CONSIDERATION
16 No particulars have been provided in respect of any of the grounds of appeal, although some information has been incorporated into the second and third grounds as reflected immediately above. No written submissions were received from the appellants, and only limited oral submissions were made by the first appellant. Further, the grounds of appeal are essentially identical to grounds of the appellants' application before the primary judge. This is not a criticism of the appellants given that they are self-represented and not fluent in English. They are matters that are important to note however, as it is not the role of this Court on judicial review to make the case of an appellant.
17 As to the first ground of appeal, it is not clear which relevant considerations the Tribunal is said to have ignored. In oral submissions, the first appellant argued that the evidence that the appellants relied on before the Tribunal was true. She also referred in an abstract manner to an obligation on Australia to protect refugees. Such arguments as they were framed do not disclose a failure on the part of the Tribunal to take into account relevant considerations.
18 Rather, it appears that the first appellant seeks to have the Court review the information that was before the Tribunal, but come to a different conclusion. Such a review of the merits of the appellants' case, including the Tribunal's findings of the credibility of the first appellant's evidence, is not permissible on this appeal: Chen Xin He v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Federal Court of Australia, RD Nicholson J, 23 November 1995, unreported) at [24]. In any event, the Tribunal's reasons, which appear to thoroughly consider the evidence and claims of the appellants, do not suggest that it failed to take any relevant consideration into account.
19 The second ground of appeal refers to an alleged error in translation of the second appellant's evidence as to the first appellant's practice of Falun Gong in China. To fully understand this submission, it is necessary to provide some further explanation as to the evidence provided to the Tribunal.
20 Shortly after the Tribunal hearing, a Tribunal officer sent a letter dated 11 May 2012 addressed to the appellants to the appellants' migration agent ('the Tribunal's Letter'). Such letter, in accordance with s 424A of the Act, outlined particulars of information that, subject to any response from the appellants, would be at least part of the reason for affirming the delegate of the Minister's decision to refuse the first appellant a protection visa. The information in part related to a number of perceived inconsistencies in the first and second appellant's evidence, including in relation to the first appellant's alleged injuries inflicted by Chinese police, comments made by the first appellant's mother, and the first appellant's practice of Falun Gong in Australia. Of particular note however is the Tribunal officer's reference to the evidence of the first appellant's practice of Falun Gong in China. The letter, without alteration, states:
In the hearing you [the first appellant] gave evidence that you had practiced Falun Gong in China for 1 ½ - 2 years,
By contrast, [the second appellant] said you practiced Falun Gong in China for 10 years…
21 The first appellant responded to the Tribunal's Letter in a statement made on 19 May 2012. The first appellant alleged that a number of the inconsistencies were due to incorrect translations of the second appellant's evidence by the interpreter, such as in relation to her injuries and statements by her mother. In response to the Tribunal's query as to the evidence of her practice of Falun Gong excerpted immediately above, the first appellant stated as follows, without alteration:
It had been over 10 years since I first practiced Falun Gong in China, but during this period I actually practiced 1.5-2 years. My husband meant the total period of time from the beginning of my practice to the time we departed China, while I meant the actual period of time of practice.
22 The first appellant did not suggest in her response that the second appellant's evidence had been incorrectly translated. The Tribunal's careful consideration of the first appellant's response is directly reflected in its reasons, which state at [87]:
The Tribunal notes that there is considerable variation and confusion surrounding the evidence about the period the applicant practiced Falun Gong in China. At the hearing the applicant gave evidence that she practiced [sic] Falun Gong for 1 ½ - 2 years, starting in 1998 and finishing in 1999 when she found it was illegal. The applicant told the departmental officer that she was able to continue practising Falun Gong in the mornings when she and her husband were running a minibus business between 1999 and 2004, whereas her husband gave evidence that said she practiced Falun Gong in China for 10 years. The Tribunal does not accept the explanation for this inconsistency as being because her husband was referring to the period she started practicing Falun Gong until when they departed China firstly [sic] because this would have been 13 years and secondly because it seems a very contrived explanation to respond in such a way to question asked [sic].
(Emphasis added)
23 As can be seen, the Tribunal provided the first appellant with an opportunity to respond to the inconsistency between her evidence as to the length of her practice of Falun Gong in China and the evidence of the second appellant on the same issue. In responding, the first appellant did not in any way suggest that such inconsistency was due to an error in translation by the interpreter. The Tribunal cannot fail to consider an argument that was not put to it. As such, the second ground of appeal must fail.
24 The Court also notes for completeness the submission made at the end of the appellants' second ground of appeal, namely that the Tribunal's finding that the evidence as to the first appellant's practice of Falun Gong in China was inconsistent ('the main inconsistency finding') led the Tribunal to make erroneous findings of fact as to the first appellant's arrest, her interrogation by Chinese police, her injuries and her stays in hospital. This argument must be rejected. Even if the Tribunal's main inconsistency finding constituted an error of law, it did not form the basis for the Tribunal's findings as to the first appellant's arrest, her interrogation by Chinese police, her injuries and her stays in hospital.
25 As to the third ground of appeal, it is not evident why the second appellant's residence in Europe for a number of years constituted a relevant consideration that the Tribunal was required to take into account. In any event, the Tribunal noted that the second appellant resided in Italy from April 2004 until 2011, during which time he worked as a supervisor in a factory in Milan. Clearly cognisant of the fact that the second appellant had spent a significant number of years in Europe, the Tribunal was not required to again refer to that factor when considering discrepancies in the first and second appellant's evidence at [88] of its reasons. Furthermore, although numerous such discrepancies were noted in the Tribunal's Letter, the first appellant in her response did not refer to the second appellant's time in Europe as an explanation for the inconsistent evidence.
26 With respect to the fourth ground of appeal, the first appellant referred briefly during oral submissions to scarring on her body. The Court assumes that the first appellant alleges such scarring was due to the harm alleged to be inflicted upon her by the Chinese police. The reasons of the Tribunal clearly show that it considered the medical reports tendered by the first appellant. More broadly, the Tribunal considered the first appellant's claims to have practised Falun Gong and rejected the claims that she suffered any harm in China by reason of her actual or imputed Falun Gong practice. Similarly to the first ground of appeal, it appears that the first appellant seeks a form of impermissible merits review.
27 For the reasons above, each of the appellants' grounds of appeal must be rejected. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.