Taphouse Investments Pty Ltd v Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority

Judgment (7 paragraphs)

[1]

ve Tribunal Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Date of Decision: 1 August 2022 Before: L Andelman, Senior Member File Number(s): 2021/00277173

[2]

REASONS FOR DECISION

These reasons for decision are concerned with a threshold point raised by the respondent as to whether the appeal should be dismissed because it has become a moot appeal and, therefore, should be dismissed under s 55 (1) (b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the NCAT Act) on the basis that it is misconceived and lacking in substance.
The appeal is from an administrative review decision of the Tribunal in respect of a refusal by the Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority (the Authority), the respondent to the appeal, in May 2022, to grant an extended trading authorisation (ETA) to the then licensee of a hotel in south-western Sydney. That licensee is the appellant but is no longer the licensee in respect of the premises.
The appellant was the licensee at material times, including when the appeal was lodged, but ceased to be the licensee in November 2022, before the hearing of the appeal, following the completion of a sale of the hotel business.
In its reply submissions on the appeal, provided on 28 February 2023, the Authority raised as a threshold matter that because of the change of licensee the appeal was "without utility and incompetent" on the basis that the appellant no longer had any interest in the appeal proceedings and that the Authority's refusal decision was specific to the appellant. The point was not expanded upon in detail.

Moot appeals

Feeney concerned an appeal in an access to government information case in which, by the time of the appeal, the information requested by the applicant had been supplied to it and there was, therefore, no live dispute between the parties as to whether the applicant could have access to the information. As a consequence, the Appeal Panel made an order under s 55 (1) (b) of the NCAT Act dismissing the appeal on the basis that it was misconceived and lacking in substance.
In that case, the Appeal Panel said: 1. This appeal is moot. The respondent to the appeal, the Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (the Secretary) has complied with the Tribunal's orders. If we decide the appeal, there will be no practical consequences for the parties. The general rule for moot appeals is that they should not be entertained. The Secretary submits that we should decide the appeal because, among other things, it raises important issues of principle about the scope of a provision of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (GIPA Act). In our view, the factors in favour of determining the appeal are insufficient to displace the general rule. …. 7. There is currently no dispute between the parties on any issue. The Secretary has complied with Tribunal's orders and Mr Feeney is not a party to current legal proceedings where he is able to apply for the information. If the Appeal Panel were to make a determination, it would be have no practical outcome for either party. In those circumstances, the appeal is moot. 8. The Appeal Panel has power to dismiss an appeal at any stage of the proceedings, for reasons including that "the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance": NCAT Act, s 55(1)(b). The Tribunal has power under that provision to dismiss a moot appeal. In determining whether to dismiss an appeal we are guided by the principles applied by courts when faced with a moot appeal. 9. The guiding principle in s 36 of the NCAT Act is that the Tribunal is to "facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings". However, that principle applies to issues of practice and procedure, not to substantive issues before the Tribunal. 10. The most recent and authoritative discussion of the relevant principles can be found in Hunter Development Corporation v Save our Rail NSW Incorporated (No 2) [2016] NSWCA 375; 93 NSWLR 704 (Hunter Corporation). At [34], Beazley P (as her Excellency then was) quoted the High Court's explanation for the general rule in Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334; [1999] HCA 9 at [47]: Because the object of the judicial process is the final determination of the rights of the parties to an action, courts have traditionally refused to provide answers to hypothetical questions or to give advisory opinions. 12. In Jardin v Metcash Ltd [2011] NSWCA 409 (Jardin) at [35], Campbell JA (Young JA and Meagher JA agreeing) went so far as to say that: "[I]t could only be in rare circumstances, if ever, that a court was justified in reaching a decision on legal question that had no practical consequences for either of the parties": Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales [1977] 18 ALR 55 at 60, 69. ….. 25. In summary, in three Court of Appeal judgments - Hunter Corporation, Jardin and Industrial Equity - there was a live issue as to costs. The Court gave leave to appeal solely or principally on that basis. In PWD Australia costs was not a live issue but the Court gave leave because the appeal had been argued almost to its conclusion and there was at least one other proceedings on foot where the question of law raised in the appeal, was likely to be pivotal. 