Tachnat Pty Ltd v Orsini - [2022] NSWSC 393 - NSWSC 2021 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWSC

Tachnat Pty Ltd v Orsini

[2022] NSWSC 393

Supreme Court of NSW|2021-09-17

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2021-09-17

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (56 paragraphs)

[1]

Background

In 2013, the second plaintiff had a trademark registered for a menswear business and also a trademark registered for a company that designed menswear. He planned to have garments manufactured in Australia and exported to India (T9.37-50).
The underlying proceedings to which this matter relates involved a dispute between Tachnat and Pick Packers Pty Limited ("Pick Packers"). It was a commercial dispute between two corporate entities. In 2018, Tachnat had an agreement to store goods in Pick Packers' warehouse. On about 22 February 2015 the stored goods were water damaged (T10.20-30).
After some preliminary email exchanges between the second defendant and the second and third plaintiffs, the first defendant was retained as the solicitor for Tachnat on 22 September 2015. Curiously the first defendant retained the second defendant, a barrister, to advise and appear for Tachnat in its dispute with Pick Packers on 30 June 2015, before she herself was retained. It should also be noted that the second defendant had some contact with the plaintiffs prior to 22 September 2015 (CB Vol 2, 813).
Proceedings between Tachnat as plaintiff and Pick Packers as defendant were commenced in the District Court. The statement of claim in the District Court sought damages of $443,278.69. The District Court proceedings settled at mediation for the sum of $100,000 ("the settlement"). That sum was the maximum recoverable under Pick Packers' insurance policy.
Tachnat filed an application for assessment of the first defendant's costs in 2018/24202 Tachnat Pty Ltd v Julie Orsini. The first defendant sought costs and disbursements of $293,093.75. On 6 December 2018, Costs Assessor Richard Hamwood ("the Costs Assessor"), provided reasons for his decision and issued a certificate. He assessed that a fair and reasonable sum for the first defendant's costs was $242,018.85 (CB Vol 1, 174).
Tachnat appealed to the costs review panel. On 18 May 2019, a Review Panel comprised of Stephen Lanken and Michael Robinson ("the Review Panel") substituted the sum of $192,702.75 in lieu of the Costs Assessor's decision (CB Vol 1, 202).

[2]

The pleading in the Amended statement of claim ("ASC")

On 9 June 2021, the plaintiffs filed a statement of claim in this Court. On 11 August 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended statement of claim ("ASC"). The alleged conduct of the defendants is said to have resulted in a number of losses to the plaintiffs including loss of income, loss of profits, loss of business opportunities, loss of the opportunity to have children, and to have caused the second and third plaintiffs mental harm.
It should be noted that the defendants acknowledge the amendments made in the ASC are not material to the motions before the Court save for the fact that the pleadings in the ASC should be substituted for the original statement of claim, where referenced, in the second defendant's Notice of Motion.
The plaintiffs seek the following: 1. a judgment or declaration on the financial disadvantage caused to the plaintiff(s) pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); 2. a judgment or declaration on misleading and deceptive conduct pursuant to s18 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth); 3. a judgment or declaration on breach of duty of care pursuant to Division 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); 4. a judgment for damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth); 5. a judgment or declaration for breach of contract for negligent, misleading, dishonest and deceptive conduct; 6. an order or judgment that the defendant pays damages/compensation.
More specifically, the plaintiffs plead the following in the ASC: 1. the "defendant" withheld notices, and settlement offers issued by Pick Packers or its lawyers; 2. the defendants were intentionally negligent and knowingly brought false detinue and conversion claims against Pick Packers; 3. the defendants knowingly initiated proceedings with no reasonable prospects of success for their own financial advantage and contrary to the plaintiffs' instructions; and 4. the defendants intentionally misled the plaintiffs, thereby breaching contract, their duty of care, and their fiduciary duties.
At [82] of the ASC, the plaintiffs seek punitive and exemplary damages in addition to a number of heads of other damages, including for mental harm to the second and third plaintiffs.
As can be appreciated, these are serious allegations made against the first and second defendants, both of whom are legal practitioners.

[6]

The second defendant's Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021

The second defendant does not seek to strike out the majority of the claims made by Tachnat, having accepted that they are matters that are to be determined at trial. Rather, the second defendant focuses on the summary dismissal and strike out of the second and third plaintiff's claims against her.
The second defendant's Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021 ("Second Defendant's Motion") is lengthy and involves all three plaintiffs. The relief sought against the second and third plaintiff is almost identical. I have excised paragraph [16] concerning security for costs and reproduced it later in this judgment where I deal with that topic. The second defendant's Motion relevantly reads: "With respect to the third plaintiff: [1] The proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the third plaintiff, be dismissed as against the second defendant pursuant to rule 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. [2] In the alternative to Order 1, stay the proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the third plaintiff, permanently as against the second defendant pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. ("Permanent stay of proceedings") [3] In the alternative to Orders 1 and/or 2, the whole of the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the third plaintiffs claims against the second defendant, be struck out pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). [4] In the alternative to Order 3, the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the third plaintiffs claims against the second defendant, be struck out in part (to the extent that it purports to plead a cause of action against the second defendant) pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). [5] The third plaintiff pay the second defendant's costs of and incidental to these proceedings, including with respect to this Notice of Motion. [6] In the alternative to Orders 1 to 5 above, the third plaintiff to provide particulars in answer to paragraphs 31.6, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the correspondence from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiffs dated 29 June 2021. ("Particulars") … With respect to the second plaintiff: [8] The proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the second plaintiff, be dismissed as against the second defendant pursuant to rule 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. [9] In the alternative to Order 8, stay the proceedings, insofar as they are brought by the second plaintiff, permanently as against the second defendant pursuant to s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. ("Permanent stay of proceedings") [10] In the alternative to Orders 8 and/or 9, the whole of the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the second plaintiff's claims against the second defendant, be struck out pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). [11] In the alternative to Order 10, the Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the second plaintiff's claims against the second defendant, be struck out in part (to the extent that it purports to plead a cause of action against the second defendant) pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). [12] The second plaintiff pay the second defendant's costs of and incidental to these proceedings, including with respect to this Notice of Motion. [13] In the alternative to Orders 8 to 12 above, the second plaintiff to provide particulars in answer to paragraphs 31.6, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the correspondence from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiffs dated 29 June 2021. ("Particulars") … With respect to the first plaintiff [15] The Statement of Claim filed on 9 June 2021, insofar as it relates to the first plaintiff's claims against the second defendant, be struck out in part pursuant to rule 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). [16] ["Security for costs"] [17] The first plaintiff to provide particulars in answer to paragraphs 31.6.1, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the correspondence from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiffs dated 29 June 2021. ("Particulars") …"
Paragraphs [6], [13] and [17] relate to particulars. I note that paragraph [6] is not pressed at this stage (T51.47-52.22). By arrangement paragraphs [13] and [17] have not been dealt with by me at this hearing, they are to be referred to the Registrar for directions, if appropriate.
In summary, the main issues in the second defendant's Notice of Motion to be addressed in the summary judgment / strike out application are whether: 1. certain relief sought by the plaintiff should be struck out/dismissed; 2. claims for summary dismissal against the second and third plaintiffs should be granted; 3. proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs should be stayed; and 4. security for costs as against Tachnat should be granted.

[7]

The law - summary judgment/strike out proceedings

UCPR 13.1, 13.4 and 14.28 provide: "13.1 Summary judgment (1) If, on application by the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff's claim for relief or any part of the plaintiff's claim for relief-- (a) there is evidence of the facts on which the claim or part of the claim is based, and (b) there is evidence, given by the plaintiff or by some responsible person, that, in the belief of the person giving the evidence, the defendant has no defence to the claim or part of the claim, or no defence except as to the amount of any damages claimed, the court may give such judgment for the plaintiff, or make such order on the claim or that part of the claim, as the case requires. (2) Without limiting subrule (1), the court may give judgment for the plaintiff for damages to be assessed. (3) In this rule, a reference to "damages" includes a reference to the value of goods. 13.4 Frivolous and vexatious proceedings (1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings-- (a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or (b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or (c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1). 14.28 Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings (1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading -- (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or (b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or (c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1)."
The power to enter summary judgment should be exercised with great care, and an order under the rule should only be made where it is clear that there is no real question to be tried: see Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99; Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 at [5]; Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28; Dennis v Joukhador [2021] NSWSC 870 at [17]. If there is a real question, either of fact or law, and the rights of the parties depend on it, it is not open for the court to intervene summarily: see Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91. It must be clear that there are no facts in issue.
The test applied in considering an application for summary judgment is similar to that applying to an application for summary dismissal as per General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 ("General Steel") at [8], eg "so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed", "manifestly groundless", "so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument".
UCPR 14.28 enunciates grounds, upon which a defective pleading may be struck out. Whereas UCPR 13.4 focuses on the weakness of a party's case rather than defects of pleading: see Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937.
The plaintiffs, in their submissions seeking summary judgment, rely upon s 174 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) ("LPUL") which reads: "174 Disclosure obligations of law practice regarding clients (1) Main disclosure requirement A law practice-- (a) must, when or as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given in a matter, provide the client with information disclosing the basis on which legal costs will be calculated in the matter and an estimate of the total legal costs; and (b) must, when or as soon as practicable after there is any significant change to anything previously disclosed under this subsection, provide the client with information disclosing the change, including information about any significant change to the legal costs that will be payable by the client-- together with the information referred to in subsection (2). (2) Additional information to be provided Information provided under-- (a) subsection (1)(a) must include information about the client's rights- (i) to negotiate a costs agreement with the law practice; and (ii) to negotiate the billing method (for example, by reference to timing or task); and (iii) to receive a bill from the law practice and to request an itemised bill after receiving a bill that is not itemised or is only partially itemised; and (iv) to seek the assistance of the designated local regulatory authority in the event of a dispute about legal costs; or (b) subsection (1)(b) must include a sufficient and reasonable amount of information about the impact of the change on the legal costs that will be payable to allow the client to make informed decisions about the future conduct of the matter. (3) Client's consent and understanding If a disclosure is made under subsection (1), the law practice must take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs. … (8) Change in amount of total costs--where previously below higher threshold If the law practice has not made a disclosure under subsection (1) but has made a disclosure under subsection (5) because the total legal costs in the matter are not likely to exceed the higher threshold, the law practice must, when or as soon as practicable after the law practice becomes aware (or ought reasonably become aware) that the total legal costs (excluding GST and disbursements) are likely to exceed the higher threshold-- (a) inform the client in writing of that expectation; and (b) make the disclosure required by subsection (1)."

