Approval
12 The principles which govern the court's discretion to approve a scheme are well established and were adverted to by Jacobson J in Re Seven Network Ltd (No 3) (2010) 267 ALR 583 at [35]-[40]. There is no need to repeat these here.
13 The Court's jurisdiction in relation to an arrangement is supervisory. The Court is to be satisfied that there has been no oppression and the arrangement is one that is capable of being accepted. The Court must be satisfied that the meeting to approve the scheme has been completed and that the resolution has been passed in accordance with the statutory requirements: Central Pacific Minerals NL [2002] FCA 239 at [12].
14 The Court's ultimate approval of the scheme is dependent upon fulfilment of one of two alternative conditions set out in s 411(17) of the Act.
15 ASIC has provided a written statement to the effect that it has no objection to the Scheme although it has invited the Court's attention to certain matters for the purposes of the hearing. Despite this, the second alternative condition (s 411(17)(b)) is, in effect, satisfied. The ASIC letter is in the 'usual form' save for raising matters concerning whether financing conditions precedent will be satisfied.
16 If the Court were to find that the Scheme had been proposed for the purpose of avoiding the operation of a provision of Ch 6 (proscribed purpose) and that the existence of the proscribed purpose would work oppressively, unjustly or unfairly against the plaintiff's members or some other interested party, that finding may be taken into consideration as part of the exercise of the Court's power to approve the scheme under s 411(4)(b): Re Coles Group Ltd (No 2) (2007) 215 FLR 411 at [75]-[80].
17 Where the directors of a target company consider a merger proposal is in the best interests of the members of the target company the implementation of the merger by a method that provides for the certainty of outcome (100% ownership by the bidder company) through a single process is a commercially rational reason for choosing a scheme of arrangement over a Ch 6 takeover. This reason for preferring a scheme of arrangement to a Ch 6 takeover is not a proscribed purpose: Re ACM Gold Limited; Re Mt Leyshon Gold Mines Limited (1992) 34 FCR 530 at 541-543.
18 There is no reason to conclude that the Scheme has been proposed for the proscribed purpose.
19 ASIC is properly entitled to raise these for the Court's consideration, however, in my opinion, it is not strictly a matter under s 411(17) of the Act but rather is a matter that is to be considered in the context of the Court's discretion in respect to approval of the Schemes under s 411(4) of the Act. I accept the plaintiff's submission that properly understood, ASIC's point is about the satisfaction of a condition subsequent to court approval.
20 There is no conditionality within the Schemes concerning Windfield's financing package. Instead, the Schemes, in terms, require Windfield to satisfy its funding requirements by 5.00 pm the day before the Implementation Date (that is 5.00 pm on Monday, 25 March 2013). This construct protects the applicant's securityholders from performance risk in respect of the Schemes, the elements of which can be summarised this way:
(a) each of the applicant and Windfield, acting through responsible boards of directors, must issue the relevant certificates of satisfaction or waiver of the Conditions;
(b) the deposit of scheme consideration into trust accounts operated by Talison (or a depositary appointed by Talison) in cleared funds by 5.00 pm the Business Day prior to the Implementation Date (that is by 5.00 pm on Monday, 25 March 2013), failing which Talison becomes entitled to receive the break fee of approximately US$25 million (already paid and held) and terminate the SIA; and
(c) Windfield has entered into a deed polls in favour of the Shareholders and the Optionholders pursuant to which Windfield is obliged to pay the scheme consideration in accordance with terms of the Share Scheme and the Option Scheme, respectively.
21 Accordingly, the Windfield financing package does not involve unacceptable scheme conditionality. There are provisions that work to ensure self-executing efficacy. To the extent the financing package is a relevant issue at all, its temporal relevance is confined to the funding obligation due when Windfield deposits the scheme consideration into the relevant trust account, that is, by 5.00 pm on Monday, 25 March 2013.
22 I am satisfied on the evidence as to the following:
(a) there is no performance risk to the Schemes;
(b) the conditions have been satisfied (subject only to Court approval);
(c) each of the conditions within the Windfield financing are self-executing and are matters likely to be satisfied in any event;
(d) in the event that the conditions to the Windfield financing are not satisfied, the Shares and Options will not be transferred and the status quo will be preserved;
(e) in the event that the conditions to the Windfield financing are not satisfied, Talison will retain Windfield's deposit of US$25 million currently in an account operated by Talison; and
(f) the Court may, consistently with the authorities and previous practice, exercise its discretion to approve the Schemes in such circumstances, even if it is not certain that the Windfield financing conditions will be satisfied.
23 The matters, quite properly raised by ASIC in its letter, for the Court's consideration are not such as to preclude approval of the schemes pursuant to s 411(17) or otherwise. The ASIC letter satisfied the provisions of s 411(17)(b) of the Act.