ANALYSIS
37 It is convenient to set out the relevant statutory provisions.
38 Section 657A of the Act relevantly provides:
Declaration of unacceptable circumstances
(1) The Panel may declare circumstances in relation to the affairs of a company to be unacceptable circumstances. Without limiting this, the Panel may declare circumstances to be unacceptable circumstances whether or not the circumstances constitute a contravention of a provision of this Act.
(2) The Panel may only declare circumstances to be unacceptable circumstances if it appears to the Panel that the circumstances:
(a) are unacceptable having regard to the effect that the Panel is satisfied the circumstances have had, are having, will have or are likely to have on:
(i) the control, or potential control, of the company or another company; or
(ii) the acquisition, or proposed acquisition, by a person of a substantial interest in the company or another company; or
(b) are otherwise unacceptable (whether in relation to the effect that the Panel is satisfied the circumstances have had, are having, will have or are likely to have in relation to the company or another company or in relation to securities of the company or another company) having regard to the purposes of this Chapter set out in section 602; or
(c) are unacceptable because they:
(i) constituted, constitute, will constitute or are likely to constitute a contravention of a provision of this Chapter or of Chapter 6A, 6B or 6C; or
(ii) gave or give rise to, or will or are likely to give rise to, a contravention of a provision of this Chapter or of Chapter 6A, 6B or 6C. The Panel may only make a declaration under this subsection, or only decline to make a declaration under this subsection, if it considers that doing so is not against the public interest after taking into account any policy considerations that the Panel considers relevant.
[…]
39 Section 657B of the Act provides:
When Panel may make declaration
The Panel can only make a declaration under section 657A within:
(a) 3 months after the circumstances occur; or
(b) 1 month after the application under section 657C for the declaration was made; whichever ends last. The Court may extend the period on application by the Panel.
40 In the context of s 657B, Finkelstein J in Re Takeovers Panel [2002] FCA 1120 at [9] and [10] said the following:
Prior to the establishment of the Panel it was the courts that had power to declare certain acquisitions of shares and certain conduct in relation to the affairs of a company to be unacceptable. However, it was soon discovered that proceedings before the courts were cumbersome, slow and expensive. Further, bringing a takeover case before a court, or even threatening to do so, was regarded by some as a tactic to be employed if one wished to delay or hinder the progress of a takeover. So Parliament decided that the powers of the court should be given to an administrative body (the Takeovers Panel) in the expectation that proceedings before that body would be fair, expeditious and inexpensive.
There can be no doubt that the public interest in good administration requires that persons potentially affected by unacceptable circumstances should not be kept in suspense as to the validity of action taken or whether the effect of that action is to be reversed. Most likely for this reason, Parliament has imposed a time limit within which the Panel must perform its task. The timetable reinforces the need for there to be a speedy means for determining whether certain conduct is unacceptable or not. Thus, it will not usually be appropriate to extend the period set by s 657B. Good reason must be shown before an order will be made.
41 His Honour then went on to consider and apply various of the following interrelated considerations relating to the exercise of his discretion:
(a) First, the fact that the Panel operated in the public interest and there was a public interest in the Panel fulfilling its functions expediently and expeditiously, particularly given its position as the main forum for resolving disputes about takeovers before the expiration of any relevant bid period (s 659AA).
(b) Second, whether the Panel had, in context, unreasonably delayed in carrying out its functions.
(c) Third, whether there were any preliminary or threshold factual questions that needed to be dealt with, for example, an application to the Panel under s 657C(3).
(d) Fourth, the stage that the Panel had reached in its investigations and deliberations.
(e) Fifth, whether interested parties had engaged with the Panel in relation to its investigations or proposed findings.
(f) Sixth, whether the additional time sought was beneficial in order for the Panel to form informed conclusions, including reducing or minimising the risk of any judicial review challenge.
(g) Seventh, whether the additional time sought was extensive or modest.
(h) Eighth, whether, if the extension sought was granted, the Panel would be very likely to finalise the matter within the time as extended.
(i) Ninth, whether any actual or likely prejudice would be caused to any party before the Panel or any non-party if the extension was either to be granted or refused.
42 It would be supererogation on my part to supplement the synthesis of Finkelstein J (see also his analysis in Takeovers Panel v Glencore International AG (2005) 55 ACSR 453; [2005] FCA 1628). For completeness, I do not need to discuss Chaudhri v Takeovers Panel (2011) 218 FCR 574, which was dealing with the scenario where the Panel had sought an extension of time to consider making a declaration, but where it had already resolved some months earlier not to make a declaration; that case turned more on the question of whether the power to extend was available.
43 In my view, the extension sought is appropriate.
44 First, the extension sought is only for some three weeks. Given that it would appear that the alleged unacceptable circumstances likely occurred more than two months before the date of the applications to the Panel on 11 April 2017, being in or before February 2017, it is likely that for the purposes of s 657B, the period referred to in s 657B(b) "ends last". Accordingly, any s 657A declaration has to be made within one month after 11 April 2017 in the absence of any extension.
45 Second, the extension sought is well justified by the Panel's need to properly consider the voluminous material filed, any matters arising out of the conference that has been convened, and generally to take the steps discussed at [30] to [34] above.
46 Third and relatedly, a complicating feature of the Panel's present task is to address the s 657C(3) question that has arisen. That requires additional time for factual analysis in addition to considering the principal question of whether there are unacceptable circumstances and, if so, whether a declaration and other orders should follow.
47 Fourth, in context, the Panel has not delayed in discharging its functions to date or bringing the application for an extension before me.
48 Fifth, interested parties have engaged with the Panel's processes. Moreover, such parties have either consented to or not opposed the extension sought under s 657B.
49 Sixth and implied in the last point, no actual or potential prejudice to any interested party has been identified if I grant the extension. Moreover, I am able to infer that if an extension was not granted such that the Panel was not able to properly discharge its functions, potential prejudice may be caused to an interested party.
50 Seventh, if the extension is granted, the Panel is most likely to finalise the matter within the extended time.
51 Eighth and generally, given the breadth of the power to extend under s 657B albeit informed by its purpose and context, including the public interest considerations identified by Finkelstein J, in my view this is an appropriate case for an extension for the limited period sought.
52 I will make orders substantially to the effect of those sought by the Panel.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beach.