Consideration
13 The applicant argued that as the PRC treats people who belong to underground churches differently from people who belong to registered churches, the question of whether that different treatment amounts to persecution within the meaning of the Convention will depend on whether the different treatment is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the PRC (Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170 ALR 553 at 560; Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 per McHugh J at 258). As the Tribunal did not seek to answer this question, it was contended that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of s 36(2) of the Act.
14 The respondent contended that it was open to the Tribunal to find, as it did, that the applicant had not suffered persecution in China by reason of her religion. He drew attention to the Tribunal's finding that the applicant's detention in 1994 was by reason of her attending an unauthorised meeting rather than for reason of her religion. The respondent also contended that it was open on the material before it for the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant would not be prevented from practicing her religion if she returned to the PRC as she could worship in a registered Catholic Church (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Zheng (FC) [2000] FCA 50; and Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 511).
15 In my view, it was open to the Tribunal to conclude on the evidence and other material before it, as it did, that nothing that the applicant had done in the PRC before her departure in 1997 gave rise to a well founded fear that she would suffer harm should she return to the PRC, for reasons of her religion or political opinion.
16 The Tribunal is also to be understood, as I read its reasons, to have concluded that, in view of the nature of the applicant's involvement with her underground church, she would not be at risk of harm in the PRC should she return there and continue her involvement with the church. That is because the Tribunal found that persons with the profile of the applicant were not at risk of harm in the PRC. There was nothing before the Tribunal to suggest that, if the applicant were to return to China, she would act in a way which would change her profile. That is, relevantly, by becoming an underground church leader who offended repeatedly, a preacher at underground gatherings or a perceived activist. Subject to the issue considered below, it was therefore open to the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant would not be at risk of persecution were she to return to the PRC and continue to attend an unauthorised church.
17 The reasons of the Tribunal do not make it entirely clear why it went on to make the finding that the applicant is able to practice her religion in China by, as I understand the Tribunal's reasons, attending an official Catholic Church. The Tribunal had given consideration to whether the applicant would experience persecution within the meaning of the Convention if she were to continue to attend an unofficial Catholic Church in China and, as I understand its reasons, had concluded that she would not. It may be that the Tribunal acted on the basis that a legal prohibition on the practicing of one's religion without more would amount to persecution on the ground of religion (cf Zheng's case per Hill J, with whom Whitlam and Carr JJ agreed in this regard, at para 41).
18 In reaching the conclusion that the applicant would be able to practice her religion in China in an official church, the Tribunal must be understood to have concluded that the religion practised in the PRC in underground Catholic Churches is, for the purpose of the Convention, the same religion as that practised in official Catholic Churches. That is, that the underlying religious faith being practised in unofficial and official Catholic Churches in the PRC is the same. The Tribunal referred specifically to the evidence before it that the PRC government allows Catholics to acknowledge the Pope as the spiritual head of the Church and that the Vatican has unofficially recognised many Chinese bishops.
19 In Zheng's case the Full Court concluded that it was open to the Tribunal in that case, on the evidence before it, to draw a distinction between "the governance of a church" and "underlying religious faith". There was similarly evidence before the Tribunal in this case upon which such a distinction, assuming it to be a legitimate distinction in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, could be drawn.
20 Like Lindgren J (see Zheng's case), I have doubts about the legitimacy of the distinction so far as all denominations of the Christian religion are concerned (see, for example, Matthew 18: 19-20). However, like Lindgren J in Wang's case, I consider that the decision of the Full Court in Zheng's case authoritatively decides that the distinction between the governance of a church and religious faith is a valid one in the context of the Convention. For this reason I conclude that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude, on the evidence and other material before it, that the applicant will be able to practice her religion in the PRC, should she return there, by attending an official Catholic Church. It is therefore unnecessary for me to determine whether a legal prohibition of general application, whether enforced or not, which would prevent a person from lawfully practicing his or her religion, would amount to persecution within the meaning of the Convention (see Applicant A per McHugh J at 258; Lama v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (FC) [1999] FCA 1620).
21 The decision of the Tribunal will be affirmed.
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Branson.