SZUTY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

The Tribunal's reasons 19 The Tribunal did not believe that the applicant was homosexual or that he would be treated as such. It reached these conclusions for several reasons, including that: (1) he had failed to make contact with the gay community in Sydney; (2) he had not "explore[d] or express[ed]" his alleged homosexuality since he had been in Australia, although that was his professed motivation for coming here; (3) his account of what he claimed was his single homosexual experience in year 11 at school (holding hands with another boy) lacked credibility because this conduct is "largely acceptable in Arab culture, and not indicative of sexual orientation" (referring to a New York Times article entitled "Why Arab Men Hold Hands"); (4) his claim to have been expelled from school because of this incident was inconsistent with the reasons given by the school disciplinary board in a letter supplied to the Tribunal after the hearing; (5) he had a "singular lack of interest" in conducting research into homosexuality in Australia or engaging with the gay community in any way; (6) his alleged relationship (presumably homosexual relationship) with a Jordanian friend who had helped him with his visa process lacked credibility; (7) there were various other inconsistencies in his claims; and (8) the Tribunal was unable to accept the applicant's explanations for the apparent inconsistencies in his account. 20 Nor did the Tribunal accept that the applicant was facing an arranged marriage on his return to Jordan in the absence of images of his future bride or any correspondence about impending marriage arrangements either from her or from his family. While the applicant produced emails purportedly from his father and Facebook messages purportedly from his mother, the Tribunal was not satisfied that they emanated from either parent. 21 Finally, the Tribunal considered that the failure to submit the protection visa application until nearly 18 months after the applicant had first claimed to fear returning to Jordan was "not indicative of someone who fears serious harm". The Tribunal rejected the applicant's explanation for the delay (that he believed he could apply for permanent residence after two years as a student), because, having cancelled his MBA course after one year he would not have been eligible to apply for permanent residency and also because, in the absence of supporting evidence, it did not believe his claim that he had enrolled (but not studied) at a college in the city. 22 Consequently, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant satisfied the criteria for a protection visa.

The primary judge's reasons 23 The application in the court below was not included in the bundle of documents filed by the Minister. Nor was it annexed to either of the applicant's affidavits. According to the primary judge's reasons for judgment (which in this respect were not the subject of any criticism), the applicant raised four grounds. 24 The gravamen of the first ground was that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error because the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant was not a homosexual was one which no reasonable decision maker could have reached, in the absence of evidence of what behaviour was consistent with homosexuality. The primary judge said this argument was misconceived for several reasons. 25 First, his Honour said that the Tribunal did not purport to apply any test of homosexuality and in fact acknowledged (at [47]) that there was no such test. He said that the Tribunal did not ask questions in the expectation that there was only one correct answer. Rather, it questioned the applicant with a view to eliciting information which "might be consistent with being homosexual". I interpolate that his Honour had the transcript of the Tribunal hearing before him. His Honour said that this was not "a tick-a-box approach" and that it was the combination of the applicant's answers which led the Tribunal to conclude that he was not homosexual. 26 Second, there was a logical connection between the Tribunal's approach and its findings and the applicant's claim to have come to Australia in the first place because he wanted to explore his sexuality, studied abroad for that purpose and chose this country because of the openness of its society. His Honour noted the Tribunal's reliance (amongst other things) on what he referred to as "a general lack of activity in Australia", the evidence about two homosexual relationships and the evidence concerning the applicant's expulsion from school. 27 Third, his Honour held that the Tribunal did not require rebutting evidence in order for it to be able to assess the applicant's claim. He said that it was "entirely legitimate for the Tribunal to have tested the applicant by reference to his familiarity with and interest in the Australian homosexual community", referring to the Full Court judgment in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431 at [61] and [65], to which I will return in due course. 