction had turned upon conclusions of fact. Moreover, I was conscious that any
appeal at that stage would inevitably disrupt the hearing of
the principal proceeding; to the possible prejudice of a Party, AMH, who was not concerned with the matters sought to be argued on the proposed appeal. It would remain open to the Borthwick respondents to appeal upon any appropriate ground, including jurisdiction, if they were dissatisfied with the orders made in the principal proceeding. For similar reasons I refused to order a stay of proceedings whilst the Borthwick
respondents applied to a Full Court for leave to appeal.
Notwithstanding my view about the undesirability of an appeal at that stage upon the question of jurisdiction, the Borthwick respondents applied to a Full Court for leave to appeal. That application was unsuccessful, the Full Court holding that the application was incompetent: see Thomas
Borthwick & Sons (Pacific Holdings) Limited v Trade Practices
Commission (Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Sheppard JJ, 15 April 1988,
In the event the estimate that a hearing would occupy one week proved sadly astray. The hearing in fact occupied a total of 23 days. The extra time was partly occasioned by the joinder of the Borthwick respondents, involving issues relevant only to those respondents, but the major cause of the expansion of hearing time was the amount of evidence which the applicant and AMH, particularly AMH, adduced upon the issue of market definition. I am sure that the parties intended this material to be helpful to the Court and I salute the industry
of the many people involved in its collection and analysis.
However, although none of the evidence is irrelevant, much of it has proved to be of little assistance. It is for me a matter of concern that the curial determination of the limits of a market -- about which question I assume commercial people frequently make almost intuitive judgments -- should be seen as requiring the time, effort and expense involved in this case. My concern is intensified by the circumstance that, almost by definition, proceedings to prevent a breach of 5.50, or to reverse the effects of an antecedent breach, will always involve a measure of urgency. I suppose that the very flexibility of the concepts of market and of dominance necessarily casts a wide evidentiary net; but, in this type of litigation, there is a particular need for rigorous consideration of the probative value of potential items of
In particular I deprecate the course, taken by AMH, of supplying to economists proofs of the evidence to be given by other witnesses and then eliciting from those economists opinions as to the proper conclusion upon the definition of the market. Economists are able to assist the Court in relation to economic principles. But, once the relevant principles are expounded, their application to the facts of the case is a matter for the Court. The proper definition of a market is entirely a matter of fact, the determination of which ought not to be made more protracted and expensive by
In the event, the necessity of finding other hearing days, given existing commitments, has prolonged the
finalization of the case beyond what I would have wished.
I had occasion, in Mark Lyons Pty Limited v Bursill
Sportsgear Pty Limited (1987) 75 ALR 581 at pp.588-591, to
discuss at some length the concept of "market", as that term is used in Part IV of the Trade Practices Act. I drew particularly upon the seminal decision of the Trade Practices
Tribunal (Woodward J presiding) in Re Queensland Co-operative
Milling Association Limited (1976) 25 FLR 169. I need not
repeat my previous comments. But it is necessary to observe that, in Mark Lyons -- as in each of the authorities referred to therein -- the alleged market was one in which the relevant company acted as a vendor of goods or services to the public. Consequently, in discussing substitutability, the cases refer to the possible consequences of a decision to "give less and charge more"; to borrow the language used in Queensland Co-operative Milling at p.190. In the present case, the alleged market is one in which AMH acts as a purchaser of cattle from a wide variety of vendors, mainly breeders. It is the obverse situation; but nonetheless the description of a
market contained in Queensland Co-operative Milling continues
"A market is the area of close competition between firms or, putting it a little differently, the field of rivalry between them. (I£ there is no close competition there is of course a monopolistic market.) Within the bounds of a market there is substitution
~- substitution between one product and another, and between one source of supply and another, in response to changing prices. Soa market is the field of actual and potential transactions between buyers and sellers amongst whom there can be strong substitution, at least in the long run, if given a sufficient price incentive. Let us suppose that the price of one supplier goes up. Then on the demand side buyers may switch their patronage from this firm's product to another, or from this geographic source of supply to
another. As well, on the supply side, sellers can adjust their production plans, substituting one product for another in their output mix, or substituting one geographic source of supply for another. Whether such substitution is feasible or likely depends ultimately on customer attitudes, technology, distance and cost and price incentives.
It is the possibilities of such substitution which set the limits upon a firm's ability to 'give less and charge more'. Accordingly, in determining the outer boundaries of the market we ask a quite simple but fundamental question: If the firm were to 'give less and charge more' would there be, to put the matter colloquially, much of a reaction? And if so, from whom? In the language of economics the question is this: From which products and which activities could we expect a relatively high demand or supply response to price change, i.e. a relatively high cross-elasticity of demand or cross-elasticity of supply?"
One of the expert witnesses called on behalf of AMH, Associate Professor T G Parry of the Faculty of Economics at the University of New South Wales, discussed in his evidence the concept of "market". Drawing upon that evidence, and the decided cases, counsel for AMH put the following submissions relating to the concept of "market":
take into account substitution possibilities in both consumption and production. The
quality or other characteristics of the products, does not by itself place the
based on what happens (or would happen) on either the demand or the supply side in
I adopt this submission and I hold that, in considering whether there are separate fat cattle markets within Queensland, it is necessary to consider what would happen on the supply side in response to a change in the price
There is an issue between the parties as to the relevant product market. The applicant contends that the product market consists of cattle turned off for immediate slaughter and that it does not include either store cattle or feed lot cattle. AMH, by contrast, submits that there is but a single product -- beef cattle -- which includes all three categories. It is, of course, necessary to identify the relevant product in order to determine the geographical area
I have already set out a description of each of the relevant categories. There is general agreement amongst the witnesses that, in relation to a small proportion of cattie turned off for sale, informed people may differ as to the
appropriate category in which to place a particular beast. At
the extremes there is no problem. Provided that abattoir capacity is available, there 1s no point in postponing the slaughter of an animal in optimum condition. Similarly, except perhaps in times of severe drought, cattle in poor condition are unlikely to be slaughtered. But differences may occur in relation to cattle in good, but sub-optimal, condition. One person may consider that any improvement in condition will not be worth the cost involved in achieving it. Another may think that a period in a feed lot -~- or even on open pasture -- is worthwhile. Those witnesses who dealt with the matter used different language to refer to the proportion of cattle in connection with which opinions might differ as to whether they were store or fat cattle. Mrs Smith compared the position with "drawing lines on a map when you want to divide up regions, there is going to be a blur at the edges; but by and large the animals fall into quite clearly defined categories". Mr Grahame Flynn, General Manager, Livestock, of AMH said that there was "a top end" where stores and fat cattle merge but he agreed that, subject to that qualification, there was "a clearly understood and universally applied distinction" between these two categories. His evidence went on: "Q If a cattle jobber gave evidence to
females, there is a big interlap against (sic) with store. When
there is a flush in the season the store buyer will come into the boning cow market and compete very strongly, to put more condition on them, get a calf out of them and then sell them.
Q But competition between store buyers and fat cattle buyers is fairly unusual, is it not?
Q It bespeaks exceptional circumstances in the market, does it not?
A I keep repeating it is the 20 per cent, that there is a continual intermingle both in the female and the male cattle.
Q The reason why those terms fat cattle and store cattle are used so universally is so that people in the cattle industry have a clear understanding of what they mean, do you not agree?
A Yes. It is more of a -- in one term it is a case of utilization, at that top end. What to me is a store beast, to you might be a meatworks beast. It depends on the purchaser's ability to handle then,
Mr Ian Whan, Chief Research Officer for the LMAQ, gave similar evidence. He agreed that, in his writings, he had been accustomed to distinguish between store cattle and fat cattle. He said that they were "separate commodities", although "their utilization can overlap quite a bit, go to one market or the other". Mr Whan would not accept the suggestion that store cattle and fat cattle constituted separate markets, but he said that he had "talked about them as being separate parts within the market".
There 15 no doubt that the prices obtainable for store cattle are influenced by the price level for fat cattle. This 15 to be expected, given the fact that the purpose of purchasing stores is to convert them into fat cattle. But the two price levels do not directly correlate. They are subject to different influences, chiefly seasonal. Mr Ian Barrett, a cattle producer from the Bowen district, made the comment in evidence:
He said that in 1987, a drought year, "from June to September you were flat out giving them away, no one wanted them", that is store cattle. But, even under these circumstances, Mr Barrett said that the stores were not being bought for slaughter. Although Mr Barrett did not refer to the reason,
it appears that, at that time, ample fat cattle were
The evidence shows that the practice within the industry is for sales of cattle to be advertised either as "fat cattle" sales or "store" sales. Sometimes each sale will be held successively at the one place upon the one day. There is some intermingling of purchasers. Mr Maurice Binstead, a large scale cattle dealer based at Rolleston in central Queensland, said that sometimes dealers will buy at fat cattle sales animals which were then only of manufacturing meat quality, and further fatten them for the Japanese market. But
"Normally they are specalist sales and fat sales are fat sales and store sales are store sales. Fat buyers do not usually operate at store sales. Sometimes they do on the top quality in that range but store buyers do operate at fat sales because of the reasons I said". This evidence is consistent with what was said by several witnesses employed by abattoir operators as to their own
It is common ground between the parties, and their expert witnesses, that the existence of marginal overlapping and substitutability does not in itself negative the existence of separate markets. A question of degree is involved in determining at what point the substitutability of one product for another means that the two products should be regarded as being with the same market. None of the expert witnesses offered any opinion upon that matter. A judgment must be made upon the basis of the whole of the relevant evidence, and considering that question from the point of view of both
In one sense there is almost complete substitutability by vendors of stores for fat cattle. Except in times of drought, it will usually be open to a producer to sell cattle as stores rather than as fat cattle. But, of course, in so doing, the producer must sacrifice part of the income able to be derived from fattening the beast to slaughter condition. Where a producer takes this course, he or she is not substituting indifferently in the one market; but rather selling the animal as product X rather than
retaining it, adding value to it, and selling it as product Y.
I have already referred to evidence that, under certain circumstances, purchasers may substitute as between store cattle and fat cattle. But this course is available only in respect of the overlap between the two categories, put at 20% by Mr Flynn. That it is an exceptional phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, as everyone agrees, there are two separate categories -- stores and fat cattle --
The evidence establishes that, in the present context, store cattle and fat cattle are separate products offered in separate markets; and this notwithstanding that, on the margin, purchasers will sometimes buy one product in
The question whether feed lot cattle constitute a separate market arose only late in the hearing. The issue was raised by counsel for the applicant, probably as a result of the production of figures showing that, of all cattle transported from one region to another, a significant proportion were granted the pleasures of the feed lot before slaughter. No doubt it was thought to be advantageous -- in connection with the dispute over the geographical market -- to minimise the number of fat cattle shown to be moved between
I am not persuaded that feed lot cattle ought to be regarded as being within a different product market to fat
cattle. There is no evidence of any practice, within the
industry, of holding "feed lot sales" in the same way as producers and their agents hold store sales and fat cattle sales. Whereas, both in publications and in the evidence, there are frequent references to stores and fat cattle as being separate products, there is no such recognition of feed lot cattle. In contrast to the store market, but like the fat cattle market, usually the purchasers of feed lot cattle are slaughterers. And feed lot cattle are cattle very nearly ready for slaughter. There must be a high degree of substitutability. I think that the correct conclusion is that the sale of feed lot cattle takes place within the same market
The relevant product market, for the purposes of this case, may then be defined as the fat cattle market, using that
term to exclude store cattle but to include cattle purchased
As I have indicated, the geographic limitations of the appropriate product market -- that 18, upon my finding, the fat cattle market -- is a major issue in this case. There is no doubt that, as a general theoretical proposition, it is possible to transport fat cattle from any part of Queensland for slaughter in any other part. It does not, of course, follow that the whole of Queensland should be regarded as
constituting, or being part of, a single market. That
question depends upon whether or not, in practice as distinct from theory, the whole of Queensland is an area in which there is a single "field of rivalry" between those involved in the fat cattle market; between producers for sales and between
Before turning to the evidence directly relating to that matter, it is desirable to note the effect of the evidence regarding methods of sale. Fat cattle are sold either by private treaty or by auction. There are advantages in private treaty sales, both to the vendor and to the purchaser. Sale by private treaty offers to a vendor the advantage of a certain price and some savings in selling and handling charges. The alternative, submission to auction, may mean, in the case of a large consignment, that the vendor depresses prices by "swamping" the sale. Consequently, the largest producers sell almost exclusively by private treaty, using sale yards only for the disposal of odd lots. From the purchaser's point of view, as Mr Flynn pointed out, sale by private treaty facilitates product planning. The purchaser knows how many cattle will be available and is able to plan delivery and throughput accordingly. Additionally, the reduced handling of cattle, which occurs when they are
purchased directly from the grazier, minimises bruising.
There are three methods of private treaty purchases: direct liveweight purchase where the price is negotiated at a rate per liveweight kilo and the cattle are weighed at the
point of delivery; per head direct purchase where a rate per
head is offered by the buyer after visual inspection and upon the basis of the buyer's estimate of the dressed carcass weight of the beast, delivery being made at the vendor's property; and weight and grade purchase where the buyer quotes a price in cents per kilo based upon the dressed weight of the carcass as determined at the abattoir. According to Mr Flynn, weight and grade purchase -- commonly known as "over the hooks" -- is now the most popular method of sale. This opinion is borne out by figures contained in the livestock report submitted to the October 1987 meeting of the board of AMH. That report showed that, so far in 1987, AMH had purchased 54.5% of its cattle "over the hooks", 22.9% in the paddock and 22.7% at auction. Evidence from employees of other abattoir operators suggests that such a mix is fairly
At sale yards cattle are auctioned upon a cents per liveweight kilo basis; the cattle being weighed after the
sale and immediately before delivery to the purchaser.
The applicant called evidence from 32 producers, whose properties are widely scattered over northern and central Queensland. Some properties even extend into the eastern fringe of the Northern Territory; an area which has been regarded by all parties as part of northern Queensland, in the production sense. The applicant also called several agents and dealers. The producers who gave evidence included some of the largest cattle vendors in Queensland, in terms of
turn-off. The purpose of this evidence was to establish the
proposition that vendors of fat cattle are generally most unwilling to effect a sale at a location further from their own property than is absolutely necessary. That purpose was achieved. There is no doubt in my mind that, although producers and dealers tend to keep themselves aware of prices being realised for cattle over a large geographic area, they
There are a number of reasons for this attitude. In the first place, the expense of transporting cattle to the place of sale has to be met by the vendor. Transportation costs are high. For example, Mr J L P Griffith, Chief Executive Officer of Australian Agricultural Company Limited, a major pastoral company with extensive cattle holdings both in Queensland and in the Northern Territory, said that the cost of transporting an animal from "Brunette Downs" station -- which is situate just across the Northern Territory border from Mt Isa -- to Brisbane by road 1s about $40 greater than the cost of transporting the same animal to Townsville. Mr Griffith estimated the difference in road freight from the Gulf country to Brisbane, as distinct from Townsville, as being the equivalent of 15 to 20 cents per kilogram of hot dressed weight. On an average beast of 300 kgms this amounts to to $45-$60 per head. Mr Griffith conceded that rail freight rates were lower than road freight rates but he said that he would not consider using the railway for such a long journey because of the loss of condition which the cattle
would sustain. For cattle, the journey from Cloncurry to
Brisbane, by rail, takes seven days, with two spells on the way. Mr GL Hughes, manager of the Koolatah Pastoral Company, which owns stations in both northern and central Queensland, quoted $20 and $25 per head as the difference in transport costs from his company's stations on the Mitchell River, in the Cape York Peninsula, to Rockhampton and Biloela
Even for producers on the coast, with direct access to the north-south railway line, freight costs are significant. For example, Mr Rodney Barrett, who has a property just out of Bowen, said in his written statement that the additional direct cost to him of sending his cattle to Townsville, Mackay and Brisbane -- as distinct from the Borthwick abattoir at Bowen -- would respectively be $9, $10 and $30 per head. The question was not picked up in Mr Barrett's oral evidence but the reference to Brisbane may have been an error for Rockhampton. Mr Ian Barrett, who has the adjoining property, gave evidence that the rail cost to Cannon Hill (Brisbane) was $62 per head as against $15.30 to Mackay and $30.65 to Rockhampton.
