Tisdale v Cumberland City Council

The decision under appeal

1. The Tribunal's decision, Tisdale v Cumberland City Council [2021] NSWCATAD 132, was published on 21 May 2021. The Tribunal ordered the Council to undertake further searches to ascertain whether the General Manager's office has any further information which may fall within the scope of the appellant's requests and otherwise affirmed the decisions under review.
2. In respect of the issue concerning legal professional privilege, the Tribunal held: 49 I have read the documents over which the claim of legal privilege is made. I am satisfied that these documents are confidential communications made between the client and a lawyer prepared for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the client. I am also satisfied that the documents were prepared for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to pending proceeding in which the client was a party. 50 There can be no doubt that this information falls within the scope of clause 5 of schedule 1 to the GIPA Act. Therefore, it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information.
3. In respect of the issue concerning the video footage and related information, the Tribunal held, at [68]: In my view, this material before me [the material provided on a confidential basis] establishes that the disclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of a real and substantial detrimental effect on a person's psychological or emotional wellbeing. Further, the disclosure of the withheld information could also reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of serious harassment or serious intimidation. I am satisfied that the risk exists based on the Applicant's prior conduct. Therefore, in my view, there is a public interest consideration against disclosure of the withheld information. It should be given significant weight.
4. At [87] the Tribunal recorded: I agree that transparency in regard to the Council's processes is a consideration in favour of release of the withheld information. I agree that the public interest in maintaining transparency and maintaining proper procedures should be given significant weight.
5. The Tribunal referred to the discussion of the appropriate approach to be taken in the consideration of clause 3(f) of the table to s 14 of the GIPA Act in Dezfouli v Justice Health & Forensic Mental Health Network [2018] NSWCATAD 11 at [23] - [33], and concluded: 91 As was the case in Dezfouli, the evidence before me indicates that the Applicant has a history of sending correspondence to officers of the Council and the correspondence has often been abusive, defamatory or offensive. Some of his correspondence has also been circulated to numerous other agencies and the media. 92 In this matter, the Applicant's behaviour falls well short of that discussed in Dezfouli. However, it is apparent that there is ongoing conflict between the Applicant and other residents in Benaud Street. There is also considerable animosity towards a number of Council officers. 93 I accept that the Applicant is frustrated by the lack of response that he has received in regard to issues that he has raised with the Council. He clearly has strong views about a number of the Council's officers and sees himself as being victimised by the Council's procedures. This explains but does not justify his behaviour. 94 The evidence before me also suggests that the Applicant has engaged in harassing and intimidatory behaviour towards other residents in the street. 95 When looked at objectively, I am satisfied that there are sound reasons for believing that the Applicant's behaviour will continue. Were he to be provided with the video footage, it is highly likely he would be able to identify the location or locations from which the footage was obtained. It is likely that he would seek to communicate directly with third parties in Benaud Street and/or name them in his correspondence with the Council and other agencies. It is also highly likely he would make offensive comments about them and issue threats towards them. 96 The question to be determined is whether or not the disclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm, or of serious harassment or serious intimidation. The material before me suggests that the Applicant has already engaged in conduct that exposed a person to harm, serious harassment or serious intimidation. Arguably, the disclosure of the withheld information could not reasonably be expected to expose a person to those risks if the Applicant merely continued such conduct. 97 The Respondent contends that if the withheld information is released, it is reasonable to expect that there would be an escalation of what is already occurring. I agree with that contention. 98 The Applicant's past behaviour strongly indicates that he is likely to engage in harassing and intimidatory behaviour towards other residents in Benaud Street if he were to be provided with the information. In my view that harassment or intimidation is likely to be at such a level that it amounts to serious harassment or serious intimidation. As I have noted above, it is also my view that the disclosure of the withheld information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm. That is, a real and substantial detrimental effect on a person's psychological or emotional wellbeing. 99 In my view, this consideration against disclosure should be given greater weight than the considerations in favour of disclosure that I have referred to above. 100 I am therefore of the view that disclosure of the video footage and related information could reasonably be expected to expose other residents in Benaud Street to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation and that, on balance, there is an overriding public interest against the disclosure of that information pursuant to clause (3)(f) of the table to s 14 of the GIPA Act.
6. The Tribunal affirmed the determination of the Council that the video footage and related information should not be disclosed.