[8]

The costs agreements

The plaintiffs' application for summary judgment centres upon the two costs agreements; the first being between Tachnat and the first defendant ("Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement") and the second between the first and second defendants ("Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement").
The Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement reads (CB Vol 1, 96): "COST DISCLOSURE TO: HULIO GASH REJANI RAJAN TACHNAT PTY LIMITED AC15918889S TACHNAT)' From: Julie A Orsini XXX Catherine Street, Lilyfield NSW. 2040 Date: 22 September 2015 RE: Tachnat-v- Pickpackers Proceedings re Contract & damages We note your Instructions to act in the above matter. The Work. (Schedule 1) The work you require us to do is to take all action necessary to advise and act in your behalf in respect of Contractual Claim by Tachnat against Pick Packers and to represent you in Court Proceedings, Including negotiations with the other parties representative, drafting and engrossing any Interlocutory Applications or Motions, Affidavit evidence, arranging any expert evidence, in support of both any interlocutory process and final orders, issue of Subpoenas, engagement of experts, attending court for directions, briefing counsel, attending the hearing & all necessary other attendances required for determination of all issues between Tachnat and Pickpackers. Professional fees: (Schedule 2) In accordance with me terms of our General Cost Agreement, by reason of the referral, we agree to charge you afee of $450.00 per hour excluding GST, given the urgency of the application', and charged in minimum 6 minute unite as set out In our General Cost Agreement Other Charges: We will charge you for other services we supply as set out in our general cost agreement. We are likely to Incur expenses and disbursements, being money mat we are liable to pay others on your behalf. You are required to pay these in accordance with the terms of our General Cost Agreement. We will inform you of these expenses and disbursements as well as other payments required to be made as soon as practicable. Present Estimate: (Schedule 3) it is not possible to provide you with an accurate estimate of the total costs. Instead a range of time estimates of billable time is provided for different stages. There are a number of stages in your matter which will vary but broadly:- 1. Instructions and Investigation of matter 5-10 [hours] 2. Considering evidence, perusing documents, preparing originating and interlocutory processes, financial statements & lay evidence 40-70 [hours] 3. Briefing counsel including conferences 10-20 [hours] 4. Addressing other parties evidence & any expert Evidence or expert accounting evidence (If required) 30-50 [hours] 5. Issue Subpoenas and consideration of documents Produced 5-10 [hours' 6. Arranging for expert evidence 5 [hours] 7. Attendances at Court for directions (est 5-8) 10 [hours] 8. All other general attendances, preparation for Hearing and attendance for hearing (est 3 days) 60-80 [hours] These estimates are made on the information available to us at this time. They may and probably will change when more information is available or if more evidence is filed by the other party. Major factors which affect the estimates are: 1. More evidence being filed which may require consideration and reply; 2. Interlocutory applications being brought or to be brought requiring us to deal with them; 3. Failure to reach hearing times by Court or applications by other parry requiring further adjournments, directions or further attendances at Court. Engagement of another Law practice/ Barrister It will be necessary to engage a Barrister on your behalf. We will consult you when this is required. You may be asked to enter into a costs agreement with that party. The Barrister will disclose costs in a similar fashion and we will dispose those to you. We are of the view that a senior barrister may be required for this matter. Briefing a senior barrister will require, at some stage, the briefing of a junior barrister to assist. A barrister's fee ranges from 3000.00 per day to 10000.00 per day for senior counsel. Please note that this is an estimate only and a retainer will be provided by the barrister agreed to be briefed when required. Billing Arrangements You are generally billed monthly in accordance with our General cost agreement. You will generally be billed at monthly intervals and/or upon any orders tor costs being; made pursuant to any interlocutory application or motion. Payment is required in accordance with the terms of our General Cost Agreement. Termination of Retainer In the event that you terminate the services of this firm, all outstanding fees and disbursements are required to be paid prior to collection of the file. Substantial changes to disclosure You will be informed, as soon as is reasonably practicable of any substantial changes to anything contained in this disclosure document. Persons responsible for your matter and costs The persons responsible for the provision of instructions and for payment of costs is Hulio Gash. Persons further responsible for the provision of instructions and for the payment of costs are Rejani Rajan and Tachnat. All terms of this disclosure and the Cost Agreement apply to those parties jointly and severally. By your continued Instructions, you accept these terms apply to the work referred to herein. Costs In Court Proceedings In accordance with the terms of our general cost agreement, the court may order the other parry to pay your costs of the proceedings. This sum will not necessarily cover the whole of your legal costs due to us. It Is possible that the court may make an order that you pay the other parties costs (if, for instance, you lose the-case). These costs are payable by you to the other party in addition to the costs payable to us. Estimate of costs payable to other party if unsuccessful If you are successful in the litigation the following is the range of costs that may be recovered from the other party. The sums given below are merely estimates. Prior to hearing: $100,000 Est 3 day contested hearing (including junior counsel: $40,000 Estimate of costs payable to other party if unsuccessful If you are unsuccessful in the litigation you may be ordered to pay the other party's costs. The sums given below are merely estimates, and based on my/our estimate of what the other party's law practice may charge. Prior to hearing: $80,000 Up to and including weeks (if senior and junior counsel briefed) contested hearing: $40,000 Settlement and Costs If settlement of your claim is being negotiated, we will provide you before settlement with a reasonable estimate of my/our costs payable by you on settlement AND a reasonable estimate of the costs you would obtain from the other party on settlement if the settlement is favorable to you OR a reasonable estimate of the costs you may have to pay the other party (eg. Your case is weak, etc). Provisions of the General Cost Agreement In all other respects, the arrangements in respect of this matter are set out In the General Cost Agreement dated 22 September 2015 and which is adopted by you and applies to this matter as though each term of the agreement has been set out herein. Applicable law The law of NSW applies to legal costs regarding this matter. However, see your rights in the accompanying Form. Your understanding of this disclosure You should ensure that you fully understand the terms of the General Cost Agreement and of this disclosure. By either executing and returning a copy of the Cost agreement and/or by simply continuing to instruct this firm at any time after 7 days of receipt of the Cost Agreement and this disclosure, you confirm that you have fully understood the terms of the Cost Agreement and Disclosure and you -willingly accept its terms. Dated 22 September 2015 [Signed first defendant]"
With regards to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement, the first defendant deposes in her affidavit dated 29 July 2021 ("Orsini Aff 29 July 2021") at [4] that on 25 June 2015, she had an oral conversation with the second defendant. Shortly after that discussion, she commenced acting for Tachnat, and retained the second defendant as Counsel in relation to Tachnat's dispute with Pick Packers.
The Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement reads as follows (CB Vol 3, 1974): "Dear Julie, Tachnat Pty Limited v Pick Packers Pty Ltd Fee Disclosure and Costs Agreement Thank you for your brief in this matter. What follows is my current fee disclosure with respect to the above matter. Fee Disclosure Pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, 2004 (NSW) ("the Act"), I set out below the basis of my charges and billing arrangements. The information set out below should be sufficient to enable you to comply with section 310(1) of the Act, having regard to your knowledge of the matter and your professional experience and skill. Basis of Charges and Billing Arrangements 1. My charges are primarily a function of my hourly rate, together with any disbursement and any separately negotiated fee increase. Hourly Rate 2. My hourly rate: $480 per hour (plus GST). My hourly rate is charged for all work performed and is charged for each hour or part thereof. For directions hearings I shall charge an amount equivalent to one hour, unless it exceeds one hour's duration. Daily Rate 3. My daily rate for any hearing is $3,850 per day (plus GST). This includes all work performed between 9am-5pm. If I am briefed to appear at a contested interlocutory application, I will charge an amount equivalent to half my daily rate. If the time exceeds half a day, I will charge an additional amount according to my hourly rate. If the hearing is adjourned or the matter is settled,in either case less than one week before the hearing, I shall charge a brief on hearing for the first day of the hearing. 4. My fee rates include waiting and travelling time, if any. Disbursements 5. I charge as disbursements the following: • Couriers and international telephone and facsimile charges; • Fares for travelling; • When away from Sydney, accommodation, breakfast and dinner expenses; and • Photocopying costs. GST 6. A liability to pay Goods and Services Tax ("GST") will be incurred in respect of the charges set out above. An amount equal of that liability will be included by me in any memorandum of fees rendered in accordance with these arrangements. Billing Arrangements & Interest 7. I may render a memorandum of fees at any time. My fees are payable upon receipt. Outstanding fees carry interest at 10% or the cash rate published by the Reserve Bank plus 2%, whichever is the lesser, until paid. Please note that your firm, and not your client, carries responsibility for my fees. Fee Increases 8. From time to time I review my hourly rate. If following such review I determine to increase my hourly rate, such increase will be notified to my instructing solicitors. If the amount of the increase is agreed it will be applicable from the date of notification. Acceptance of any increase is signified by your continuing to brief me. Return or Withdrawal of the Brief 9. If I receive no instructions at all in the matter for a period of three months or if there should be a failure to reach agreement on any cancellation fee or any fee increase which may be sought (provided the proposed fee increase is not more than 10% in any calendar year) or the amount of any memorandum of fees remains unpaid for more than two calendar months from its date, I shall be entitled to return the brief on giving 14 days' notice to my instructing solicitors regardless of the position of the matter at that time. Further if the Bar rules indicate or I am unable to be given instructions when reasonably needed on an important matter I shall be entitled to return the brief on such shorter notice as is reasonable. Where the brief is returned or withdrawn I am still to be paid for all memoranda of fees rendered and all work performed but unbilled. Counsels' Immunity Nothing herein is intended nor should be understood to limit or affect in any way whatsoever my independence as counsel; my legal and professional duties to the courts (or any other tribunals) and to the legal representatives of other parties; the operation of any law or any professional rules promulgated by the New South Wales Bar Association; nor my immunity from suit which exists under the general law. Without limiting the generality of any immunity, my retainer is to be on the basis that I have immunity from suit with respect to, at least, all forensic and/or tactical decisions and/or judgments made by me in the course of the preparation for or the conduct of any hearing. Also, please note that any liability I might have is limited by reason that the New South Wales Bar Association Scheme is approved under the Professional Standards Act, 1994 (NSW). Costs Agreement Acceptance of the above terms of my retainer set out in this letter will constitute a costs agreement between us under section 322(1)(c) of the Act. Acceptance of these terms is signified by your continuing to brief me or by signing and returning a copy of this letter at your earliest convenience. Yours faithfully, [signed second defendant]"

