Reasoning on the present application for an order of review
31 While the RRT accepted that Mr Wang may have been detained as many as five times between December 1995 and October 1996, it did not expressly answer the question it posed for itself, namely, whether that treatment was persecutory on grounds of religion.
32 The gravamen of the RRT's reasoning is found in the following two paragraphs:
"The Tribunal is satisfied … that the applicant could practise as a Protestant Christian in China. It notes that many Protestants move between the official and unofficial churches. It also notes that there is a growth in registered Protestants and a corresponding growth in the demand for Bibles. Moreover it also notes that the government continues to approve the printing of Bibles. The Tribunal did not find that the applicant held any significant belief which would prevent him from participating in worship services where these 'flexible' arrangements were in place."
"The Tribunal is satisfied that, given the applicant's level of understanding of his Protestant faith and the growth of links between the official and the unofficial Protestant Churches in China, he would be able to resume his religious practices and beliefs, subject to some state controls but insufficient to deprive him of his right to religious freedom. The Tribunal is not persuaded that he is a person wanted by the authorities and that he faces persecution from them. He was given permission to leave China well after his religious activities became known. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant would not face persecution in the future on account of his religion."
33 Giving the RRT's Reasons for Decision, and these passages in particular, the beneficial construction that I must accord them (cf Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272), I think it reasonably clear that the RRT's reasoning was that even assuming in Mr Wang's favour that he was detained as mentioned and that there was a real chance that if he were to return to China his experience would be repeated, this would not constitute persecution "for reasons of … religion". Rather, it would constitute the enforcement of a system of regulation of church governance that was not persecutory of religion. Mr Wang's amended application for an order of review and the submissions made on his behalf are consistent with this understanding of the RRT's reasoning.
34 In the two passages set out above, the RRT made these findings:
· Mr Wang can practise as a Protestant Christian in both official and unofficial churches;
· Mr Wang does not hold any significant religious belief that would prevent him from doing so;
· Mr Wang's level of understanding of his Protestant faith is not such that he would encounter religious difficulty in worshipping in an official church;
· If Mr Wang were to resume worshipping in an unregistered church, difficulties that he might again encounter with the authorities would be due to the enforcement of the régime of governmental control over the organisation of religious institutions, not the inhibition of his religious beliefs and practices.
35 Since the RRT's decision in the present case, a Full Court of this Court has considered the question whether the requirement that churches in China be registered constitutes persecution. The case is Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Zheng [2000] FCA 50, decided on 10 February 2000. Hill J delivered the leading judgment in which his Honour stated (at [41]-[43]):
"For my part I am prepared to accept that the prohibition legally to practise one's religion could, and probably would, constitute persecution on religious grounds for the purposes of the Convention. But did the Tribunal find that Mr Zheng was prohibited from practising his religion?
There was evidence before the Tribunal which was accepted by it that, while problems were encountered by members of the underground Catholic church, there was not prohibition upon Catholics practising their religion. The fact that religious congregations were required to register was not itself persecution as the Tribunal held. The Tribunal was of the view that there was no doctrinal difference in religious practice between the underground church on the one hand and the open registered Catholic church on the other. The difference between them lay only in the need for registration, what the Tribunal referred to as "the governance of the church". Put another way, the country information showed that the recognised or patriotic Catholic church was required to be self-supporting and self-propagating with choice of bishops being left to Chinese authorities rather than the Vatican but the underlying religious faith was the same.
In my view it was open to the Tribunal to reach the conclusion it did on the evidence before it and it follows that the decision of the Tribunal discloses no reviewable error."
Whitlam and Carr JJ agreed.
36 I can see no reason for distinguishing this case from Zheng in the relevant respect. In both cases the RRT distinguished between the Christian religion (in Zheng Roman Catholic and in the present case Protestant) and church organisation and administration. According to the distinction, it is not persecution on grounds of religion to make and enforce laws prohibiting congregational worship elsewhere than at "registered" or "official" or "patriotic" churches, the clergy of which have been appointed by the Chinese Government.
37 The Full Court in Zheng held that the RRT had been entitled to rely on that distinction on the evidence before it. I am bound to follow Zheng for what the Full Court decided. Although its decision was founded on the evidence that was before the RRT in that case and therefore does not require a particular result in this case, it is important that the Full Court implicitly accepted the validity for the purpose of the Convention definition of the general distinction just mentioned. I should follow the Full Court in this respect. There was evidence before the RRT in the present case on which it was entitled to make the same distinction.
38 Contrary to Mr Wang's submission, the RRT did address the question, albeit only implicitly, what would happen to him if he were to resume worship in the underground church. It accepted that he may well be again detained, reprimanded and released, but thought that this would not be persecution on grounds of religion, but would be the legitimate enforcement of a system of regulation of public religious assembly that is consistent with the Convention. In my respectful opinion, the RRT's approach in the present case is consistent with that taken by the RRT, and found acceptable by the Full Court, in Zheng.
39 Notwithstanding this result, I question the general distinction between "religion" and the governance of religious institutions. The distinction seems to treat "religion" in the Convention sense as necessarily and in all cases limited to matters of personal faith and of doctrine and as not having a congregational, community or corporate aspect. I doubt the correctness of this view. My concern is reflected in the following passage from the Human Rights Watch/Asia October 1997 Report on the State Control of Religion in China, which was before the RRT in the present case:
"for Chinese officials, religious belief is a personal, individual act, and they distinguish between personal worship and participation in organized religious activities. It is the latter that they go to great lengths to control, not the former. The whole concept of religious freedom, however, involves not only freedom of the individual to believe but to manifest that belief in community with others."
40 The kind of difficulty to which I refer is indicated by the following passage from a statutory declaration by Mr Wang's wife that was before the RRT:
"I have attended a registered church as well as an unregistered church. I noticed that the differences between the two churches were as follows:
1) In the registered church the minister after reading a bible spoke about communism and how we must not allow our religious beliefs to override communist ideologies.
2) At the registered church officers of the PSB were present."
41 Finally, the difficulty referred to is inherent in Mr Wang's claim, as described by the RRT, that he "could not worship faithfully in a registered church which was there to serve the purposes of the Communist party", a claim that the RRT must be taken to have rejected.
42 If I were to give effect to my concerns, however, I would intrude upon a consideration of the merits of Mr Wang's application for a protection visa. Having regard to the RRT's findings of fact and the Full Court decision in Zheng, I think Mr Wang has not established either of the grounds of review on which he relies.