Issues
39 The notice of appeal sets out the following grounds:
1. The primary judge erred in dismissing the proceedings (paragraph [217] of the judgment delivered on 17 June 2008 ("the judgment").
2. The primary judge should have found that:
a. The strata managers Bright & Duggan Pty Ltd and John Patman Strata Management ("the strata managers") had been duly appointed pursuant to section 162 of the Strata Schemes Management Act, 1996 ("the SSMA") with the full powers of the Owners Corporation (paragraphs [174], [175], [177-180] of the judgment);
b. The strata managers, having been duly appointed pursuant to section 162 of the Strata Schemes Management Act, had not (and could not) delegate their full authority or full powers of the Owners Corporation to the lot owners of the strata scheme (paragraphs [174], [175] and [191] of the judgment);
c. No meetings or notices of meetings were required as a precondition to the making of determinations by the strata managers (paragraphs [188], [189], [190], [194], [198], [201], [209] and [213] of the judgment);
d. Each of the determinations made by the strata managers was a valid exercise of authority by the respective strata managers;
e. The managing agent's authority to instruct the plaintiff's solicitors was not circumscribed by section 80D of the SSMA or the regulations thereunder (paragraph [183] of the judgment);
f. If a meeting/s of lot owners were necessary for any purpose then in consequence of the operation of clause 10(8) of schedule 2 of the SSMA, the respondents were disentitled from casting any effective vote at any such meeting.
3. The primary judge erred in coming to her decision on the basis of matters not pleaded by the respondents in their defences:
a. That Mr Patman delegated his authority (paragraphs 174 and 175 of judgment);
b. That Mr Jaworski delegated his authority in relation to the meeting of 29 March 2006 (paragraph [191] of the judgment);
c. That section 80D of the SSMA and the regulations thereunder circumscribed authority to instruct the plaintiff's solicitors (paragraph [183] of the judgment);
d. That the alleged failure of the strata managers to comply with sections 75 and/or 76 of the SSMA invalidated determinations (paragraphs [172], [173], [197], [199], [203], [207] and [215] of the judgment).
4. Further or in the alternative to paragraphs 3(c) and 3(d) above, the primary judge should have found that the strata managers complied with Section 80D of the SSMA and sections 75 and/or 76 of the SSMA.
5. The primary judge erred in failing to find that upon the proper construction of Section 80 of the SSMA, the Owners Corporation was entitled to recover the whole of its costs and/or expenses pursuant to Section 80 of the SSMA in the amount of $61,624.61.
6. Inasmuch as the primary judge found that any decisions purportedly made by or on behalf of the Owners Corporation were for any reason invalid or ineffective, the primary judge should have found that any and each such decision was duly and validly ratified by the Owners Corporation by subsequent determinations or by fresh determination (paragraphs [176], [183], [193], [195], [197], [198], [199], [210], [203], [206], [207], [209], [210], [211], [213], [214] and [215] of the judgment).
7. The primary judge erred in failing to find that the respondents' liability for ordinary levies fell due upon the passing of each such resolution for ordinary levies.
8. The primary judge erred in failing to find that the respondents had been notified of their contributions to pay ordinary and special levies, in the absence of any issue in consequence of the respondent's evidence that notification of such ordinary and special levies had been received (Transcript of 21 February 2008 at page 28/29) and (paragraphs [176], [192], [197], [200], [204], [208], [212] and [216] of the judgment).
9. The primary judge erred:
a. In failing to hold that the determination of the issues of the terms of the appointment of the respective strata managers, the validity of their appointments generally, the requirement for notices of meetings, the requirement for notices of contributions and the validity of the determinations of the compulsorily appointed strata managers prior to 23 February 2007 ("the Chapter 5 issues") were all matters within Chapter 5 of the SSMA and were therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Consumer Trader & Tenancy Tribunal ("the CTTT");
b. In failing to hold that as a result of findings made by the CTTT previously in relation to the Chapter 5 issues, the respondents were estopped from re-litigating the Chapter 5 issues or were otherwise embarking upon an abuse of process in seeking to do so (paragraphs [166-170] of the judgment);
c. In so far as her Honour had any discretion to deal with any matters within Chapter 5 of the SSMA, any discretion purportedly exercised in that regard was erroneous;
d. In failing to come to the same conclusion as the CTTT in relation to the Chapter 5 issues.
10. The primary judge omitted to give any or any sufficient reasons for any of her factual findings or legal conclusions (paragraphs [166] to [218] of the judgment)
40 There is a notice of contention setting out the following grounds:
1. Her Honour should have held that the plaintiff failed to issue proper and effective notices of meeting of the Owner's Corporation to the defendant in respect of meetings purportedly held on 24 August 2006 and 27 July 2007, and that such meetings were invalid and the decisions that were purportedly made at them were nullities.
2. Her Honour should have held that the plaintiff failed to issue proper and effective contribution notices to the defendant with respect to the levies arising in 2003, 2006 and 2007.
3. Her Honour should have held in the case of the levies purportedly resolved upon at the 24 August 2006 meeting and the 27 July 2007 meeting of the plaintiff, the levies were excessive and struck without lawful justification.
4. Her Honour should have held that Bright & Duggan Pty Ltd was invalidly appointed as Strata Manager.
5. Her Honour should have held that, with respect to the 2003 meetings, no valid resolutions were passed due to unlawful delegation.
6. Her Honour should have held that no valid resolution to instigate and prosecute the subject legal proceedings has been passed.
41 At the hearing of the appeal, the respondents did not seek to uphold the decision of the primary judge that OSP had not notified Mr and Mrs Andrews of their contribution, as required by s 78(1) of the Act.
42 In my opinion this concession was correct. Mr and Mrs Andrews were given minutes of the meetings of 25 August 2003 and 27 August 2003, and were sent the letter of 5 November 2003; and subsequently they received the notices set out at pp 469-482 of the Blue Book.
43 Also, the respondents did not seek to uphold the decision of the primary judge, concerning the meetings of 24 August 2006 and 27 July 2007, to the extent that it turned on the view that the resolutions were ineffective because the levies substantially exceeded the amounts needed.
44 In my view, this concession is also correct. It is true that s 75 of the Act requires the owners corporation to estimate "how much money it will need to credit to" both its administrative fund and its sinking fund "for actual and expected expenditure"; but s 76 requires determination of a different amount, namely the amount to be levied "to raise the amount estimated as needing to be credited" to the funds (s 76(1)) or "in order to meet the expenses" (s 76(4)). If an owners corporation determines that the levy will not in fact be paid by some of the unit holders (for example, because of bankruptcy), the amount of the levy necessary to raise the required amounts and/or to meet the expenses will be that much greater. By reason of s 78(2) of the Act, the contributions have to be payable in shares proportionate to unit entitlements.
45 The issues actually contested on the appeal were:
(1) Whether Mr Patman exercised the function of the owners corporation in making relevant determinations at the August 2003 meetings.
(2) Whether the appointment of Bright and Duggan was subject to limitations of the kind referred to in the draft agreement.
(3) Whether certain functions of OSP had to be exercised at a properly convened general meeting, notwithstanding the appointment of a strata managing agent under s 162 of the Act, notably the functions under s 76(4) and s 80D of the Act.