[9]

The plaintiff's submissions for claim for summary judgment against both defendants

Tachnat, through the second plaintiff, submitted that it gave instructions to the defendants to request and provide the information to Pick Packers' lawyers that would settle the dispute. It submitted this was an appropriate instruction for the plaintiffs given circumstances at that point in time and relied on the comments of Fitzgerald JA (with whom Sheller and Handley JJA agreed) in Studer v Boettcher [2000] NSWCA 263 at [74]: "[74] The client, not the lawyer, is entitled to decide whether to compromise or to litigate. The duties of a legal practitioner in relation to settlement negotiations were considered by the State Administrative Tribunal in Legal Practitioner's Complaints Committee and Fleming [2006] WASAT 352."
Tachnat also referred to Across Australia Finance v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799 in which it was stated at [78]: "[78] A solicitor or barrister retained to conduct litigation ordinarily has implied as well as ostensible authority to bind his or her client to a compromise of the proceedings provided that he or she does not act contrary to instructions, the circumstances do not otherwise indicate that express instructions are required, the compromise does not include matters collateral to the action, and the compromise is effected in a fair and reasonable manner so that it is fairly within the limits of authority (Donellan v Watson (1990) 21 NSWLR 335 at 342; Prestwich v Poley (1865) 18 CB (NS) 806; 144 ER 662; Waugh v H B Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch 374 at 387)."
Tachnat noted that the public interest is served by practitioners encouraging an early settlement of their client's dispute, and that practitioners are under a duty to seek such a settlement citing UCPR 5.7. I interpose at this point, that UCPR 5.7 deals with privileged documents. However, solicitors do have a fundamental ethical duty to act in the best interests of their clients and to deliver legal services competently, diligently and as promptly as reasonably possible: rr 4.1.1, 4.1.3 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW) ("ASCR").
Tachnat further noted that certain relationships are recognised as being fiduciary in character, and that the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship include solicitors and clients: see Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 ("Hospital Products").
Tachnat then submitted that the first and second defendants pursued the litigation purely for their financial benefit from the accruing of legal bills. Tachnat stated that the defendants did not provide any information as to the prospects of the litigation's success pursuant to Schedule 2 of the LPUL.
Tachnat noted the following: 1. on 22 September 2015, at 12:11:30 pm, the first defendant sent the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement to the plaintiffs by email. It gave an estimate of a successful recovery for $100,000 and $40,000 for counsel; 2. on 6 September 2017, at 4:16 pm, after mediation the second defendant wrote to the second plaintiff "very unusual for such a large business [Pick Packers] to have such a limited cap on insurance cover [of $100,000]"; 3. on the same date, at 4:59 pm, the second defendant wrote to the second plaintiff "Legal practitioners would be out of business very quickly if they guaranteed success and no legal costs".
Tachnat submitted that the first defendant acted for all the plaintiffs, for the first as a company, and the second and third plaintiffs as directors and natural persons, and that the defendants' conduct caused personal injury and harm to the second and third plaintiffs as pleaded in the ASC.
In support of this contention Tachnat noted the following: 1. on 22 September 2015, the first defendant's covering email for the costs disclosure stated "You will see from the Disclosure document that as Tachnat is a company, the persons who are responsible for the payment of my fees and any disbursements are Tachnat itself, and also each of you personally (i.e. both being directors and instrumental in providing instructions)"; 2. the first defendant's costs disclosure agreement is addressed to "HULIO GASH, REJANI RAJAN, and TACHNAT PTY LIMITED ACN XXX (TACHNAT)." 3. The clause in the costs agreement under the heading "Persons responsible for your matter and costs" states: "The persons responsible for the provision of instructions and for payment of costs is Hulio Gash. Persons further responsible for the provision of instructions and for the payment of costs are Rejani Rajan and Tachnat. All terms of this disclosure and the Cost Agreement apply to those parties jointly and severally". 4. on 15 March 2018, The plaintiffs rely on the first defendant's submission to the supreme court costs assessor that states: "I note that the cost applicant is Tachnat. Neither Mr. Gash nor Ms. Rajan are named as applicants, notwithstanding they are jointly and severally liable to pay the fees". [plaintiffs' emphasis]
Tachnat submitted it is not an error or mistake that the first defendant included the second and third plaintiffs personally in the costs agreement. A solicitor is learned, and the first defendant had reasons as to why second and third plaintiffs were included as natural persons. Tachnat referred to the following passage in Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 ("Griffiths") where Denning LJ stated: "…the word of the client is to be preferred to the word of the solicitor because the client is ignorant and the solicitor is, or should be, learned and a lawyer who does not take the precaution of getting a written retainer has only himself to thank for being at variance with his client over it and must take the consequences."
I interpose at this point, it should be noted that Griffiths applies to a situation where there is an oral agreement between the client and his or her solicitors. The circumstances as between the first defendant and Tachnat is that there is a written costs agreement and as such Griffiths is not instructive here.
In relation to the second defendant, Tachnat submitted that from 24 June 2015 to 22 September 2021, the second defendant provided professional services in return for monies pursuant to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), and hence she owed a duty of care towards the plaintiffs. Tachnat noted the second defendant charged professional fees for professional services, in addition to fees charged by the first defendant, and that the monies were paid directly into the second defendants' bank account by the plaintiffs.
Tachnat noted that the second defendant started providing professional advice from 24 June 2015, and that between 24 June 2015 and 22 September 2015 there was no costs agreement or a retainer between the plaintiffs and the second defendant.
Tachnat noted the following: 1. on 22 September 2015, at 11:08am, the second defendant emailed the second plaintiff that "Julie suggested I send the invoice directly to you as it includes work before Julie became involved"; 2. on the same date, at 12:10pm: the first defendant emailed the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement to the plaintiffs. There is a clause in the cost agreement under the heading "Engagement of another Law practice/ Barrister" which reads: "It will be necessary to engage a Barrister on your behalf. We will consult you when this is required. You may be asked to enter into a cost agreement with that party. We are of the view that a senior barrister may be required for this matter. A barrister's fee ranges from 3000.00 per day to 10000.00 per day for senior counsel. Please note that this is an estimate only and a retainer will be provided by the barrister agreed to be briefed when required".
Tachnat finally submitted that at no point in time did the second defendant notify the plaintiffs that she does not accept direct instructions from litigants noting the following: 1. on 24 June 2015, at 3:24pm, the second plaintiff wrote to the second defendant stating: "Once we have you on board for this issue can you request for the insurance copy and take the necessary steps?". 2. on the same day, at 3:42 pm, the second defendant wrote back "I will talk with David tomorrow and we can take it from there". This suggests that the second defendant agreed to assist the plaintiffs, invoiced the plaintiffs, and received payments directly into her account. Hence it should be concluded that the second defendant failed to have a retainer with the plaintiffs in compliance with the LPUL and the first defendant's costs agreement.