28 Fourth, his Honour rejected the applicant's contention that the Tribunal had made "perverse assumptions" about the degree of interest a homosexual with qualifications in information technology would have with the Australian "gay scene". This, too, his Honour considered was based on a misunderstanding of the Tribunal's decision. He said that the Tribunal had only referred to the applicant's training in IT when considering his failure to conduct internet research into homosexuality in Australia and his inability to use the internet because he shared an email address with his mother (in fact the applicant said that it was because he shared a computer with his siblings). His Honour observed that a person's knowledge of IT has a logical bearing on the person's ability to conduct computer research. 29 Fifth, his Honour rejected the applicant's criticism of the Tribunal's use of an article from which it had inferred that men holding hands was acceptable in Arab cultures and was not indicative of a person's sexuality, considering that the criticism was based on a misreading of the article. 30 Sixth, his Honour dismissed (both as untrue and as providing no "relevant unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality") the applicant's complaint that the Tribunal failed to take into account a number of matters including his explanation for the absence of a reference to the incident with the other boy in the letter from his school about his expulsion. 31 The second ground was that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations such as the applicant's stated personal view of homosexuality (having a same-sex life partner), the evidence of his two witnesses, his choice "to live a gay life with a degree of privacy", his fear that his homosexuality might be discovered by members of the Jordanian community, and his explanation for the delay in lodging his protection visa application. 32 The primary judge dismissed this ground because he considered that the Tribunal had in fact taken those matters into account. 33 Evidently, the applicant also argued that there was a denial of procedural fairness and it was not open to the Tribunal to give no weight to the corroborative evidence where the witnesses' credibility had not been destroyed and there was "no cogent material" to show that they had lied. 34 The primary judge rejected this argument because he considered that it was based on a misreading of the judgment in WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 568; [2004] FCAFC 74. 35 Finally, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal was wrong to find (at [54]) of the decision record that his witnesses could shed no light on any aspect of his homosexuality, pointing to various passages in their evidence. The primary judge accepted that the witnesses' evidence went further than simply stating that the applicant had disclosed his homosexuality to them, for example by describing the applicant's conduct around women. But his Honour concluded that the Tribunal did not overlook that evidence. In any event, his Honour said, the evidence was "not central to the matter or matters which founded the Tribunal's rejection of the applicant's claims and was (scil.) not particularly cogent". Consequently, his Honour said that, even if the Tribunal had overlooked the evidence and proceeded on a false factual assumption, this was not a jurisdictional error. 36 The third ground was that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by concluding that he was not a homosexual without allowing him the chance to "freely respond" to assertions that his behaviour was not consistent with the Tribunal's notions of homosexuality. 37 His Honour said that this ground was based on a brief passage in the transcript of the hearing which, read in context, did not support it. His Honour considered that the Tribunal was not preventing the applicant from addressing its concerns, merely endeavouring to secure "a focused response". He concluded that there was no denial of procedural fairness. 38 The fourth and final ground was that the Tribunal erred by coming to a preliminary conclusion about the applicant's purported homosexuality and failing to decide whether he faced a real chance of persecution. In submissions, according to the primary judge, this developed into an argument that the Tribunal failed to account for the individualised experience of membership of a particular social group, an argument which relied on Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 (see at [59] per McHugh and Kirby JJ). 39 The primary judge rejected this ground, too, holding that the Tribunal did not overlook the applicant's individual experience and (in effect) that, having determined that the applicant was not homosexual and therefore not a member of the particular social group (homosexual men of Jordanian nationality), there was no foundation in fact for his claim to fear persecution.

The discretion to extend time to appeal 40 The Court has a discretion to extend the time to appeal. There are no express fetters on its exercise but, like any power conferred by the Rules, it must be exercised in the way that best promotes their overarching purpose: the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible (Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M). The exercise of the discretion is also guided by some well-established principles. They include the extent of the delay, the explanation for the delay, prejudice (if any) to other parties, and the merits of the appeal. Above all, before a court will exercise the discretion in the applicant's favour it must be fair and equitable in all the circumstances to do so: see, for example, Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6].