26. As a general rule, the Appeal Panel should not entertain appeals on legal questions that have no practical consequences for the parties. Where there is a live issue as to costs, the appeal may be determined but courts have sometimes expressed reluctance to do so unless, for example, the amount of costs in dispute is high. In this case, there was no live issue as to costs. We have not taken into account that Mr Feeney should not be put to the cost of defending the appeal. That consideration is already encompassed by the general rule that an appellate body should not determine a moot appeal. ….. 31. The grounds of appeal involve an issue of construction having a significance beyond the immediate rights of the parties. That is a factor in favour of determining this appeal. The impact of the Tribunal's decision on the time it takes for an agency to process a GIPA application, is reflective of the significance of the legal question in dispute. However, this is not a case where the Tribunal's decision is plainly wrong and can be disposed of quickly. Nor are there other proceeding on foot where the questions of law identified by the Secretary would be pivotal. 32. The single factor in favour of determining this moot appeal is that it raises a question of general importance to all public sector agencies about the proper meaning of s 60(1)(e) of the GIPA Act. For the reasons we have given, that factor is insufficient to displace the general rule that such appeals should not be entertained.
In the Bass v Permanent Trustee decision referred to by the Appeal Panel, the plurality of the High Court also said: 45 The purpose of a judicial determination has been described in varying ways. But central to those descriptions is the notion that such a determination includes a conclusive or final decision based on a concrete and established or agreed situation which aims to quell a controversy. In R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex Parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd[52], Kitto J said: "[J]udicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or classes of persons... [T]he process to be followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which ... entitles and obliges the persons between whom it intervenes, to observance of the rights and obligations that the application of law to facts has shown to exist." 46 Similarly, Professor Borchard in his pioneering work, Declaratory Judgments stated[53]: "A judgment of a court is an affirmation, by the authorized societal agent of the state ... of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. It is a conclusive adjudication that a legal relation does or does not exist. The power to render judgments, the so-called 'judicial power,' is the power to adjudicate upon contested or adverse legal rights or claims, to interpret the law, and to declare what the law is or has been. It is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action which distinguishes the judgment from all other public procedural devices to give effect to legal rights." (footnotes omitted)
Those principles have been followed in subsequent decisions of the Appeal Panel: see, for example, Dibb v Transport for NSW (No 2) [2022] NSWCATAP 89 at [58]); Australian Press Council Inc v Southey [2022] NSWCATAP 127 at [48].
As we expand upon below, a determination of the merits of this appeal will not determine any current legal controversy between the appellant and the respondent, nor can it determine any existing or future controversy between the respondent and the new licensee, nor will it have any practical consequence for either party to the appeal.
The appellant sought to overcome this threshold objection to the appeal by the following contentions: 1. The grant of an ETA, as with the grant of a licence, was in rem in nature such that it would run with the premises until revoked. In this way, such a grant would be binding upon the public at large, including the new licensee, not just between the parties to the decision and, hence, a decision upon the merits of the appeal was of practical utility. 2. There was relevant utility in the determination of the appeal because the Appeal Panel, if it upheld the appeal, could order that the ETA be granted to the new licensee, who could be joined as a party to the appeal. 3. There was a practical consequence for the appellant by a determination of the appeal because it would avoid an exposure it otherwise would have to a claim for breach of the Deed of Indemnity. It was also said that the Deed of Indemnity gave the appellant a relevant interest in the appeal. 4. There were practical consequences by a determination of the appeal because a fresh application for an ETA by the new licensee might be met with an argument that it was an abuse of process or, at least, the new licensee would need to overcome a prima facie position that it was not entitled to the ETA and, hence, would be significantly prejudiced if the Tribunal's decision stands. 5. The Appeal Panel had a discretion to determine the appeal even though it would result in no practical consequence for either party. For a number of reasons the Appeal Panel should exercise that discretion in favour of proceeding to determine the appeal.