[10]

The first defendant's submissions - Opposing summary judgment against her

The first defendant noted that on 30 July 2021, she filed Orsini Aff 29 July 2021, and therein denied the allegations of negligence and disputed the other matters raised in the ASC. She deposed that she: 1. contends that the District Court statement of claim in the Pick Packers matter was prepared in accordance with Tachnat's instructions at [11]; 2. denies that there were unconditional settlement offers sent by Pick Packers; 3. denies that any offers made by Pick Packers were not passed to the plaintiffs at [15]; 4. denies that the terms of collection of all stock were acceptable to Tachnat at [18]; 5. states that the settlement of the matter was made on the instructions of the plaintiffs at [28]; 6. denies that the dispute was a minor dispute limited to $40,000 at [29]; and 7. refers to sworn affidavit evidence from the second plaintiff from 2016 and 2017 which confirms the much wider scope of the losses said to have been incurred by Tachnat, which were not limited to water damaged stock but extended to Pick Packers' responsibility for delays in the first defendant's business proceeding.
The first defendant submitted that on 6 September 2021, she filed and served a defence in these proceedings, following delays in the fullsome provision of particulars by the plaintiffs. The defence denies the allegations of negligence made by the plaintiffs and either denies or does not admit large numbers of the factual assertions made by the plaintiffs.
The first defendant noted that at [5] of the 18 June 2021 Hulio Gash Affidavit it is stated "the particulars make the following submission in support of the summary judgment because the defendants have no defence as they do not have a copy of the plaintiff's file contrary to ASCR 14.2 and further there are no issues that needs or must be tried" (CB Vol 3, 2144).
The first defendant submitted that: 1. the status of her file is incorrectly stated by the second plaintiff. The first defendant has explained how she has been able to retain the vast majority of her file in Orsini Aff 29 July 2021 at [8]-[9]; 2. the submission is incorrect legally. ASCR 14.2 simply states that "A solicitor or law practice may destroy client documents after a period of 7 years has elapsed since the completion or termination of the engagement"; and 3. even if there was no file retained, it would not be a proper basis for a summary judgment application.
The first defendant finally submitted that as illustrated by her defence and Orsini Aff 29 July 2021, there are serious concerns surrounding the plaintiffs' claims and if being pressed, the matter should proceed to hearing in the usual course.

[11]

The second defendant's submissions - Opposing summary judgment against her

The second defendant submitted that the plaintiffs' application for summary judgment is doomed to fail and does not pass the General Steel test, as there are serious issues to be tried.
The second defendant noted that Mr James Berg, a partner of the solicitors acting for the second defendant, in his affidavit dated 27 July 2021 ("Berg Aff 27 July 2021") relevantly deposes: "Allegations in these proceedings [17] In the Statement of Claim filed 9 June 2021, the plaintiffs plead at paragraph 2 that the defendants acted for the plaintiffs to resolve the dispute with Pickpackers. In this paragraph, there is no delineation between the defendants, on the one hand, or the plaintiffs on the other. [18] Miss Culkoff instructs me she denies any relevant retainer with any of the plaintiffs. [19] In addition the plaintiffs, collectively, plead: 19.1 intentional negligence by Miss Culkoff - from paragraph 64 of the Statement of Claim; 19.2 initiating proceedings with no prospects in the underlying dispute, although it is not clear to me what the legal cause of action is said to be in this respect - from paragraph 66 of the Statement of Claim; 19.3 breach of duty and contract - from paragraph 67 of the Statement of Claim; 19.4 a failure to provide a costs agreement to the plaintiff- at paragraph 74(e) of the Statement of Claim; and 19.5 an entitlement to damages for various alleged losses, including for what appears to be personal injury, which are set out from paragraph 75 of the Statement of Claim. [20] At page 3 of Exhibit JDB is an email from Mr Gash to me dated 26 July 2021 setting out some proposed amendments to the Statement of Claim. [21] Miss Culkoff instructs me that she denies each of the allegations. [22] In addition, Miss Culkoff instructs me she no longer holds the brief she had for the purposes of the underlying proceedings."
The second defendant noted that the retainer is the starting point for consideration of the legal relationship between the parties, and submitted that Any work undertaken by the second defendant from 30 June 2015 was: 1. undertaken pursuant to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement; 2. undertaken in the context of Tachnat's dispute with Pick Packers; and 3. invoiced to Ms Orsini.
The second defendant submitted that the nature and scope of the duty of care allegedly owed by the second defendant to the second and third plaintiffs is not articulated in the ASC, and in any event, the second defendant was retained by first defendant to advise and appear for Tachnat. The second defendant was not retained by Tachnat however, in line with conventional authority, the first defendant does not deny she owed Tachnat a duty of care in the provision of her services pursuant to the retainer, subject to the terms and conditions of the retainer.
It is clear, however, in the second defendants' submission that she: 1. was not retained/engaged by the second defendant and/or the third defendant in respect of the impugned conduct which is the subject of the claims; and 2. did not owe the second or third plaintiffs a duty of care.
The second defendant further submitted that while it is true that the second defendant charged some fees for work undertaken prior to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement, none of the work undertaken in respect of those fees relates to conduct which the plaintiffs seek to impugn in these proceedings, nor could it. Even if, for the sake of argument, there was an engagement of the second defendant by one or more of the plaintiffs prior to 30 June 2015, that engagement did not extend beyond 30 June 2015 and all work done by the second defendant after that date was pursuant to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement.
The second defendant noted that neither the second nor third defendants were parties to the dispute between Tachnat and Pick Packers. The second defendant noted that the first defendant did not act for either of them at any stage and they were, for all relevant purposes, strangers to the litigation. The fact that they were directors of Tachnat, in the second defendant's submission, cannot operate to impose any duty on her.
The second defendant submitted that Tachnat has a cause of action against the second defendant in negligence. That is a matter which Tachnat can pursue and not one which vests in the second and third defendants as individuals.
The second defendant further submitted that in short, there was no contractual arrangement between herself and any of the plaintiffs and the law does not recognise the existence of a duty of care between the second defendant and second plaintiff, or the second defendant and third plaintiff, in the circumstances of the second defendant's engagement by the first defendant pursuant to the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement.
On that premise, the claims in contract and tort, by the second and third plaintiff, in the second defendant's submission, have no prospects of success. Likewise, in the second defendant's submission there being no relationship between the second and third plaintiffs and second defendant there is no scope for argument that the second defendant owed either a fiduciary duty.
The second defendant noted that from [64] of the ASC which follows a heading of "Intentional negligence, incorrect and false detinue and conversion claims", it is alleged claims of this nature should never have been made in the underlying proceedings. The second defendant submitted that whether that be true or not, such claims could only ever vest in Tachnat as they relate to goods owned by Tachnat which were the subject of the alleged detinue and conversion.
The second defendant noted that the plaintiffs included, as part of the 'Relief Claimed', a judgment or declaration on the financial disadvantage caused to the plaintiff (singular) pursuant to section 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). In the second defendant's submission, this is not a justiciable claim, nor does it reflect a form of relief available to any of the plaintiffs, and therefore it ought to be dismissed.
Further the plaintiff noted that in the ASC, under the heading 'Relief Claimed', the plaintiffs assert an entitlement to damages under s 82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)("TPA"), and there is also reference to misleading and deceptive conduct. For the purposes of these motions, the second defendant makes no complaint about references to the TPA instead of the Australian Consumer Law. However, on review of the ASC, in the second defendant's submission it is difficult to discern any pleading of misleading and deceptive conduct, and no cause of action under the Australian Consumer Law is actually pleaded.
The second defendant submitted that aside from questions of form, the substance of the position is: 1. there can be no claim for misleading and deceptive conduct by the second or third plaintiffs against the second defendant given all services provided by the second defendant were in the context of advising Tachnat; and 2. there is no basis for a claim to the effect that the second or third plaintiffs, in their respective personal capacities relied upon, and/or were induced into error by, any representations made by the second defendant.
The second defendant submitted that as such the ASC fails to disclose a cause of action for misleading and deceptive conduct.
The second defendant noted that part of the relief pleaded by the second or third plaintiffs is for damages in relation to mental harm, and submitted that the law does not recognise, as compensable, the type of harm pleaded. To this extent, the second defendant submitted: 1. the mental harm is not consequent on personal injury of another kind; and 2. the mental harm does not arise wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with another person being killed, injured or put in peril by the alleged acts or omissions of the second defendant.
In the second defendant's submission, the claim for damages in respect of alleged mental harm has no reasonable prospects of success.
The second defendant acknowledged that, in accordance with the principles established in General Steel, the bar is high for her to succeed on this application. However, the claims by the second or third plaintiffs against the second defendant fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and are so clearly without legal substance that it would be inappropriate to allow them to continue.
For these reasons, the second defendant submitted that the claims by the second and third plaintiffs against the second defendant should be dismissed.