The applicant's submissions 41 The submissions began with an attempt to explain the delay in making the application. The gist of the explanation was that the applicant mistakenly believed that he had no right to appeal to this Court, that he was misled into thinking this by the negligent advice of his "solicitor/migration agent", and that he filed his application as soon as he learned about his options. The submissions then largely foreshadowed what appeared in the second affidavit: 1. The Applicant mistakenly believed he appealed twice to two different legal bodies or courts already; namely to the AAT and then to the FCC. 2. He held this belief because his solicitor/migration agent advised him he could only appeal to the Minister. His solicitor/migration agent advised him to wait, before initiating next appeal option (Ministerial Intervention), for a letter from the Department giving him 28 days to depart. 3. He never changed his address and kept waiting for that letter. 4. He relied on a notification on Visa Entitlement Verification Online (VEVO) stating that he had an indefinite visa. 5. He was picked up by NSW police off the street and brought to the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre on 9 November 2015. 6. This was when he first realised he had not been correctly advised and he no longer had a visa. 7. At the first meeting with his case manager he was told he only had 48 hours to agree to leave or be placed on a removal pathway. The Applicant did not consider this an option. 8. The Applicant determined at this point that he needed to rely on credible advice and not put himself at the mercy of his migration agent/lawyer. The Applicant gathered more information and expertise about the options and avenues available to him and sought access to his documents from his house. He believed his landlord had thrown some of his things away and he would not be able to access any documents he had kept there. 9. In late November 2015, he decided to apply to the Federal Court. On 4 December 2015 he lodged an FOI request to get informations related to his case so he can lodge an appeal to this Court. 10. Thus he never actually delayed to appeal in this Court as soon as he learned about his options. 11. He was a victim of the breach of his agent's statutory obligations under s 314(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 42 Section 314(2) of the Act requires that a registered migration agent conduct himself or herself in accordance with the Code of Conduct prescribed by the Migration Agents Regulations 1998 (Cth). The Code is over 20 pages in length. The submissions did not identify what provision of the Code was breached and an argument in support of the proposition was withdrawn at the hearing.

The revived arguments 43 Before going any further I should dispose of the two matters revived in the submissions after the dismissal of the interlocutory application. 44 In relation to the request for a copy of the transcript of the hearing in the Federal Circuit Court, the applicant's written submissions simply reiterate the points he made at the hearing on 1 March 2016. That is, the applicant claims that the primary judge misunderstood the arguments of counsel and that "for the purpose of justice and to assist the court" he requires a copy of the transcript to be provided to him. As no new argument was raised by these submissions or in oral argument, I adhere to what I said in my earlier judgment. 45 Nothing was said either in the applicant's written submissions or in oral argument in support of the request for an order standing over the application for an extension of time to be heard with any appeal. In the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the request was not pressed. In any case, there was no sound basis for it. 46 The apparent pretext for the request was that something could turn up in the transcript that might give rise to an appeal point. This was the same pretext for the earlier adjournment application, which I refused and which the Minister's lawyer rightly characterised as a fishing expedition. No good reason has been shown for why attempts were not made to obtain a transcript well before the eve of the hearing. In the event that there was some difficulty in securing it, an affidavit could have been obtained from the lawyer who represented the applicant in the court below setting out the basis, assuming there to be one, for any argument that the primary judge misconceived the oral submissions put forward on his behalf.

Should an extension of time be granted? 47 The Minister does not contend that he is prejudiced by the delay, but the delay is substantial and largely unexplained. 48 As I have already noted, the application was filed about 25 weeks after the time in which to appeal expired. In the first affidavit there was no explanation for the failure to take any action in the more than 23 weeks leading up to the applicant's detention. Moreover, the explanation for the delay thereafter, such as it is, is unsatisfactory. The applicant was represented by counsel and solicitors in the proceeding below and by a migration agent in the Tribunal. Doubtless, they would have all the relevant documents. Yet, the applicant did not apparently take the simple step of asking for them. According to the annexure to the first affidavit, the outcome of the FOI request should have been known by 31 January 2016 or thereabouts, but no evidence was led on this subject. 