Direct costs are only part of the problem. Mr Griffith said that, apart altogether from the freight costs, "in many years it is not possible to consider a trip to southern Queensland for our cattle" from the northern stations "because of their condition due to drought and age. A large percentage of these cattle would perish before they reached
their destination". But, even in the case of cattle in good
condition, there 1s an indirect cost. Mr Griffith estimated that cattle sent from the Gulf country to Brisbane would lose about two per cent of their original body weight in transit. He stated a rule of thumb that a beast loses about a kilogram a day after the second day. Thus there is little weight loss on journeys to local abattoirs; even using the word "local"
to encompass a journey from the Gulf country to Townsville.
Similar evidence was given by other producers, many of whom emphasised that aged cows constituted a significant component of the turn-off in the north. These cows were generally in poor condition and unfitted to sustain a long journey. Reference was also made to a fever found in northern Queensland called femoral fever, which is said to show no symptoms upon loading but which causes significant deaths to cattle under stress during travelling. Mr Rodney Barrett summed up the position in this way:
"A We cannot conclude that you can take cattle away from pastures and waters and their natural environment and not suffer a disadvantage. That is a fact of life and when they are put under stress they are then vulnerable to all of the extra things that affect them and they react probably more severely and so that you have such a thing as a loss of condition or maybe a disease problem or tremendous heat or adverse weather conditions or a two-man crew on a train that is not entitled to pick up waggons when a three-man crew is supposed to and all this nonsense so when those things occur - if everything goes 100 per cent well you can shift them around provided they are in store condition or something like that and expect a good job. If they are fats you can expect weight losses and because they are fat and heavy your problems are then a bit compounded.
In terms of travel though, any travel is going to cause some distress to the beasts, is it not?
And it is only a question of degree of quantification?
of the damage having regard to the particular voyage under consideration?
I am sorry, I thought you were going to say something more?
All I would add 1s that the human race being what we are it seems almost impossible to have the perfect run when it comes to trains or trucks or things like that.
And all you say is that when you send it over a long distance the odds are that --?
-- the odds are higher that something is going to go wrong?
Bruising was another matter mentioned by witnesses.
Bruising can be minimised by the careful handling of cattle,
especially during loading and unloading. But there was a
general acceptance amongst the witnesses that, despite all
endeavours, some bruising is likely to result from road or
from a long journey than from a short journey. Everything depends upon the way in which they are handled. But several witnesses pointed out that a journey from northern Queensland to southern Queensland necessarily involves at least one spell -- often two spells -- en route, for the purposes of which the cattle have to be unloaded and reloaded. So there is an increased opportunity for bruising to occur. Bruising is at the expense of the producer, bruised meat being cut from the
Apart from the costs just discussed, there are intangible disadvantages, at least in the eyes of some producers, in selling to a distant market. Several witnesses made the comment that they like to visit the abattoir at the time of the slaughter of their cattle in order to inspect the carcasses. In this way they obtain helpful information as to the condition of their stock. They also pointed out the management problems which result from selling at a distance. The producer remains responsible for the stock whilst in transit, so that if something goes wrong with the transportation arrangements he or she may have to travel a considerable distance to organize spelling, or to cope with sick or dead animals. Reference was also made to concern about receiving prompt payment from a distant buyer, as distinct from a known local buyer, and to the desirability, for humanitarian reasons, of minimising the distress suffered
Some of the producers who gave evidence told of occasions when they had sold cattle to an abattoir outside their own region. Without exception these were recounted as extraordinary events, and not readily to be repeated. They were said to have been caused either by unusual seasonal conditions or by a desire to test alternative possibilities. Each one of these witnesses said that, when the costs of transportation were taken into account, the return was less
The perception and attitude of the producer witnesses can accurately be summarized by making short quotations from the evidence of three of them. Mr R J Schmidt, Managing Director of King Ranch Australia and a man with 35 years experience in the industry, said in his statement: "It is my considered opinion that northern based producers including King Ranch are effectively constrained to selling to north based purchasers and that there is in effect a discrete livestock selling market there". Mr Ian Barrett, who has been in the industry since 1956, said: "From my experience and knowledge of the local industry I can say that very few cattle are ever sent by local producers to saleyards or meatworks in southern Queensland. The only time I would consider selling cattle in southern Queensland would be in desperate times such as severe drought". Mr K H Power, a producer near Cloncurry, put the matter in this pithy manner: "I ama firm believer that to go past the first set of weighing scales is only foolhardiness as cattle lose weight, bruising increases and
Mr J J Daniels has been a stock and station agent for 30 years, 28 of them in Cloncurry. In 1987 he sold about 21,000 cattle on behalf of clients. He has also been a grazier on his own account since 1967. The evidence does not disclose whether Mr Power is one of his clients but the two men share the same philosophy. Mr Daniels said in evidence:
that is Cloncurry." Where that advice is followed, the property in the animals immediately passes to the meatworks company which can, of
course, choose the place of slaughter; but the meatworks
company bears the costs and risks of transportation.
It is significant that there is no evidence -- whether from any cattle producer or from any purchaser -- as to the existence of any producer who habitually sells fat cattle at a location remote from the property from which they are turned-off. If there was such a producer, turning-off cattle in any volume, his or her existence would be unlikely to have escaped the knowledge of AMH people such as Mr Flynn. Particularly under those circumstances, it is a safe finding to say that, except under extraordinary conditions, producers sell locally: in the paddock, at a local sales yard or to the local abattoir. [I use the word "local", of course, in the expanded sense necessary to accommodate the distances found in northern Queensland. In fact the "local" sales yard or
abattoir may be some hundreds of kilometers from the vendor's
property but nonetheless be "the first set of weighing scales".] As Mr Whan agreed in cross-examination, producers
in the north "appear not to want to send their cattle away".
This attitude is so entrenched, and supported by such cogent factors, that, in my opinion, 1t is unlikely to be affected by anything short of a major change in present purchasing policies. It is significant that, although the difference between southern prices and northern and central prices not infrequently rises above the freight cost, there is no evidence that producers in these regions "chase" the southern prices by sending their cattle south. No doubt there may come a point where northern and central producers would become interested in sending cattle south. Perhaps some would react to a major rise in southern prices. But I think that, for many producers, more than a price rise would be required. They are perhaps more likely to respond to a changed form of agreement, whereby the risk and responsibility of the journey is cast upon the purchaser. But such a change would be contrary to the recent trend towards weight and grade
There is evidence as to the behaviour of abattoir operators. The applicant called several witnesses who were employees of central or southern abattoirs and who deposed to the fact that their companies normally made all their
purchases in the local region. They admitted to some
exceptions and, 1n particular, it appears not to be uncommon for some southern abattoirs to purchase in the central region; property in the stock there passing and the purchaser accepting the cost and risk of transportation back to the abattoir. Some of the witnesses called by AMH were employed by southern abattoirs. They asserted the willingness of their employers to purchase cattle in northern Queensland whenever the prevailing prices so permitted. But in fact only a minor percentage of the cattle purchased by their respective employers came from central Queensland. The proportion of north Queensland stock was extremely small. Mr J McKenzie, General Manager of the R J Gilbertson Group which operates a boning room at the Cannon Hill abattoir in Brisbane, agreed that 22% of the cattle slaughtered by his company at Cannon Hill came from central Queensland and 9% from the north. The Tancred abattoir at Oxley (Brisbane) may take as little as 2% of its stock from north Queensland, according to Mr Reginald Clanchy, the company's Livestock Manager; and this on a definition of north Queensland by Mr Clanchy which draws the line through Nebo, south of Mackay. Mr Clanchy put purchases from central Queensland at 40% of the total throughput of the abattoir. Smorgon, which operates an abattoir at Inverell in northern New South Wales, purchases cattle in southern and central Queensland but not at all in northern Queensland. Mr Malcolm Foster, General Manager, Beef Operations of Elders agreed that the proportion of stock purchased for the company's feedlot at "Beef City" Toowoomba which comes from northern Queensland "would not be high". He would not
comment, one way or the other, upon the suggestion that the
Proportion was in fact less than 1%. Apparently the company buys mainly British breed stock. Morex Meat Australia Pty Limited, which operates abattoirs at Maryborough, Roma and Grantham in southern Queensland, sends buyers to both northern and central Queensland sales. Nonetheless it was conceded by Mr Max Nunn, the chief cattle buyer of the company, that the company purchased only "a small percentage" of its fat cattle north of Rockhampton. The cattle purchased by Morex in northern Queensland are mainly bulls, which are used for the
The position in relation to AMH's southern abattoirs is not much different. Figures produced by AMH show that, in the period July 1986 to July 1987, 5% of the kill at Dinmore (Brisbane) came directly from northern Queensland and 38% from central Queensland. The comparable figures for the Beaudesert
Figures obtained from auction sales probably tend to exaggerate the activity in the northern market of buyers for southern abattoirs. As already indicated, the volume of cattle sold by private treaty greatly exceeds that sold at auction and there is an absence of evidence of southern operators entering into private treaty purchases in the north of the State. However, even in the sale yards, the proportion of stock taken by southern buyers 1s not high. There are no complete statistics, but the evidence includes an analysis, by name of purchaser, of the sales made during 1987 at Bohle
(Townsville), Mareeba and Cloncurry. At Bohle, southern
buyers took 17.5% of all cattle sold. This figure includes 4% for Morex, a specialized buyer, and 3% for Teys, which also has an abattoir in the central region. The Mareeba figure was 15.6%; but Morex accounted for over two-thirds of this proportion. In Cloncurry the southern percentage was 21%;
An exercise was undertaken by the solicitors for AMH in an attempt to identify by region the source of the stock slaughtered at selected abattoirs in 1986 and 1987. The investigation team examined the records of the relevant abattoirs and allocated the cattle, according to whether their source was in the northern, central or southern statistical region of Quensland. In some cases only 1987 figures were available. The following results emerged:
northern central 1986 2553 (3.66%) 16490 (23.6%) 1987 836 (1.19%) 13660 (19.49%)
northern central 1986 12294 (4.68%) 33397 (12.73%) 1987 15722 (5.46%) 29678 (10.3%)
Teys Beenleigh - a southern abattoir northern central
1986 2915 (3.1%) 28723 (31%) 1987 2687 (2.4%) 31459 (28.94%)
northern(April-December only) 6137 (5.15%) 1987 14008 (7.99%)
northern 1987 3221 (9.3%) Elders "Beef City" - a southern abattoir northern 1987 743° (1.2%)
central southern 1986 6205 (4.9%) nil 1987 7663 (6.7%) 57 (0.05%)
central southern 1986 1359 (2.5%) nil 1987 225 (0.5%) 1 (0.0025%)
1987 nil nil Tancred NQ Townsville - a northern abattoir central southern
The figures obtained upon an analysis of primary documents made on behalf of the applicant differ in detail, partly because some of these figures were taken for the 1986-1987 financial year rather than for the 1987 calendar year. However, they give much the same impression as those set out above. That analysis resulted in the following
PERCENT AREA FROM WHICH OF KILL COLUMN (3) SOURCED FOR PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT TOTAL WHICH FROM FROM FROM KILL SOURCE NORTH CENTRAL SOUTH ABATTOIR "000 KNOWN QLD QLD QLD (incl NT) (incl NSW) NORTHERN CAIRNS (AMH) 42 100% 100% 0% 0% TOWNSVILLE (AMH) 115 100% 95% 5% 0% CAPE RIVER (AMH) 50 100% 95% 5% 0% TOWNSVILLE (QME) 60 99% 92% 4% 4% TOWNSVILLE (TAN) 24 96% 85% 15% 0% BOWEN (BORTH) 72 91% 75% 23% 2% INNISFAIL 16 89% 99% 1% 0% TOLGA (BYRNES )} (not available) CENTRAL ROCKHAMPTON (AMH) 79 100% 7% 91% 2% MACKAY (BORTH) 106 96% 8% 90% 2% ROCKHAMPTON (CQME) 167 92% 2% 85% 13% BILOELA (TEYS) 59 100% <1% 91% 9% SOUTHERN BEAUDESERT (AMH) 170 100% 1% 5% 94% DINMORE (AMH) 175 100% 5% 38% 57% BEENLEIGH (TEYS) 97 99% 23% 30% 68% GRANTHAM (MOREX) 87 94% 7% 63% 87% MARYBOROUGH (MOREX) 59 97% 6% 17% 77% ROMA (MOREX) 51 95% 3% 11% 86% KILCOY 49 99% <1% 4% 96% KILLARNEY 23 100% 0% 0% 100% OAKEY 56 98% <13% 4% 95% OXLEY (TAN) 68 78% 2% 26% 71% TOOWOOMBA 38 100% 03 3% 97% DOBOY 31 1003 0% 25% 75% MURGON 72 100% <1% 15% 84% WARWICK 75 99% 1% 3% 96% CANNON HILL 146 Service killing only IPSWICH 50 Service killing only
There is some information, obtained from the Queensland railways, as to the numbers of cattle loaded and unloaded at various locations. The information enables an assessment of the number loaded north of Mackay and unloaded
south of Mackay; that is, individuals which travel through
Mackay. The railways, of course, make no distinction between fat cattle and stores; but the suggestion is made on behalf of AMH that, where cattle are unloaded at a place served by an abattoir or a feed lot, it is likely that this is their destination, so that at least the great majority of those cattle are fat cattle, as defined above. In some cases this assumption is reasonable; for example, where the unloading point is at a place without any substantial activity in store sales. This apparently is the position, for example, at Dinmore. But I would not, without more, assume that all cattle unloaded at places like Rockhampton and Toowoomba were fat cattle. One would expect stores to be transported to
In perusing the rail figures, I notice that there is one unloading point whose figures are grossly out of line with the slaughter figures set out above: Beaudesert. The AMH documents show the slaughter at Beaudesert abattoir in 1987 of 1,594 head from the north and 8,401 from the central region. The railway documents, however, show that 23,890 cattle, which were loaded north of Mackay, were unloaded at Beaudesert in
The solicitors for AMH have examined documents called "AMH Beaudesert Receival Dockets 1987". These show receipt at Beaudesert during 1987 of 24,452 cattle from the north and
There is a feed lot at Beaudesert. I know nothing about store sales but, having regard to its proximity to Brisbane, 1t seems unlikely that this 1s a major activity in Beaudesert. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that at least the major portion of the discrepancy between the unloading/receival figures and the kill figures is attributable to the fact that the cattle are taken into the feed lot and, when killed, not sourced back to the place of purchase. However, making this assumption -- and thus treating all cattle received by AMH at either Beaudesert or Dinmore as fat cattle, as defined above to include feed lot cattle -- the total of fat cattle received from northern Queensland is, on AMH's figures, still only 40,054, or 11.9% of the 1987 combined Dinmore-Beaudesert kill of 336,427 head. The applicant's analysis, which shows a lower Dinmore figure,
Another exercise undertaken on behalf of AMH was to compare the total numbers of stock sent from the northern and central regions to the south with those slaughtered in the northern and central regions. The exercise spanned three years -- 1985, 1986 and 1987 -- but I am distrustful of the conclusions made in respect of the two earlier years because these conclusions depend upon the unlikely assumption that no cattle unloaded at relevant points are stores. The 1987 figures, on the other hand, do not depend upon the information
given by the railways and they do provide some assistance.