The nature and scope of internal appeals

1. By virtue of s 80(2) of the NCAT Act, internal appeals from decisions of the Tribunal may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with leave of the Appeal Panel.
2. In Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 the Appeal Panel set out at [13] a non-exclusive list of questions of law: 1. Whether there has been a failure to provide proper reasons; 2. Whether the Tribunal identified the wrong issue or asked the wrong question. 3. Whether a wrong principle of law had been applied; 4. Whether there was a failure to afford procedural fairness; 5. Whether the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant (i.e., mandatory) considerations; 6. Whether the Tribunal took into account an irrelevant consideration; 7. Whether there was no evidence to support a finding of fact; and 8. Whether the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would make it.
3. The principles applicable to the grant of leave to appeal were considered by the Appeal Panel in Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [82] - [84].
4. At [84] the Appeal Panel held: (1) In order to be granted leave to appeal, the applicant must demonstrate something more than that the primary decision maker was arguably wrong in the conclusion arrived at or that there was a bona fide challenge to an issue of fact: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [19] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45]; (2) Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve: (a) issues of principle; (b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or (c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand; (d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or (e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact-finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed, BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [20] and the authorities cited there, SAB v SEM [2013] NSWSC 253 at [8] and [9] and the authorities cited there, Nakad v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2014] NSWCATAP 10 at [45]; (3) In relation to an application for leave to appeal relating to a question of practice and procedure, the application is to be approached with the restraint applied by an appellate court when reviewing such decisions, especially if the application is made during the course of a hearing: BHP Billiton Ltd v Dunning [2013] NSWCA 421 at [21] and the authorities cited there.

Grounds of Appeal

1. The grounds of appeal set out in the appellant's Notice of Appeal were as follows: a) The Tribunal erred by making findings adverse to Mr Tisdale which were not put to him and denied him procedural faimess. The adverse findings include that he had engaged in harassing and intimidatory behaviour towards other residents in the street; that it was highly likely he would issue threats against them. b) The Tribunal, via Section 107 of the GIPA Act and 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, effectively allowed not only information which could identify complainants to be withheld from Mr Tisdale, it allowed a whole case theory to be put in confidential session which was not put to Mr Tisdale and parts of which were irrelevant to the matter to be determined. c) The Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations that material could be released to the media and that this would constitute serious intimidation. d) The Tribunal erred in not seeking further searches for memos or file notes which record the reasons for issuing a PIN for littering and declaring him an unreasonable complainant. e) The Tribunal erred in not considering the redactions in emails between Mr McNulty and Mr Taylor. f) The Tribunal erred in conducting the balancing test.
2. The appellant sought orders setting aside the Tribunal's decision and 2. That the Appellant is provided with access to the withheld video. 3. That the redacted material in email between Mr McNulty and Mr Taylor be considered for disclosure.
3. The appellant also sought leave to appeal on the basis that: The appeal involves issues of merit (the balancing test and adequacy of searches) as well as issues of law (The use s107 of the Government Information Public Access Act 2009 to make fundamental submissions) and the making of unnecessary adverse findings without procedural fairness.

A Preliminary Issue

1. Before dealing with the substance of the appellant's appeal it is appropriate to deal with a preliminary issue.
2. The appellant put before the Appeal Panel a great deal of material including four affidavits or statements made after the decision at first instance.
3. While the Appeal Panel accepted an affidavit dated 17 November 2021 as constituting the appellant's submissions on the appeal, we do not consider it appropriate to receive or have regard to the balance of the additional material.
4. The appellant's explanation of the relevance of the additional material was that it "goes to establishing what precipitated the events" which led to the making of the appellant's document requests to the Council. The appellant's explanation why that material had not been placed before the Tribunal at first instance was that his solicitor did not think it was necessary to rely upon that material at the hearing.
5. The principles applicable to the receipt of new evidence in internal appeals in the Tribunal have been canvassed in a number of decisions of Appeal Panels: See Yuen v Thom [2016] NSWCATAP 243 at [14] - [22]; Lettau v Artwork Transport Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 14 at [21] - [33]; Ros v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 70 at [27] - [43]; and Lauron v Michael [2021] NSWCATAP 120 at [21] - [32].
6. It is clear from those authorities that it is not appropriate to admit, on an internal appeal, evidence which was not put before the Tribunal at first instance, which the appellant could, with reasonable diligence, have obtained and tendered at the first instance hearing.
7. Clearly, in this case, the further evidence was available to the appellant in advance of the original hearing. On the appellant's own case, his legal representative made a deliberate decision not to rely upon it. The appellant is bound by that decision.
8. The appellant sought to suggest that "the whole judgment turns on confidential evidence" which was only produced at the hearing and the existence of which the appellant was only notified of two days in advance of the hearing. The confidential evidence to which the appellant referred was, we understand, the confidential affidavit sworn by Ms Albazouni which, as described by the Tribunal at [19], "annexed unredacted versions of the information which has been withheld" and also annexed evidence "relat[ing] to the withholding of information based on clause 3(f) of the table to section 14", that is that disclosure could reasonably be expected to "expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation".
9. As we understood the appellant's submission in this regard, it was that the decision of his solicitor not to rely upon the additional material was vitiated by the fact that the Council had produced the further confidential evidence at the hearing.
10. The answer to that submission is that the appellant's solicitor did not seek an adjournment when the Council sought to rely upon the additional material. The appellant had legal representation at the first instance hearing. If the appellant's legal representative had considered that the appellant's case had been prejudiced by late disclosure of the Council's intention to rely upon further confidential evidence, they could have sought an adjournment. They did not. The appellant is also bound by that decision.
11. The appellant's grounds of appeal include the proposition that the appellant was denied procedural fairness in the way that the Tribunal relied upon the confidential evidence. We turn to address the appellant's grounds of appeal.