49 The account given in the second affidavit insinuates that it is the applicant's advisers, including his lawyers, who are at fault. The inference I was invited to draw was that he did not know that he could have appealed to this Court and that his migration agent/solicitor did not tell him. Tellingly, however, the affidavit falls short of disclosing what he was told. For all I know, the applicant's advisers told him that his only recourse was to the Minister because they were of the opinion that any appeal was bound to fail. Furthermore, if he was unaware before he was taken into immigration detention that he had a right of appeal to this Court and that if he did not file a notice of appeal within the prescribed time, he would need to apply for an extension of time, neither affidavit provides any indication of precisely when and how he became aware. Finally, this allegation was only made on the day of the hearing. It did not appear in the first affidavit and the applicant offered no explanation as to why it had not been raised earlier. 50 In some cases these deficiencies may be excused. But not in this one. The evidence in both affidavits was given without the assistance of an interpreter but it was never suggested that the applicant required one. The applicant was unrepresented at the time he swore his first affidavit but not at the time he swore the second. Furthermore, he is well-educated, and although English is not his first language, he has a reasonably good command of it. He addressed the Court himself on 1 March 2016 in English, again without the assistance of an interpreter, and he gave me the impression that he was an intelligent man. 51 For all these reasons, I reject the submission that there is in truth no delay, that the applicant did all that he could to pursue his rights as soon as he knew what they were, and that there is a satisfactory or acceptable explanation for the lengthy delay. 52 I now turn to consider the merits of the appeal, but before doing so, it is important to note three matters of principle. 53 First, while a strong case will weigh heavily in the applicant's favour, an apparently weak, but arguable case does not weigh against the grant of an extension: Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 83 at 98 (French J). 54 Secondly, as Mortimer J observed in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [63], when the question of merits is considered on an application for an extension of time, a court is not concerned with whether the applicant will ultimately succeed, but whether he or she has a reasonably arguable case. 55 Thirdly, it is not in the interests of justice to extend the time to appeal from a judgment which is plainly right or where the proposed appeal is bound to fail. In such a case it would be futile to do so. 56 Here, the applicant does not have a strong case, so the merits of the appeal are not a factor in his favour. The next question is whether his case is at least reasonably arguable. 57 On the face of the draft grounds of appeal, that question is easy to answer. 58 Like its predecessor, the amended draft notice of appeal makes sweeping, unparticularised allegations. The written submissions shed little light on them. Although they both record that they were prepared by Mr Attia, he told the Court that the applicant was the author. He claimed to have edited both documents but, if he did, the edit was desultory. With the possible exception of the first submission entitled "possible biased approach", the submissions did not, at least in terms, address the draft grounds of appeal, they were not supported by authority, and they barely engaged with the submissions filed by the Minister. 59 Under the rubric of "possible biased approach" the applicant submitted that: (1) The primary judge erred at [41] of his reasons (when dealing with ground 2 of the judicial review application) when he said that the evidence of the witnesses about their observations of the applicant in connection with women was not central to the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the applicant's claims. (2) The Tribunal was "biased" in its assumptions as to how a homosexual would act, and in upholding that view the primary judge was also "biased" because he failed to appreciate "what it means for a person with homosexual tendencies to identify himself as such". (3) The primary judge erred at [42] of his reasons by holding that the Tribunal had considered the evidence before it, in circumstances where the Tribunal failed to expressly analyse that evidence. The primary judge further erred by "putting words in [the] member['s] mouth", by stating that the Tribunal had "meant to say" that the evidence shed no light on the applicant's involvement or interest in the homosexual community. (4) The primary judge, like the Tribunal, erred by assessing the applicant's claim on the basis that he was claiming to be a "member of the homosexual community", where in fact his claim was that he belonged to a class of people who identified as homosexual. 60 Mr Attia ultimately conceded that the first draft ground of appeal was hopeless. The concession was properly made. An allegation of actual bias must be "distinctly made and clearly proved": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69]. Here, the allegation is not distinctly made and there is no reason to think that the applicant will be in a position to clearly prove it. To make out a case of actual bias based on prejudgment, which the applicant apparently wishes to mount on appeal, it is necessary to show that the decision maker's mind was "so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented": Jia at [72]. At no point was I directed to any material that might make out such a case. 61 Nor do the submissions provide any basis for an appellate court to find that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, that is to say, that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions in dispute: see, for example, Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 300; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11]. This is obviously an easier test to satisfy than the test for actual bias. But it is still necessary to point to the facts and circumstances that might give rise to the possibility of such an apprehension and to articulate "the logical connection" between those facts and circumstances and "the asserted conclusion that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to bear upon the issues that are to be decided": Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 at [63], [67]. The applicant's submissions did not do either. 