the subsequent written contentions
20 In subsequent written submissions, counsel for the applicant raised two further grounds of alleged jurisdictional error.
21 First, it was contended that the school had not provided a certificate as to whether the applicant's academic results were satisfactory because the school had been misled by the Department about the issue to which its certification should be directed.
22 The question put by the Department is set out in [12] above. The question, if it is intended to elicit a response in terms relevant to condition 8202(3)(b), is misleading. It is misleading in two respects. It introduces the notion of satisfactory academic progress, compared to satisfactory academic results. The two notions may exist together, but they are not necessarily the same. It also explains what is meant by satisfactory academic progress. If that is a reference to satisfactory academic results, the explanation imposes a limitation upon the notion of satisfactory academic results which condition 8202(3)(b) does not necessarily carry. In certain circumstances, academic results may be satisfactory even though the course has not been completed in the normal timeframe. There is a danger in substituting for statutorily expressed terms some other form of words which is thought to do the same work: see per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ at Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572-573.
23 However, it does not follow that the Tribunal misdirected itself in law when it considered whether to affirm the cancellation of the applicant's visa. It is necessary to consider how the Tribunal went about its task of review. As noted, it looked at the material referred to in [12] and [13] above, to reach the conclusion quoted in [7] above. That passage from its reasons indicates that the Tribunal did not itself fall into the error of looking to academic progress rather than academic results, or to completion of the course in the normal timeframe rather than academic results. It considered properly whether the school had provided a certificate that the applicant's academic results were at least satisfactory.
24 In my judgment, on the material available to it, the Tribunal's finding was open to it.
25 There is an obligation imposed upon education providers under the ESOS Act to inform students under a student visa of unsatisfactory attendance or unsatisfactory academic performance. Section 20 of the ESOS Act so provides. Its operation is described briefly in [9] above. Moreover, s 19 of the ESOS Act obliges the education provider to give to the Secretary of the Department of Education Science and Training certain information about such students. The s 20 notice in this matter appears to have been prompted by a letter from the Department dated 23 August 2003. It was a letter sent to all education and training providers registered under the ESOS Act. It was to remind the providers of their obligations under s 19(2). It specifically quoted s 19(2) of the ESOS Act:
'A registered provider must give the secretary particulars of any breach by an accepted student of a student visa condition relating to attendance or satisfactory academic performance as soon as practicable after the breach occurs.'
The letter reminded the school that a failure to report a breach as required would expose the school to administrative sanctions, including the imposition of conditions, suspension or cancellation of registration as an education provider.
26 The relevant terms of the 'certification' in the s 20 notice are set out in [10] above. It is not in terms which correlate directly to condition 8202(3)(b). It is expressed more in terms of commitment than achievement. However, the obligation under condition 8202(3)(b) is one requiring positive or affirmative certification by the school. The s 20 notice does not do so. The school's subsequent letter of 18 September 2002, although not expressed in the precise words of condition 8202(3)(b), clearly enough focuses upon academic performance. The applicant's academic progress is described as 'poor'. The markings in the boxes on the response to, or copy of, the respondent's facsimile letter of 17 September 2002 also respond to the question about academic progress in terms which do not indicate satisfactory academic progress.
27 If the requirement of condition 8202(3)(b) were to certify that the student's academic result was unsatisfactory, there may be some doubt that the information provided by the school referred to above would fall within that description. The reason why the s 20 notice would not do so is clear: as noted, it refers to commitment rather than academic results. The reason why the response on the letter of 17 September 2002 may not do so is that it refers to academic progress rather than academic results. That is the matter to which the school was asked to respond. A student may not progress well, but may nevertheless attain satisfactory results. A further reason why that response and the letter of 18 September 2002 may not do so is that the response must be seen in the light of the question to which it is responsive. The completion of a course within the normal timeframe may be an indicator of a satisfactory academic result, but it is not the same as a satisfactory academic result.
28 Those observations do not, however, assist the applicant. Condition 8202(3)(b) imposes a requirement for certification in positive terms. None of the communications from the school about the applicant's academic results during 2002 meet its terms.
29 Counsel for the applicant referred to the letter offering the applicant placement or enrolment in year 11 again at the school during 2003, sent at an unspecified date but apparently some time in October 2002. He contended that letter amounted to certification in terms of condition 8202(3)(b). I do not agree. It is an offer of enrolment in year 11 in 2003. It does not contain any certification about the quality of the applicant's academic performance during 2002.
