THE APPEAL
31 The appellant filed a notice of appeal which raised in effect the same three complaints as were comprised in the grounds of review. I have treated the grounds of appeal as comprising a complaint that the Federal Magistrate erred in not making the findings contended for in each of the grounds of review.
32 In view of the decision to which I have come, it is only necessary to deal in detail with the grounds of appeal based on the second of the grounds of review, namely, that the Federal Magistrate erred in failing to find that the Tribunal contravened s 424A(1) of the Act in that it failed to provide the appellant with particulars in writing of the information in the financial support documents comprising part of the daughter's student visa application.
33 The first respondent supported the Federal Magistrate's finding that the relevant information did not undermine the appellant's Convention claim. Further, the first respondent contended that, whilst the Tribunal had had regard to the financial information in the student visa application in questioning the appellant during the hearing, the Tribunal's reasons showed that that information had not formed part of the decision of the Tribunal to affirm the delegate's decision. Accordingly, so the first respondent contended, the obligation on the Tribunal to comply with the process in s 424A(1) was not enlivened.
34 The relationship between the Tribunal's published reasons and the circumstances in which the obligation under s 424A(1) of the Act is enlivened was considered in the case of SZBYR. At 615, at [17] of SZBYR, the majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) observed:
Secondly, the appellants assumed, but did not demonstrate, that the statutory declaration "would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review". The statutory criterion does not, for example, turn on "the reasoning process of the tribunal", or "the tribunal's published reasons". The reason for affirming the decision that is under review is a matter that depends upon the criteria for the making of that decision in the first place. The tribunal does not operate in a statutory vacuum, and its role is dependent upon the making of administrative decisions upon criteria to be found elsewhere in the Act. The use of the future conditional tense (would be) rather than the indicative strongly suggests that the operation of s 424A(1)(a) is to be determined in advance - and independently - of the tribunal's particular reasoning on the facts of the case. Here, the appropriate criterion was to be found in s 36(1) of the Act, being the provision under which the appellants sought their protection visa. The "reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review" was therefore that the appellants were not persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention. When viewed in that light, it is difficult to see why the relevant passages in the appellants' statutory declaration would itself be "information that the tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review". Those portions of the statutory declaration did not contain in their terms a rejection, denial or undermining of the appellants' claims to be persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. Indeed, if their contents were believed, they would, one might have thought, have been a relevant step towards rejecting, not affirming, the decision under review.
35 The decision in SZBYR was recently considered by Heerey J in MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483 (MZXBQ). At 492, at [27], Heerey J observed:
SZBYR 81 ALJR 1190; 235 ALR 609, and in particular [17] of the majority judgment, essentially says that the Tribunal must assess the "information" in question in terms of its dispositive relevance to the Convention claims advanced by the applicant before the Tribunal. For example, let it be assumed an applicant claimed fear of persecution in a country because he was a Christian, and the Tribunal has a written statement from X that the applicant said to him he never was a Christian and had invented the claim in order to get a visa. If true, X's statement, being "evidentiary material or documentation", would be a reason for the Tribunal's affirming the refusal of a visa. It would "undermine" his claims to have well‑founded fear of persecution by reason of religion. By contrast, a statement by Y that the applicant had worked in Australia under a false name would at best only go to the applicant's credibility. If the Tribunal in either of these hypothetical instances had not given a s 424A notice the reviewing court would have to characterise the statements of X and Y and determine whether or not they attracted the s 424A obligation as at the time they came to the Tribunal's attention. This assessment would not depend on the use the Tribunal subsequently made of the statements in its reasons.
36 It follows that it is the relationship which the information in question has to the content of the Convention claim made by the applicant before the Tribunal that is a significant consideration in determining whether it is information in respect of which s 424A(1) applies. Further, the assessment of whether the information enlivened the obligation on the Tribunal under s 424A(1) is made by reference to the time at which the Tribunal becomes aware of the information. Accordingly, and significantly, in light of the submission made by the first respondent, the assessment is not dependent upon the use that the Tribunal subsequently made of the information, although, in my view, that may be a relevant consideration in drawing inferences as to the proper characterisation of the information.