Contentions (1) and (2) - in rem nature of grant of an ETA/grant of relief to the new licensee

It is convenient to deal with contentions (1) and (2) together because to a considerable extent they interrelate.
Contentions (1) and (2) were made at the hearing of the appeal and contention (1) was developed by the appellant in submissions to re-open after the hearing of the appeal (in this regard, after the hearing of the appeal we received short written submissions in chief and in reply from the appellant and a short, written submission from the respondent -both parties were content to deal with these additional matters in writing).
At the outset, we mention three matters concerning contention (1).
First, the contention must, ultimately, be directed at overcoming the interpretation of s 49 (2) of the LA, according to which the Authority and, hence, the Tribunal or the Appeal Panel, standing in the shoes of the Authority, may only grant an ETA to the licensee who applies for the grant.
Secondly, it is important to recognise that the statements in the authorities the appellant referred us to concerning the in rem issue are authorities concerning judgements in rem. When applied to the subject of liquor licenses these authorities were concerned with decisions of the now replaced Licensing Court of New South Wales. In saying this, we recognise that the characterisation of the judicial decisions as judgements in rem followed from legislative provisions that change the status of persons and/or property as against the public at large.
Thirdly, no one contended that the current decisions of the Authority and the Tribunal against the grant of the ETA attached to the hotel premises such that the new licensee could not pursue her own application for such authorisation. At its highest, at the hearing of the appeal, the appellant submitted that the new licensee faced the risk of a discretionary decision that her application was an abuse of process. However, this was disavowed by the respondent which undertook not to raise any such argument and that it would consider any such application on its merits.
For the purpose of this appeal, by analogy with decisions in this field by the now replaced Licensing Court, we are prepared to accept that a decision by the Tribunal or the Appeal Panel as to the merits of the appellant's application for an ETA would be regarded as a judgement in rem concerning the appellant's status in respect of the ETA, or as having the same status as such a judgment, and, hence, would be conclusive against all the world and would prevent "'all persons from saying that the status of the thing adjudicated upon was not such as declared by the adjudication": as referred to by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of News South Wales in Washington H. Soul, Pattinson & Co v Ogilvy (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 143 at 148; see also per Hope J in Odze v Carr (1970) 92 W.N. 685 at 690-691; see also PE Bakers Pty Ltd & Ors v Yehuda (1988) NSWLR 437 at 442 concerning decisions by the Land and Environment Court.
In the Ogilvy decision the Full Court went on to say: "Not only are the owner of the premises and the licensee estopped from setting up that the premises were unlicensed, but this attribute of the premises cannot be called in question by any other person. The status of the premises is settled by the order of the licensing court, and neither the parties nor their privies, nor any other person, can dispute that order. So long as the licence remains in force, untransferred and unremoved, the premises must be taken to be licensed premises for all purposes and in all courts".
However, as we expand upon below, we do not see how such status for the Tribunal's decision under appeal says anything about whether the Appeal Panel should proceed to determine the appeal in light of the change in the licensee in the circumstances of this case and the particular legislation in issue.
As we see it, whether the new licensee should obtain an extended trading authorisation depends upon a variety of factors for investigation, consideration and decision by the Authority. That has not yet occurred. No administrative review right has yet arisen in respect of any such a decision.
Through the administrative review proceedings in the Tribunal and subsequent appeal, the appellant sought to overturn the Authority's refusal of its extended trading authorisation application. In this regard, in the Notice of Appeal (lodged on 29 August 2022) the appellant sought orders from the Appeal Panel that: 1. The decision under review is set aside. 2. In substitution for the decision under review, the Tribunal orders that the application is approved.
In doing so, the appellant sought to invoke the powers of the Tribunal in administrative review proceedings to stand in the shoes of the decision-maker and decide what was the correct and preferable decision based upon the material presented to the Tribunal; s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).
Under s 13A (1) and (5) of the Gaming and Liquor Administration Act 2007 (NSW), because the appellant was the applicant for the ETA, the appellant was a relevant person who was aggrieved by the decision of the Authority and, accordingly, was able to apply for administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).
The appellant also sought to invoke the powers given to the Appeal Panel under s 81 (1) (d) and (2) of the NCAT Act, in respect of an appeal, to make a decision in substitution for a decision the subject of the appeal and, in doing so, to exercise the functions of the Tribunal conferred by legislation.
