Consideration
19 There would appear to be a fundamental misconception in the proposed grounds of appeal as it is clear that the appellant did not tender in the Federal Circuit Court any transcript that may have been available of the first hearing before the Tribunal or of the second hearing. Further, the primary judge did not say that there were no transcripts but that there was no transcript before the Federal Circuit Court. I find that the nature of the mistake is that the appellant considers that the statutory declaration by the NAATI interpreter and translator concerning the mistakes in translation at the first hearing of the Tribunal constituted a "detailed transcript": see paragraph 2 of the appellant's letter dated 11 November 2013. In answer to questions by me, the appellant confirmed that the statutory declaration by the NAATI interpreter and translator was what he was referring to in the letter as the transcript. Clearly this was not a transcript of the kind referred to in the judgment of the primary judge.
20 The transcript of the hearing before the primary judge also makes it clear that the appellant did not seek to put before the primary judge the transcript of the hearings in the Tribunal beyond the statutory declaration to which I have referred.
21 I note that on 5 December 2012 a different judge of what is now the Federal Circuit Court directed that any transcript be filed and served by 15 February 2013. The primary judge, from whom this appeal is brought, took the appellant to the relevant directions at the hearing on 30 August 2013.
22 In any event, in my opinion, the presence or absence of a transcript of the first hearing in the Tribunal is not of any significance, as the matter is put, because the reasons of the Tribunal record the receipt by it of the statutory declaration from an accredited interpreter and translator in the Nepal and English languages who stated that he had listened to the recording of the hearing and set out in the declaration a number of instances in which there had been errors in the interpreting process which then led to the Tribunal stating as follows:
[41] In the light of the statutory declaration from the accredited interpreter, the Tribunal decided that the applicant may have been denied a proper opportunity to give evidence about the issues in the review and decided to hold a hearing with the new interpreter. For that reason, the Tribunal abandoned the evidence the applicant was recorded as giving at that hearing and the Tribunal disregards it. The Tribunal elected to conduct a fresh hearing with a new interpreter to give the applicant a meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in relation to the issues arising in the review.
…
[164] The Tribunal notes that its assessment of the applicant's credibility is based on the issues discussed above which arose from and were discussed at the second hearing which was convened with a new interpreter. The evidence given by the applicant at the first hearing is disregarded by the Tribunal in view of the objections made to the interpreter used at the hearing, the Tribunal being unable to be certain that its questions and the applicant's responses were properly interpreted.
23 As framed, the grounds of appeal must therefore fail.
24 Looking at the appeal more broadly there is in my opinion nothing to suggest that the primary judge erred in finding there was no merit in the appellant's claim of bias on the part of the Tribunal: see Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425; [2001] HCA 28 at [27]-[28].
25 As to the appellant's submission that the Tribunal did not want to listen to him or that at the time of the second hearing the Tribunal member had already made up his mind and did not look at the appellant's documents, these are mere claims in the sense that there is no material to support them. Indeed, as submitted by counsel for the Minister, the lengthy and detailed reasoning of the Tribunal member in his reasons tends against the submission that the member did not listen to the appellant or had already made up his mind. As to not looking at the appellant's documents, this course was directed by the limited jurisdiction being exercised by the Federal Circuit Court.
26 I note that the then solicitors for the appellant, in their letter dated 19 June 2012 forwarding the statutory declaration of the qualified interpreter and translator, did not suggest that the Tribunal member should disqualify himself by virtue of having conducted the first hearing. I also note that no such application is recorded in the reasons of the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that a representative of the appellant, as well as an interpreter, attended the second tribunal hearing.
27 The mere fact that errors were later found to have been made, and accepted by the Tribunal to have been made, in the translation of the first hearing does not establish bias. Indeed it also tends in the opposite direction. There is no other material to make out that claim of bias. To the extent that the appellant contends that the Tribunal member went ahead with the first interview even after the deficiencies in the interpretation were drawn to the member's attention that submission, in my opinion, goes nowhere in light of the approach taken by the Tribunal in [41] and [164] which I have set out above. To the extent that the appellant contends that the Tribunal member got angry with him at the first hearing because a timely objection was not taken to the inadequacy of the interpretation, of itself that does not establish bias or ostensible bias: VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 102; [2003] FCA 872 at [81].
28 If there is an allegation by the appellant of bias on the part of the primary judge I reject that contention as baseless.
29 In oral submissions before me the appellant submitted that at the second hearing before the Tribunal the appellant felt the member, who as I have said was the same member as at the first hearing, was a bit biased and was not listening properly and had not been fair to him and that another Tribunal member would have listened to his claims properly. The appellant submitted that at the second hearing it was the same interviewer and he was very well aware of the appellant's submissions and the appellant felt that the Tribunal member was biased.
30 The appellant requested a fresh look at his case as there was no condition on which he could return to his country. He submitted there had been injustice done to him and he requested a review of his case. The appellant referred to the fact that the primary judge said he was not able to accept further evidence relating to some incidents in Nepal which the appellant wished to put before the primary judge.
31 In my opinion there is nothing additional in these submissions which would establish error on the part of the primary judge in finding that there was no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. In part the appellant, understandably enough, assumed that the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court or the appeal to this Court involved a further review of his visa application on the merits. This is not so. The proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court are in the nature of judicial review for jurisdictional error and the appeal to this Court is directed to questions of any error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court.
32 In submissions in reply the appellant said that he was not aware of the orders of 5 December 2012 made by the Federal Circuit Court, as it now is. However this contention is contradicted by what appears in the transcript of the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court on 30 August 2013. In addition, the copy of the orders made on 5 December 2012 directing that any transcript be filed and served by 15 February 2013 bear the appellant's signature. I confirmed with the appellant that the signature on the document was his. In the circumstances I do not permit the appellant to raise the contention that he was not aware of the orders. Neither do I grant the appellant more time to adduce evidence in support of that contention.