[13]

The first defendant

The starting point for the relationship between Tachnat and the first defendant, its solicitor, is the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement. I note:

firstly, that the first defendant addressed her costs disclosure to Hulio Gash, Rejani Rajan and Tachnat;
secondly, there is a clause headed 'Engagement of another Law Practice/Barrister' that relevantly states; "It will be necessary that to engage a barrister on your behalf. We will consult you when this is required. You may be asked to enter into a costs agreement with that party."
thirdly, there is a clause under the heading 'Persons responsible for your matter and costs' which relevantly reads; "The persons responsible for the provision of instructions and for payment of costs is Hulio Gash. Persons further responsible for the provision of instructions and for the payment of costs are Rejani Rajan and Tachnat. All terms of this disclosure and the Cost Agreement apply to those parties jointly and severally. By your continued instructions, you accept these terms apply to the work referred to herein."
fourthly, under the heading 'The work (schedule 1)', the first defendant stipulates that; "the work you require us to do is to take all action necessary to advise and act in your behalf in respect of Contractual Claim by Tachnat against Pick Packers and to represent you in Court Proceedings, including negotiations with the other parties representative, drafting and engrossing any Interlocutory Applications or Motions, Affidavit evidence, arranging any expert evidence, in support of both any interlocutory process and final orders, issue of Subpoenas, engagement of experts, attending court for directions, briefing counsel, attending the hearing & all necessary other attendances required for determination of all issues between Tachnat and Pick Packers."
Finally, the costs agreement does not refer to any work to be undertaken on behalf of the second or third plaintiffs.

While the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement states that the plaintiffs may be asked to enter a costs agreement with a barrister, none of the plaintiffs were ever asked to enter into a separate agreement with the second defendant.
Furthermore, despite the agreement specifing 'Hulio Gash, Rejani Rajan and Tachnat' as the 'Persons responsible for the provision of instructions and payment of costs', Tachnat, not being a natural person, requires a director to give instructions on its behalf. Payment of costs by the second or third plaintiff on behalf of Tachnat does not give rise to the first defendant owing a duty of care to the second and third plaintiffs. Nor does the clause in the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement that all terms of disclosure and the costs agreement apply to the parties "jointly and severally" make the first defendant liable to all three plaintiffs.
It is arguable that the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement complies with s 174 of the LPUL. The other matters raised by the plaintiffs give rise to disputed facts and circumstances. These can only be resolved at trial.
Despite the retainer being the starting point for the relationship between the parties, it should be noted that in her defence filed on 6 September 2021 the first defendant ostensibly admits undertaking work prior to 22 September 2015. For example: she admits having been referred to the plaintiffs by the second defendant on 24 June 2015 and afterwards scheduling an inspection of the stock held at the Pick Packers warehouse (at [8]); that she communicated with Pick Packers on 29 June 2015 (at [10]) and on 9 July 2015 (at [12]); and that she corresponded with the second plaintiff on 14 August 2015, 31 August 2015, and 15 September 2015 (at [13]-[16]). What claims may be brought in relation to the period between the first defendant's first involvement in the matter before the existence of the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement is a matter for trial.
Although the first defendant has not sought to dismiss or strike out any claims by the second or third plaintiffs as against her, it should be said that there are circumstances in which a solicitor may be found to owe a duty of care to the directors of their corporate clients due to special features in their relationship: See About life v Maddocks [2021] NSWSC 1370 at [701]. The existence of such special features in this case is matter for resolution at trial.
One further matter should be noted. The plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the basis that the first defendant has not retained her complete file. The loss of the first defendant's file is disputed by the first defendant in Orsini Aff 29 July 2021 at [8]-[9], and in any event, the destruction of a legal practitioner's complete file does not give rise to an order for summary judgment.

[14]

The second defendant

Again the starting point for the relationship between the parties is the retainer. The second defendant was retained by the first defendant to advise and appear for Tachnat in the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement. It is dated some 3 months before the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement.
It is unusual for a solicitor to engage a barrister to act without first contracting with their client, as the usual course is that barristers do not deal directly with clients but instead receive instructions and fees through the intermediary of their instructing solicitor.
There is also evidence that the second defendant dealt directly with Tachnat and the second plaintiff directly, before the date of the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement and (logically) before the date of the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement. In Orsini Aff 29 July 2015 the first defendant deposes that she had an oral conversation with the second defendant on 25 July 2015 and thereafter commenced acting for Tachnat. Further there is email correspondence between the second defendant and the second plaintiff predating both costs agreements. On 22 September 2015, the second defendant emailed the second plaintiff an invoice saying "[the first defendant] suggested I send the invoice directly to you as it includes work before [the first defendant] became involved", and on 24 September 2015 there is further correspondence wherein the second plaintiff asks that the second defendant request the plaintiffs' insurance copy once on board, to which the second plaintiff responds she will talk with David the following day.
Given the unusual circumstances of this matter the correct chronology of events is at best uncertain. On this basis, in my opinion it makes sense to split the plaintiffs' claims into two periods, the claims which relate to conduct before the first defendant entered into an agreement with Tachnat on 22 September 2015, and those which relate to conduct after that date.
However before addressing the plaintiffs' claims by reference to those two periods, some claims may be briefly dealt with.
Under the heading 'Intentional negligence, incorrect and false detinue and conversion claims' the plaintiffs allege that the defendants drafted pleadings that had no reasonable prospects of success. I agree with the second defendant that such claims could only ever vest in Tachnat as they relate to goods owned by Tachnat, however perhaps more pointedly, this claim is at odds with the fact that Tachnat recovered the sum of $100,000 from Pick packer's insurer after the District Court statement of claim had been filed and served. A claim cannot be characterised as having 'no reasonable prospects of success' if there is evidence that it was in fact successful. There is therefore no discernable claim pleaded by any of the plaintiffs against the second defendant, and as it stands this claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be summarily dismissed.
The second and third plaintiffs claim for relief in the form of a judgment or declaration for the financial disadvantage caused to a "plaintiff" (singular) pursuant to s192E of the Crimes Act. This provision reads: 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly-- (a) obtains property belonging to another, or (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. : Maximum penalty--Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person's obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. (3) A person may be convicted of the offence of fraud involving all or any part of a general deficiency in money or other property even though the deficiency is made up of any number of particular sums of money or items of other property that were obtained over a period of time. (4) A conviction for the offence of fraud is an alternative verdict to a charge for the offence of larceny, or any offence that includes larceny, and a conviction for the offence of larceny, or any offence that includes larceny, is an alternative verdict to a charge for the offence of fraud.
It is not pleaded as to how this could be a justiciable claim by the plaintiffs against the second defendant. As it stands this claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be summarily dismissed.
Finally the second and third plaintiffs seek damages in relation to mental harm which is said to be consequent on the actions of the defendants. The mental harm has not been pleaded as being consequent on personal injury of another kind, nor as arising from mental or nervous shock in the connection with another person being killed, injured or put in peril by the acts or omissions of the second defendant. The law does not recognise the type of harm pleaded. This claim also fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be summarily dismissed.
The General Steel test imposes a high bar for summary dismissal, however it is clear these three claims are without substance such that they cannot be repleaded to assert a variable claim. It is clear that there is no question to be tried. It would therefore be inappropriate for them to continue to trial.

[15]

Before 22 September 2015

As before stated there is evidence that the second defendant carried out legal work on Tachnat's instruction before both the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement and the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement. There is also evidence that the second defendant dealt directly with the second plaintiff during this period. While the second defendant says there was no contractual relationship between herself and any of the plaintiffs, in my opinion the factual matrix is such that it would be inappropriate to accept the second defendant's contention without the matter proceeding to trial. The existence of such a relationship before 22 September 2015 is a matter for trial, as is the effect of the Orsini/Culkoff Costs Agreement on that relationship.
The plaintiffs submitted that the second defendant breached her fiduciary duty to them citing Hospital Products as authority for the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the second defendant and each of the plaintiffs. The solicitor/client relationship is accepted as a category of fiduciary duty: see Hospital Products at [53]. Notwithstanding the existence of clear examples, there is no single test to identify whether a relationship is fiduciary in character, and it is not every case in which there is a relationship of trust that fiduciary obligations will be imposed: see Hospital Products at [54]. The plaintiffs have asserted the existence of a fiduciary relationship without having properly pleaded their claim. Further, as there may have been a contractual relationship between Tachnat and the second defendant during this period, there is ostensibly scope to bring a claim for misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law by Tachnat as against the second defendant. Again, no such claim has been properly pleaded. These two claims fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out.
As to the claim of breach of contract, if a contract between the second defendant and any of the plaintiffs is found to have been in existence during this period it is conceivable that the second defendant breached its terms and that breach caused damage to the plaintiff(s). The existence of such a contract, its breach and the damage which flowed from that breach are all in issue and are all for resolution at trial.
To the allegation of negligence, it is uncontroversial that in circumstances where the second defendant may have been acting directly for one or more of the plaintiffs that she would have owed them a duty of care. Further, in accordance with About life v Maddocks there may have existed special features in the relationship between the second defendant and second and third plaintiffs such that the second defendant could be said to owe them a duty of care directly. I note that About Life v Maddocks refers only to a solicitor owing a duty to the directors of a corporate client, however this is an unusual situation in which a barrister may have dealt directly with the directors of a corporate client. Whether the principle in About life v Maddocks extends to such a scenario is not a matter to be resolved here, however in my opinion the claim should not be struck out as it is not clear that there is no real question to be tried and is a matter which again should be left for trial.
Therefore, in relation to the period before 22 September 2015, I propose to strike out all remaining claims except those for breach of contract and in negligence.