30 What is apparent is that the school provided information which either under s 20 of the ESOS Act or in response to the letter of 17 September 2002 amounted to a form of certification by the school as to the academic progress of the applicant. At least in respect of terms 2 and 3 of the course during 2002, the school indicated that the applicant made no academic progress. Upon that basis, in my view, its response does not amount to a certificate that her academic results were at least satisfactory. Consequently, I consider that the Tribunal's conclusion that condition 8202(3)(b) was not met at least in respect of terms 2 and 3 of the course was open to it. The Tribunal did not err in a way which affects its jurisdiction in determining that it was obliged to affirm the cancellation of the applicant's visa. There was a breach of the condition, and s 116(3) for the reasons explained above led to the Tribunal having no jurisdiction or no power other than to affirm the cancellation of the visa.
31 The second post-hearing submission was that the Tribunal erred by regarding s 116(1)(b) and (3), together with reg 2.43(2)(b) of the Regulations, as requiring strict compliance with condition 8202(3)(b). It was submitted that substantial compliance with condition 8202(3)(b) is sufficient, and that the material before the Tribunal demonstrated substantial compliance with the condition. Reliance was placed upon the decision in Shrestha v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 64 ALD 669;[2001] FCA 359 (Strestha).
32 In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Hou [2002] FCA 574, Conti J decided that s 116(1)(b) and s 116(3) are clear, and do not admit of any substantial compliance test. His Honour regarded s 116(1)(fa) as providing no reason for qualifying the plain meaning of those provisions. Section 116(1)(fa) empowers the respondent to cancel a student visa, inter alia, if the holder is not or is not likely to be a genuine student. It appears to be directed to circumstances different from those to which s 116(1)(b) refers, and it does not fall within the reach of the circumstances prescribed under s 116(3). It was not in force at the time of the cancellation of the student visa addressed in Strestha, but was introduced into the Act effective from 21 December 2000: Migration Legislation Amendment (Overseas Students) Act 2000 (Cth) (Act 168 of 2000), s 3 and cl 1 of Sch 4. Strestha also addressed an earlier version of condition 8202. Conti J in Hou at [32] explained that s 116(1)(fa) is directed to circumstances where a student visa holder has complied with the visa conditions but has behaved in a way which indicates the visa holder is not a genuine student, and may be occupying a place which could well be occupied by a genuine student. Act 168 of 2000 also introduced s 116(1A) providing for the Regulations to prescribe matters to be considered when considering cancellation under s 116(1)(fa). It is, in my view, clear enough that those amendments were to be complementary to s 116(1)(b) and s 116(3) rather than to cut across or to qualify those provisions.
33 Act 168 of 2000 by s 3 and Sch 1 also introduced subdiv GB of the Act, including s 137J. That subdivision ties to the procedure imposed upon an education provider under s 20 of the ESOS Act. Failure to comply with a notice under s 20 of the ESOS Act leads to automatic cancellation of the student visa: s 137J, but the student may apply for the cancellation to be revoked: s 137K. The respondent is empowered under s 137L to revoke the cancellation if the respondent is satisfied the relevant condition was not breached, or if 'the breach was due to exceptional circumstances beyond' the student's control, or if a prescribed circumstance applies. Compliance with a s 20 notice requires the student to attend in person before an officer of the respondent's Department to explain the breach. If the officer were satisfied the relevant condition was not breached, then the powers available to cancel the visa under s 116(1) of the Act would not be enlivened. If the officer were satisfied the relevant condition was breached, because the condition must relate to attendance or satisfactory performance (as s 20 of the ESOS is limited to those conditions, the officer of the respondent by reason of s 116(1)(b) and s 116(3) would have no direction but to cancel the visa. Unlike s 137L(1)(b), the officer cannot address exceptional circumstances beyond the non-citizen's control.
34 It appears ironical that the failure to respond to a notice under s 20 of the ESOS Act which leads to automatic cancellation of a student visa may ultimately enable the student to have the cancellation revoked for exceptional circumstances, but responding to such a notice leaves no scope for the consideration of exceptional circumstances. The submission was made, but rejected, in Hou that the apparent irony was avoided if s 116(1)(b) and s 116(3) required substantial compliance only with condition 8202.
35 I respectfully agree with the reasons of Conti J in Hou at [33] that there is no room for an implication into s 116(1)(b) and s 116(3) of a requirement only of substantial compliance with those provisions. Their words are clear, in particular s 116(3). I do not think the reading down of those provisions is reasonably open. The uncompromising operation of those provisions and condition 8202 is also reflected in the decisions of the Court concerning the attendance requirement in Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1285; Patsanza v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 734; and Ariyagama v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1407. However, the apparent irony noted in [33] above may merit the respondent's attention.
36 For the reasons given, the application must be dismissed.