62 As the Minister submitted, the second draft ground misconceives the role of the primary judge. It is for the Tribunal to find the facts. The Federal Circuit Court's jurisdiction is limited by s 476 of the Migration Act. It may only review the Tribunal's decision for jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476). As the Minister put it, the primary judge's only concern was whether the decision was lawfully made. During oral argument the applicant abandoned this ground, too. 63 That left the third proposed ground: that "the primary judge misconceived the factual basis of the argument". In oral argument it morphed into a contention that the primary judge misconstrued the legal argument. 64 Mr Attia submitted that his Honour's error was revealed by what he said at [27]-[28] of his reasons. In order to understand the argument it is necessary to refer to [26] as well. In those paragraphs his Honour said this: 26. The next particular is that the Tribunal failed to take into account the applicant's explanation for the fact that the letter from the school concerning his dismissal did not include any reference to homosexuality. Even if that were true, it would not found any relevant unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality. However, it is not true. The Tribunal was not obliged anywhere in its statement of reasons to make findings about each and every one of the applicant's arguments as to why certain evidence should be accepted. Its obligation in that respect, as imposed by s.430 of the Act, does not go so far: Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405. For both those reasons this particular is rejected. 27. The final five particulars of the first ground are also based upon assertions that the Tribunal failed to take into account certain matters. Those particulars are rejected for the same reason as the previous particular. It is clear that, rather than focusing upon the legality of the Tribunal's decision in this respect, these particulars reflect a simple disagreement with the Tribunal's conclusion about the applicant's credibility. Such disagreement cannot form the basis for the exercise of power by this Court under s.476 of the Act. 28. In light of these conclusions it is unnecessary to consider the first respondent's submission that "unreasonableness" applies only to determining the validity of discretionary decisions rather than the fact-finding leading to those decisions. Certainly, the reliance by the applicant in his submissions on the decision in Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 reveals some lack of clarity in his approach to this ground. Nevertheless, it is a controversial proposition that issues relating to reasonableness can never arise in the exercise of powers that are not discretionary. Although it may be a difference in principle or simply one of terminology, a decision may be open to review on the basis that it is "illogical, irrational or lacking a basis in findings or inferences of fact supported on logical grounds": Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at [52] per McHugh and Gummow JJ. 65 Mr Attia contended that his Honour was wrong to conclude in [27] that the final five particulars of the first ground of appeal do not focus on the legality of the Tribunal's decision but "reflect a simple disagreement with the Tribunal's conclusion about the applicant's credibility". The error was said to be a failure to appreciate that the applicant's case was that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable. Mr Attia submitted that his Honour did not deal with that part of the case, pointing to what his Honour went on to say at [28], namely, that, in the light of the conclusions reached in the preceding paragraphs it was unnecessary to consider a submission by the Minister that "unreasonableness" only applies to determining the validity of discretionary decisions. Mr Attia argued that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable because the only evidence was that the applicant identified as a homosexual and there was no evidence to the contrary. He contended that being homosexual is not determined by one's activities. He maintained that the applicant was a member of a social group of people who identified as homosexual rather than being a part of a community of homosexuals, as the Tribunal appeared to assume. 66 In order to do justice to the application, with the consent of both parties I inspected the amended judicial review application on the file of the Federal Circuit Court and the written submissions made to that court. 67 Having done so, I am not persuaded that there is substance in any of these arguments. 68 The first ground of the amended application pleaded that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error "in the nature of legal unreasonableness by finding that the Applicant did not belong to a social group". Particulars were then given, listed as a-d. Particular d began with the words: "Such a finding is unreasonable because" and thereunder 11 propositions were advanced, listed, unhelpfully, as a-k. It was common ground that the primary judge's reference in [27] to the final five particulars of the first ground were subparas g-k: g. The Tribunal failed to take into account two witnesses that had confirmed being told by the Applicant that he was homosexual. h. The Tribunal failed to take into account the Applicant's expressed choice to live a gay life with a degree of privacy. i. The Tribunal failed to take into account the Applicant's expressed fear if members of the Jordanian community discovered that he was a homosexual. j. The Applicant's subjective beliefs are the dominant indicators of his homosexuality and the Tribunal failed to take in to account those expressed factors. k. The Tribunal failed to take into account the Applicant's expressed reasons for his delay in lodging his protection visa application. 