In accordance with s 49 (2) of the LA, the application referred to in proposed Order 2 (for an ETA) was an application by the appellant, as licensee, for the licence it held to have extended trading hours.
It was an application, dated 20 October 2020, under which it was proposed that the existing trading hours of 5 am to 12 pm on Monday to Saturday be extended to a closing time of 4 am the following day, Monday to Saturday inclusive, and the existing trading hours on Sunday of 10 am to 12 pm be extended from a closing time of 10 pm to a closing time of 12 pm. The application was accompanied by various documents, including an additional information document which proposed that various measures and restrictions apply during the additional hours in order to minimise the likelihood of any negative impacts. It also stated that the appellant was the business owner of the hotel and was duly experienced in operating licensed premises within NSW.
In this additional information document it was said that gambling activities, in the form of gaming machines and TAB facilities, would be conducted on the licensed premises during the proposed extended trading. In this regard, various points were made concerning how such activities would be conducted and harm minimisation practices followed.
The licensing regime under the LA is one under which "a licensee", defined as the holder of a licence, is authorised to sell liquor in accordance with the Act and conditions of the licence - it otherwise being prohibited for "a person" to do so without such authority.
In the case of a "hotel licence" (the license with which we are concerned in these proceedings) a regime is established under which "a licensee" is authorised to sell liquor by retail on the licensed premises: ss 4, 7,10 and 14 of the LA. The grant of the such an authority affects the status of both a specific person (relevantly, it can be an individual or a corporation; s 40 (2)) and specific premises.
Accordingly, the assessment of an application for a licence includes an assessment as to whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to carry on the business to which the licence relates: s 45 (3) (a) of the LA.
So also does the assessment as to whether a transfer of the licence will be approved involve an assessment as to whether the proposed transferee is a fit and proper person to carry on the business to which the licence relates: s 60 (5) of the LA.
Similarly, the LA makes it clear that the assessment of an application for an ETA may include an assessment of the ability of the existing licensee to implement measures with a view to ensuring that the "overall social impact" of extended hours sought will not be detrimental to the "well-being of the local or broader community" and that liquor is supplied responsibly on the premises, along with an assessment of what requirements the Authority may require the licensee to comply with before the extended trading authorisation takes effect: see s 47 (2) in conjunction with s 51 (3); s 48 (2) (c), (3) & (5); s 51 (1) (a), (3), (8) & (9).
In accordance with the terms of s 49 (2), and this context concerning a licence and an extended trading authorisation under the LA, contrary to the submissions of the appellant, in our opinion, an ETA is not an authorisation that is given to the licensee "from time to time", irrespective of who the licensee is, until such time as it may be revoked.
Accordingly, the Authority's decision the subject of these administrative review proceedings was a decision that refused the application for the grant of extended trading hours to the appellant. It follows that the relief sought by the appellant in the administrative review proceedings, and on appeal, must be seen as relief to reverse that situation and obtain a grant of such authorisation, specifically, to the appellant.
Furthermore, as we construe s 49 (2), neither the Authority, nor the Tribunal, nor the Appeal Panel on appeal, has any power now to grant the ETA sought to either the appellant or to the new licensee in response to the appellant's application.
Section 49 of the LA, relevantly, provides: 49 Extended trading authorisation - general provisions (1) Application of section This section applies in relation to the following types of licences (referred to in this section as a relevant licence) - (a) a hotel licence, ….. (2) Extended trading authorisation for consumption on premises In the case of a relevant licence (other than a packaged liquor licence) that authorises the sale or supply of liquor for consumption on the licensed premises, the Authority may, on application by the licensee, authorise the licensee to sell or supply liquor, for consumption on the licensed premises only, during any of the following periods - (a) in the case of a hotel licence - a specified period between midnight (other than midnight on a Sunday) and 5 am on any day of the week (other than a Monday), ….. (5) Nature of extended trading authorisation An extended trading authorisation operates to authorise the sale or supply of liquor on the licensed premises - (a) on a regular basis (until such time as the authorisation is varied or revoked by the Authority), or (b) if the authorisation so provides - on a special occasion that takes place on a specified date, or (c) if the authorisation so provides - on up to 12 separate occasions in any period of 12 months. …. (8) Restrictions on granting extended trading authorisation The Authority must not grant an extended trading authorisation in respect of licensed premises unless the Authority is satisfied that - (a) practices are in place, and will remain in place, at the licensed premises that ensure as far as reasonably practicable that liquor is sold, supplied or served responsibly on the premises and that all reasonable steps are taken to prevent intoxication on the premises, and (b) the extended trading period will not result in the frequent undue disturbance of the quiet and good order of the neighbourhood of the licensed premises. [Our emphasis in italics]