[16]

After 22 September 2015

None of the parties have sought to question the existence of the Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement. The first defendant does not deny she owed Tachnat a duty of care in the provision of her services subject to the terms and conditions of the retainer. The nature and scope of the duty of care allegedly owed by the second defendant to the second and third plaintiffs has not been articulated in the ASC.
As from 22 September 2015, there was no contractual arrangement directly between the second defendant and any of the plaintiffs. It follows that a claim for breach of contract cannot succeed and should be struck out for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. Further, the law does not recognise the existence of a duty of care between the second defendant and second plaintiff, or the second defendant and third plaintiff, in the circumstances where the second defendant's engagement by Tachnat is pursuant to Tachnat/Orsini Costs Agreement as it was after 22 September 2015. These claims should also be struck out as they disclose no reasonable cause of action. However, as is not disputed by the second defendant, she nevertheless owed Tachnat a duty of care. Therefore, the claim in negligence by Tachnat as against the second defendant should be left for trial. Similarly, there being no relationship between the second and third plaintiffs and the second defendant, there is no scope for argument that the second defendant owed them fiduciary duties. These claims should also be struck out for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
Further, while it is theoretically possible for Tachnat to bring a justiciable claim for misleading and deceptive conduct as against the second defendant, there is no such discernable claim pleaded by any of the plaintiffs. As it currently stands the claim for damages due to misleading and deceptive conduct fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out.
The result is that I strike out all remaining claims during this period as against the second defendant save the claim for negligence by Tachnat which is to be left for trial.

[17]

Stay of proceedings generally

The second defendant seeks a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs: see [2] and [8] of the Second Defendant's Motion.
Section 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) reads: "67 Stay of proceedings Subject to rules of court, the court may at any time and from time to time, by order, stay any proceedings before it, either permanently or until a specified day."
The applicable principles to a grant of permanent stay are well known. They were summarised by Campbell J in GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2021] NSWSC 1204 ("GLJ") at [37] referring to Bell P in Moubarak bht Coorey v Holt (2019) 100 NSWLR 218 ("Moubarak") as: "(i) the onus lies "squarely" on the defendant; (ii) a permanent stay should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances; (iii) a permanent stay should be granted when the interests of the administration of justice so demand; (iv) the categories of case are not closed; (v) one category of case where a permanent stay may be ordered is where the proceedings or their continuance would be vexatious or oppressive; (vi) the continuation of proceedings may be oppressive if that is their objective effect; (vii) proceedings may be oppressive where their effect is seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging; (viii) proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would be manifestly unfair to a party; and (ix) proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute."
The prejudice that a delay in bringing proceedings occasions to the ability to have a fair hearing has been subject to examination in many cases: see, Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 ("Taylor"); Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79; Connellan v Murphy [2017] VSCA 116 ("Connellan") at [44]-[47]; Newcastle City Council v Batistatos [2006] HCA 27 ("Batistatos").
The factors that have been identified as giving rise to prejudice include: 1. the death of witnesses; 2. the destruction or inability to locate documents; 3. "unknown unknowns" i.e. prejudice that is caused by the disappearance of evidence that no one was aware existed: See Taylor at [551]: "As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Barker v Wingo, "what has been forgotten can rarely be shown". So, it must often happen that important, perhaps decisive, evidence has disappeared without anybody now "knowing" that it ever existed. Similarly, it must often happen that time will diminish the significance of a known fact or circumstance because its relationship to the cause of action is no longer as apparent as it was when the cause of action arose… The longer the delay in commencing proceedings, the more likely it is that the case will be decided on less evidence than was available to the parties at the time that the cause of action arose." 1. the general diminution of the body of evidence available; and 2. the unreliability of evidence that either fades or is subject to reconstruction by being recalled over a number of times particularly where the events provoke an emotional reaction: See The Nominal Defendant v Cordin [2019] NSWCA 85.
Neither party made submissions on this issue. The second defendant did not provide any evidence as to prejudice as set out in Batistatos, nor as to there being exceptional circumstances. The second defendant's prayers for a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs fail. I dismiss paragraphs [2] and [8] of the Second Defendant's Motion seeking a permanent stay of proceedings against the second and third plaintiffs respectively. It may be that the second defendant is seeking a stay of proceedings in the event that Tachnat does not lodge security for costs. I have dealt with this issue under the heading 'Security for costs'.

[18]

The plaintiff's notices of motion seeking default judgment and that damages be assessed

The plaintiffs filed two notices of motion purportedly seeking default judgment and for damages to be assessed, the first on 27 July 2021 and the second on 5 August 2021 ("Default Judgment Motions"). The plaintiff seeks default judgment pursuant to UCPR 14.3, 16.2, 16.3 and 16.7 on the basis of the defendants' failure to file defences and that damages be assessed. It is convenient that I deal with both of these notices of motion together.
By way of email dated 2 August 2021, the second defendant's solicitor asked the second plaintiff why two motions seeking, in essence, the same thing were required. The second plaintiff responded by advising the plaintiffs seek default judgment because the defendants had not filed their defences to the Statement of Claim within 28 days.
Relevantly UCPR 14.3, 16.7 and 30.1 read: "14.3 Defence (1) Subject to these rules, the time limited for a defendant to file a defence is 28 days after service on the defendant of the statement of claim or such other time as the court directs for the filing of a defence. (2) If, before the defendant files a defence, a notice of motion for summary judgment under rule 13.1 is served on the defendant, but the court does not on that motion dispose of all of the claims for relief against the defendant, the court may fix a time within which the defendant must file a defence. 16.7 Default judgment on claim for unliquidated damages (1) If the plaintiff's claim against a defendant in default is for unliquidated damages only, judgment may be given for the plaintiff against the defendant for damages to be assessed and for costs. (2) The relevant affidavit in support-- (a) must state that the matter has not been settled with the defendant, and (b) must state the source of the deponent's knowledge of the matters stated in the affidavit concerning the claim, and (c) must state whether costs are claimed and, if so, how much is claimed for costs, indicating-- (i) how much is claimed on account of professional costs (not exceeding the amount fixed by the regulations made for the purposes of section 59 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014), and (ii) how much is claimed on account of filing fees, and (iii) how much is claimed on account of the costs of serving the originating process, and (d) must state when and how the originating process was served on the defendant." 30.1 Damages under judgment (1) This rule applies to proceedings in which judgment against a party has been given for damages to be assessed. (2) Subject to subrule (3), the proceedings are to proceed to trial for assessment of damages. …"
It is convenient that I now outline a short chronology of events (as best I can) to ascertain whether Tachnat is entitled to default judgment and/or that damages be assessed.

[19]

The short chronology

On 1 June 2021, the plaintiff served a statement of claim on both defendants (curiously this appears to be prior to the statement of claim actually being filed in this court).
On 9 June 2021, the first, second and third plaintiffs filed a statement of claim against the first and second defendants.
On 19 June 2021, (10 days after the statement of claim was filed), the plaintiffs filed and served the Summary Judgment Motion. The defendants had at least until 30 June 2021 (28 days after the statement of claim was filed at the earliest) to file their defences.
On 29 June 2021, the second defendant requested particulars. In that request, at [45] the second defendants' solicitor wrote "In the meantime, we assume that the time for filing of our client's defence will not commence to run until the particulars requested above have been provided. Please let me know if this assumption is incorrect." Tachnat did not advise that the assumption was incorrect.
On 30 June 2021, the first defendant filed a defence.
On 6 July 2021, a directions hearing took place before the Registrar. The Registrar made the following orders: "(1) First defendant to request particulars of the statement of claim on or by 12 July 2021; (2) Plaintiffs to provide particulars in response to the first defendants request on or by 23 July 2021; (3) The defendants to file and serve any notices of motion they propose filing by 30 July 2021, together with any affidavit evidence in support; (4) Defendants to serve any evidence in response to the plaintiffs Notice of Motion, filed 19 June 2021, on or by 30 July 2021; and …"
On 12 July 2021, a request for particulars was made by the first defendant to the plaintiffs.
On 23 July 2021, Tachnat "answered" the second defendants request for particulars. The answer comprised of five emails from the second plaintiff attaching his responses to the request for particulars as well as over 385 pages of documents in support of his claim against the second defendant. On review, the second defendant's solicitors decided that this response was inadequate.
On 5 August 2021, at 12.58pm the first defendant caused a letter to be sent to the plaintiffs. In that letter the first defendant pressed for a proper response to a number of the requests for further and better particulars contained in the letter of 12 July 2021, and indicated a defence would be filed after the further particulars were received and considered.
On the same day, at 1.28pm, the first defendant received an email from the second plaintiff, in response to the first defendants' letter of 5 August 2021. The first defendant says that the second plaintiff failed to provide a substantive response to the letter of 5 August 2021.
On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion seeking default judgment against both defendants. Both defendants hold the opinion that the plaintiffs have not adequately replied to their requests for particulars
On 10 August 2021, the Registrar made the following directions: "(1) The plaintiff is to file and serve an amended statement of claim by the end of business 11 August 2021. (a) The plaintiff to provide a response to the first defendant's notice to produce dated 19 July 2021 by 13 August 2021, (2) Plaintiffs to provide a response to the first defendant's letter dated 5 August 2021 requesting further and better particulars of the Plaintiffs' claim by 13 August 2021. (3) Plaintiffs to serve any evidence in respect of the first defendant's motion filed 30 July 2021 and the second defendant's motion filed 27 July 2021 by 30 August 2021. (4) Parties are to file a written outline of submissions in respect [of the five motions] by 6 September 2021."
On 11 August 2021, the plaintiffs filed the ASC.
On 6 September 2021, the first defendant filed a defence to the ASC.
The second defendant is yet to file a defence to the ASC.

