General - the FASOC and the Agreement
44 The FASOC proceeds on the basis that the Agreement, although it expired on 7 December 1992, was replaced or extended. When I refer to the Agreement, I am referring to the Agreement as originally in force and as extended. ResMed has pleaded in its further amended defence the facts establishing the renewal of the Agreement which took effect from 7 December 1992. So far as I know, however, when the Agreement was entered into its contemplated life was only the original term (from 1 January 1991 to 7 December 1992).
45 According to the FASOC, the University makes the following claims:
(a) The Mirage Mask is a Product in respect of the selling of which ResMed was obliged to pay a licence fee to the University under cl 5 of the Agreement (FASOC paras 10-17);
(b) Each Mirage Mask is, or incorporates, an improvement in connection with the Intellectual Property made or discovered by ResMed of which the University became the owner (see cl 11 of the Agreement and paras 19-26F of the FASOC);
(c) Each Mirage Mask infringes the Patent (FASOC para 27-34);
(d) ResMed used the Intellectual Property for the purpose of applying for and obtaining the Patents and Designs in breach of the Agreement (see cl 3.3 of the Agreement and FASOC paras 35-40);
(e) ResMed has made discoveries or improvements in connection with the Intellectual Property (of which the University is the rightful owner) which have led to the obtaining of the Patents and Designs (of which the University is also the rightful owner) (cl 11 of the Agreement and FASOC paras 41-48).
46 The parties' submissions referred to the effect of various provisions of the Agreement. As noted at [7] above, any opinions I express in these reasons as to the proper construction of the Agreement are not final. They are but an aspect of the exercise of my discretion on the question whether ResMed should be required to give discovery of the documents in the disputed categories.
47 Schedule 2 to the Agreement disappoints as a setting forth of particulars of "trade marks, patents, copyrights, processes, know-how, registered designs and other like rights" (see the definition of "Intellectual Property" in cl 1 of the Agreement). Although para (a) refers explicitly to the Provisional Application alone, I think it also catches the Patent that was associated with it.
48 Paragraph (b) in Schedule 2 is not limited to integers of the invention the subject of the Patent. Paragraph (b) refers to information and know-how relating to the "Nasal Mask" (subject to the two carve outs in para (b)). I cannot, for present purposes, be precise as to the meaning of "relating to", beyond saying that cl 3 of the Agreement suggests that the information and know-how are information and know-how:
· which the University possessed and of which it could grant a licence to ResMed on 17 May 1991; and
· which the University had the capacity in 1991 to furnish to ResMed in the ways identified in Schedule 7 to the Agreement (that is, by supplying to ResMed (1) a copy of the Provisional Application, (2) "detailed information" possessed by Associate Professor Colin Sullivan, and (3) a working prototype of the Nasal Mask).
49 Schedule 4 similarly disappoints the reader's expectation of a setting forth of products and/or processes that arises from the definition of "Product" in cl 1 of the Agreement. As will be recalled, Schedule 4 contains only the words "Nasal Mask". However, the definition of "Product" also contains the words "which incorporate the use of the Intellectual Property". This raises a question as to whether those words are limiting as to the range of products and/or processes that could be within the term "Products", or are merely descriptive of such products and/or processes.
50 The distinction between the relative pronouns "that" and "which" is discussed in various books on English usage: see, for example, Fowler's Modern English Usage, "that" (relative pronoun) 3, 4; The Penquin Working Words "that/which" and "clause"; Gower's The Complete Plain Words (HMSO 1973), (xiv) "Which" and "that", pp 142-145; Strunk and White, The Elements of Style (4th edition, 2000) "That. Which.". Purists say that the relative pronoun "that" defines, limits, restricts or qualifies, whereas the relative pronoun "which" does not do so but introduces a feature or characteristic of something that has already been defined. According to this view, the words "which incorporate the use of the Intellectual Property" in the definition of "Product" are not restrictive (as the expression "that incorporate the use of the Intellectual Property" would have been) so that the product is simply "the products and/or processes set forth in Schedule 4".
51 As the books to which I have referred make clear, however, it would be quite unsafe to rely on the that/which distinction. The English language is not used with close attention to such niceties, even by drafters of contracts.
52 It seems to me that the expression "the Nasal Mask" in para (b) of Schedule 2 and in Schedule 4 is a reference to the "Nasal Mask" mentioned in para (a) of Schedule 2. In para (a), Nasal Mask is an invention, that invention being the subject of the Provisional Application and later of the Patent itself.
53 On this view, even if the expression "which incorporate the use of the Intellectual Property" were to be considered definitional, the Nasal Mask incorporates at least that part of the Intellectual Property that is the invention that was the subject of the Provisional Application.
54 I need not decide questions of construction now. They can await the final hearing. For present purposes, it is important that the definition "Intellectual Property" may include information and know-how, the use of which was not incorporated in the Product, and that merely relates to the Product. The Product itself need not have incorporated the use of all of the Intellectual Property. In particular, it need not have incorporated the use of the information and know-how "relating to" the invention (the Nasal Mask) that the University undertook by cl 3.2 to supply to ResMed.