Grounds (a) and (b) - Procedural Fairness

1. It is convenient to deal with the appellant's grounds (a) and (b) together as they both assert the denial of procedural fairness in the way the Tibunal dealt with the confidential material.
2. Denial of procedural fairness would raise a question of law.
3. The appellant's submissions concerning these grounds largely consisted of assertions that various conclusions of the Tribunal, in particular the conclusion that the applicant had engaged, and was likely to engage, in harassment and intimidatory behaviour towards other residents on the street, were incorrect and that it was the appellant who was the subject of intimidation and harassment by other residents.
4. The appellant submitted in particular that the Tribunal's conclusions were based on "the presentation of cherry picked and contrived evidence supplied by Council that is aimed at discrediting [the appellant] only" and that much of the evidence was not relevant to his application.
5. The appellant submitted: 13. While the GIPA Act is constructed in a way to allow for records and evidence to be shown confidentially to the Tribunal and not to one of the parties - findings based on this confidential evidence should be restricted to that which is commensurate with the inability to provide procedural fairness to the adversely affected party. For example there is a great difference between the statements in [98] and [100] of the judgment which are simple summaries, to those made in [94], [95] and [96] which are accusatory. 14. The judgement is arrived at in circumstances where it is acknowledged by the Senior Member, at [74], that Mr Tisdale believes Council has a willingness to believe other resident's complaints but not his own. Despite this there are no affidavits (even confidential ones) from the complainants, only from the Council who, Mr Tisdale has complained, consistently do not believe his version of events but believe others and hold evidence of property damage and harassment against Tisdale by the very complainants Council relies on. Tisdale appeared in front of the member for cross-examination.
6. In relation to appeal ground (b), the appellant submitted that he had not, until delivery of the decision, been aware that there was more than one "complainant" who had provided video footage and submitted that this suggested that the video footage had been "produced", that is, that it was a combination of multiple videos and not raw footage.
7. The Council submitted that s 107 of the GIPA Act required the Tribunal to receive the confidential evidence and hear argument concerning that evidence in the absence of the appellant. Section 107 relevantly provides: 107 Procedure for dealing with public interest considerations (1) In determining an application for NCAT administrative review, NCAT is to ensure that it does not, in the reasons for its decision or otherwise, disclose any information for which there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. (2) On an NCAT administrative review, NCAT must receive evidence and hear argument in the absence of the public, the review applicant and the applicant's representative if in the opinion of NCAT it is necessary to do so to prevent the disclosure of information for which there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
8. The Council submitted that the clear inference arising from s 107 was that the requirements of procedural fairness must be limited in proceedings under the GIPA Act. The Council referred to Black v Hunter New England Local Health District [2011] NSWADT 295 at [30]: Without a procedure along the lines of section 107, the general rule of an open hearing and the open receipt of evidence would apply, which would be contrary to the objects of the GIPA Act and also render the determination of the respondent nugatory. This clearly was not the intention of Parliament. At the same time, it can be inferred that Parliament did not intend the procedure in section 107 to have a broader application other than to the 'information' that is the subject of the review application and any other information, the disclosure of which would disclose the information the subject of review. This may include information of the surrounding circumstances of the information in dispute.
9. The Council also referred to Saul & Anor v Commissioner for Fair Trading [2017] NSWCATAD 91 at [70]: I have had significant regard to the fact that the majority of the hearing occurred in the applicant's absence and that there is an inherent unfairness in such a situation. However balancing that unfairness is the text of the statute whereby it is clear that such matters (where appropriate) were intended to be dealt with in this manner. Such a position is not inconsistent with the objects of the GIPA Act in that a confidential session ensures that there is sufficient scrutiny of the information and the arguments in a frank and candid manner. and to Brazel v Sydney Water Corporation [2021] NSWCATAP 13 at [62]: Mr Brazel's complaint that he was denied procedural fairness is not without merit. However, the denial of procedural fairness is required by the terms of s 107(3) of the GIPA Act. Section 107 expressly abrogates procedural fairness (Bristrol Custodians Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADTAP 44 at [28]). Further, as Principal Member Pearson said in Forbidden Foods Pty Ltd v Rice Marketing Board for the State of NSW (No 2) [2020] NSWCATAD 73 at [28], s 107 of the GIPA Act "qualif[ies] the principles based on the presumption of open justice otherwise applicable to proceedings in the Tribunal."
10. The Council submitted that "[a]ny denial of procedural fairness to the Appellant arose as a consequence of the orders which are expressly permitted to be made under s 64 of the NCAT Act and s107 of the GIPA Act." The Council further submitted that the appellant had been given the opportunity to file, and had filed, further written submissions addressing the confidential affidavit.