In 1987, 419,780 cattle were slaughtered in abattoirs situate in northern Queensland. According to the analysis made on behalf of AMH, an additional 47,403 head were sent to southern Queensland for immediate kill. This figure included 15,602 for AMH and 15,722 for Morex. 14,805 were sent for slaughter in central Queensland. According to the applicant, the southern figure was 38,449 (AMH 11,256, Morex 10,732) and
the central figure was 17,554. To these figures must be added the cattle received from the north at the feed lots at Beaudesert and "Beef City" Toowomba: 22,858 and 11,449
position may be presented in this way: Northern cattle sent to southern or central
47,403 + 14,805 62,208 feed lots 34,307 96,515 Add northern kill 419,780
On these figures 18.7% of the northern turn-off of fat cattle were sent to the southern or central region. Of the total northern turn-off, 81,710 (15.8%) were eventually killed in
If one substitutes the immediate kill figures calculated by the applicant, the total number of northern cattle sent to the south becomes 72,756, the number killed in the central region becomes 17,554, yielding a total turn-off of 510,091 head and final percentages of 17.7% and 14.77%
In order to put these figures into perspective, three comments should be made. First, of the 96,515 head sent out of the northern region (AMH figures) 34,307 went to feed lots in the south. 15,722 were taken by Morex, a specialist purchaser, and 18,327 were "immediate kill" cattle owned by AMH. The combined take of the whole of the remainder of the industry was only 28,159, and this includes the cattle produced immediately north of Mackay and taken into the Borthwick plant in that city. In relation to the AMH "immediate kill" purchases, it is pertinent to recall Mr Plynn's comment in evidence that, "when you have abattoirs in the north, you naturally use them first, you do not send them on a long ride just for the sake of transporting them. We only send the cattle in excess of our requirements in the north to the south". In other words, these are cattle
purchased in the north which are at that time unable to be
slaughtered in one of AMH's northern abattoirs and so sent south as a matter of convenience. [There is evidence from several producers that, at the peak of the killing season, the situation in some abattoirs is such that producers have to
This leads to the second point that, although the cattle just mentioned are actually slaughtered in the southern or central region, the contract of sale of the cattle is made in the northern region. These cattle are not sent out of the northern region for sale elsewhere. If there is a separate northern market, it seems to be legitimate to regard it as including sales made within the northern region to people who come up from the south with the purpose of buying cattle to be
Thirdly, and assuming contrary to the above that the cattle exported from the northern region should be regarded as being sold outside the region, it is common ground between the experts that the existence of some sales outside the limits of a hypothetical market does not necessarily negative the existence of a separate market. Everything must depend upon the extent of the exceptions. Mrs Smith was asked in cross-examination what she would regard "as being a significant movement of cattle from the north to the south sufficient to link the two divisions into one market. She replied: "somewhere upwards of 30 plus per cent". When asked to comment upon the figure of 20% she replied: "no, I think
that is on the lower side". Mrs Smith did accept that 20% may
be a sufficient movement 1f the product was the same in the a two divisions, but she explained that this condition would require that something like 70-80% of the cattle in the south were the same as those in the north. The evidence, of course, shows that this condition is not satisfied. Although the range of types of beast produced in the north overlaps that of the south, an analysis of the use of the ultimate product, beef, would show significant regional differences in the proportions used for domestic consumption, export of prime cuts and manufacturing meat. So Mrs Smith's evidence should be interpreted as requiring a movement of something like 30%
before it could be said that there was only one market.
Professor Parry was asked about Mrs Smith's figure of 30%. He said that he had no basis for either accepting or rejecting that figure and he criticised the absence of a "process of analysis that explains to me why the 30% figure was obtained". But, although it was accepted that some degree of movement may occur between separate markets, no witness for AMH was prepared to specify a relevant percentage or to deny that the degree of movement found in this market was consistent with the existence of two or more separate fat
Of course, even the lower end of the range suggested by Mrs Smith, 20%, would accommodate the conclusion that the exceptions demonstrated in this case do not deny the existence of a separate northern Queensland constitutes a separate
This accords with such evidence as is available of people's perceptions of the position. In commenting upon the cattle population and slaughter statistics, Mrs Smith said that the northern region of Queensland "has traditionally been self-sufficient with the regional abattoirs killing those animals which are available for slaughter". She referred to calculations showing that, in 1986, the north held 23% of Queensland slaughter supplies and accounted for 21% of the State's slaughterings; compared with the figures for central Queensland of 37% and 17% respectively, and southern Queensland of 40% and 62% respectively. Mrs Smith's assessment is consistent with the evidence of Mr Peter McHugh, General Manager/Business Development of the Meat Division of Elders. Mr McHugh, who has been employed in the meat industry since 1972 and who has had considerable experience in Queensland, agreed in cross-examination "that of the total of cattle slaughtered in southern abattoirs, the percentage which
are bought for slaughter in the north (is) extremely low".
The matters just discussed tend towards the conclusion that there is a separate fat cattle market in northern Queensland; although perhaps not in central Queensland. But AMH puts two major arguments against such a finding: price correlation and the potential for southern
There is a broad correlation between the price of fat cattle in Queensland and the export price for beef. Furthermore, as was conceded on behalf of the applicant, there is a general correlation between the prices of cattle in the various regions of Queensland, one factor in that correlation being the common response of the various regions to variations in export prices. Judging by those who gave evidence, Queensland cattle producers keep themselves well informed
about prices obtaining in various parts of the State.
As a general statement, cattle prices -- expressed at a rate per kilogram and whether by reference to liveweight or dressed weight -- tend to be lower in northern Queensland than in the south. Mr Daniels gave evidence that he keeps aware of Brisbane prices and that, when he conducts an auction, he looks for an opening bid at a figure which represents the previous day's Brisbane price for that type of beast less the approximate freight cost to Brisbane. And prices negotiated by private treaty are strongly influenced by the prices at recent local auction sales. But it is clear that prices in the north do not necessarily follow those in Brisbane. Mr Daniels does not always get a bid at the figure he seeks. Sometimes the bidding goes well above his looked-for opening figure. Sometimes the differential between prices in the north and in the south is more than the freight cost;
sometimes it is less. Sometimes northern prices exceed those
in Brisbane. An analysis made by Mrs Smith of the average weekly price differential of southern abattoir prices, on the one hand, against the northern region and central regions, on the other, for manufacturing cows (all weights), expressed in cents per kilogram, shows the following sequence for the 30 weeks from 9 January to 14 August 1987: -5, +4, +11, +5, +11, +6, +9, -2, +5, 0, 0, 0, -3, -3, +12, +18, +14, +14, +7, +26, +5, +5, +2, +12, +2, +2, +11, +11, +1, +1. Positive figures apply to weeks in which the southern price was higher than the northern/central price; negative figures where the advantage was the other way. The range of difference was 31 cents (from +26 to -5). The mean difference was +6 cents. From 21 August to 18 November 1987 Mrs Smith separately analysed the price differential of manufacturing cows over 320 kilograms and manufacturing bulls over 540 kilograms. The range of difference was much the same. Moreover, these two categories sometimes moved in opposite directions. Thus, in the period from 4 September to 9 October, the cow figures were +4, -12, -12, -4, +9 and +6, whereas the figures for bulls were +13,
A series of graphs prepared by Mr G M Browne, an officer of LMAQ, showing prices achieved respectively at Toowoomba, Rockhampton and Townsville during the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 for three different categories of beast -- cows, steers and bulls of a defined weight range -- reflect this same pattern. There are occasions when prices for a particular category of beast rise or fall in all three
centres. Generally speaking, Toowoomba prices are higher than
those in Rockhampton, with which they have a close correlation. The Townsville prices are usually below those in
Toowoomba but they are much more volatile. For significant periods they exceed those in Rockhampton. Occasionally they
Professor Robert Officer, AMP Professor of Finance in the Graduate School of Management, Melbourne, gave evidence on behalf of AMH. Professor Officer had an analysis made of prices achieved by three different categories of beast in the period July-December 1987 at various sales yards, including Mareeba and Townsville in northern Queensland and Rockhampton in central Queensland. The purpose of this analysis was to ascertain the correlation coefficient. The closer the movement between prices in two particular sales yards from one sale day to the next, the nearer the figure to one. A movement of prices in an opposite direction produced a negative figure, which had the effect of reducing the average. The average was calculated over the total scores, as between each two centres; not less than 20 movements being measured
This exercise does confirm that, broadly speaking, cattle prices throughout Queensland move in the same direction. Each figure in Professor Officer's table is a positive figure; andeed most exceed 0.5. But the figures also confirm the effect of distance. For example, the most comprehensive table, steers between 371 and 450 kg, shows a
correlation between Brisbane and the other six southern
centres of 0.747, 0.816, 0.767, 0.706, 0.762 and 0.744. But the correlation reduces to 0.696 for Rockhampton, 0.646 for
I think that it is not accurate to say that prices of cattle are similar throughout Queensland, save for discounts reflecting the cost of transport. It is accurate to say that prices follow a similar trend, and as Professor Officer shows, this trend broadly follows the export beef price. But there are idiosyncratic differences suggestive of separate market forces. The fact that two series of prices respond ina similar way to a particular external stimulus does not
necessarily mean that they are within the same market.
In the expert evidence given on behalf of AMH reference was made to the importance of potential in determining the existence of a common market. Professor Officer illustrated the point with an example, which I quote:
"Two stores (A & B) are 5 kilometres apart ona road. The question is are they in competition? Most likely the stores will attract customers in their immediate area. In fact it is likely that upwards of 75 percent of customers are regular clients of one store or the other, it is the balance of customers who visit, alternatively, either store that link the stores in competition. Clearly, we do not require every customer to be clients of both stores for the stores to be in competition. In fact, suppose every potential customer of either store received regular bulletin of the stores' prices. The posted prices, indicating little or no difference between the stores, would induce the clients
maintains competition." Professor Officer went on to refer to the knowledge by both producers and abattoir operators of the level of prices throughout Queensland, the suggestion being made that the potential for both sellers and buyers to switch the point of sale meant that the whole of the State constituted, or was
I have already referred to the evidence given by various producers as to their reluctance to send cattle away for sale. An exercise was carried out by Mr John Schmitt, Manager, Budgets and Costs, of AMH in which he calculated the marginal costs of operating at various AMH abattoirs. As might be expected, this study showed that marginal costs would reduce with increased throughput; so that if Dinmore, for example, increased its then throughput from 3,500 per week to 4,250 per week, there would be a saving of $15.97 per head, or $67,872.50 per week. It follows, according to the calculation, that AMH could afford to pay up to an additional $90 per head to optimise throughput at Dinmore. As this is a greater sum than the difference between the landed cost at Dinmore of a beast purchased in the north and the landed cost of a beast purchased in the south, so the argument runs, there is a potential for AMH to supply Dinmore from the north;
Criticisms were made of some of the assumptions in Mr Schmitt's calculations; but, even accepting its arithmetical accuracy, the exercise has no relationship to reality. The logic of Mr Schmitt's position is that AMH ought to close all of its northern and central abattoirs and concentrate upon an optimum operation in southern Queensland. But AMH itself recognizes that this is not a real option. In a report on rationalisation submitted to the AMH board of directors on 29 September 1987 there was discussion about the possibility of closing certain abattoirs and expanding others. The report said:
cattle purchases in North Queensland are weight and grade."
In evidence Mr Flynn, an experienced cattleman, agreed that, whilst weight and grade purchase predominated, it would not be practical to enlarge Dinmore and Beaudesert to take substantial numbers of northern cattle. The reason was that producers would not be willing to accept the risks and costs of the journey south. Mr Flynn did comment "if the savings in costs were such that you could offer a vendor, say, $30 a head more for his cattle by putting them over a liveweight scale as against weight and grade that would have an encouraging effect". But it is significant that, notwithstanding Mr Schmitt's calculation that AMH could afford
to pay up to $90 per head more, it has not done so. As I have
already mentioned, Mr Flynn himself said that cattle are only sent south for slaughter at times when there was insufficient capacity in the north. It seems that AMH is no more keen to
take on the costs, risks and problems of long-range
A further exercise undertaken on behalf of AMH was one designed to show that southern producers' participation in northern sales was directly related to the price differential between the southern and northern regions. This exercise was conducted by Dr R A Bewley, a senior lecturer in the Department of Econometrics at the University of New South Wales. Dr Bewley set himself to examine whether there was a relationship between the differences in the sale prices of cattle in the northern and southern regions of Queensland and the volume of fat cattle movement from the north to the south. He reported that there was a "highly significant" relationship, implying "that the greater the excess of the price in the south over the price in the north, the greater will be the flow of cattle from the north to the south of Queensland". I have to say, with all respect to Dr Bewley,
that I do not think that his study shows this result at all.
Dr Bewley obtained from AMH price data relating to the years 1986 and 1987. When he obtained this data he believed that the figures represented sale yard prices only and his conclusions were based upon that assumption.
Subsequently he learned that the northern prices included the
cost of freighting stock from north to south Queensland, so that the sale yard differentials were greater than he had
Dr Bewley then took data, from the information supplied by the Queensland railways, as to the number of cattle moved each month in 1986 and 1987 by rail to six different locations in southern Queensland. He assumed that all of these cattle were fat cattle; an assumption which has not been verified but which may perhaps be accepted for present purposes. Dr Bewley also obtained some figures as to the extent of cattle purchases in northern Queensland in each month in 1986 and 1987 by AMH, Tancred, Morex, R J Gilbertson (1987 only) and Teys (Beenleigh). The assumption was that all of these stock were purchased with the intention that they be transported to southern Queensland. This assumption is probably valid for the other four operators, none of whom has an abattoir in the north. However, it 1s extremely questionable in the case of AMH, having regard to Mr Flynn's evidence about cattle only being sent south when there 1s inadequate abattoir capacity in the north. There is no evidence that AMH ever buys stock in the north with the intention, at the time of the purchase, of sending the stock south; and it is significant that the late autumn and winter months dominate the AMH figures. These months are the time of highest strain on northern abattoir capacity. The comment just made has particular significance because over 70% of the
total cattle considered by Dr Bewley were purchased by AMH.
Having obtained this data, Dr Bewley submitted it to an algebraic formula involving the use of unknown constants called "a", "b" and "c". Despite my requests for enlightenment, the rationale of this formula was not explained. But Dr Bewley did indicate in his primary report how he detected a significant result. Table E-1 to that report set out "Estimated Abattoir and Aggregate Equations" for the 1987 figures. This table showed figures, some positive and some negative, for each of the five abattoir operators under each of "a", "b" and "c". Each was followed by a number in parentheses. These numbers Dr Bewley called "t-ratios". He said that "they are used to show whether or not a given price variable is significant in explaining the variations in the quantity. If a t-ratio is greater than 2.37 the effect is said to be significant at the 5 per cent level,
the usual level of significance adopted in econometric work".
Each of the t-ratios shown in the table against AMH exceeds 2.37. None of the t-ratios for any of the other purchasers is as high as 2.37. Two out of the three aggregate figures exceed 2.37 but they reflect the dominance of AMH in that aggregate. It seems to me that, in terms of his own criterion, these figures demonstrate that only AMH fits the
hypothesis framed by Dr Bewley. Looking at a different column
"Prom Table E-1, it can be noted that the price differential has a significant impact on the AMH sales data. With the exception of the Morex equation and to a lesser extent the Teys and Tan equations, the fit,of each equation, measured by the adjusted R", is reasonable. The other three estimates of b are positive but not significant at the 5 per cent level."
This 1s the same thing as saying that, on the R? measurement, only two of the five operators -- AMH and Gilbertson ~~ fit
In a supplementary report, which took in 1986 data for Morex and Teys, Dr Bewley calculated the two year t-ratios for those companies. He said that, with a longer historical view, 2.13 was the critical t-ratio value. But only AMH reached that figure. Even when Dr Bewley discarded two months which were inconveniently "not described by the same behaviour as the remaining data", the best he could do
was a figure, in one column only, for Morex of 2.12.