37 At the heart of the appellant's Convention claim based on economic hardship and discrimination arising from the "one child" policy, was the appellant's claim that she and her family were financially stressed and would suffer economic hardship and prejudice by reason of having to support the children who were born outside the "one child" policy.
38 I infer from the handwritten notation on the daughter's student visa application referred to at [11] above, that all the copy documents comprising the student visa application, had found their way to the Tribunal from the daughter's student visa application file held by the department. Further, I infer from the fact that the Tribunal was able to, and did, ask the appellant questions about this information at the hearing, that it was aware of this information by the commencement of the hearing.
39 Accordingly, by the time of the hearing, the Tribunal had information from a departmental file, other than the appellant's protection visa file, that showed the appellant's husband had a comparatively well paid job and that she and her husband had accumulated a comparatively large amount in savings over the course of three years. The information, if accepted, therefore, substantially undermined the Convention claim made by the appellant. Accordingly, the information fell within the category of information referred to by the High Court at 615, at [17], of its judgment in SZBYR and into the first category of information referred to by Heerey J in MZXBQ. Further, I infer from the obvious adverse nature of the content of the information and from the fact that the Tribunal used it in the course of the hearing to question the veracity of the claim made by the appellant that she was financially stressed, that, at least by the time of the commencement of the hearing, the Tribunal considered that the information would be part of the reason for affirming the decision of the delegate to refuse the application for the protection visa.
40 It follows from those findings, and from the application of the principles referred to in SZBYR and MZXBQ, that by the commencement of the hearing the information was of the character that fell within s 424A(1) and that, therefore, the Tribunal was obliged to comply with s 424A(1) or take the alternative steps open to it under s 424A(2A) and s 424AA. It is accepted by the first respondent that the Tribunal did not advise the appellant of the information in writing in accordance with s 424A(1), nor did it undertake the alternative process contemplated in s 424A(2A) and s 424AA.
41 It follows that, in my view, the Federal Magistrate erred in concluding that relevant information in the student visa application was not information which undermined the Convention claim made by the appellant in respect of economic hardship and discrimination. The reasoning of the Federal Magistrate on this issue is not well exposed. However, it appears that the error is founded on the misapprehension by the Federal Magistrate that the appellant's complaint was that she was not asked to comment on the information that her daughter had applied for a student visa to undertake paid study in Australia, rather than the more specific complaint that she was not asked in writing to comment on the adverse information in the financial support documents accompanying the student visa application which showed that she and her husband were, comparatively speaking, well off financially. Alternatively, based on his comments at [67] of his reasons, set out at [26] above, the Federal Magistrate may have been of the view that the financial support information was information which went only to credibility and not to the heart of the Convention claim and did not, therefore, invoke s 424A(1) of the Act.
42 Further, in my view, the Federal Magistrate erred in determining (as he appears, at least implicitly, to have determined) that the information the subject of the appellant's complaint, was information which fell within the ambit of s 424A(3)(ba) or s 424A(3)(b) of the Act. Again, the Federal Magistrate's reasons for these findings are not well exposed. However, as I have previously said, it appears that the Federal Magistrate misconstrued the precise nature of the information that was the subject of the appellant's complaint. Had the Federal Magistrate properly apprehended the nature of the appellant's complaint, it would not have been open to the Federal Magistrate to make the findings which he appears to have made. This is because it is apparent from the face of the student visa application documentation which is referred to at [11] above, that this information was not provided by the appellant, but was copied from another file held by the department, namely, the appellant's daughter's student visa application file. Accordingly, this ground of appeal succeeds.
43 As to the ground of appeal based on the first ground of review, in my view, the Federal Magistrate did not err in concluding that the Tribunal did not seek to embark upon the process provided for in s 424AA. Further, as to the ground of appeal based on the third ground of review, in my view, for the reasons which he gave, the Federal Magistrate did not err.
44 The first respondent did not submit this was a case where, notwithstanding that the Tribunal did not comply with s 424A(1) of the Act, relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds.
45 Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the decision of the Tribunal set aside.
I certify that the preceding forty‑five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Siopis.