Consideration - Grounds (a) and (b)

1. It is in our view clear, from the terms of s 107 and from the authorities referred to above, that in proceedings for review of decisions under the GIPA Act the requirements of procedural fairness are limited to ensure the protection of the confidentiality of the information the subject of the proceedings. The limitations on the disclosure of information to an applicant must extend to evidence or information the disclosure of which would disclose the information the subject of the application for review.
2. The Tribunal addressed the attachments to the confidential affidavit in six paragraphs [22] - [29] which were not published generally or disclosed to the appellant.
3. It is clear from those paragraphs, which were made available to the Appeal Panel, that the Tribunal carefully considered the content of the confidential attachments and concluded that disclosure of that material would disclose information which was the subject of the application.
4. We are not persuaded that the receipt by the Tribunal of the confidential affidavit or the Tribunal's reliance upon the attachments to that affidavit involved any denial of procedural fairness beyond what was required by the terms of s 107.
5. The Tribunal may have recognised, at [74], that the appellant believed that the Council tended to believe other residents over him, but it cannot be said that the Tribunal acted upon the Council's view of the appellant's credibility compared to others. In its decision, the Tribunal carefully set out the basis upon which it accepted that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation. That conclusion was not founded upon an acceptance of any other person's assessment of the appellant's credibility.
6. Insofar as the appellant asserts that he was not aware that there was more than one complainant who had provided video footage, the appellant does not clearly identify the basis upon which he suggests the decision discloses that there was more than one complainant. The passage in the decision cited by the appellant was paragraph [62]: "The video footage and related information ("the withheld information") was provided by third parties on a confidential basis. The third parties objected to the release of the footage as they wished to protect their identity.
7. In that passage the Tribunal referred to "video footage and related information". It is not a necessary implication from that statement that the video footage was supplied by more than one person. We should not be understood as affirming or denying that there was more than one person who supplied video footage. In our view that issue is simply irrelevant.
8. The issue before the Tribunal was not whether the video footage was genuine, or, more accurately, raw and unedited. The issue was whether disclosure of the footage could reasonably be expected to expose a person to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or serious intimidation.
9. The Tribunal concluded that, if the appellant were able to view the footage, he would be likely to be able to identify the source of the footage and that, were he able to do so, he would be likely to harass or intimidate the source or sources. Whether there was one or more than one source, and whether or not the video was edited, had no bearing on those issues.
10. Appeal grounds (a) and (b) must be rejected.

Ground (c) - alleged irrelevant considerations

1. The appellant's submissions referred to paragraphs [90] and [91] of the decision as involving the Tribunal taking into account irrelevant considerations. We have set out paragraph [91] above, at [16]. Paragraph [90] was as follows: Furthermore the Respondent has concerns that no conditions could be imposed in relation to what the Applicant could do with the withheld information if it were released. The Respondent is concerned that the release of this information to the Applicant may well lead to him providing it to the media. If this were the case it could be seen as a form of intimidation of the third parties.
2. The appellant submitted that "It is hard to see how a video of [the appellant] allegedly littering would have media appeal or be intimidating." The appellant suggested that, in making the finding at [90], the Tribunal was displaying "unconscious bias".
3. The appellant also submitted that the fact that he had sent correspondence to Council officers which had been abusive and defamatory was not relevant to determining whether there was a risk of serious harm or intimidation to third parties.
4. The Council's written submissions pointed out that the Tribunal had recorded in paragraph [91] that some of the appellant's correspondence had been circulated to the media.
5. The Council submitted that: To the extent (if any) that the Senior Member considered the release of material by the appellant to the media in the context of potential harassment and/or intimidation to the complainant, this was not an irrelevant consideration.
6. The Council further submitted that s 55(1)(b) of the GIPA Act expressly permitted the Tribunal to take into account the appellant's "motives for making the access application" as a factor in considering whether there was an overriding public interest against disclosure.