I put to Dr Bewley that, if the hypothesis was correct, it might be expected that the variations in monthly purchases by the various abattoirs would be broadly consistent; they each responding to a change in the relevant price differential. Dr Bewley agreed. Testing the matter in this way, I have considered the columns of raw figures, representing actual numbers of cattle purchased. Without going into detail, it is enough to say that there is no consistent pattern in those figures. If they were reproduced graphically, the lines would be going from month to month in
The major expert witness for AMH was Professor Officer. Upon the basis of the evidence he had seen, he
expressed the view that there was no separate northern market
for slaughter cattle, nor any separate northern and central market. His primary reason for that conclusion was the correlation between prices at the various centres but, in reaching the view that there was a sufficient correlation, he does not appear to have gone beyond the sale yard to sale yard comparison which I earlier described. In particular, it seems that he did not consider the significance of Mrs Smith's figures of average north-south prices. Professor Officer also put much emphasis upon the proportion of stock purchased by southern buyers in northern sale yards. In his original statement he set out the percentages of stock purchased during 1987 by non-northern abattoirs and went on: "On the basis of these figures the Northern Region should not be, in my opinion, considered a separate market for slaughter cattle". He re-affirmed the importance of these figures to his final conclusion in cross-examination. But, unfortunately for the reasoning, the figures taken by Professor Officer (Bohle 56.5%, Mareeba 41% and Cloncurry 32%) are well above the true figures set out above: 17.75%, 15.6% and 21% respectively. Professor Officer seems to have been misinformed as to the
Under these circumstances, and notwithstanding Professor Officer's acknowledged expertise, his view as to the geographical limits of the market cannot, I think, be accorded much weight. If he had had the true facts, he may well have reached the contrary conclusion. In this connection, it 1s interesting to note that in 1986, in a document analysing the
Trade Practices Act implications of the Avocado venture,
Professor Officer accepted that it was at least arguable that there wag a separate northern cattle market. In that document he was primarily concerned to argue that, whatever the boundaries of the market, the four Avocado partners would not be 1n a position of dominance. However, after considering the possibility that the relevant markets embraced less than a whole region, he expressed this conclusion:
because of the extensive movement of cattle from the Central region to the South."
The tentative view expressed by Professor Officer in 1986 is consistent with that expressed during the course of this case by Mr Griffith. Mr Griffith is particularly well placed to form an opinion upon the matter. He is a qualified economist. He is currently Chief Executive Officer of the company which appears to be Queensland's largest cattle producer, Australian Agricultural Company. Before taking up that appointment he spent eight years at the University of New England leading a research team which developed a computerised cattle marketing system, now known as CALM, in the course of which he had to run extensive marketing trials. The view expressed by Mr Griffith was that "there 1s at least two markets. There is a northern market and probably a central-south market combined. I believe that the northern
I do not propose to discuss the whole of the voluminous evidence which was adduced upon the question of the geographical extent of the market. It 1s sufficient to say that I have re-read all the exhibits -- including the statements of witnesses -- touching this matter and also those sections of the transcript referred to by counsel in their submissions. In my opinion the most significant evidence upon the question is that which quantifies the extent of movement of fat cattle between the various regions of Queensland, followed by the evidence concerning the barriers to any significant increase in that movement. There is no evidence to suggest responsiveness by either producers or processors to
Questions of degree are involved which, in the end, require an exercise of judgment. However, I think that the movement figures, and distance barriers, are such that the northern region of Queensland must be regarded as constituting a separate fat cattle market. For the reasons I have indicated, I do not think that the evidence relating to price
correlation or potential negatives that conclusion.
In relation to the central region, although the issue is finely balanced, I am not similarly satisfied. As Mrs Smith said, "the central region is, in many ways, a transitional area between the two other more distinctly defined regions". I think that it is also a transitional area in terms of market. There is a much greater degree of
penetration by southern buyers of the central region than of
northern Queensland. Perhaps because of this factor, the correlation between prices in the central region and the southern region 1s closer than between the north and the south, or the north and the central regions. Although there is no evidence that central producers, any more than their northern counterparts, are inclined to send stock beyond "the first set of scales", they face much lower barriers to selling in the south. In short, I have reached a view which accords with that voiced by Professor Officer in 1986 and affirmed during this case by Mr Griffith.
The conclusion just expressed relieves me of the necessity to consider the capacity of AMH to dominate the fat cattle market in central Queensland. It is conceded on behalf of the applicant that, if central Queensland is within the same market as southern Queensland, a contravention of s.50 cannot be made out. But it is necessary to consider whether AMH is in contravention of s.50 in connection with the
In Trade Practices Commission v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Limited (1978) 32 FLR 305,
Northrop J considered the meaning of the word "dominate", as used in s.50 of the Act. At p.325 he said that the word "1s to be construed in its ordinary sense of having a commanding influence on". In an article commenting upon this
construction, "Control or Dominate a Market: Developments in
Australian Merger Law", 24 Antitrust Bulletin 371, Dr G de Q Walker contrasted the ordinary meaning of "dominate" with its meaning in economics, where it is nearer to "control". At that time, of course, s.50 specified an alternative test "a position to control or dominate"; so there was good reason for treating "dominate" as referring to something different to, and short of, "control". Dr Walker observed that the ordinary content of the word "dominate" was closer to sociology than to economics and, adapting the sociological meaning, he postulated the following proposition: "An enterprise is in a position to dominate a market when there is a probability that the other enterprises in the market will act in a way calculated not to affect adversely the dominant concern's short-term interests". "In other words", said Dr Walker, "they will behave non-competively, which is the state
of affairs that Parliament was seeking to prevent".
The approach taken by Dr Walker is consistent with that of Northrop J. It seems to me that it is correct and that Dr Walker's explanation of the term usefully emphasises the point that dominance, unlike control, is not primarily concerned with the formal relationship between entities but rather with their conduct towards each other within a particular market environment. If the size or strength of a particular entity is such that, in practice, other entities are unable or unwilling actively to compete with it ina
particular market, that entity is dominant in that market.
The word "control" was dropped from s.50({1) in 1986; but it seems to me that this does not affect the continued application of the construction placed upon the word
After discussing the economic theory of domination, in Ansett at p.328, Northrop J postulated five criteria appropriate for consideration by him in that case: "(1) the firms operating in the market and the degree of market concentration, ie market share; (2) the capacity of (the alleged dominator) to determine prices for its services without being consistently inhibited in its determination by other firms; (3) the height of barriers to entry, that is the ease with which new firms may enter and secure a viable share of the market; (4) the extent to which the products of the industry are characterized by extreme product differentiation and sales promotion; (5) the character of corporate
relationships and the extent of corporate integration".
In formulating this list, Northrop J did not purport to prescribe criteria of universal application. No doubt there will be cases in which other relevant considerations emerge and, in some cases, some of the matters mentioned by Northrop J may be of little or no significance. Nonetheless, in many cases it will be useful to go to that list, at least in the first instance, in considering the issue of dominance in a market. I think that this is such a case and I propose
to examine the evidence regarding these five matters.
The first matter is market share. As already mentioned, prior to the subject transaction, AMH controlled five of the ten abattoirs in the northern region. However, it is not enough merely to count abattoirs. The theoretical capacity of the various abattoirs in northern Queensland varies considerably, as does the ratio between actual throughput and that capacity. The throughput figures are relevant to the calculation of the proportions of fat cattle turned-off in northern Queensland which are purchased by the various abattoir operators. The capacity figures give guidance as to the extent to which an existing abattoir operator, without having to incur the capital cost of a new abattoir, might influence the market by increasing its
According to information emanating from LMAQ, the capacity and throughput figures -- with percentage of throughput to theoretical capacity -- for the 10 northern abattoirs in the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 were as follows:
Abattoirs Annual 1985 1986 1987 Capacity throughput throughput throughput
Cairns 97920 54654 45951 60798 (55.81%) (46.93%) (62.01%)
Townsville 102880 68054 117754 109414 (66.15%) (114.45%) (106.35%)
Townsville 50000 24542 23409 24539 (49.08%) (46.82%) (49.08%)
Bowen 96000 47717 100710 77238 (49.71%) (104,.91%) (80.46%)
Townsville 120000 51091 66954 82012 (42.58%) (55.80%) (68.34%)
Innisfail 25000 6121 4847 14962 (24.48%) (19.40%) (59.85%)
Tolga 37500 9554 8854 11621 (25.48%) (23.61%) (30.99%)
The total annual capacity of the five existing AMH abattoirs is 456,800 head: 58.16% of the total capacity of the region. During the years 1985, 1986 and 1987 respectively, AMH slaughtered 200,601, 359,435 and 209,408 head; these figures respectively representing 43.91%, 78.69% and 45.84% of its annual capacity. If the Tancred NQ figures be added, the total annual capacity rises to 506,800 head and the slaughter totals to 225,143 (44.42%), 382,844 (75.54%) and 233,947 (46.26%) respectively. The addition of the Borthwick abattoir at Bowen lifts the total annual capacity to 602,800 head -- 76.76% of the regional capacity -- and the throughput figures for the three years become 272,860 (45.27%), 483,554 (80.22%) and 311,185 (51.62%) respectively.
(There are some minor discrepancies between different LMAQ documents. In another place Byrnes, Tolga is shown as having an annual capacity of only 34,500 and Innisfail of only 23,000. If those figures were substituted, the effect would be to increase AMH's market share, but by a minimal amount. It should also be noted that the capacity figures I have used are the raw figures issued by LMAQ, calculating capacity upon the basis of a season of 160 days. The evidence indicates that a lengthier season is often worked, especially in the larger abattoirs. If capacity were calculated upon that lengthier season, the effect would be to increase the Proportion of unused capacity in the larger abattoirs, and therefore the theoretical potential for AMH to increase its
Some indication of AMH's market share in the northern region may be gleaned from the 1987 figures. As the table shows 419,780 head were slaughtered in north Queensland last year. In addition, according to AMH figures, 96,515 head were sent from northern Queensland to the southern or central region for slaughter, either immediately or after a period in a feed lot. The total turn-off of fat cattle was therefore 516,295 head. Of these, AMH purchased 247,868 head: 209,408 for slaughter in the north, 15,602 for immediate slaughter in the south, and a further 22,858 for the Beaudesert feed lot. This amounts to 48% of the total regional turn-off. If one
adds the figures for Tancred NQ and Borthwick -- Bowen and
Mackay -- and the Elders' feed lot at Toowoomba, the total purchase comes to 331,339 head; that is, 64.17% of the total
The second and fifth matters mentioned by Northrop J may conveniently be discussed together. The capacity of AMH to determine the prices which it will pay for cattle is
There is an issue between the applicant and AMH upon the question whether Tancred NQ should be regarded as being independent of AMH. It will be recalled that the agreement of 29 July 1986 between the shareholders in AMH referred to the abattoir conducted by Tancred NQ at Townsville as one "controlled by Tancred", that is Tancred Brothers Pty Limited, the shareholder in AMH. The use of this phrase was not explained in the evidence. But it does appear that Tancred NQ is not a subsidiary of Tancred. The shares in Tancred NQ are held by three companies: Reichhold Investments Pty Limited (50%), GOT Investments Pty Limited (33.33%) and G Lazy J Pastoral Pty Limited (16.67%). Until 2 March 1988, Mr Geoffrey Tancred ~- who 1s a director of both Tancred and AMH -- held a minority interest in Reichhold Investments; the majority of the shares in that company being held by Mr H J Reichhold and members of his family. Mr Tancred served on the board of directors of Reichhold Investments -- along with Mr H
J Reichhold, Mr M H Reichhold and Mr Tancred's son, Thomas --
until 29 March 1988. On 2 March 1988 Mr Geoffrey Tancred transferred his shares in Reichhold Investments to Mr H J Reichhold. On 29 March he resigned from the board of directors. He was replaced by his son, Ross. It follows that, so far as appears, none of the shares in Reichhold Investments is held by interests associated with AMH. But two of the four directors of that company are sons of a person who has at all times had an influential role in AMH. Both GOT Investments and G Lazy J Pastoral are owned by members of the family of Mr Geoffrey Tancred, the directors of each company being Mr Tancred's wife, Jacqueline, and his son, Ross. Those two companies, directly and indirectly, hold a majority interest in Tancred Brothers Industries Pty Limited, the owner
So far as the evidence shows, the interests now associated with Mr Geoffrey Tancred hold only 50% of the shares in Tancred NQ. But, given the presence upon its board of two of Mr Tancred's sons -- one of whom is also a director of G O T Investments and of G Lazy J Pastoral -- 1t seems unlikely that the other owner of Tancred NQ, Reichhold Investments, would wish Tancred NQ to be operated in a manner displeasing to Mr Geoffrey Tancred. And the board of Tancred NQ itself consists of the same four persons who constitute the board of Reichhold Investments. Moreover, there was some interesting evidence from Mr T G Edmonds, the General Manager of Tancred NQ, who claims Mr Geoffrey Tancred as a personal friend. Mr Edmonds has no contract of employment with Tancred
NQ but, when asked to agree that his continued employment was
dependent upon his retaining the goodwill of the board of
directors of Tancred NQ, he gave the curious answer "no, not really". He then gave an affirmative answer to the question "The perception is that if you behave in a manner adverse to
the goodwill of the directors of Tancred NQ you would continue to be employed as the general manager". Perhaps Mr Edmonds thought that the goodwill of someone else was more
I think that, at least in a practical sense, it remains true to say that Tancred NQ 1s "controlled by" Tancred. I note that Mr Gunthorpe gave evidence that 1t was his understanding in January 1988 that the Tancred NQ abattoir was "owned by" Tancred; by which, I assume, he meant indirectly owned through Tancred NQ. He added that he understood that AMH had a right of first refusal over the abattoir, if Tancred ever wished to sell it. This is plainly a reference to the relevant provision in the Shareholders'
The relationships just discussed are relevant also to the Innisfail abattoir. Since the beginning of 1987 that abattoir has been owned by a company in which Mr Edmonds has a 50% interest. Reichhold Investments financed the purchase of the abattoir. Mr Edmonds was not required to make any capital investment. Although this was not spelt out in the evidence, Reichhold Investments is apparently the owner of the remainder of the shares. Once again, I think that it is fair to say that the Innisfail abatto1r would be unlikely to be operated
These conclusions lead to a consideration of the extent to which the four shareholders in AMH, including Tancred and Mr Geoffrey Tancred on its behalf, are likely to order their affairs in a manner calculated not to affect
Each of the four companies continues to trade on its own account. In some areas they remain competitors, perhaps vigorous competitors. Although the evidence upon the point 1s not comprehensive, my understanding 1s that each of the four shareholders continues to market meat on its own account; as, of course, does AMH. There may be areas of special advantage, and it is clear that the shareholders exchange information about export meat prices. However, broadly speaking at least,
the shareholders compete against each other, and against AMH,
It is equally clear that in other areas the shareholders do not compete against each other. AMH regularly purchases quantities of small stock on behalf of its shareholders. AMH also purchases non-livestock items, such as packaging materials and petrol, on behalf of its shareholders, as well as for 1ts own requirements. A report submitted to the December 1987 meeting of the AMH board referred to the constitition of a "working group to determine possible opportunities and practicalities of combining AMH and its
From time to time AMH has purchased cattle on behalf of Tancred, but only in small quantities. In October 1986 Mr Smorgon indicated, at an AMH board meeting, that in future he would require AMH to purchase livestock on behalf of his company "as allowed for under the shareholders' agreement". Presumably he was referring to stock in excess of the 35,000 head permitted in a particular year. It was decided that "it would be necessary for AMH to establish the systems necessary for this to occur". According to Mr McHugh, AMH has not yet
The evidence is that, since the establishment of AMH, each of the four shareholders has continued to purchase cattle on its own behalf. It 1s difficult to gauge the extent of their competitiveness in so doing. Many of the AMH buyers previously worked for one of the shareholder companies. The effect of that history upon their willingness to compete with their old employer is a matter about which there can only be conjecture. Some witnesses called on behalf of AMH claimed that there was fierce competition between the various buyers to fulfil their purchase orders. It is not difficult to believe that, on occasions, personal zeal will result in active competition between particular buyers. It may be that, at least up to this time, in those cases in which buyers for the separate shareholder companies attend auction sales, they bid competitively with the intention of acquiring the number
However, there is some evidence that the incidence of separate attendance has decreased since the formation of AMH. Mr Daniels said that, prior to the formation of AMH, there were eight regular buyers at Cloncurry auctions. These buyers represented Metro, FJ Walker (Elders), Tancred, Smorgon, Borthwick, QME, Morex and the local butcher. At the present time there are five: AMH plus the last four named. Morex is a specialised buyer. The local butcher purchases only small numbers of cattle. The number of major participants has, therefore, shrunk from six to three. There is no evidence that this reduction in numbers has yet resulted in collusion between the buyers, but it is axiomatic that the potential for
collusion rises as the number of buyers at a sale reduces.
