Data breach
3 The appellant is one of a group of individuals in immigration detention on 31 January 2014, whose personal information was inadvertently made available on the internet by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection ("data breach"). In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180 ("SZSSJ"), the High Court of Australia summarised the circumstances of the "data breach" as follows, at [3]:
The data breach occurred on 10 February 2014. The Department routinely publishes statistics on its website. This time the particular electronic form of the document in which the statistics were published included embedded information which disclosed the identities of 9,258 applicants for protection visas who were then in immigration detention. The document containing the embedded information remained on the website until 24 February 2014.
4 As it turns out, this summary was not completely correct. In SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1173 ("SZWAJ") at [33], Griffiths J noted relevantly:
Senior Counsel for the respondents acknowledged that there is evidently a factual error in SZSSJ High Court at [3] and [4] where it is suggested that the Data Breach affected only applicants for a protection visa. The Data Breach involved the disclosure of information of 9,258 persons who were in immigration detention, including but not limited to persons who are applicants for protection visas. This point is demonstrated by the Appellant's own circumstances because the Data Breach affected her as a person who was in immigration detention even though, at that time, she was not an applicant for a protection visa.
5 On this appeal, the Minister's counsel, Ms Francois, emphasised that the appellant was in a similar situation to the applicant in SZWAJ in that he also was not an applicant for a protection visa at the time of the data breach, having not yet been permitted to make a protection visa application.
6 In SZSSJ at [5], the High Court recorded the following concerning the aftermath of the data breach:
[T]he Department retained external consultants, KPMG, to investigate. KPMG prepared a report for the Department. An abridged version of the KPMG report was later made available to affected applicants. The abridged version of the report recorded that, during the 14 days in which the document disclosing the identities of the visa applicants had remained on the website, the document had been accessed 123 times and that the access had originated from 104 unique internet protocol ("IP") addresses.
The abridged version of the KPMG report did not record those IP addresses or give the precise times of access. Rather, the abridged version stated:
It is not in the interests of detainees affected by this incident to disclose further information in respect of entities [who] have accessed the Document, other than to acknowledge that access originated from a range of sources, including media organisations, various Australian Government agencies, internet proxies, TOR network and web crawlers.
7 The High Court recorded that the following also occurred after the breach, at [8]:
In early March 2014, the Secretary of the Department sent a standard form letter to each of the affected applicants. The letter informed those applicants of the Data Breach and expressed deep regret. The letter continued:
"The information that it was possible to access was your name, date of birth, nationality, gender, details about your detention (when you were detained, reason and where) and if you have other family members in detention.
The information did not include your address (or any former address), phone numbers or any other contact information. It also did not include any information about protection claims that you or any other person may have made, and did not include any other information such as health information.
The department will assess any implications for you personally as part of its normal processes. You may also raise any concerns you have during those processes."
8 At [10], the High Court referred to the Department's conduct of processes known as "International Treaties Obligations Assessments" ("ITOAs"), stating:
Departmental officers conducting the ITOAs were specifically instructed to assess the effect of the Data Breach on Australia's non-refoulement obligations adopting the assumption that an applicant's personal information may have been accessed by authorities in the country in which the applicant feared persecution or other relevant harm.
9 At [91] and [92], the High Court concluded:
[91] Sensibly interpreted and applied in the context of making an assessment of whether the Data Breach engaged Australia's non-refoulement obligations with respect to them, the assumption was not simply that some of their personal information might have been accessed by some authorities. The assumption was rather that all of their personal information had been accessed by all of the persons or entities from whom they feared persecution or other relevant harm. That is how the assumption was in fact interpreted and applied by the officer who conducted SZTZI's ITOA and how it could reasonably be expected to be interpreted and applied in the conduct of SZSSJ's ITOA.
[92] SZSSJ and SZTZI were not deprived of any opportunity to submit evidence or to make submissions relevant to the subject matter of the ITOA process as a result of not having such further information as might be inferred to have been contained in the unabridged version of the KPMG report. Exactly how and why the Data Breach occurred was simply not relevant to the question of whether one or more of Australia's non-refoulement obligations were engaged in respect of them. And irrespective of what the unabridged KPMG report might have to say about the identities of the 104 IP addresses from which the document had been accessed during the 14 day period of the Data Breach, the fact would remain that once the document was downloaded the personal information of SZSSJ and SZTZI could have been accessed by anyone. Even if the unabridged KPMG report might have allowed SZSSJ and SZTZI to prove by reference to the report that one or more of those IP addresses were associated with persons or entities from whom they feared harm, that proof would advance their cases for engagement of Australia's non-refoulement obligations no further than the assumption already made in their favour.
10 Accordingly, the High Court accepted that there had been no denial of procedural fairness resulting from the Department's refusal to give SZSSJ and SZTZI the unabridged copy of the KPMG report, and overturned the decision of the Full Court in SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 125; (2015) 234 FCR 1.