[27]

The law

Section 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) reads: "Costs (1) Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given. (the threshold issue) … (2) The costs of any proceeding before a court under this Act are to be borne by such party to the proceeding as the court, in its discretion, directs."
UCPR 42.21 reads: "42.21 Security for costs (1) If, in any proceedings, it appears to the court on the application of a defendant - … (d) that there is reason to believe that a plaintiff, being a corporation, will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered to do so, or … the court may order the plaintiff to give such security as the court thinks fit, in such manner as the court directs, for the defendant's costs of the proceedings and that the proceedings be stayed until the security is given. (the threshold issue) (1A) In determining whether it is appropriate to make an order that a plaintiff referred to in subrule (1) give security for costs, the court may have regard to the following matters and such other matters as it considers relevant-- (a) the prospects of success or merits of the proceedings, (b) the genuineness of the proceedings, (c) the impecuniosity of the plaintiff, (d) whether the plaintiff's impecuniosity is attributable to the defendant's conduct, (e) whether the plaintiff is effectively in the position of a defendant, (f) whether an order for security for costs would stifle the proceedings, (g) whether the proceedings involves a matter of public importance, … (j) the costs of the proceedings, (k) whether the security sought is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute, (l) the timing of the application for security for costs, … (2) Security for costs is to be given in such manner, at such time and on such terms (if any) as the court may by order direct. (3) If the plaintiff fails to comply with an order under this rule, the court may order that the proceeding on the plaintiff's claim for relief in the proceedings be dismissed. (4) This rule does not affect the provisions of any Act under which the court may require security for costs to be given."

[32]

Discretionary Factors

The first and second defendants submitted that this Court should exercise its discretion in each of their favour and order Tachnat give security for their costs in accordance with the orders sought, at an amount considered by the Court to be appropriate in the circumstances. The plaintiffs oppose the making for an order for security for costs.
The factors to be considered for ordering security for costs were set out in Meltglow where Beazley J said at 196-198: "The law is now settled that the discretion to order security for costs is unfettered and should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances of the case without any predisposition in favour of the award of security: see the review of the authorities by French J in Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497 at 509. See also Interwest Ltd v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 621 at 623-624 and Zeeman J's decision in Weily's Quarries v Devine Shipping Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 186 at 188. In Gentry Bros Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 405 at 415, Cooper J stated that: "[i]t is not possible or appropriate to list all of the matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion. The factors will vary from case to case. The weight to be given to any circumstance depends upon its own intrinsic persuasiveness and its impact on other circumstances which have to be weighed: P S Chellaram & Co Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 65 ALJR 642 at 643." Notwithstanding the broad unfettered discretion with which the Court approaches an application for security for costs, there are a number of well established guidelines which the court typically takes into account in determining any such application. They are: 1. That such applications should be brought promptly. This is a principle of longstanding: see Grant v The Banque Franco-Egyptienne (1876) 1 CPD 143; see also Smail v Burton; Re Insurance Associates Pty Ltd [1975] VR 776 per Gillard J at 777; Caruso Australia Pty Ltd v Portec (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 311 at 313; Bryan E Fencott at 514. I should state immediately that there is no issue of delay in this case. 2. That regard is to be had to the strength and bona fides of the applicant's case are relevant considerations: see M A Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 97 at 100; Bryan E Fencott at 514. As a general rule, where a claim is prima facie regular on its face and discloses a cause of action, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court should proceed on the basis that the claim is bona fide with a reasonable prospect of success. (Bryan E Fencott at 514). 3. Whether the applicant's impecuniosity was caused by the respondent's conduct subject of the claim: see M A Productions v Austarama Television at 100. 4. Whether the respondent's application for security is oppressive, in the sense that it is being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate: see M A Productions v Austarama Television at 100; Yandil Holdings Pty Ltd v Insurance Co of North America (1985) 3 ACLC 542 per Clarke J at 545; Bryan E Fencott at 513. In Yandil Holdings at 545 Clarke J stated the principle in these terms: "[t]he fact that the ordering of security will frustrate the plaintiff's rights to litigate its claim because of its financial condition does not automatically lead to the refusal of an order. Nonetheless it will usually operate as a powerful factor in favour of exercising the court's discretion in the plaintiff's favour." This factor is related to the next, namely: 5. Whether there are any persons standing behind the company who are likely to benefit from the litigation and who are willing to provide the necessary security: see Memetu Pty Ltd v Lissenden (1983) 8 ACLR 364; Sent v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 201; Bell Wholesale Co Pty Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1; Hession v Century 21 South Pacific Ltd (In liq) (1992) 28 NSWLR 120 at 123; ; Bryan E Fencott at 513; Yandil Holdings at 545. The combined effect of these two principles was summarised by Meagher JA in Hession at 123 as follows: " … a company in liquidation against whom an order for security for costs is sought cannot successfully resist such an order merely by proving that it cannot fund the litigation from its own resources if an order for security is made; it must prove that it cannot do so even if it relies on the other resources available to it (the company's shareholders or creditors) … Finally, whilst it is both true and important that poverty must be no bar to litigation, what that means is that the courts must be astute to see that no person pursuing a claim which is not frivolous is precluded from doing so by the erection of obstacles which poverty is unable to surmount; it does not mean that proof of insolvency automatically confers an immunity from statutory provisions which deal with insolvent plaintiffs." 6. An issue related to the last guideline is whether persons standing behind the company have offered any personal undertaking to be liable for the costs and if so, the form of any such undertaking: see Cameron's Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton & Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 46 at 53; Mantaray Pty Ltd v Brookfield Breeding Co Pty Ltd (1990) 8 ACLC 304; Clyde Industries Ltd v Ryad Engineering Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 325. 7. Security will only ordinarily be ordered against a party who is in substance a plaintiff, and an order ought not to be made against parties who are defending themselves and thus forced to litigate: see Interwest at 626; Heller Factors Pty Ltd v John Arnold's Surf Shop Pty Ltd (1979) ACLC 32,446; Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 480; Weily's Quarries v Devine Shipping where Zeeman J stated (at 189): "[t]he general proposition that security ought not to be ordered where the proceedings are defensive in the sense of directly resisting proceedings already brought or seeking to halt self-help procedures is no more than that, a general proposition. It ought not to be elevated to being a rule of law. In many cases of that nature it could be considered oppressive to require security and that in itself may be sufficient to refuse to make an order … [see] Sydmar Pty Ltd v Statewise Developments Pty Ltd and Interwest Ltd v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd."

[46]

Assessment of quantum of costs by first defendant

In Moran Aff 2 August 2021, Mr Moran, who has been in practice for 38 years, outlined similar work as in Mr Berg's affidavit (reproduced below). The same type of work needs to be undertaken by both the first and second defendant's solicitors in these proceedings. I do not think it is necessary to reproduce them again here.
Mr Moran's assessment of his costs on a reasonable party/party basis is as follows: "I provide the following estimate of the costs that will be incurred in respect the work required to defend the proceedings. In calculating the estimate of costs, I assume the following rates (exclusive of GST): a. Bill McManus (CO) $400 per hour and $3,500 per day b. Peter Moran (PA) $420 per hour c. Christopher Harrison (SA) $385 per hour d. Chantelle Bauer (SO) $310 per hour Task, personal involved and time estimate Cost estimate Correspondence: SO@ 10 hours, SA@ 5 hours, PA@ 5 hours $7,125 Pre-Trial Appearances: SO@ 10 hours $3,100 Applications: SO@ 10 hours, SA@ 15 hours, PA@ 5 hours, CO@ 2 days $18,000 Further and Better Particulars: PA@ 2 hours $840 Defence: PA@ 5 hours and CO@ 5 hours $4,100 Pleadings: PA@ 2 hours $840 Plaintiffs' Evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 2 hours, PA @ 2 hours, CO@ 3 hours $4,360 Second Defendant Evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 2 hours, PA @ 2 hours, CO@ 3 hours $4,360 Subpoenas: SO@ 10 hours $3,100 First Defendant Lay evidence: SA@ 5 hours, PA@ 5 hours, CO@ 5 hours $6,025 First Defendant expert evidence: SO@ 5 hours, SA@ 10 hours, PA@ 2 hours, CO@ 10 hours $10,240 Mediation: SO@ 10 hours and CO@ 1 day $6,600 Other disbursements including filing fees, fees for the service of court documents, fees incurred in respect of subpoenas and discovery $20,000 Trial preparation: SO@ 25 hours, PA@10 hours, CO@ 15 hours $17,950 Trial attendances: SO@ 38 hours, PA@ 10 hours, CO@ 5 days $33,480 Expert witness expenses for trial $25,000 Disbursements for trial, including hearing fees, fees for the service of court documents, transcript fees $15,000 to $25,000 Total $183,220 to $193,220