The appellant submitted that, if the appeal was allowed, s 49 (2), as applied to the facts of the present case, would permit the Appeal Panel, or the Tribunal upon a remitter, to grant the ETA to the new licensee in response to the appellant's application that was refused by the Authority. It submitted that the requirement for an "application by the licensee" was satisfied by the appellant's application in October 2020 and that a grant of authority to the new licensee fell within the meaning of "authorise the licensee" because this was a reference to the licensee from time to time.
The appellant submitted that this interpretation was supported by four matters. First, an appreciation that a licence and an ETA, in effect, run with the hotel premises much like the way, so it was submitted, that a development consent runs with the land.
Secondly, the interpretation was supported by the terms of s 60 (12) of the LA concerning the transfer of a licence, which provides: (12) The transfer of a licence has effect as if the licence had been granted to the transferee.
Thirdly, the interpretation was supported by considerations of practicality and convenience, having regard to one of the objects of the LA to provide a flexible and practical regulatory system with minimal formality and technicality (s3 (1) (b) of the LA) and to the fact that licence transfers were commonplace.
Fourthly, concerns about the need to assess characteristics that are specific to the new licensee were addressed by the power of the Authority, subsequently, to vary or revoke an ETA: see s 51 (9) (b) of the LA.
As to the first contention (a license and an ETA run with the land), in disagreeing with this contention it is sufficient to point to the provisions in the LA referred to above concerning the grant of authority to a specific person and to s 60 of the LA concerning the transfer of a licence.
The appellant asserted that the situation was analogous to a development consent but did not address the different legislative contexts concerning these areas.
With respect to both of these first two contentions, it is relevant to consider the whole of the terms of s 60 of the LA (as well as our analysis of the nature of a licence and an ETA under the LA set out earlier in these reasons). That section, relevantly, otherwise provides: 60 Transfer of licence (1) The Authority may, on application made in accordance with this section, approve the transfer of a licence to a person who, in the opinion of the Authority, would be entitled to apply for the same type of licence in relation to the licensed premises. (2) An application for approval to transfer a licence may be made by the licensee or the person to whom the licence is proposed to be transferred. ….. (4) An application for approval to transfer a licence must - (a) be in the form and manner approved by the Authority, and (b) be accompanied by the fee prescribed by the regulations and such information and particulars as may be prescribed by the regulations, and (c) if made by a person other than the licensee - be accompanied by the written consent of the licensee to the proposed transfer, and (d) comply with such other requirements as may be approved by the Authority or prescribed by the regulations. (5) An application for approval to transfer a licence to another person is to be dealt with and determined by the Authority as if it were an application for the granting of a licence to the other person and the other person was the applicant for the licence. Accordingly, the provisions of Division 1 apply in relation to an application under this section. ….. (7) The Authority may provisionally approve the transfer of a licence to another person if the Authority is satisfied that - (a) there is nothing that would preclude the Authority from approving the transfer of a licence, and (b) the circumstances of the case justify giving the approval on a provisional basis. (8) A provisional approval to transfer a licence is sufficient authority for the transfer of the licence. However, any such provisional approval ceases to have effect unless it is confirmed by the Authority before the end of the period specified by the Authority when provisionally approving the transfer (or such later period as may be allowed by the Authority before the expiration of the specified period). (9) If a provisional approval to transfer a licence ceases to have effect because of the operation of subsection (8), the Authority may make such orders in relation to the licence as the Authority considers appropriate, including any of the following orders - (a) an order that the licence is to revert to the transferor, (b) an order treating a person (with the person's consent) as licensee until a transfer of the licence is effected, (c) an order that the licence cannot be exercised until specified conditions are met or the Authority orders otherwise. (10) Any such order has effect according to its terms. (11) The Authority must not approve or provisionally approve the transfer of a licence unless satisfied - (a) that practices will be in place at the licensed premises of the transferee as soon as the licence is transferred that ensure as far as reasonably practicable that liquor is sold, supplied and served responsibly on the premises and that all reasonable steps are taken to prevent intoxication on the premises, and (b) that those practices will remain in place. (12) The transfer of a licence has effect as if the licence had been granted to the transferee.
