JUDGMENT (Trade Union - actionable defamation at suit of - no claim for actual loss - "injury to pocket" - pleading - judicial comity)
1 By second further amended statement of claim filed on 5 September 2003 the plaintiff sues the defendant for damages for defamation. The relevant article was published in the "Sydney Morning Herald" on 11 December 2001.
2 Two imputations are pleaded as arising from the natural and ordinary meaning of the article and they are:
4(a) The Environmental Health and Building Surveyors' Association ("EHABSA") sanctioned its Secretary, Ian Robertson, giving evidence at the Administrative Decisions Tribunal which supported entrenched interests of certain male members of the Union over interests of certain female members of the Union.
(b) The Environmental Health and Building Surveyors' Association ("EHABSA"), is a "boys club" that puts the interests of its male members ahead of the interests of its female members.
3 The matter complained of, the text of which is appended hereto, was dealt with in detail by Simpson J in her judgment in this action and a concurrent action against the same defendant brought by Mr Ian Robertson who was Secretary of the plaintiff: [2003] NSWSC 473, 13 June 2003.
4 The plaintiff in paragraph 1 of the second further amended statement of claim pleads that it is an organisation "which is registered pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act and is able to be sued and sue in its registered name".
5 The defendant contends that this new pleading (filed as a consequence of her Honour's ruling) does not plead or particularise facts which would, if proved, establish an actionable defamation.
6 What the plaintiff has done in paragraph 5 of the new pleading is state "By reason of the publication of the matter complained of…the plaintiff has been held up to public ridicule and contempt and has been damaged in their reputations (scil: its reputation) and has suffered and continues to suffer loss and damage".
7 The defendant submits that the plaintiff has not pleaded an actionable defamation because it does not plead or particularise facts which would establish "that the plaintiff has been injured in its pocket": see NSW Aboriginal Land Council v Jones (1998) 43 NSWLR 300 at 308B; Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] 1 AC 234 at 262.
8 The defendant contends that this matter was, in effect, ruled upon by her Honour Simpson J at paras [29]-[32] of her judgment. Para [32] is in the following terms:
"[32] The absence of any pleading to this effect, or particularisation thereof, is not a matter which would lead me to strike out a statement of claim without giving the Association the opportunity to plead appropriately. However, having read the authorities to which I was referred, and the passages in Tobin and Sexton, I have come to the view that there is merit in the point. It will be for the Association to obtain advice as to the manner in which it should remedy the deficiency".
9 Her Honour had obviously heard extensive argument between the same parties touching upon this very issue. Her Honour had considered what was said in Lewis and NSW Aboriginal Land Council, particularly the judgment of Handley JA at 308B.
10 Her Honour also had read para [3017] of Tobin and Sexton "Australian Defamation Law and Practice" which deals generally with this subject.
11 The defendant urges upon me that by way of judicial comity I should strike out the second further amended statement of claim in the light of the failure of the plaintiff to particularise the matters to which her Honour, it is said, clearly was adverting in para [32].
12 The plaintiff has sought to rely upon an absence of any requirement to establish "special damage" or "injury to its pocket" by reference to such authorities as: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510; Kay & Anor v Chesser & Anor [1999] 3 VR 55; Feo v Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd & Ors [1999] 3 VR 417 and Selecta Homes v Advertiser News Weekend (2001) 79 SASR 451.
13 I add that even in National Union of General and Municipal Workers v Gillian & Ors (1945) 2 All ER 593 Birkett J, in upholding the right of that trade union to sue, made reference to the property of the union being adversely affected by the libel (at 596D); the passage is cited in Tobin & Sexton.
14 That there should still be an issue along these lines is curious. That it may have to be resolved elsewhere is obvious.
15 I propose to follow the submissions of the defendant in comity with the decision of Simpson J, on the basis that the pleading discloses no actionable case in defamation.
16 The defendant also argued that the matter complained of was not reasonably capable of carrying imputation 4(a). The matter complained of suggests that the Secretary of EHABSA, Mr Robertson, was a witness who gave evidence to the ADT. It is argued that how he came to give evidence is not revealed and the article cannot be understood as conveying that the union "sanctioned" the giving of evidence of the kind described, by Mr Robertson.
17 For the plaintiff it is argued that, for example, the use of such terms as "the union boys' club" and "male privilege entrenched by dinosaur union attitudes" establishes that the evidence provided by the Secretary and thereby sanctioned by the Association was evidence to further those attitudes. Although it is not necessary for me to decide the question of capacity, I would indicate my view that the article is reasonably capable of carrying imputation 4(a). The contents particularly of paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 with paragraph 15 and especially the opening words of paragraph 10, the last mentioned commencing "The principle appears to have eluded the Environmental Health and Building Surveyors Association of NSW (EHABSA). Ian Robertson, the secretary of the union, told the tribunal he was very concerned that any decision to award cars would jeopardise the position of those who already had use of them", leads me to this view.
18 The formal orders are:
- The second further amended statement of claim is struck out.
- The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of the action and the defendant's application.