The minutes of the AMH board meeting of 19 March 1987
record this item: "Directors agreed that, as co-operation between AMH and Shareholder livestock buyers was proceeding satisfactorily, there was no need to invoke the provisions of Clause 5 of the AMH Shareholders' Agreement which provides for
AMH to undertake some livestock buying on behalf of shareholders."
Mr McHugh denied that this was a correct statement of the position. Mr McHugh was not a director on that date but he was present at the April meeting when the minutes of the meeting of 19 March were confirmed, without any correction of this item. Mr Gunthorpe was present on 19 March. In his statement of evidence he expressed the view that it was impractical for AMH to purchase all of the cattle required by
the four shareholders each month, and then satisfy its own
requirements as well. He explained the word "co-operation" as being intended to refer to the fact that the tension which had occurred at an earlier stage, because AMH was doing some buying for Tancred, had now settled down. This explanation cannot be accepted. The word "co-operation" implies more than an absence of tension. Moreover, the tension referred to by Mr Gunthorpe had been at board and senior executive level.
But this minute referred to co-operation between the livestock buyers. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that it referred to a situation, 1f£ not of price collusion, at least to some co-operation between the buyers in dividing up the
The possibility of co-operation between those responsible for purchasing cattle on behalf of AMH and on behalf of its shareholder companies should occasion no surprise. The price paid for cattle 1s a major element in the profitability of their various slaughter operations. All five companies have an interest in keeping down cattle prices. The four shareholder companies share an interest in the profitability of AMH. The economic logic of the situation was recognized in the initial terms of the shareholders' agreement, whereby AMH was to purchase all of the cattle required by any of the five companies. As Mr Gunthorpe conceded, prior to the formation of AMH the parties had been "anxious for there to be developed a practice of AMH's buyers buying for the shareholders". Mr Gunthorpe said that this position had since changed, that the directors were content
with the present arrangement whereby, substantially, each
shareholder purchases on its own account. He said that, since the formation of AMH, "the shareholders have come to understand that 1t would not be practical for AMH to purchase cattle on their behalf. Each abattoir has its own special requirements as to cattle types and weight ranges within which to operate. These factors are determined by the markets into which the processors sell their product and the particular operating conditions and capital assets available in the
I make four observations upon this statement. First, the reference to "special requirements as to cattle types" sits uneasily with AMH's case regarding market definition, the whole emphasis of which was upon the interchangeability of
Secondly, although there is some evidence of specialist abattoirs -- for example, Morex -- and that, generally speaking, southern abattoirs take more cattle suitable for the domestic and Japanese market than do northern abattoirs, there is no evidence whatever that the abattoirs operated by AMH and its shareholders, within a particular region, take different types of stock; for example, as between Tancred NQ and AMH Townsville or between Tancred Oxley
or Elders Beef City and AMH at Dinmore or Beaudesert.
Thirdly, if the position had been as Mr Gunthorpe stated, this would have been obvious all along. Yet it 15
clear that the original intention was that AMH would buy on
behalf of all of its shareholders. Even such an experienced cattleman as Mr Flynn proceeded upon the basis that this would happen. He gave evidence that, when AMH was formed, he calculated the percentage of stock which AMH would seek to purchase at particular locations. He gave this information to selected competitors, the purpose being to avoid their being alarmed by the possibility that AMH would take more than its shareholders had previously taken. He quoted an example of a calculation of 26% for Gracemere (Rockhampton). The
"Q So what you were saying to your competitors is: well our four shareholders took 26 per cent last year, AMH will restrict itself to 26 per cent at Gracemere?
A No, I did not say we would restrict ourselves, I said we expected to maintain that share.
Q Now, there is implied in that, if it 15 to be meaningful, that the four shareholders would not themselves be buying at Gracemere?
Q So was the idea that AMH would come in as a buyer in place of the four previous --?
A That was the idea, it did not work out that way, your Honour, because Smorgons decided to buy 60,000 cattle out of
Queensland and became very strong competitors in the area."
Finally, the explanation given by Mr Gunthorpe seems to conflict with the position taken by Mr McHugh, a person with greater experience of the cattle industry than Mr
Gunthorpe, when I asked him some questions about the future.
Having in mind the obvious financial advantage to the AMH shareholders in establishing a common purchasing agency, I invited Mr McHugh to point to any commercial reasons which made it likely that the existing situation would continue. Mr McHugh replied by saying that there was a diversity in the operations of the various shareholders, both in location of abattoirs and stock slaughtered, and he said that each of the shareholders prided itself on being more efficient than the others. But I referred him to cases where there was competition for the same stock. I gave an example:
"Q But I am talking about where you do compete, and we have been told that that is happening all the time. It just surprises me, to be honest, that - I had this mental picture of a sale yard up at Cloncurry or wherever, and somebody there from AMH and standing beside him and bidding against him is a man from Tancreds or somebody else from Metro and somebody else from Smorgons, and they go and have a beer together afterwards and they say, well why are we doing this?
You know, we are all AMH, are we not? Why would not one of them say, why would not it be arranged that one of them would fill the buying orders of all of them and then distribute the cattle? I am not suggesting that it is being done yet, and the reason I am raising it with you because uninstructed by evidence I would have thought that is the way commercial people would be likely to behave in the long run, and I want to give you an opportunity as a commercial man to tell me the reasons why I should not draw that view?
A I cannot see that, you know, I am not prepared to answer your question because I have never considered the proposition and believe everyone is in that, now there is probably the very good reason that can be thought about but I just have not got it here at the moment. All I know is, it does not happen."
The suggestion which I put to Mr McHugh finds some support in documents at AMH board level. The minutes of the directors' meeting of 28 January 1987 record the following item, under the heading "Shareholder co-operation and AMH organisation":
discussions should occur at the weekend conference scheduled for March 1987."
The minute of 28 January 1987 does not identify any particular area of shareholder co-operation. However, specific areas were identified in a document prepared by Mr Gunthorpe for consideration at the March conference. This document presented material upon a number of aspects of AMH's operations, with "key strategies" being stated in respect of particular subjects. In the section dealing with "cattle supply" Mr Gunthorpe set out information regarding the numbers and sources of cattle slaughtered by AMH. He itemized certain "factors affecting supply" and then turned to "key strategies", para.6 of which was "Participate under the terms of the Shareholders Agreement in purchasing cattle for
In the final section of the strategy document, called "Corporate", Mr Gunthorpe set out six key strategies. They
"2 Re-open negotiation for the acquisition of Mackay and Bowen abattoirs and submit a recommendation for the Board on the economics of purchase.
3 Improve the relationships between shareholder companies and AMH by increasing liazrson at senior management level and developing a wider perspective involving the group as a whole rather than AMH only. However, all conflicts of interest are to be highlighted to all shareholders for a decision by directors.
6 Encourage further rationalisation in the industry particularly with shareholders to increase the dominance to a position
where AMH is able to influence factors of production wherever possible."
In his statement of evidence, Mr Gunthorpe referred to "the difficulty the AMH directors were experiencing in letting go of their prior direct involvement in the various undertakings of what 1s now AMH". He referred to "mistrust within AMH and between shareholders" as being the problem highlighted in para.3. He said that the "factors of production" referred to in para.6 were "land, labour,capital and machinery". He added that it was "a broad term used to encapsulate the directors' understanding of what their role in
I do not doubt that there were internal conflicts on the AMH board from time to time and that individual directors sometimes found difficulty in giving priority to AMH corporate interests. I accept that Mr Gunthorpe had this in mind when he wrote para.3. But para.6 deals with a different subject matter. Mr Gunthorpe explained that the word
"rationalisation" in that paragraph means "elimination of
surplus capacity" 1n the industry. He was plainly postulating a strategy of further reducing surplus capacity, the objective being to increase AMH's existing dominance to a position where
The concession had to be extracted from him in cross-examination; but Mr Gunthorpe did admit that it was obvious to him at all times "that a major factor of production for AMH had to do with its livestock input". He said that
this was an accidental omission from his statement.
I do not accept this claim. Mr Gunthorpe's statement was prepared very late in the trial; it had not, apparently, initially been intended that he would be called. The statement was the last of a series of draft statements, about which Mr Gunthorpe had received legal advice. The statement dealt at some length with the strategy document -- a document upon which reliance had already been placed by counsel for the applicant. Mr Gunthorpe studied economics in the course of attaining a degree in Commerce. He well knew both the meaning of the term "factors of production" and also the significance, in the context of this case, of a concession that it included livestock prices. I think that he deliberately refrained from mentioning livestock prices in the hope that they would be
Mr Gunthorpe's attempt to argue, once the concession was made, that he was referring in the strategy document to
land rather than to livestock prices does him no credit. I
can readily understand that, by increasing throughput and reducing surplus capacity, an abattoir operator may make more efficient use of its land. But that will be the result of the rationalisation which is the first stage of the strategy; whereas the ability to influence factors of production is the result of the dominance consequent upon rationalisation. It
No other relevant factor of production having been mentioned, I cannot read para.6 other than as a statement that the strategy is to use AMH's dominance to influence prices of inputs into the production process, including livestock. [It 1s clear that Mr Gunthorpe contemplated that dominance should be achieved by a number of means: by acquisition of the two Borthwick abattoirs, by the closure of some abattoirs and by greater co-operation between the shareholders of AMH. It would be consistent with that strategy for Mr Gunthorpe to press Mr Tancred to take all steps necessary to ensure that both Tancred NQ and the Innisfail abattoir co-operated in any AMH buying policy. And, as both would have an interest in purchasing cattle at the lowest possible price, there 1s no reason why they should resist a low-price policy; provided that they were able to acquire the relatively small numbers of
The QME (Vestey) abattoir at Townsville has the largest capacity in northern Queensland, although in terms of throughput, in the period 1985-1987, it has run third to AMH
Townsville and Borthwick Bowen. The applicant does not
suggest that there is any formal relationship between AMH and Vestey. It does, however, suggest that there 1s an amicable corporate relationship between AMH and Vestey, making 1t unlikely that Vestey would actively resist an AMH pricing policy. Reference has already been made to Lord Vestey's willingness to assist AMH to acquire Borthwick; an action inconsistent with a perception that a stronger AMH would adversely affect Vestey. Mr Gunthorpe was asked about this incident in cross-examination:
"Q And it did not strike you as incongruous having regard to the relationship between Borthwicks and Vesteys as competitors in Australia?
A No, I believe that the discussion was going on at the very senior levels of the Elders and Vestey companies, and I believe the aggression that occurs in the marketplace for the operations of the abattoirs is at a much lower level, and in fact is 1n AMH which is a 25 per cent investment.
Q It did not strike you as odd that Vesteys should want to assist AMH which was one of Vestey's competitors to acquire these two abattoirs?
A I think it is fair to say that we were using the relationship that Mr Nugent had
Contacts between AMH and Vestey at executive level are not uncommon. Both are members of the Queensland Meat Exporters Association which meets periodically in Brisbane; but both Mr McHugh and Mr Gunthorpe denied any conversation with competitors, including Vestey, regarding such matters as level of utilization of abattoirs, opening and closing dates,
prices and numbers of livestock to be purchased. Mr McHugh
referred to certain understandings he had gained from things said to him by others in Elders or AMH, but I do not think that anything which he said upon that topic provides admissible evidence from which I may draw an inference as to the holding of any discussions, or the making of any
In his written statement, Mr Gunthorpe categorically denied knowledge of any agreements within the industry relating to prices, abattoir operation dates or throughput levels. He said that he had not been a party to any discussions upon these matters. However, he went on to say that, in early 1987, the AMH board was concerned about the likely shortage of cattle for slaughter in that year and he was asked "to find out about the likely shed opening times for Angliss and Borthwicks". The statement did not disclose what action, if any, Mr Gunthorpe took pursuant to that request. However, 1n cross-examination Mr Gunthorpe said that he arranged a dinner in Sydney to co-incide with a meeting of the Ausmeat Council which was attended by Mr Cash of Borthwick, Mr Scott Benton, Managing Director of the vestey group in Australia, Mr Flynn and himself. But, 1f Mr Gunthorpe is to be believed, the meeting was a waste of time. He said that, although his purpose was to ascertain the likely opening dates of the Borthwick and Vestey abattoirs in north Queensland, he himself was not prepared to give any hint as to AMH's intentions about opening dates and that he did not do so. It is difficult to see how, under those circumstances, Mr
Gunthorpe could have expected to receive any information. Mr
Gunthorpe said that, notwithstanding the limitation which he
imposed upon himself as to what he would say, he thought that 1t was worthwhile to hold the meeting "if for no other reason than to increase my understanding of the modus operandi of my competitors". Mr Flynn, he said, had indicated to him "that
it would be a waste of time having the meeting because we
There are difficulties about accepting Mr Gunthorpe's evidence about this meeting. Not only was the meeting one requested by the board, it was one upon which Mr Gunthorpe himself set some store. On 20 January 1987 Mr Gunthorpe wrote a letter to Mr Stan Carslake of Barclays Bank, London. Barclays Bank provided services to the United Kingdom Borthwick companies and Mr Gunthorpe was anxious to use his influence with those companies. In the letter Mr Gunthorpe referred to indications that the cattle turn-off in 1987 would be much lower than in 1986. The letter went on:
"I mention all of these matters because of our company's concern that there is a continuing need for a further rationalisation if the Industry is to avoid the losses that normally follow a heavy drought-related turnoff period. For this reason I will be entering negotiations here in Australia with the Australian Management of Borthwicks and others, in an endeavour to discourage opening all of the plants that operated during 1986. This may be difficult because many of the processors will be flushed with their successes realised during 1986.
Many of the problems in North Queensland would be solved if we were to purchase the Bowen and Mackay abattoirs. If there is a possibility that Borthwicks may be interested in selling these abattoirs, I should like to progress this matter as soon as possible."
According to Mr Gunthorpe, when he wrote the letter, he had no auntention to negotiate about the opening of plants in 1987;
the statement was made "for the purpose of unsettling the UK
The evidence of Mr Gunthorpe upon this point 1s not only difficult to reconcile with an almost contemporaneous AMH board request for discussions; it is contradicted by Mr Flynn. According to Mr Flynn, the meeting with Mr Cash and Mr Benton was at his instigation. He felt "that it would have been disastrous for us to open the plants at that stage. The cattle numbers had not come forth and I felt it best for everybody to wait another week or two". Mr Flynn said that AMH needed to know that Borthwick and Vestey were not going to open in order to have the confidence necessary to enable him to decide that AMH would not open. A meeting was held, Mr Flynn said, which was attended by Mr Cash, Mr Benton, Mr Gunthorpe and himself at which he suggested that the sheds not be opened until after Easter. The others "said that they would think about it and it did not happen, we all opened
I have no hesitation in accepting Mr Flynn's version of this meeting and rejecting that of Mr Gunthorpe. Not only is Mr Flynn's version inherently more probable; the fact that there was a serious discussion about opening times is supported by the reference to the matter in the board minute
The evidence does not support the conclusion that there has yet been any agreement between AMH and Vestey regarding prices, opening dates or any other relevant matters. It does support the conclusion that, at a senior level, relations are such that an agreement upon any of those
However, I prefer not to evaluate the strength of the competition between AMH and Vestey by reference to that possibility. Setting aside overt collusion, there is ample evidence that Vestey is a price follower in northern Queensland rather than a price setter. Many of the cattle producers who gave evidence spoke of the role played by Borthwick in keeping up the prices available from AMH. No similar observation was made about Vestey. Some producers directly compared the roles of Vestey and Borthwick. For example, Mr A M Henn, a producer at Clermont, who has relatively easy access both to Borthwick at Mackay and to Vestey at Rockhampton, said that he was aware of the prices offered for Japanese ox by both AMH and Vestey. He commented: "From these discussions we are well aware that Borthwicks offer the best prices for the cattle we produce". Mr Griffith said in his statement: "Regarding Vestey's purchasing power, we have found that they are generally price followers as opposed to Borthwicks which were often price setters". Mr Schmidt of King Ranch said that Vestey "would pay good prices if we forced them to, if that is the right word, or if we
could establish to them that better prices were available
elsewhere". No attempt was made to refute this evidence, or the evidence to similar effect which fell from several of the
A snippet of evidence from Mr Daniels provides an insight into the relative importance of Vestey and Borthwick as a competitor to AMH. Mr Daniels referred to a sale in Cloncurry in April 1987 which only Vestey and AMH attended.