55 The FASOC does not allege that the University supplied any information or know-how to ResMed in performance of its obligation under cl 3.2. It is conceivable, I suppose, that the University's case will be that ResMed acquired information and know-how that related to the Nasal Mask, whether forming part of the invention or not, otherwise than by being supplied with that information and know-how by the University pursuant to cl 3.2. The University should be required to clarify what its case is in this respect. It should be required to plead facts as to the supply of information or know-how by the University to ResMed pursuant to cl 3.2, or as to the acquisition by ResMed of information and know-how outside cl 3.2, if this is indeed the University's case.
56 Although ResMed is critical of the University's FASOC in this respect, ResMed has not sought any relief in respect of the FASOC and it is on the FASOC as it exists that I am required to determine the present discovery dispute.
57 Arguably, contrary to para 15 of the FASOC, each Mirage Mask was not within the expression "Product" because it was not the Nasal Mask referred to in Schedule 4. On this view, it may incorporate some integers of the invention being the Nasal Mask, but not fall within the term "Nasal Mask" itself. On this basis, the University's claim for royalties based on cl 5 and Schedule 3 in respect of the sales of the Mirage Masks would be without foundation.
58 If this view were to prevail, attention would still have to be given to the University's claim pursuant to cl 11 of the Agreement (paras 19ff of the FASOC). That claim is very broad. Paragraph 22 asserts that if any Mirage Mask is not within the defined term "Product", it nonetheless is or incorporates "a discovery or improvement in connection with the Intellectual Property, whether patentable or not" within cl 11 of the Agreement. It will be recalled that the Intellectual Property comprises the Nasal Mask, and the University's information and know-how relating to that invention. The information and know-how relating to the invention is itself a broad concept. The notion of an "improvement in connection with" that already broad concept is broader still. ResMed must have made or contributed to the discovery or improvement. However, unlike the Intellectual Property itself, a discovery or improvement is not limited to the University's Nasal Mask invention and related information and know-how as at 1991 (see [48] above).
59 In relation to discoveries and improvements, the University's claim is framed as one for damages or an accounting for profits, and an order for specific performance of an implied obligation to assign any intellectual property held by ResMed in any discovery or improvement. It will be recalled that under cl 11.1 of the Agreement, discoveries or improvements made by ResMed "in connection with the Intellectual Property" belong to and are the absolute property of the University. The University's case is, therefore, that the discoveries and improvements represented in the twelve Mirage Masks belong to and are the absolute property of the University.
60 ResMed sought to distinguish between two cases advanced by the University. The first was referred to for convenience as "the objective case". This case was to be established simply by an objective comparison between each Mirage Mask and the Intellectual Property that was alleged to have been furnished by the University to ResMed or otherwise acquired by ResMed. According to the objective case, it is only the final form of each Mirage Mask that the University needs to have, and documents relating to the development of each Mirage Mask, as are sought in categories 4, 5, 6 and particularly 8, are not relevant.
61 The second case was referred to for convenience as "the subjective case". This is the case that the University supports in its submissions. This case was described by the University as being that the Intellectual Property was as a matter of fact used in the creation of each Mirage Mask, notwithstanding that this may not be apparent from an objective comparison of the kind described in the last paragraph. That is, it suffices that there is a causal link between the Intellectual Property and each Mirage Mask.
62 ResMed submits that the subjective case is not pleaded by the University. It says that although the University pleads that various elements of the Intellectual Property were "incorporated" into each Mirage Mask, it has pleaded and particularised (whether in the FASOC or in response to a request for further and better particulars) those elements only by reference to physical features of a product. ResMed submits that in these circumstances, the question of whether those features have been incorporated into each Mirage Mask must be capable of being answered by a comparison involving the final form of each Mirage Mask. The documents relating to the development of each Mirage Mask, as are sought in categories 4, 5, 6 and particularly 8, are not, so ResMed contends, relevant to the University's case as pleaded.
63 In answer to ResMed's submission, the University says it may be that a simple comparison between each Mirage Mask and the relevant element of Intellectual Property would be enough. However, it argues that it is not limited to that approach. It suffices, so the University submits, that ResMed has used the Intellectual Property to formulate or arrive at the final product. The University therefore contends for a broader reading of the term "incorporates".
64 In my view, the University is not limited to the objective case by the FASOC and the particulars provided. For example, the FASOC alleges in para 15(g) that the Mirage Mask incorporates "information and know how relating to the nasal mask". The information and know-how referred to in that para is particularised by the University to be the elements of Intellectual Property referred to in Annexure A of the FASOC (with the exception of para (n)). Even though ResMed describes those elements as "physical features", their "incorporation" into a product may not be evident from a simple visual comparison. Similarly, in relation to paras 38 and 41 read with Annexure A, I do not think that the allegation of "incorporation" must be provable exclusively by a visual comparison. However, whether following discovery or not, the University must make this aspect of its case clearer in its pleading. (Opportunity should be taken to incorporate in the pleading all particulars, including those presently found in correspondence.)