the application for leave to appeal
13 The applicant applied for leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge.
14 The proposed notice of appeal contains the following proposed grounds:
1. The trial judge erred not to make any assessment in regards to the decision by the second respondent on complementary protection.
2. The trial judge erred not to consider the country information where the applicant's country of origin is subject to abusig [sic] human rights.
15 The applicant also filed written submissions.
16 The applicant's written submissions again complained that the Tribunal had not given any importance to the applicant's wife's testimony that she was raped by cadres of the Awami League. The applicant went on to complain that the Tribunal had not given reasons why the letter from his wife was not genuine, nor had the Tribunal raised with the applicant the question of the genuineness of his wife's evidence. Accordingly, said the applicant, he was denied procedural fairness.
17 Further, the applicant also said that his fear of persecution was genuine, and gave the Tribunal "examples of atrocities by Awami League supporters" but that evidence had been ignored by the Tribunal and the Federal Circuit Court.
18 The applicant also complained that his claim had not been considered by the Tribunal.
19 In addition, the applicant complained in his written submissions that the standard of interpreting in the Federal Circuit Court had been inadequate.
20 At the commencement of the oral hearing before this Court, counsel for the Minister drew the Court's attention to the fact that the interpreter who was present in Court had advised counsel that he was the same interpreter who had provided interpreting services for the applicant before the Federal Circuit Court.
21 I ruled that notwithstanding the complaint about the standard of interpreting made by the applicant in his written submissions, the matter should proceed. The applicant provided no evidence in support of the assertion that the interpreting services before the Federal Circuit Court had been inadequate. Accordingly, the applicant had failed to demonstrate any interpreting errors, let alone errors of so serious a nature as to undermine the integrity of the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court, and so deprive the applicant of the opportunity of a fair hearing. (See, SZOYU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 936 at [29]-[32].) I also observe that there was no evidence that the applicant had raised the question of poor interpreting services before the Federal Circuit Court.
22 In his oral submissions before the Court, the applicant complained about the credibility findings made by the Tribunal, and the Tribunal's rejection of his documentary evidence.
23 In my view, the primary judge did not err in dismissing the applicant's application for judicial review.
24 As the primary judge held, grounds one and three of the applicant's grounds of review took issue with the factual findings of the Tribunal and, therefore, did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. It is well recognised that the assessment of the credibility of a witness and the attendant fact-finding process is a matter which falls squarely within the purview of the Tribunal, such that any error in that regard does not give rise to jurisdictional error. In this case, the Tribunal made particularly trenchant and persuasive credibility findings in relation to the applicant's oral evidence. At [11]-[34] of the decision record the Tribunal sets out nine reasons for taking an adverse view as to the applicant's credibility. In light of those findings, it was open to the Tribunal to place weight on the adverse view which it reached in relation to the applicant's oral evidence, and to place no weight on the documentary evidence provided by the applicant. Accordingly, in my view, the primary judge did not err in dismissing these grounds of review.
25 As to ground two of the applicant's grounds of review, the primary judge did not err in finding that it was open to the Tribunal to disregard the documentary evidence provided by the applicant, without the Tribunal having to embark upon an inquiry as to whether the documents were genuine or not. There is no duty upon the Tribunal to inquire; although in certain circumstances the failure by a Tribunal to make a simple inquiry which it is open to make, may constitute an indication that the Tribunal has failed to carry out a review (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429). However, this was not such a circumstance.
26 The other matters raised in the applicant's written submissions did not form part of the grounds of review considered by the primary judge. There is not sufficient merit in any of these complaints to warrant granting the applicant leave to raise those arguments.
27 First, in my view, there was no jurisdictional error arising from the applicant's complaint that he was denied procedural fairness because the Tribunal did not warn him that it may find that the letter said to be from his wife, was not genuine. This is because the Tribunal made it plain both in the hearing and by means of the s 424A letter that it had concerns about the genuineness of the applicant's claim that his wife had been raped in 1997. The applicant was alerted to that issue and had the opportunity to comment upon it during the hearing and thereafter. In those circumstances, there was no obligation on the Tribunal founded in procedural fairness, to give the applicant an opportunity to comment upon its prospective finding that the letter was not genuine.
28 An argument similar to that raised by the applicant was rejected by the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMOK (2009) 257 ALR 427. At [72]-[75], the Full Court observed:
[72] The applicant was aware that the tribunal was concerned by the absence of documentary evidence to support his claim. The tribunal had informed the applicant that it was unable to make a favourable decision on the information that had been provided to it by the applicant. Further, the tribunal invited the applicant to provide any documents that he wanted the tribunal to consider. When the applicant was invited at the hearing to tell the tribunal why he did not want to go back to Bangladesh, he made no mention of false charges against him. Accordingly, when the applicant subsequently alleged that, before coming to Australia from Singapore, he had heard about a court case being lodged against him in Bangladesh, the tribunal was understandably doubtful: the applicant had not previously mentioned such a case, either in his application for a protection visa or in his submissions to the tribunal.
[73] The tribunal made it abundantly clear to the applicant that it did not believe the very late claim that he was then making. The tribunal was at first reluctant to give the applicant time to provide further material, because it was of the view that the applicant had made up the claim as he went along. It must have been abundantly clear to the applicant that, even if some documents were provided, the tribunal may not accept them.
[74] In the circumstances of the present case, the tribunal had given the applicant the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in relation to the decision under review. There was not an issue as to the authenticity of the impugned documents that were subsequently provided to the tribunal by the applicant. While there may have been an issue, raised by the applicant in the course of the hearing, as to whether there was false charge brought against him in Bangladesh, he had been given ample opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to that issue, as the tribunal pointed out to him at the hearing. The tribunal did not believe him. There was no failure to comply with s 425. Further, the rejection by the tribunal of the subsequently provided documents was not information within s 424A. There was no failure to comply with s 424A. There was no failure to comply with the provisions of Div 4 in the tribunal's conduct of the review of the delegate's decision.
[75] There was nothing unfair or unjust in the way in which the tribunal applied Div 4 in its conduct of the review of the delegate's decision. It follows that the primary judge erred in concluding that the tribunal had committed jurisdictional error in dealing with the review.
29 As to the applicant's complaint that the Tribunal rejected his claim that he genuinely feared persecution, and had not accepted the country information that he had advanced, that complaint does no more than quibble with the fact-finding process of the Tribunal. This does not disclose jurisdictional error. Further, it is plain from the decision record that the Tribunal did consider the applicant's claims, and did so in considerable detail. Accordingly, the applicant's complaint that the Tribunal did not consider his claims is without merit.
30 There is no substance in the first proposed ground of appeal because there was no ground of review before the primary judge which went to complementary protection. Nor is there any substance in the second proposed ground, because it was not the role of the primary judge to assess the country information - that being a function of the Tribunal as part of its fact-finding role.
31 Accordingly, in my view, there is not sufficient prospect of success to warrant granting the applicant leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge.
32 The applicant's application for leave to appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Siopis.