He described this sale as "a disaster because we only had the two operators there and we passed every beast in and sold them a week and a half later". At the sale, he said, AMH and
Vestey "were offering us 20 or 30 cents below the going rate".
The statement made by Mr Tancred at the meeting attended by Mr Bourke on 18 January 1988 also throws light upon Vestey's competitive prowess. It will be recalled that Mr Tancred commented that "if they had not had competition from Borthwicks" AMH would have earned another $10 per head. Nothing was said about Vestey. The clear inference from Mr Tancred's statement is that he regarded Borthwick, but not Vestey, as standing in the way of additional AMH
Provided that Vestey can obtain sufficient cattle to operate its Townsville abattoir at something like optimum throughput, it has no interest in forcing up prices; quite the contrary. As Mr Benton agreed in evidence, if AMH were successful in depressing prices that "would have a beneficial
spin off from Vestey's point of view". Even if, in a poor
year, Vestey had difficulty in filling its needs, it might think carefully before embarking upon a price war against AMH. A comparison of the 1987 throughput of the five AMH abattoirs in northern Queensland with their theoretical capacity -- based upon a season of 160 days -- shows a surplus capacity of 253,926 head; just over twice the capacity of the Vestey abattoir in Townsville. Admittedly, 1987 was a drought year when production was lower than usual. Also whole season capacity figures can mislead. The evidence shows that there is ample capacity at the beginning and end of a season but, sometimes, an over-supply in the middle of the year. But, of course, these observations apply equally to Vestey. What is significant, in the present context, is that AMH owns two abattoirs -- Mareeba and Mt Isa -- which are currently closed. Those abattoirs have a combined annual capacity of 144,000 head. This capacity not only exceeds that of Vestey at Townsville; it is capacity available to be used at any stage of the season, including in the busy months. And, of course, the above figures disregard the surplus capacity of the
Mr Benton gave this evidence: "Q Suppose, for example, that you Saw AMH
engaging in conduct with a view to pushing down livestock prices?
Q You would realise, would you not, that if you went in and took up the slack, that would be regarded by AMH as a hostile act?
Q And you would expect, would you not, retaliation for such an act?
A Depends on the relative profitability of the plants involved.
Q You can envisage, cannot you, circumstances where such conduct on your part would be likely to provoke retaliation from AMH?
Q But depending on the circumstances you would expect in some circumstances such conduct of yours to provoke retaliation, would not you?
Q Mr Benton, it is just commonsense to say, 18 not it, that if you saw AMH in the market engaging in conduct which you identified as being an attempt to reduce the prices of livestock, you would have to think extremely carefully before any conduct of yours was permitted which would neutralize their attempt?
The remaining competitor of AMH in northern Queensland is the Byrnes abattoir at Tolga. This 15 a small abattoir which has been almost totally ignored in evidence. It 16 obviously not seen by anybody as presenting any
Finally, there was uncontested evidence from Mr Griffith that a single buyer acted for each of the AMH abattoirs in north Queensland. He had never been able to
Dominance: entry barriers and product differentiation
I turn to the third matter considered by Northrop J in Ansett: the height of barriers for entry. I can deal with this briefly because the evidence is clear that no prudent person would open a new export abattoir in north Queensland at the present time. Mr McHugh expressly stated this opinion. According to a report submitted to the AMH board on 29 September 1987, it would cost $3 million merely to upgrade each of the existing abattoirs at Townsville and Rockhampton so as to permit them to operate two shifts per day. Mr Teys estimated that the capital cost of establishing a new 600 head per day abattoir would be between $12 million and $15 million and that the working capital required for such an abattoir would be $6 million to $10 million. He pointed out that a
deterrent to a new entrant 1s the fact that cattle numbers in
north Queensland have been static for some years and that this
AMH called some evidence from Mr J W Lott, part owner of a slaughter house in Bowen. Mr Lott and his partners wish to upgrade this slaughter house to export standard. Mr Lott
estimated the cost of carrying out this work as $1.2 million,
together with operating capital costs of just over $1 million. These estimates are not made on the basis of either professional advice or a quotation from a contractor. I am
Another major deterrent to a new entrant is the extent of surplus capacity in the north, especially the surplus capacity in the hands of AMH. As was pointed out by several expert witnesses, it would be possible for AMH to meet the competition of a new entrant by using its closed plant and, for the purpose, increasing prices to obtain the necessary stock. The new entrant could find itself either deprived of cattle or forced to pay prohibitive prices. Once the new entrant was forced out of the market, AMH could again close down its plant. The significance of the closed plants was recognized in an AMH board report where it was suggested that any plants which were closed by the company should be mothballed as "this could act as a deterrent to any potential competitors opening in our areas if they thought we could
I have already referred to part of the fourth matter mentioned in Ansett: product differentiation. There is product differentiation in the cattle industry but differences lie between regions, not between abattoirs. Within northern Queensland the relevant product 1s mainly tropical cattle with the potential to produce, primarily, manufacturing meat. Ina limited coastal area Japanese ox are turned-off. I do not think that this aspect of the matter bears either way in
Counsel for AMH contend that a finding of dominance should not be made. They accept that AMH currently has a large proportion of both the capacity and the throughput of northern Queensland but they say, rightly, that AMH purchases most of its cattle by private treaty and, again rightly, that prices at private treaty are strongly influenced by sale yard prices. They then submit that prices at northern sale yards are determined by prices at southern sale yards and refer to "large numbers of independent buyers operating in the price determinant sale yards both in the north, the centre and in the south". It follows, they say, that AMH is not ina position to determine prices in the northern paddock without inhibition from its sale yard competitors. The problem about this submission, of course, is that it mistates the effect of the evidence. It is a gross over-simplification to say that northern sale yard prices are determined by sale yard prices
As a variant upon this submission, counsel submit that "the height of barriers to entry to any separate northern market by southern or central processors is limited to freight differential between sale yards in the north and sale yards in the south. Even 1f AMH can influence the determination of prices in the North, there is an absolute floor to any
reduction in price determined by the freight differential".
This submission also fails to cope with the evidence. - As I have pointed out, it 1s not correct to describe the northern prices as being the southern prices less freight differential. Nor is the freight cost the only barrier to inter-region traffic. It may be accepted that, at some point well beyond the freight differential, southern buyers may move into the northern market in a substantial way and thereby put a floor under prices in the north. But this does not deny dominance by AMH. Upon such a hypothesis, AMH could push down prices to a level just above that at which southern buyers would commence to enter the market. That would be an exercise of market power. And it would be an action costly to northern producers who would lose the difference between the price then available and the price available in a competitive northern
Finally, counsel submit that, if faced with anti-competitive conduct on the part of AMH, producers have the option of selling off their cattle as stores or transporting their cattle to other regions for slaughter. The submission recognizes what the evidence abundantly proves: that producers usually do not have the option of keeping their cattle off the market. Whatever the price, they are usually forced to sell, both to avoid loss of condition of the cattle and to obtain a cash flow. But, whilst it is true that producers often would have the two options mentioned by counsel, the exercise of either option would represent a loss of income to the producer occasioned by the manipulation of
Upon consideration of all of the factors listed above, I conclude that the acquisition of Borthwick by AMH will enable AMH to dominate the northern fat cattle market. Despite the volume of evidence presented by AMH on this issue, that conclusion will not come as a surprise to some of the executives of AMH who have given evidence in this case. Indeed, some of them are of the view that, even before the acquisition of Borthwick, AMH was in a dominant position. tin the course of cross-examination about the March 1987 strategy document Mr Gunthorpe made the comment: "I am saying, AMH was in a dominant position in the industry, in the slaughtering of
"Q Then you say: to increase the dominance
A The dominant position that they had put AMH in on the formation of AMH was being undermined by the activities of the shareholders outside AMH and also within AMH, there was a lot of disruptive activity and noise that was being created in the AMH management that was
Mc Gunthorpe also referred to AMH having "behaved most responsibly" since it commenced operations. This choice of words is reminiscent of earlier evidence by Mr K T
McLachlan, Assistant General Manager, Livestock of AMH:
Yes, Our activity does influence the market but by the same token I think they have already illustrated the fact that we are very consistent in our operations.
We are not up and down. We do not make a practice of pulling out of markets. We are very consistent all the time.
Well are you saying this: that AMH acts responsibly in relation to its position in the market? Is that what you are saying?
Is this the position: that you take particular care to act responsibly in relation to any conduct of AMH which might influence prices in the market?
And that is so, is it, because you are well aware of the ability of AMH's conduct to make a substantial difference to prices achieved in the market?
A difference, Mr Sweeney, yes. I would not say substantial but a difference.
Well, you see, is this the situation that you consider that it would not be responsible for AMH to use the full force of its ability to influence prices in the market? Is that right?
But you appreciate, do you not, that I am asking you about exercising responsibility in relation to conduct which would have an influence on price in the market? You understand that is what I am asking you about, do you not?
already said I think that you are careful to exercise that responsibility?
As counsel submits, the references by both Mr Gunthorpe and Mr McLachlan to "responsibility" betray a recognition by each of those witnesses of the power of AMH significantly to affect the price of cattle; in other words, of the commanding position, or dominance, of AMH in that
Finally, during the course of his cross-examination, Mr McHugh agreed "that, in the northern part of Queensland, AMH enjoys far and away the dominant presence amongst the
Having regard to the views expressed by Messrs Gunthorpe, McLachlan and McHugh, it may seem that I am being too cautious; but I am not prepared to find that AMH was already in a dominant position in the northern market before its acquisition of Borthwick. In so saying, I am particularly influenced by the evidence of Borthwick's market aggressiveness. Although Borthwick's market share, during recent years, has been comparatively small, it appears to have had an influence upon prices which was disproportionate to its size; forcing prices to a level higher than they might otherwise have reached. To adopt Dr Walker's test, I am not satisfied that Borthwick, unlike Vestey, Tancred and the
others, has been prepared to act in a way calculated not to
affect adversely AMH's short-term interests. AMH has been influential in northern Queensland, ever since its formation; but whilst Borthwick survived as an independent entity pursuing an aggressive price policy, 1t could not, I think, be said that AMH enjoyed, in Northrop J's phrase, "a commanding influence". Since the acquisition of Borthwick by AMH there
is no doubt that AMH's influence has ripened into command.
The question whether the acquiring corporation is likely to use its dominant position to the disadvantage of others is not a matter which arises under 5.50. No doubt Parliament thought that it would be commercially naive to doubt that a corporation which does enjoy a dominating position will use that position to its own advantage. However, because it may be relevant on discretion, I should record that, in the present case, there can be no question that AMH would use its position to purchase cattle as cheaply as possible. Mr Flynn said that this was the company's present policy. He disclaimed the suggestion that the company might altruistically keep up prices for the benefit of producers. Mr Gunthorpe said that he would not pay more than the minimum price needed "to win cattle away from (his) competitors"; and that he would "sack a buyer who paid more
I find, pursuant to s.50(1)(a) of the Trade Practices Act, that, as a result of the acquisition of Borthwick, AMH 15s
in a position to dominate the northern Queensland fat cattle
market; and that it 1s likely to continue to be in that position during the foreseeable future. It follows that the acquisition represents a contravention of s.50(1)(a). I reject the case made by the applicant in reliance upon s.50(1)(b), which case depends upon the proposition that AMH
was in a position of dominance even before the acquisition.
The finding that, in acquiring the whole of the issued capital in Borthwick from Pacific Holdings and UK, AMH contravened s.50 of the Trade Practices Act raises the question of relief under s.81 of that Act. As earlier indicated, that section provides two broad alternatives: an order for divestiture under sub-s.(1) or a declaration, under sub-s.(1A), that the acquisition is void. Alternatively, the matter may be disposed of by acceptance of an undertaking under sub-s.(1C). The applicant relies upon both sub-ss.(1) and (1A). However, before coming to the question of the form of relief appropriate to this case, it is convenient to set out my reasons for concluding that the Court would have jurisdiction to make an order under s.81(1A); and, accordingly, for dismissing the applications to set aside the
service made upon each of the Borthwick respondents.
As mentioned, on 15 February 1988 counsel for the Borthwick respondents conceded that s.50 was sufficiently wide to cover the case of an acquisition of shares in a foreign
company trading in Australia. That concession was never
retracted. In my view 1t was correctly made. The prohibition of the section 18 upon the acquisition by a corporation of any shares in, or assets of, a body corporate if that acquisition is likely to have specified consequences, in terms of market dominance. The word "market" is defined in s.4E of the Act so as to mean "a market in Australia". Thus s.50 is concerned with acquisitions which are likely to affect dominance in an Australian market. Although there is a presumption that "a statute is to be construed as limited in its operation to the
territory or the nationals of the state which enacts 1t" --
see Windeyer J in Meyer Heine Proprietary Limited v The China Navigation Company Limited (1966) 115 CLR 10 at p.43 -- the
question of extra-territoriality is always one of interpretation. As Windeyer J went on to note, in relation to the case then under consideration, the question is "whether the prima facie presumption, that the Act does not extend to penalize acts done outside Australia, by foreigners, has been displaced". See also Kitto J at p.23 and Menzies J at p.38. In the present case the legislative intent to regulate certain extra-territorial conduct is made express. Section 5(1) of the Act provides that "Parts IV and V extend to the engaging in conduct outside Australia by bodies corporate incorporated or carrying on business within Australia or by Australian
citizens or persons ordinarily resident within Australia".
Whether or not s.50 would otherwise be interpreted as extending to the conduct in this case of AMH, s.5(1) puts that question beyond doubt. Section 50 is contained within Part IV
of the Act and AMH is a company which is incorporated, and
which carries on business, within Australia. Consequently, so far as AMH is concerned, it is ammaterial that the relevant conduct took place in the United Kingdom and that it involved
the acquisition of shares in a United Kingdom company.
However, the situation relating to the Borthwick respondents is more complicated. It is a condition of relief under s.81(1A) that the Court find that the vendor of the relevant shares or assets was "involved in the contravention"; that is, in the present case, the contravention by AMH of 6.50. Section 75B(1) explains what is meant by the words "involved in a contravention" of a provision of Part IV or V:
involved in a contravention of a provision of Part IV or
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention;
(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention;
(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or
(dad) has conspired with others to effect the contravention."