69 In [27] the primary judge rejected these five particulars because, contrary to what was alleged in the pleading, the Tribunal did in fact take all these matters into account. Doubtless it is for this reason that his Honour concluded that the particulars reflected a simple disagreement with the Tribunal's conclusions about the applicant's credibility. In other words, "failed to take into account" was no more than a euphemism for "failed to accept". The same propositions were advanced in support of the second ground of the judicial review application (the failure to take into account relevant considerations). When dealing with this ground, his Honour identified certain paragraphs in the evidence where the Tribunal had had regard to them. Having closely read the Tribunal's reasons, I cannot discern any error in [27]. 70 There is no foundation for the submission that the primary judge failed to consider the argument that the Tribunal's conclusion was legally unreasonable. He deals with it at [18]-[27]. The point of [28] was to dispose of an unmeritorious argument propounded by the Minister. 71 The applicant's arguments ignored the internal inconsistencies in his case before the Tribunal and overlooked two fundamental problems with the argument in the court below, to which the primary judge referred at [18]-[19] and [23] of his reasons. First, the Tribunal did not apply any test of homosexuality. To the contrary, it expressly recognised at [47] of the decision record that there is none. Second, the Tribunal has to reach a state of satisfaction. In order to do so it is obliged to carry out a review of all the evidence. It was to this end that it interrogated the applicant about his various claims. It was not obliged to accept the applicant's word. As the primary judge observed at [18], the matters it canvassed in its interrogation were designed to elicit information which might be consistent with the applicant's claim to be homosexual. In this context, the primary judge referred (at [23]) to SBAN. 72 SBAN was a judgment on three appeals brought by the Minister from judgments of the Federal Magistrates Court (the former name of the Federal Circuit Court), the last of which was an appeal involving WAAG, a man who claimed to fear persecution in Iran because of his homosexuality. In that case the magistrate had concluded that the Tribunal's approach to questioning and its consequential findings demonstrated that it had a fixed view about the behaviour of homosexual men in Iran and that it had a closed mind, incapable of persuasion. Heerey and Kiefel JJ held that this conclusion was unsustainable, observing at [65]: Where a claim for refugee status is based on grounds such as religion, membership of a particular social group or political opinion it is understandable that the RRT might test the veracity of the claim by reference to knowledge or attitudes which members of the relevant religion, social group or political party might be expected to possess. As a matter of common sense, this is a perfectly legitimate fact-finding technique for an administrative decision-maker. To take an example removed from the facts of the present case, if an applicant claimed a fear of persecution on the grounds of being a Catholic, the RRT might test this assertion by enquiring as to the applicant's knowledge of matters of Catholic doctrine, ritual, traditional belief and the like. It may be that the Tribunal member's understanding of such matters is in fact inaccurate. Or at the other extreme the Tribunal member may be correct but may assume a detailed knowledge that it would not be reasonable to expect of the average Catholic. These errors however would at worst provide grounds for criticism of the fact-finding process. They would not in themselves be suggestive of bad faith or the imposition of some illegitimate "template". 73 An argument in the present case to the effect that the Tribunal's decision lacked "an evident and intelligible justification" (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76]) would also be unsustainable. This is not a case where the court might not be able to understand from the reasons how the decision was arrived at, nor is it one in which the justification in the reasons is insufficient to outweigh the inference that the decision is otherwise outside the bounds of legal reasonableness of the range of possible lawful outcomes: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28 at [64]. Another decision-maker acting rationally and logically could well come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal on the same material. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [135] (Crennan and Bell JJ). 74 The applicant was at pains to impress upon this Court and the court below that he guarded his privacy and did not seek to be part of a homosexual community. The primary judge appreciated this and so did the Tribunal. 75 The proposition that the primary judge misunderstood the legal argument is unsound. 76 It follows that I am satisfied that the proposed appeal enjoys no reasonable prospects of success. 77 For all these reasons I am not satisfied that it would be fair and equitable to extend the time to appeal or to adjourn this application to another day. 78 The application should therefore be dismissed with costs. There will be orders accordingly. I certify that the preceding seventy-eight (78) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Katzmann.