The appeal
18 On 7 November 2007 the appellant filed a notice of appeal. The first ground was that the Tribunal was biased.
19 The effect of what the appellant said to me by way of oral submission was that the Tribunal had asked questions which indicated that it had a closed mind on whether she was a Falun Gong practitioner and that the Tribunal and interpreter had acted oppressively during the hearing. The appellant also said that the Federal Magistrate should have listened to the tape of the hearing before the Tribunal. As I have previously mentioned, I have treated the appellant's complaint to be that the Federal Magistrate erred in failing to accept the tender of evidence advanced to support the appellant's complaint of apprehended bias.
20 In the case of Re Refugee Review Tribunal and Another; Ex parte H and Another (2001) 179 ALR 425, the High Court stated at 435 ([30]-[31]):
Where, as in the present case, credibility is in issue, the person conducting inquisitorial proceedings will necessarily have to test the evidence presented - often vigorously. Moreover, the need to ensure that the person who will be affected by the decision is accorded procedural fairness will often require that he or she be plainly confronted with matters which bear adversely on his or her credit or which bring his or her account into question. Similar questions by a judge in curial proceedings in which the parties are legally represented may more readily give rise to an apprehension of bias than in the case of inquisitorial proceedings.
Where, however, parties are not legally represented in inquisitorial proceedings, care must be taken to ensure that vigorous testing of the evidence and frank exposure of its weaknesses do not result in the person whose evidence is in question being overborne or intimidated. If that should happen, a fair-minded lay observer or a properly informed lay person might readily infer that there is no evidence that the witness can give which can change the decision-maker's view.
21 In my view, the true nature of the complaint which the appellant was making before the Federal Magistrate, when she referred to the "misleading" nature of the Tribunal's questions and the alleged bullying by the interpreter, was a complaint of the nature referred to in these observations of the High Court. That is, that the hearing was conducted in a matter that might give rise to the inference in the mind of a fair-minded lay observer that the Tribunal did not have an open mind on the question of whether she was a Falun Gong practitioner.
22 In my view, in the overall context of the appellant's complaint, the Federal Magistrate took too literal a view of the appellant's complaint by treating the complaints as to the "misleading" questions and the bullying by the interpreter as discrete complaints rather than incidents of a complaint of apprehended bias.
23 Some of the questions the Tribunal asked of the appellant appeared to be sufficiently peripheral as to cause some concern to the Federal Magistrate. It was at least arguable that the questions were capable of causing a fair-minded lay observer to query whether questions of this kind would be asked by a person seeking fairly to test whether the appellant was an adherent to Falun Gong. Further, the Federal Magistrate correctly expressed some disquiet about the use of the word "infinitesimal" by the Tribunal in describing the appellant's knowledge of Falun Gong. In other words, there was enough before the Federal Magistrate to preclude a finding that the appellant's claim of apprehended bias was so frivolous or otherwise devoid of merit, that she should not be permitted to advance evidence in support of it.
24 Although new evidence will not generally be admitted on the hearing of an application for judicial review, evidence of what occurred at a hearing in support of a complaint about the absence of procedural fairness or bias in relation to the hearing, is an exception to the general rule, and may be admitted. (See MZXLD v Minister for Citizenship [2007] FCA 1912 at [10]-[11]).
25 In my view, the Federal Magistrate erred, in the circumstances of this case, in failing to admit the tape of the hearing as evidence in support of an allegation of apprehended bias. This occurred because the Federal Magistrate failed to treat the complaint about the so called "misleading" questioning and oppressive behaviour by the interpreter as comprising incidents of a complaint of apprehended basis. It was not a sufficient answer to the appellant's real concern to point out, as did the Federal Magistrate, that the questions which the appellant could remember as being objectionable, were recorded in the Tribunal's reasons and that there was, therefore, no need to listen to the tape. This missed the point that the appellant was trying to make, namely, that the unreasonableness of some of the questions indicated a predisposition on the part of the Tribunal to find that the appellant was not a Falun Gong practitioner and the hearing was conducted in a way that reflected that attitude. Further, it was no answer for the Federal Magistrate to say that he would derive no assistance from the tape because he did not understand Mandarin. It may have been possible for the Federal Magistrate at the very least to discern from the tone of the interchanges whether there was substance to the appellant's complaint. In any event, the Federal Magistrate could have used the services of an interpreter. In other words, the Federal Magistrate erred in determining, as he, in effect, determined, that the tape could not possibly be of any probative value in respect of the allegation of apprehended bias.