Plainly, a licence does not run with the premises given that the approval of the Authority, including an assessment as to the fitness of the proposed transferee, is required for a transfer to occur. Any ETA granted to the transferor would form part of the approval assessment by the Authority.
The appellant submitted that the reference in s 49 (5) of the LA to an ETA "..operates to authorise the sale or supply of liquor on the licensed premises-(a) on a regular basis (until such time as the authorisation is varied or revoked by the Authority)" [the appellant's emphasis] makes it clear that the ETA runs with the premises until revoked. In further support of this contention appellant submitted that it is not the scheme of the LA that the hours or terms of the licence are revisited each time there is a s 60 transfer and that such a posited operation would be highly impractical, contrary to the objects of the LA and common sense.
We do not agree with this interpretation of s 49 (5). This subsection addresses timing aspects of an ETA. It must be read in the context of the other provisions concerning both an ETA and a licence, to which we have referred above, under which the grant of such rights to a specific person is an important feature. It would be a strange result that an ETA ran with the premises even though a licence, plainly, did not. Furthermore, the asserted impracticality is far from clear in circumstances where the Authority is required to assess and consider a proposed transfer of the licence.
As to subsection (12) of s 60, by that subsection the approved transferee is placed in the same position with respect to statutory rights and liabilities and relations inter se with the Authority as if the transferee had been the recipient of a grant of a licence (for example, the Authority can revoke or impose conditions upon the licence which is transferred: s 53). However, this purpose and effect of subsection (12) is separate and distinct from the particular subject and issues to be addressed with respect to the power to grant an extended trading authorisation the subject of s 49 of the LA.
When so understood, subsection (12) of s 60, in our opinion, provides no support for the interpretation of s 49 (2) for which the appellant contended.
As to the considerations of practicality and inconvenience, which it is sensible to consider in conjunction with the subsequent power to vary or revoke the authorisation (the fourth matter relied upon), we do not see how these overcome the readily understandable concern to assess the relevant characteristics of, and proposals from, the existing licensee before authorising that person to trade under extended hours. There appears to be little sense in the provisions which provide the means for the Authority to give consideration to these factors if it be the case that the recipient of an extended trading authorisation could be future, unknown, licensees.
Nor do we see how these considerations overcome the specific language of s 49 (2), in particular, the repeated reference to "the" licensee as the applicant and the recipient of the authority, as well as the absence of any reference to the licensee "from time to time".
With respect to contention (2), the appellant submitted that it was open to the Appeal Panel, if it upheld the appeal, to order that the ETA be granted to the new licensee because of the power in s 81 (1) to make "such orders as it considers appropriate in light of its decision on the appeal", including to set aside the Authority's decision and for "another decision to be substituted for it,…" (s 81 (1) (d)). Section 81 (2) is relevant to this question because it provides that in exercising the power under s 81 (1) the Appeal Panel may exercise the functions that are conferred upon the Tribunal by the relevant enabling legislation.
We do not accept that the powers of the Appeal Panel under s 81, when applied to the administrative review proceedings the subject of this appeal, can be any more extensive than the power of the Tribunal under s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act to, in effect, stand in the shoes of the administrative decision maker in arriving at a new decision in substitution for the old: see s 63 (3) (b) and (c) of that Act.
Because of our interpretation of s 49 (2), it follows that the Appeal Panel in this appeal, just like the Tribunal, has no power to grant the ETA sought by the appellant to the new licensee.
We add that, in our opinion, it would be a strange state of affairs if an order granting the ETA to the new licensee was made on this appeal in circumstances where there had been no investigation or consideration of the merits of such a step by the Authority in the exercise of its powers under the LA.

At a glance

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Decision date

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Judgment (7 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (5)

Cases Cited (10)

Cited By (6)