[47]

Assessment of quantum of costs by second defendant

Mr Berg, in Berg Aff 27 July 2021 deposes the following as to quantum: "Costs of defending the proceedings [35] In order to defend this proceeding on behalf of Miss Culkoff, I anticipate that myself, Ms Puglisi and Counsel will need to undertake the steps set out below: 35.1 reviewing relevant documents in relation to the underlying proceedings, including Miss Culkoff s brief and all documents pleaded in the Statement of Claim - these documents have not yet been obtained however at pages 62 and 63 of Exhibit JDB is a copy of a letter from the solicitors for PPP's insurers in the underlying proceedings which lists the evidence relevant to those proceedings in the lead up to mediation. The affidavits and documents referred to in that letter comprise some 531 pages (Initial Document Review): 35.2 review and consider the plaintiffs' further and better particulars and draft a Defence to the Statement of Claim, including consideration of the legal relationship (if any) as between the plaintiffs, or some of them, and Miss Culkoff, advise in respect of same and having the Defence settled by Counsel (Defence); 35.3 reviewing and considering further pleadings, including from the first defendant, in conjunction with Counsel (Review Pleadings); 35.4 advising and conferring with Miss Culkoff, both generally and in relation to matters not otherwise specifically referred to herein (General Matter Management); 35.5 advising on, drafting and seeking to issue subpoenas, including associated review of documents produced in response to subpoenas (Subpoenas); 35.6 advising on, drafting any necessary application for and proceeding through the process of seeking orders for discovery against the plaintiffs, including associated review of documents discovered by the Plaintiffs (Discovery); 35.7 preparing, drafting, advising on. finalising and serving evidence to be relied on by Miss Culkoff, including: 35.7.1 expert evidence from a senior barrister in the context of a defence pursuant to section 50 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); 35.7.2 expert evidence from a senior solicitor in the context of an alternative defence of proportionate liability referable to the first defendant; and 35.7.3 in respect of quantum in which a variety of heads of damage are pleaded, potentially including medical evidence, forensic accountant evidence and expert evidence from market experts in relation to the plaintiffs' purported failed business ventures; (Second Defendant's Evidence) 35.8 reviewing, considering and advising on evidence served by the plaintiffs and first defendant (Other Evidence); 35.9 preparing for and attending mediation, including preparing mediation bundle, drafting position paper and considering position paper of the plaintiffs, etc. (Mediation); 35.10 general correspondence/emails with the plaintiffs and first defendant's solicitors (Correspondence); 35.11 preparations for (including briefing counsel) and attending on Court appearances as necessary, including: 35.11.1 directions hearings and/or relatively miconteiitious interlocutor)' applications (Pre-trial Appearances): 35.11.2 contentious interlocutory application(s), including the plaintiffs' notice of motion and the notice of motion filed and served on behalf of Miss Culkoff (Interlocutory Appearances); 35.11.3 a trial taking approximately 6 days (Trial Appearances); and 35.12 preparations for trial including coordinating conclaves of expert witnesses such as drafting questions, indexes and briefs; conferring with witnesses as trial preparation; preparing joint memorandum, objections and chronology; prepare Court Book etc (Trial Preparation). [36] I have set out in a table below the tasks referred to in paragraph 35 above. Within the table, where applicable, I have also estimated the costs of each task, which I have calculated by multiplying the estimated likely period of time to be spent on the task by each of the individuals involved, and the following assumed rates (all exclusive of GST): 36.1 Mr John Catsanos of Senior Counsel, without junior counsel, (SC) at $575 per hour and $5,750 per day; 36.2 James Berg, Partner of DLA Piper Australia (JB) at $380 per hour; and 36.3 Ms Puglisi, Solicitor of DLA Piper Australia (SOL) at $245 per hour. TASK, PERSON(S) INVOLVED AND ESTIMATED TOTAL TIME Initial Document Review. SOL @ 20 hours and JB % 5 hours $6,800 Defence: JB @ 6 hours and SC @ 2 hours $3,430 Review Pleadings: JB @ 2 hours $760 General Matter Management: SOL @ 20 hours and JB @ 10 hours $8,700 Subpoenas: SOL @ 10 hours $2,450 Discovery: SOL @ 15 hours $3,675 Second Defendant's Evidence: SOL @ 40 hours, JB @ 10 hours and SC @ 5 hours $16,475 Other Evidence: SOL @ 10 hours, JB @ 2 hours and SC @ 5 hours $6,085 Mediation: SOL @ 12 hours and SC @ 1 day (plus 2 hours prep) $9,840 Correspondence: SOL @ 20 hours and JB @ 4 hours $6,420 Pre-Trial Appearances: SOL (a), 10 hours $2,450 Interlocutory Appearances. SOL (a) 20 hours, JB @ 8 hows and SC @ 1 days plus 4 hours prep $15,990 Other Disbursements: $50,000 to $75,000

[55]

The Court orders: 1. Tachnat give security for the costs of the first defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000; 2. Tachnat give security for the costs of the second defendant by payment of funds into Court in the sum of $50,000; 3. The proceedings against the first defendant be stayed until order (1) above has been complied with; 4. The proceedings against the second defendant be stayed until order (2) above has been complied with; 5. The first defendant's Notice of Motion filed 30 July 2021 and paragraph [16] of the second defendant's Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021 seeking security for costs, are to be stood over with liberty to the defendants to restore in order to seek further security for costs; 6. In regards to the second defendant's Notice of Motion filed 27 July 2021: Paragraphs [2] and [9] seeking a permanent stay of proceedings are dismissed. Paragraphs [13] and [17] seeking answers to particulars are stood over to the Registrar at 9.00am on 27 April 2021 for directions. The plaintiffs' claims in relation to drafting pleadings with no reasonable prospects of success, those pursuant to s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and those seeking damages for mental harm as against the second defendant are dismissed. Of the plaintiffs' remaining claims against the second defendant: in relation to the period until 22 September 2015 those in negligence, and those for breach of contract remain, and for the period after 22 September 2015 the claim in negligence by Tachnat remains. All other claims made by the plaintiffs' as against the second defendant are struck out. 7. So far as the second defendant is concerned the plaintiff's request for particulars needs to be recast now that the surviving claims against her have been narrowed; 8. The second plaintiff's Notice of Motion dated 19 June 2021 seeking summary judgment, and the plaintiffs' Notices of Motion dated 27 July 2021, and 5 August 2021 seeking default judgment and the assessment of damages against both defendants are dismissed; 9. The first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the first defendant's costs of their notices of motion filed 19 June 2021, 5 August 2021, and 27 July 2021 respectively and the first defendant's Notice of Motion dated 30 July 2021 seeking security for costs. As the second defendant was almost entirely successful in her Notice of Motion, the first, second and third plaintiffs are to pay the second defendant's costs of the second defendant's Notice of Motion dated 27 July 2021.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Tachnat Pty Ltd

Respondent/Defendant:

Orsini

Legislation Cited (9)

Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules 2015(NSW)

Trade Practices Act 1974(Cth)

Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015(NSW)

Crimes Act 1900(NSW)

Civil Procedure Act 2005(NSW)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005(NSW)

Competition and Consumer Act 2010(Cth)

Civil Liability Act 2002(NSW)

Corporations Act 2001(Cth)

Cases Cited (42)

v Bassenger [2008] NSWSC 799 Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Ptd Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 16 Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Brundza v Robbie & Co (No 2) (1952) 88 CLR 171 Connellan v Murphy [2017] VSCA 116 Dennis vJoukhador [2021] NSWSC 870 Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 Epping Plaza v Bevendale [2010] VCC 805 Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 Gentry Bros v Wilson Brown & Associates [1992] FCA 592 Giannarelli and Others v Wraith and Others (1988) 165 CLR 543 GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2021] NSWSC 1204 Griffiths v Evans [1953] 1 WLR 1424 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 Intercraft Cabinets Pty Ltd v Sampas Pty Ltd (1997) 18 WAR 306 Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291 Kounnas v Citywide Civil Engineering Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 287 KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 Live Board Holdings Ltd v Cody Live Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 302 Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 Moubarak bht Coorey v Holt (2019) 100 NSWLR 218 Newcastle City Council v Batistatos [2006] HCA 27 Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 Studer v Boettcher [2000] NSWCA 263 The Nominal Defendant v Cordin [2019] NSWCA 85 Treloar Constructions Pty Limited v McMillan [2016] NSWCA 302 Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Tachnat Pty Ltd (First Plaintiff) Hulio Gash (Second Plaintiff) Rejani Rajan (Third Plaintiff) Julie Orsini (First Defendant) Vera Culkoff (Second Defendant) Representation: Counsel: B McManus (First Defendant) J Catsanos (Second Defendant)

[2017] VSCA 116

[2010] VCC 805