Section 14
25 The questions relating to the construction of s 14 are concerned with the phrase "an incidental accompaniment". A prerequisite of the application of s 14 is that the relevant tobacco advertisement be broadcast as "an accidental or an incidental accompaniment to the broadcasting of other matter". The applicants do not quarrel with the Tribunal's conclusion that the relevant material was not an accidental accompaniment to the broadcast of other matter. However, the applicants advanced a contention to the Authority that the excerpt of the interview with Russell Crowe that was broadcast during the "Mailbag" segment on 29 October 2000 was an incidental accompaniment to the broadcasting of other matter, namely, the sentiments expressed in the two letters received from viewers.
26 In its reasons, the Authority outlined its understanding of the meaning of the phrase "an incidental accompaniment". In doing so, it referred to observations made by the High Court of Australia in Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 at 612 as follows:
"In the context of s.100(10) of the Act, the word 'accompaniment' seems to refer to matter of an advertising character which occurs 'in company with' the broadcasting or televising of 'other matter'. Hence 'matter of an advertising character' will not be an 'accidental or incidental' 'accompaniment' unless it is broadcast or televised contemporaneously with the 'other matter'. In that setting, the adjective 'incidental' must mean 'happening… in fortuitous or subordinate conjunction' with the 'other matter': The Macquarie dictionary, 2nd ed. (1987 p 881)."
27 The Authority expressed the view that a tobacco advertisement would only be regarded as an incidental accompaniment if it is subordinate to the main matter being transmitted and that, if a tobacco advertisement dominates or forms a substantial feature of a television program, scene or segment, it would not be an incidental accompaniment of the program, scene or segment.
28 The Authority also referred to observations made by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1985) 5 FCR 330 where the Court said (at page 347):
It is not difficult to think of circumstances under which a licensee might televise matter of an advertising character as an incidental accompaniment of televising other matter; for example a televised news item shows a street scene with advertising billboards in the background. The transmission may be accidental, in the sense that the staff of the licensee do not notice the background billboard. But it may also be deliberate. The action - which represents a genuine news item - happens to take place in front of the billboard so that if the news item is to be used the billboard must also be shown. Under such circumstances the exclusion of 'incidental accompaniment' would apply."
29 Thus, the Authority approached the question on the basis that for the tobacco advertisement to be an incidental accompaniment to the sentiments expressed in the viewers' letters, the broadcast of the tobacco advertisement must happen in fortuitous or subordinate conjunction with the broadcast of the sentiments expressed in the viewers' letters. The applicants have no quarrel with that approach to s 14.
30 The Authority's reasoning in relation to the application of s 14 was expressed as follows:
"The visual images that constitute the tobacco advertisement do not follow in subordinate conjunction to the broadcast of the 'other matter'. As can be seen from the transcript of the segment [see Schedule 2], the content of the viewer letters was transmitted after the interview excerpt in which the tobacco advertisement appeared.
This was not a situation where, in order to broadcast the viewer responses in the context of the Mailbag Segment it was also necessary or unavoidable to broadcast the tobacco advertisement. The repeat broadcast of the visual material constituting the tobacco advertisement was a discrete segment of itself and did not occur in company with the viewer letters. In the ABA's view, it is difficult to see how the subject of the broadcast could be regarded as 'incidental' to that broadcast. In fact, it may be contended that the visual images constituting the tobacco advertisement were the subject matter of the broadcast of that matter.
The ABA is therefore of the view that the tobacco advertisement broadcast in the Mailbag Segment on 29 October 2000 was not an 'incidental accompaniment' to other matter and therefore not permitted by s.14 of the TAP Act."
31 The applicants contend that the Authority misconstrued s 14 in that reasoning in that:
· it construed s 14 as requiring that the broadcast of a tobacco advertisement be absolutely contemporaneous with, or immediately after, the broadcast of the other matter;
· it construed s 14 as requiring that the broadcast of a tobacco advertisement be necessary or unavoidable in conjunction with the other matter; and
· it proceeded on the basis that the broadcast of a tobacco advertisement immediately prior to the broadcast of other matter could not be in subordinate conjunction to that other matter.
32 The applicants' criticism of the Authority's reasoning in relation to s 14, in essence, is that the Authority assumed that s 14:
· required that the tobacco advertisement must be broadcast at the precise instant that the other matter is broadcast or, at least, must follow and not precede the other matter;
· required that the broadcast of the tobacco advertisement with the other matter must be necessary or unavoidable.
33 I do not understand the Authority to dispute that, if such constructions of s 14 were adopted, they would be erroneous. Rather, the Authority contends that it did not adopt either of those approaches in its application of s 14 but correctly identified the language and purpose of s 14 of the TAP Act as being similar to the legislation under consideration in the Rothmans and the United Telecasters Cases, such that the observations made in those cases provided guidance as to the proper interpretation of s 14 of the TAP Act.
34 No complaint is made by the applicants in relation to the Authority's conclusion as to the approach to be taken to the consideration of the application of s 14, namely, that a tobacco advertisement would only be an incidental accompaniment if it is subordinate to the main matter and if it dominates or forms a substantial feature of a television program, scene or segment, it will not be an incidental accompaniment of that program, scene or segment. The question is really whether, in the passage cited above (paragraph [30]), the Authority was doing no more than apply s 14 in accordance with the approach that it said it would adopt.
35 There is no error of law in making a wrong finding of fact - Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 77. Further, the reasons of an administrative decision maker should not be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to legal error - Minister of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. The Authority observed in its reasons that the application of s 14 was a matter of judgment that must be made having regard to the facts of a particular case. That must be correct. The Authority contends that its conclusion concerning the application of s 14 was a finding of fact in the particular circumstances of this case.
36 The observations made by the High Court of Australia in Wu Shan Liang's Case may not be of great significance in relation to reasons that have been formulated carefully and deliberately with the possibility of judicial review clearly in mind. The decision under review was made on behalf of the Authority by its Chairman, with the assistance of considered legal advice, in the light of detailed legal submissions made on behalf of the applicants by their solicitors. The Authority's determination was not that of a lay administrator made without assistance. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the Authority's reasoning of 29 November 2001 represents the result of consideration and deliberation by the members of the Authority and its staff, including legal advisers, in the expectation that the reasons would be carefully analysed by the applicants and their advisers and by members of the public generally. Thus, the reasons should be understood as a deliberate and considered statement by the Authority of its reasoning process.
37 Nevertheless, the Authority properly advised itself of the construction of s 14 of the TAP Act, as requiring a consideration of whether the broadcast of the tobacco advertisement happened in fortuitous or subordinate conjunction with the broadcast of the sentiments expressed in the viewers' letters. On the other hand, in its conclusion, the Authority referred to the fact that the tobacco advertisement did not "follow in subordinate conjunction to" the broadcast of the other matter. It referred to the fact that the content of the viewers letters "was transmitted after the interview excerpt in which the tobacco advertisement appeared". The Authority also observed that this was not a case where, in order to broadcast the sentiments expressed in the viewers' letters "it was also necessary or unavoidable to broadcast the tobacco advertisement".
38 However, I do not read those comments as detracting from the construction of s 14 that had previously been adopted by the Authority. The comments represent the Authority's reasons for making the judgment that it was called upon to make, having regard to the facts of the particular case before it. It may be that they are not particularly compelling reasons for making the judgment in question. It may be that, if I were standing in the shoes of the Authority, I would reach a different conclusion. It may be that the Authority's conclusion was wrong. However, those matters alone would nevertheless not be a basis for concluding that the Authority had made an error of law. I am not persuaded that the Authority's determination involved an error of law in relation to s 14.