SZRQF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2014] FCA 7
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2014-01-17
Before
Nicholas J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (15 paragraphs)
INTRODUCTION 1 This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate (now a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia) given on 13 February 2013 dismissing the appellant's application for a declaration (together with a related injunction) impugning the recommendation made by the second respondent that the appellant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugees Convention). The first respondent (the Minister) seeks to uphold the judgment under appeal; the second respondent (the Reviewer) has submitted except as to costs. 2 For reasons which I will explain, I agree with the primary judge that the Reviewer did not deny the appellant procedural fairness, nor did he misunderstand the appellant's claims. I also agree that the Reviewer did not fail to have regard to any relevant matter or have regard to any irrelevant matter. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
M61 3 The recommendation which the appellant sought to impugn was made by the Reviewer as part of what is referred to by the Minister as Independent Merits Review (IMR). Such a review occurs in the context of the statutory framework considered by the High Court in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319 (M61) including, in particular, s 46A and s 195A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). As the High Court explained at [13], the power given by s 46A is one that permits the Minister to determine that an "offshore entry person" may make a valid application for a visa of a specified class; the power given by s 195A permits the Minister to grant a visa in the absence of a valid application for that visa. The powers conferred upon the Minister by s 46A and s 195A may only be exercised by the Minister personally. Further, the Minister is not under any duty to consider whether to exercise his power under either provision. 4 In M61, the High Court held that where a reviewer conducts an IMR for the purposes of the Minister considering whether to exercise power under s 46A or s 195A "the assessment and review must be procedurally fair and must address the relevant legal question or questions". At [77]-[78] the Court stated: [77] Because the Minister was not bound to exercise power under either s 46A or s 195A, no matter what conclusion was reached in the assessment or review, it cannot be said that a decision to consider exercising the power affected some right of the offshore entry person to a particular outcome. The offshore entry person had no right to have the Minister decide to exercise the power or, if the assessment or review were favourable, to have the Minister exercise one of the relevant powers in his or her favour. Nonetheless, once it is decided that the assessment and review processes were undertaken for the purpose of the Minister considering whether to exercise power under either s 46A or s 195A, it follows from the consequence upon the claimant's liberty that the assessment and review must be procedurally fair and must address the relevant legal question or questions. The right of a claimant to liberty from restraint at the behest of the Australian Executive is directly affected. The claimant is detained for the purposes of permitting the Minister to be informed of matters that the Minister has required to be examined as bearing upon whether the power will be exercised. [78] The Minister having decided to consider the exercise of power under either or both of ss 46A and 195A, the steps that are taken to inform that consideration are steps towards the exercise of those statutory powers. That the steps taken to inform the consideration of exercise of power may lead at some point to the result that further consideration of exercise of the power is stopped does not deny that the steps that were taken were taken towards the possible exercise of those powers. Nor does it deny that taking the steps that were taken directly affected the claimant's liberty. There being no exclusion by plain words of necessary intendment, the statutory conferral of the powers given by ss 46A and 195A, including the power to decide to consider the exercise of power, is to be understood as "conditioned on the observance of the principles of natural justice" [Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 615 per Brennan J]. Consideration of the exercise of the power must be procedurally fair to the persons in respect of whom that consideration is being given. And likewise, the consideration must proceed by reference to correct legal principles, correctly applied. 5 In M61, declarations were made that the Reviewers made errors of law and denied the applicants procedural fairness, but injunctive relief was denied on the basis that there was no threat that the applicants in that case would be removed from Australia without the benefit of further reviews.