In the present case the applicant relies upon para.(c) of this sub-section, contending that the Borthwick respondents were
As was pointed out by Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ in Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 at p.670, "The proper construction of par.(c) requires a party to a contravention to be an intentional participant, the necessary
intent being based upon knowledge of the essential elements of
There 15, 1n this case, no question about the existence of knowledge. Each of the Borthwick respondents was aware of the acquisition by AMH. Each actively participated in that acquisition. Moreover, each had knowledge of the facts giving rise to the finding that the effect of the acquisition would be to place AMH in a position of likely domination of the market. Quite apart from any inference which might be drawn from the circumstance that plc was the controller of Borthwick, which was a prominent participant in the Queensland cattle market and from whom it received monthly reports, Mr Cash was at all material times a director of both plc and of Pacific Holdings and had been a director of UK until 6 March 1987. But the matter of knowledge does not rest there. During the hearing counsel for the Borthwick respondents expressly conceded that, at the time of the acquisition by AMH of the shares in Borthwick, each of their clients "had knowledge in a general sense of the capacity and throughput of the abattoirs conducted by" Borthwick in Queensland "and had knowledge in a general sense of the respective market shares" of Borthwick and AMH in
Notwithstanding the above, counsel for the Borthwick respondents submit that 1t is not open to the Court to find that their clients were "involved in the contravention" by AMH, with the result that no order may be made pursuant to s.81(1A). The argument is that the only conduct which may
constitute an "involvement", for the purposes of s.81(1A), 15
conduct which takes place within Australia. Counsel point out that neither s.75B nor 5.81 is within either of the Parts of the Act referred to in s.5 -- both sections being within Part VI -- so that s.5(1) does not have the effect of extending the application of those sections to conduct engaged in outside Australia. Moreover, say counsel, the express provisions for extra-territoriality contained within s.5 constitute a clear indication that Parliament intended that, in cases not falling within that section, the Act was not to have extra-territorial application. It follows, according to counsel, that, in determining in any particular case whether a vendor of shares or assets was involved in the contravention, the Court may take into account only such events as occurred in Australia. They say that this limitation applies whether the events are looked at for the purposes of characterization of the conduct, that is whether the conduct amounted to the vendor being "concerned in" the contravention, or its quality, that 1s whether it showed that the vendor had the necessary knowledge. In the words of counsel, conduct in Australia "in itself must be capable of making Borthwicks knowingly concerned and it is not permissible to have regard to conduct taking place outside Australia in combination with any conduct taking place within Australia to conclude that Borthwicks were knowingly
Counsel for the applicant put a submission at the other extreme. They say that, once it be conceded that s.50 may have an extra-territorial application -- that is, that it
May apply to a transaction effected outside Australia -- there
is no difficulty in applying to that transaction the terms of s.81(1A). Section 81(1A) 1s designed expressly to provide a remedy for contraventions of 5.50. As those contraventions, by the concession made, may involve a transaction effected outside Australia 1t would not be rational, say counsel, to attribute to Parliament an intention to ignore conduct which took place outside Australia; consequently it would not matter if none of the relevant activity of the vendor had
It seems to me that the correct position lies between these extremes. In the face of the express provisions for extra-territorial application of the Act made by s.5, it 1s difficult to ascribe to Parliament an intention that s.81(1A) should apply to persons who have no connection with Australia except the circumstance that they are the vendors of shares or of assets whose acquisition enables some other person to achieve a position of dominance in an Australian market in breach of 8.50. As Lord Russell of Killowen said in Regina v Jameson (1896) 2 QB 425 at p.430, the presumption against the extra-territorial application of a statute "is a rule based on international law by which one sovereign power 1S bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own territory". The effect upon a vendor of an order under s.81(1A) may be significant. It 1s not difficult to see the disruption to international comity which might result from an Australian court declaring void a transaction entered into by a vendor who not only lacked a
continuing association with Australia, such as residence,
incorporation, or the carrying on of business in this country but who had not even the casual relationship of having engaged
in Australia in conduct relating to the relevant transaction.
On the other hand it seems to me that the submission of counsel for the Borthwick respondents, that all conduct outside Australia must be ignored, also goes too far. Ina case where there is relevant conduct in Australia it is a misuse of language to speak of the statute being given extra-territorial effect. The statute applies because of that conduct. It attaches to conduct within Australia. But in assessing that conduct, in relation both to its nature and to 1ts quality, the Court 1s required to take into account the whole of the available evidence. Evidence of events outside Australia may, for example, establish or negative the necessary knowledge. There is nothing unusual about that course. Australian courts commonly receive evidence of overseas events which bear upon conduct affected by Australian
There was plainly relevant conduct in Australia. The directors of ple were confronted with an obstacle to their recommending to shareholders the rejection of the Teys' offer in favour of the AMH bid: the attitude of the Trade Practices Commission. The directors of the vendor companies faced the same obstacle in making a decision to accept the AMH offer.
Mr Carey asked Mr Cash to see Mr McComas in the hope that he
would be able to eliminate the obstacle. As Mr Cash agreed in
cross-examination, the purpose of the visit "was to clear the ° way from Borthwick's point of view for the sale of the shares to AMH" and "to remove the stumbling block represented by any possible opposition by the Trade Practices Commission". As he said, he was "anxious to produce the result that the TPC
In attending Mr McComas, Mr Cash must be taken as acting on behalf of plc and the vendor companies. Those companies had an interest in being able to accept the higher offer of AMH. The local trading company, Borthwick, had no interest in the destination of its shares. It 18 significant that Mr Cash was instructed to attend by Mr Carey, as Chief Executive of the group. He did not take his own decision as
In addition to visiting Mr McComas, it appears that, during the period between receipt of the AMH offer on 18 January and his departure for London on 24 January, Mr Cash had almost daily contact with Mr Carey regarding the AMH offer. He supplied him with information, as did Allen, Allen & Hemsley, from Australia. The minutes of the meeting of directors held on 20 January 1988 show that, upon that day, the board gave consideration to the reaction both of the staff of Borthwick and of the Trade Practices Commission, information upon which matters had been conveyed by persons in
I add that, if -- contrary to my opinion -- it were necessary to show that the person engaged on behalf of the vendor in conduct in Australia had the necessary knowledge to justify the epithet "knowingly", Mr Cash had that knowledge. As he himself agreed in evidence, on matters of market share,
he was the expert "as far as Borthwicks is concerned".
Counsel for the Borthwick respondents submit that there was no causal relationship between such activity as did take place in Australia, on behalf of those companies, and the ultimate acquisition by AMH. Consequently, they say, there was no conduct which could constitute the companies being
knowingly involved in the acquisition in Australia.
It is true that the visit by Mr Cash and Mr Tonking did not achieve the result desired by Mr Carey. The Trade Practices Commission did not drop its opposition to the acquisition. It is less clear that the other activity which took place in Australia between 18 January and 26 January was ineffectual. It is noteworthy that, in his statement to the Extraordinary General Meeting on 26 January, Mr Robertson referred to the view of "our advisors" as to the effect of the undertaking given to this Court upon the previous day. The information conveyed from Australia was critical to the directors' change of mind, and it may be inferred that the advice referred to included advice from Australian lawyers. And I have already quoted the accolade given to Mr Cash by Mr
However, leaving aside any question of fact, 1t seems to me to be erroneous to read s.75B as being limited to conduct without which the relevant contravention could not have occurred. The words "knowingly concerned" are commonly found in statutory provisions creating criminal offences. In that context the word "concerned" has been read as requiring facts connecting the accused with the commission of the relevant offence: see Rex v Goldie (1937) 59 CLR 254, Ashbury v_Reid (1961) WAR 49, Regina v Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567, Regina v_Kelly (1975) 24 FLR 441, Regina v Tannous (1987) 10 NSWLR 303. In Ashbury v Reid the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, after quoting the Oxford dictionary definition of "concerned", said at p.51: "The question which a court should ask itself in determining whether an act or omission on the part of an individual comes within the terms of s.54 is whether on the facts it can reasonably be said that the act or omission shown to have been done or neglected to be done by the defendant does in truth implicate or involve him in the offence, whether it does show a practical connexion
Tannous is an interesting case, in the present context. The appellant had agreed with two other persons that certain money owing to him could be used in the importation of cannabis, in the sale of which he was to become a participant. He took no other part in the enterprise. In fact his money was not used so that there was no causal relationship between
the involvement of the appellant and the actual importation.
Notwithstanding this, the Court held that there was evidence upon which he could be convicted of being knowingly concerned in the importation. At pp.308-309, Lee J said:
"The 'concern' to which the section speaks is not a concern personal to the appellant in the sense of being in his mind, but it 1s a concern which can be demonstrated objectively by reference to his association, whatever it may be, with the importation. It must be shown that he is 'concerned in' not just 'concerned about the importation'. A father, learning that his son had made arrangements to import narcotic drugs into this country, might well be anxious about, interested in or concerned about that fact and he might evince that anxiety, interest or concern to others. But he would not be guilty of the offence of being knowingly concerned merely from his knowledge of the importation and his state of mind arising therefrom. Before he could be convicted under the section he would have to do something to connect himself with or involve himself in the importation."
The Borthwick respondents were more than concerned about the acquisition of Borthwick by AMH. They were concerned in that matter. They took active steps to bring it about. Part of that activity took place in Australia. It Matters not that a part of the Australian conduct, the visit to Mr McComas, not only failed of its purpose but, as events
In my opinion the evidence demonstrates that the Borthwick respondents engaged in conduct, within Australia, which answers the description of being "knowingly concerned" in the acquisition by AMH. It follows that the Court has jurisdiction to declare the transaction void under s.81(1A) against those two respondents, Pacific Holdings and UK, who
It does not, of course, follow that the Court ought to exercise that jurisdiction. The Court retains a discretion as to the appropriate form of relief. I am of the opinion that it would be inappropriate to make a declaration under s.81(1A). There are three separate considerations which impel me to that conclusion. Standing alone, any one of these reasons might be sufficient. Taken in combination, they are
The first consideration arises out of the events of 25 January 1988. On the previous Thursday, 21 January, the Trade Practices Commission had clearly indicated by letter to Mr Tonking that its then view was that the acquisition by AMH of the Borthwick shares would constitute a breach of s.50. Reference was made to an assurance being requested of AMH that it would not proceed with its proposal, failing which "that company" -- that is AMH -- "has also been informed that the Commission will take such action as 1t might be advised to intervene in the proposal". That letter did not say whether or not any legal action would also involve the vendors of the
When the initial application was made in this Court, on 25 January 1988, the only respondent referred to was AMH. It 18 true that nothing was said to negative the possibility
that, at a later stage, the Borthwick respondents, or some of
them, might be joined in the proceeding and that an application might be made under s.81(1A). But neither was any such action foreshadowed. On the contrary, the discussion revolved around divestiture. As intimated above, counsel for AMH made an express statement taking upon their client the
The course taken by the Trade Practices Commission on 25 January, and the acceptance of the risk of divestiture by AMH, was not inconsistent with the possibility that the Commission would subsequently make an alternative clain, involving the vendors, for a declaration under s.81(1A). But, if the Commission then had in mind such a claim, it did not so intimate to any of the Borthwick companies. Perhaps the directors of ple assumed too much in their company's favour, but the result of the failure of the Commission to notify its intention to seek relief under s.81({1A) was that the directors went to the shareholders' meeting on 26 January under the belief that there was no risk that the Commission would attempt to frustrate the transaction. Acting upon that belief, they jettisoned their previous reluctance to endorse the AMH offer and they recommended its acceptance. Implicit in that recommendation was a recommendation that the shareholders reject the conditional agreement made with Teys. I am satisfied from the evidence of Mr Robertson and Mr Carey that, so far as those two gentlemen were concerned, the events of 25 January, combined with the absence of any threat of action by the Trade Practices Commission, were critical to
their personal decisions to abandon the Teys agreement and to
accept the AMH offer. The Teys agreement having been rejected by the shareholders, it is no longer available to the vendor companies. Perhaps, in the event of an order under 5.81(1A), a new agreement might be negotiated with Teys -- or with someone else -- but, as Mr Robertson said to the shareholders on 26 January, the vendors' bargaining position would be very poor. Moreover, the Borthwick group has used the proceeds of the sale to retire certain debts. Difficulties would be experienced if the group now had to find $29 million to repay
I accept that the Court should not be astute to protect parties against the consequences of commercial risks freely undertaken by them. No doubt it is true that, in entering the transaction with AMH upon the assumption that the Commission would not seek to invoke s.81(1A), the vendors took upon themselves a commercial risk. But I think that, in so doing, they were substantially influenced by what had occurred in Australia upon the previous day, combined with the fact that no intimation had been given to them by the Commission that, if they did accept the AMH offer, the Commission might seek relief under s.81(1A). Although I intend no criticism of the Commission by the comment -- much was done in a very short time -- I think that, under these unusual circumstances, the failure of the Commission to issue a warning lulled the directors and the shareholders of plc into a not unjustifiable belief that they were not at risk in taking the course which
they did. There would be a measure of harshness 1f the Court
were now effectively to declare the transaction void, putting the vendors in a worse position than their position before the
The word "effectively" leads to my second reason for refusing relief under s.81(1A). The evidence indicates that, in actual fact, it is unlikely that any declaration made by this Court would achieve the desired purpose of reversing the
The relevant shares are held upon the London register of a company incorporated in the United Kingdom. The lex
situs of the shares is the United Kingdom so that, when
registration of the transfer of the shares was effected on 26 January 1988, AMH became the owner of the shares according to the relevant (United Kingdom) law. [If it be relevant, 1t may be noted that the situation was the same under Australian law. Unless and until this Court intervenes under s.81(1A), under Australian law the transaction is valid and the transfer
There are two results of a declaration under s.81(1A) relating to shares. Firstly, the shares "shall be deemed not to have been disposed of by the vendor": para.(d). Secondly, the vendor comes under an obligation to refund the purchase price: para.(e). It is important to note that the sub-section does not itself make void the disposition of the shares. Rather it empowers the Court to make an order, in the
exercise of its discretion, which will have that effect. It
follows that any enforcement by the United Kingdom courts of a' declaration of invalidity would depend not only upon their recognition of the relevant Australian law but also upon their readiness to enforce the judgment of this Court. In expert evidence as to the relevant United Kingdom law, Professor James Crawford, Challis Professor of International Law at the University of Sydney, expressed the view that the English courts would not enforce such a judgment. He stated three reasons: firstly, because -- on his understanding of the facts -- the Borthwick respondents were at no stage present or resident within Australia and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court; secondly, the enforcement of this Court's judgment would involve the enforcement of a foreign penal, confiscatory or public law; and thirdly, that the judgment would involve a declaration of title. These reasons were put as alternatives, any one of them being, in the Professor's opinion, a sufficient reason for an English court
Professor Crawford's views were challenged, in some respects, in cross-examination; but not by the leading of any conflicting evidence. As to the first reason, Professor Crawford conceded that this reason depended upon an assumption as to the facts and that, in forming a view upon that matter, it would be necessary to determine whether the activities carried on by Mr Cash in Australia, on behalf of the Borthwick respondents, were so significant as to result in one or more of those companies being regarded as carrying on business
here; the test being "substantial activity" within Australia.
As to the second matter, the real issue was whether s.50 of the Trade Practices Act constituted a "public law". The relevant principle was discussed by the High Court of
Australia in its recent decision in the "Spycatcher" case:
Her Majesty's Attorney-General in and for the United Kingdom v
Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Limited (2 June 1988, not yet reported). Ordinarily, I would refer primarily to a
recent High Court decision relating to a principle of the common law rather than to earlier English authority. However, in this particular case, the question 18 not the state of the common law of Australia but the position under English law.
If there is a difference between the two, 1t is the latter law which 1s relevant. I hasten to add that I do not detect any divergence between the approach taken in the two countries, so that "Spycatcher" provides a much fuller discussion of the relevant principle than I will attempt. But I will confine
The term "public law" is explained in Dicey and Morris "The Conflict of Laws" (11th edition, 1987) at p.106 as being "all those rules (other than penal and revenue laws) which are enforced as an assertion of the authority of central or local government". At p.108 the learned authors give as examples import and export regulations, trading with the enemy legislation, price control regulations and anti-trust
As Dicey and Morris point out, there is not a lot of authority upon the question of enforcement of public laws.