Consideration - Ground (c)

1. We find no error of law in the Tribunal's consideration of either the likelihood that the appellant would disclose the withheld information to the media if it were disclosed to him, or the appellant's history of abusive and defamatory correspondence with Council officers. Both matters were relevant to consideration of whether, if the identity of the complainant(s) were disclosed, the appellant would be likely to engage in harassment or intimidation of them.
2. As the Council submitted, the appellant's motives for seeking the withheld information were relevant. The appellant's previous conduct towards Council officers was also relevant as indicative of the manner in which the appellant would be likely to deal with those with whom he might come into conflict or against whom he might consider he had a grievance. That was a matter directly relevant to the question whether disclosure of the withheld material might lead to harassment or intimidation of the sources of that material by the appellant.
3. Ground (c) must be rejected.

Ground (d) - Further searches

1. The appellant did not explain, either in written submissions or in the course of the hearing, why he submitted that the Tribunal should have concluded that any searches undertaken by the Council, apart from those the subject of the order directing further searches, were inadequate.
2. Ground (d) cannot succeed.

Ground (e) - Consideration of redactions

1. The appellant's submissions merely re-stated the proposition that the Tribunal erred in not considering the redactions in emails between Mr McNulty and Mr Taylor. The appellant did not expand upon that assertion. The Tribunal identified in paragraphs [12] - [16] of its decision the issues which arose on the application. The extent of redaction of emails was not identified as an issue. The appellant did not draw to the attention of the Appeal Panel any part of the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal or the submissions made to the Tribunal on behalf of the appellant which might indicate that the Tribunal had incorrectly identified the issues which arose before it.
2. Ground (e) must be rejected.

Ground (f) - The balancing test.

1. The appellant's submissions in support of this ground of appeal went no further than stating that the withheld information was relevant to determining whether the Council had acted reasonably in issuing the penalty notice to the appellant and that "it is in the public interest that public authorities do not issue PINs without reasonable case [sic, cause]".
2. The Council submitted that the Tribunal had "considered at length … the public interest considerations both in favour of and against disclosure of the video footage and related 'withheld information'". The Council further noted that the "weighting process" required under s 13 of the GIPA Act involves a decision of a discretionary character and cited the decision of the Appeal Panel in McKean v Department of Justice [2016] NSWCATAP 93 at [53] and [68] - [69]: 53 Mr McKean acknowledged as relevant to his 'error of law' case the well known statement in House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-5 per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, explaining the limited circumstances in which an appellate court might intervene, on error of law grounds, in a first instance decision of a discretionary character: The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. … 68 This is an area where the decision maker is given a wide discretion by the law in identifying what may be seen as relevant, and weighed in the balance. Furthermore the Tribunal proceeded at each stage of its analysis to give a weighting to the considerations it identified. Mr McKean challenged the degree of weight given by the Tribunal to the considerations on either side of the balance. 'Weighing' and signifying the degree of weight is an orthodox part of any reasoning process that requires the consideration of competing factors. In the question of fact/question of law dichotomy it is a fact-finding activity. 69 Weighing processes can only be undone on error of law grounds in circumstances of the kind set out in House v R.

Consideration - Ground (f)

1. The matters raised by the appellant in respect of this ground of appeal do not rise above disagreement with the weight which the Tribunal gave to the factors for and against disclosure. As the Council submitted, the decision whether the public interest in favour of disclosure is outweighed by the public interest against disclosure is a matter of judgment which cannot be set aside on appeal merely because minds may differ as to where the balance lies.
2. The appellant did not identify any error falling within any of the categories identified by the High Court in House v R. It follows that ground (f) must be rejected.

Leave to appeal

1. We are not persuaded that the appellant may have suffered any substantial injustice warranting leave to appeal. We are not satisfied that there is any error in the Tribunal's decision.
2. Accordingly, leave to appeal will be refused and the appeal must be dismissed.

Orders 1. Leave to appeal refused. 2. Appeal dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 02 May 2022