Professor Crawford referred to Attorney-General of New Zealand
v_ Ortiz [1984] 1 AC 1, a case in which the New Zealand government unsuccessfully sought to recover, in the English courts, an "historic article" unlawfully removed from New Zealand and subsequently taken to London. The defendant lived in Switzerland. The ultimate decision in the case, in the House of Lords, depended upon the question whether, upon the proper interpretation of the New Zealand legislation, the article had been forfeited to the Crown. However, in the Court of Appeal the view was taken that, in any event, the New Zealand law would be unenforceable in England. Lord Denning MR regarded the action as being one to enforce a public law saying, at pp.20-21:
"This suit by a foreign state to enforce its laws is to be distinguished altogether from a suit between private firms or individuals which raises a question as to whether a contract has been broken by one or the other orc whether a wrong has been done by one to the other. In such a suit our courts will often recognise the existence of the laws of a foreign state. We will recognise the foreign law so much that we will refuse to enforce a contract which is in breach of the laws of the foreign state ...
This present case 1s different. It 21.5 a suit by a foreign state brought in the English courts here to enforce its laws. No one has ever doubted that our courts will not entertain a suit brought by a foreign sovereign, directly or indirectly, to enforce the penal or revenue laws of that foreign state. We do not sit to collect taxes for another country or to inflict punishments for it. Now the question arises whether this rule extends to 'other public laws.' Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 10th ed. (1980), vol. L, p.90, rule 3 Say it does. I agree
with them. The term ''other public laws' is very uncertain. But so are the terms 'penal' and 'revenue.' ... But what are 'other public laws'? I think they are laws which are eiusdem generis with 'penal' or 'revenue' aws.
Then what is the genus? Or, in English, what 1s the general concept which embraces 'penal' and 'revenue' laws and others like them? It is to be found, I think, by going back to the classification of acts taken in international law. One class comprises those acts which are done by a sovereign 'jure imperii,' that is, by virtue of his sovereign authority. The others are those which are done by him 'jure gestionis,' that is, which obtain their validity by virtue of his performance of them.
Applied to our present problem the class of laws which will be enforced are those laws which are an exercise by the sovereign government of its sovereign authority over property within its territory or over its subjects wherever they may be. But other laws will not be enforced. By international law every sovereign state has no sovereignty beyond its own frontiers. The courts of other countries will not allow it to go beyond the bounds. They will not enforce any of its laws which purport to exercise sovereignty beyond the limits of its authority."
The remaining members of the Court, Ackner and O'Connor LJJ, regarded the New Zealand law as a "penal law" although, in so categorizing it, Ackner LJ at p.32 used language close to that used by Lord Denning to describe a "public law":
"The question whether a foreign law is penal must be decided by the English court. It must determine for itself, in the first place, the substance of the right sought to be enforced; and in the second place, whether its enforcement would, either directly or indirectly, involve the execution of the penal law of another state. The rule has its foundation in the well-recognised principle that crimes, including in that term all breaches of public law, punishable by pecuniary mulct, or otherwise, at the instance
of the state government, or someone representing the public, are local in this sense, that they are only cognisable and punishable in the country where they were committed. Accordingly, no proceeding, even in the shape of a civil suit, which has for 1ts object the enforcement by the state, whether directly or indirectly of punishment umposed for such breaches by the lex fori, ought to be admitted in the courts of any other country: ..."
The distinction made by Dicey and Morris between the
situation -- as in Ortiz -- where the foreign government must
rely upon its own legislation to make out the title necessary for its success in the English court, and a case in which the foreign legislation has already operated to transfer title in the foreign state 1s illustrated by Williams and Humbert Ltd v W_& H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] AC 368. However, that qualification does not assist the present applicant. Because the shares are registered in England, transfer of the title to the shares cannot be effected under Australian law alone;
even with an order of this Court. Failing voluntary compliance with such an order, the applicant would be compelled to seek an order in an English court and there rely upon the Australian legislation and this Court's order. The
Situation is not unlike that in Schemmer v Property Resources
Ltd [1975] Ch 273 wherein Goulding J set aside an order granting leave to serve notice of a writ upon a Bahamas company of whose assets, including United Kingdom assets, the plaintiff was a receiver. The plaintiff had been appointed by a United States court in the course of proceedings commenced by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities
Exchange Act 1934 (US), various fraudulent practices being
alleged. The defendant did not carry on business in the
United States and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the
United States court. At p.288 Goulding J said: "The situation relied on by the plaintiffs is that PRL is actively or passively concerned in a violation of the laws of a foreign country, and a court in that country has in consequence appointed a receiver of its assets. Under those circumstances (and in the absence of any other ground of foreign jurisdiction) the English court ought not, in my judgment, to regard the appointment as having any effect on
assets outside the foreign court's territorial limits."
The third point made by Professor Crawford arises out of a limitation contained in the relevant United Kingdom legislation relating to the enforcement in that country of a judgment of this Court. There are two separate statutes potentially relating to recognition of judgments of Australian courts: the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. Because
of the lack of evidence as to the relevant Orders in Council, it is not clear to me which of these statutes, if either of them, would enable enforcement in a United Kingdom court of an order of this Court. But that omission does not matter. It is a feature of both Acts that they apply only to judgments or orders in civil proceedings which provide for the payment of a sum of money. An order in the form of a declaration that a transaction is void is not enforceable in the United Kingdom under either Act or, so far as the evidence indicates, in any
Having regard to the other matters advanced, it i5 not necessary to determine the factual issue raised by Professor Crawford's first point. Notwithstanding the reference in Schemmer to the fact that the defendant was neither resident nor incorporated in the United States, it seems to me that Professor Crawford is correct in asserting that a United Kingdom court will not enforce a "public" or "penal" law even against a resident of the relevant foreign state: see, for example, Frankfurther v WL Exner Limited
{1947] Ch 629 and Government of India, Ministry of Finance
(Revenue Division) v Taylor [1955] Ac 491. And his third
point appears irresistable. Consequently, I accept Professor Crawford's view that, even as things stood at the commencement of this proceeding, any order which might be made in this Court pursuant to s.81(1A) of the Trade Practices Act would be
However, the Borthwick respondents were not content to rely upon the matters considered by Professor Crawford. They took steps to improve their position even further. Section 5(1) of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (UK) provides:
"S. (1) A judgment to which this section applies shall not be registered under Part II of the Administration of Justice Act 1920 or Part I of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 and no court in the United Kingdom shall entertain proceedings at common law for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judgment."
Subsection (2) makes the section apply to certain categories of foreign judgments. These categories include "a judgment
based on a provision or rule of law specified or described in
an order under subsection (4) below and given after the coming unto force of the order", Subsection (4) empowers the Secretary of State to "make an order in respect of any provision or rule of law which appears to him to be concerned with the prohibition or regulation of agreements, arrangements or practices designed to restrain, distort or restrict competition in the carrying on of business of any description or to be otherwise concerned with the promotion of such
On 23 March 1988, apparently on the application of pic, the United Kingdom Minister for Trade made an order under
s.5(4) whereby he specified, for the purposes of s.5(2) of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, s.81(1A) of the
Australian Trade Practices Act. That order removes any doubt
that may remain as to the unenforceability in the United Kingdom of any order which this Court might make under
There remains the theoretical possibility that the Borthwick respondents might decide voluntarily to comply with an order under s.81(1A). Having regard to the course of this case, I would never have had much confidence in that possibility eventuating. But whatever confidence I might have had has been further diminished by evidence of resolutions passed at meetings of the directors of each of the three Borthwick respondents which took place on 18 March 1988. According to the minutes of those meetings, each of the boards
"It was reported to the Meeting that the legal advice received by the Company was that any order made by the Federal Court of Australia in the proceedings commenced against the Company by the Trade Practices Commission was not enforceable in England and that consequently the Company needed to consider whether 1t should comply with such an order. After consideration by the Meeting IT WAS RESOLVED that the Company should not comply with any order of the Federal Court in the proceedings brought against it and that it should, if necessary, instruct Lovell, White «&
King to defend any proceedings to enforce the order of the Federal Court in England."
Of course, it would be open to the various boards of directors to recant this attitude and to decide voluntarily to give effect to any order which I might make. However, this 1s most unlikely. The only realistic view is that the Borthwick respondents would ignore any order made under s.81(1A) and that enforcement action against them, or any of them, in the United Kingdom courts would fail. Consequently, any such
My third reason for concluding that no order ought to be made is that it is possible to avoid the undesirable features of AMH's breach of 5.50 without making such an order.
In a case where the Court finds that a person has contravened s.50 by acquiring shares in a corporation it will often be appropriate to make an order under s.81(1) requiring
that person to dispose of those shares. It hardly lies in the
mouth of the contravenor of s.50 to complain that the effect of such an order will be to cause it also to lose control of assets which are irrelevant to that corporation's dominance in a particular market. If the Court has no other way of vindicating the public interest sought to be protected by ss.50 and 81, it must be prepared to restore the position
But, ideally, it is better to mould the order to the necessities of the case, going only so far as to remove from the control of the acquirer those assets which contribute to its market dominance. There is no public interest in foreing the divestiture of those that do not. Section 81(1) 1s not a
However, in the absence of an undertaking by the acquirer, there is a problem about taking this course. Where the contravention of s.50 takes the form of an acquisition of shares, the only order which may be made under s.81(1) is for the disposal by the acquirer of those shares. The reference to "assets", in s.81(1), is not a reference to assets indirectly acquired, through the acquisition of the company owning those assets, but to a direct acquisition of the assets of a body corporate. Section s.81(1) mirrors the
In the present case, counsel for AMH indicate that, if it is unsuccessful in its submission that there has been no
breach of s.50, their client would wish to have the
opportunity to frame a suitable undertaking under s.81(1C) of the Act, as an alternative to an order under s.81(1) for the disposal of the whole of the Borthwick shares. If no suitable undertaking is forthcoming, I will make an order under s.81(1). But it 18 appropriate to give the opportunity sought by counsel and, in accordance with the further request of counsel, to indicate my view as to the width of the
The major question in relation to any undertaking is the assets to which it should relate. As indicated, the Victorian and New South Wales assets are irrelevant to AMH's position in the Queensland market. They may be excluded from any undertaking. It is equally clear that the undertaking should involve the Bowen abattoir. But there 1s a dispute
Mackay lies outside the northern region of Queensland, as defined above. In the agreement for the sale of various assets by Tancred to Tancred (NQ) the City of Mackay was treated as being in northern Queensland. That course 18 consistent with the perception of Mr Reginald Clanchy, Tancred's Livestock Manager, that the boundary between the northern and central region runs through Nebo, south west of Mackay. But that is a minority view. All of the other witnesses who were asked to define the northern region drew the line immediately north of the city. Looking at the map, it 1s not difficult to see why they did. The rail
and road pattern is such that Mackay is able to serve an
extensive area to its south west, along with the coastal strip north west and south east of the city. Although there is a short rail line from Finch Hatton, west of Mackay, areas further to the west have more convenient access to Bowen, to
The livestock purchase records of the Mackay abattoir confirm the impression gained from the map. In 1986 the abattoir purchased 92,021 cattle, of which 78,868 came from the central region, 8,265 from the northern region and 4,888 from the southern region of Queensland. There were no interstate purchases. In 1987 the picture was much the same, the respective figures being: central 95,281, northern 8,705,
southern 2,657 and interstate 34; a total of 106,677 head.
There is a difficulty in reconciling the Borthwick livestock purchase figures with the records of the LMAQ relating to cattle slaughtering capacity and throughput of licensed abattoirs. According to the LMAQ, the Mackay throughput in 1986 was 118,094 and in 1987 117,971 head; theoretical capacity being 123,900. However, there is nothing in the LMAQ records to contradict the impression conveyed by the Borthwick livestock purchase records that the central region is the predominant source of livestock for slaughter at
Notwithstanding this fact, counsel for the applicant submit that any undertaking to be given by AMH should extend
to the Mackay abattoir. They submit that Mackay should not be
excluded merely because 1t falls outside the area -- the northern region -- in which AMH has obtained a position of market dominance. Counsel argue that the prima facie position is that the Court, by an order under s.81(1) or by acceptance of an undertaking under s.81(1C), will require a corporation contravening s.50(1) to divest itself of whatever has been acquired by that contravention, except only any assets whose retention adds nothing to the strength of that corporation in the relevant market. Counsel point out that, although Mackay is within the central region, as defined by most of the witnesses, it immediately adjoins the southern boundary of the northern region. The Mackay abattoir does in fact draw cattle from the northern region. Notwithstanding that such cattle constitute only a small proportion of the cattle slaughtered in Mackay, the consequence, say counsel, is that control of the Mackay abattoir gives to AMH some additional strength in the northern market. Furthermore, say counsel, the drawing power of the Mackay abattoir ought not to be judged only by reference to the current situation. Counsel suggest that, as Borthwick owns the Bowen abattoir, about 160 km to the north, 1t 1s reasonable to assume that the company has tended to direct cattle which emanated from points north of Mackay to Bowen; leaving to the Mackay abattoir the maximum potential to take cattle from more southerly areas. The suggestion 15s that, if AMH retains control of Mackay, but 1s forced to divest itself of Bowen, AMH may move aggressively into areas north of Mackay in an attempt to increase throughput at Mackay. Counsel suggest that, whether or not such a result be
intended, such conduct is likely to put at risk the future of
the Bowen abattoir. Having regard to Mr Tancred's statement at the meeting with Mr Bourke on 18 January i988 that, in the coming year, only one of the Borthwick plants needed to be operated, there must be some question, say counsel, as to the long term viability of two plants; and it is clear that Mackay 1s the better abattoir of the two, with the added advantage of a strong brand identity in Japan. Under those circumstances, it is submitted, there is doubt whether an independent operator at Bowen could sustain aggressive competition by AMH, from Mackay in the south, Cape River to
The competing view, put by counsel for AMH, 1s that, if Bowen were under independent control, it would be able to compete effectively with the three AMH abattoirs, particularly because it has a natural advantage in respect of local producers. The comment is further made that the Mackay abattoir has to face competition from the Rockhampton abattoirs. Counsel submit that it would aid competition if the Bowen and Mackay abattoirs were in separate hands, but there is no guarantee of this result if AMH is forced to sell
I see the force of both sets of submissions regarding future competition. But they are essentially speculative. So much depends upon unknown factors: particularly the identity of the purchaser of Bowen. The instant question must, I think, be determined upon a more principled basis. I accept
that the location of a particular asset is not decisive upon
the question whether it ought to be included in an undertaking to divest. The question rather 1s whether the retention of that asset, gained in contravention of s.50(1), will serve to assist the contravening corporation to dominate the relevant Market. If there 1s no nexus between the retention of the asset and domination, there is no need to insist upon divestiture. If there is such a nexus, of more than minimal proportions, the Court should insist that the contravening corporation divest itself of that asset. Only in that way may
Circumstances may exist in which the application of that principle 1s inappropriate. However, I do not think that the speculative matters referred to on behalf of AMH constitute such circumstances. In my view an appropriate undertaking in this case will include an offer to dispose of
I leave to counsel for AMH the task of formulating the terms of the undertaking. Provision will need to be made both as to the date by which divestiture will occur and as to a mechanism to ensure that the new owner is a person independent of AMH. No doubt counsel will consult together on
Counsel may also wish to discuss the matter of costs. In default of agreement upon this matter I will hear submissions regarding costs when the undertaking is brought
The only order I will make today is to adjourn the matter for further mention -- and, hopefully, the making of
final orders -- at 9.30 am on Wednesday 3 August 1988.
I certify this and the one hundred and forty-two (142) preceding pages to be a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Wilcox.
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C A Sweeney QC with Mr J S Hilton
Solicitors for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Goldberg QC with
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Blake Dawson Waldron
Counsel for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Mc B C Oslington with Mr R J Powell
Solicitors for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Allen, Allen & Hemsley
Date(s) of hearing: 25 January 1988; 15, 29 February 1988; 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31 March 1988; 28, 29 April 1988; and
TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION
AUSTRALIA MEAT HOLDINGS PTY
(1987) 75 ALR 581
(1976) 25 FLR 169
(1978) 32 FLR 305
(1966) 115 CLR 10
(1985) 158 CLR 661
(1937) 59 CLR 254
(1975) 24 FLR 441
(1987) 10 NSWLR 303