Sincerely Yours,
(signature)
Secretary
Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP)
Lakshmipur Zilla Unit
Lakshmipur, Bangladesh"
19 The second document again bears two seals. It is on the letterhead of a lawyer and states in somewhat broken English that police have filed a case against the appellant and that the Magistrate in Dakar and the Bangladesh police are searching for him all over Bangladesh to secure his arrest. The letter goes on to say that:
"The position of your case is very danger. All witnesses of your case are ready to give their evidence. Against you on political conspiracy as per instruction of the prsecution [sic]. I think, if you arrested, you will be harassed, tortured and persecuted lethally and diabolically and sent to jail custody, for unlimited period. You have no safety and security in Bangladesh. I am dealing with your case as a contracted lawyer.
So, I suggest you, try to take political asylum for safe of your life. You will not come back to Bangladesh until my further information.
…"
20 The third document referred to by the appellant is a letter and is on the letterhead of the Laxmipur Adhunic Hospital at Laxmipur, Bangladesh. It is dated 2 August 2001. It also bears two seals. It is addressed "To Whom It May Concern" and it says that the appellant was admitted to the hospital on 23 August 1999, that his body was examined and it was found that he was seriously injured by his enemy. The letter states that the appellant was treated in hospital from 23 August 1999 to 4 September 1999, and that after proper treatment he was released from the hospital. It is said that the certificate is issued from the office record and the injuries referred to are stated to be that he was: "Injured in his right hand hinted by Hockey Stick"; "Injured his back sides hinted by Rod"; and "Injured in his head hinted by Bayonet." It is purportedly signed by Eda Amin, a Medical Officer of the Hospital.
21 On their face these documents have a strong flavour of self-serving assertions. Nevertheless, if accepted as true and correct, they could significantly advance the case propounded by the appellant in support of his claim for refugee status on the ground of political belief, opinion and affiliation and support his credibility.
22 I could not find any reference to these documents in the reasons for decision of the RRT. Counsel for the Minister was also unable to find any reference to them, but pointed to the RRT's assertions referred to above, that even if it were misled in its conclusions about the trouble the appellant faced over perceived links with the BNP, the RRT could rely on the fact that the BNP is presently in power, that BNP Ministers have responsibility for the police, and that there was no evidence before the RRT of politically-motivated false charges ever having led to prosecutions.
23 This statement, however, does not address the objections raised by the appellant to the effect that relevant evidence and claims were simply not dealt with or even referred to, and that the appellant was given no opportunity to address any concerns which the RRT might have had about the documents being false, or otherwise not acceptable as reliable evidence.
24 The three documents referred to above were sent to the Department on 9 August 2001, by the Migration Agent who was then acting for the appellant, along with other documents.
25 In my opinion, the failure by the RRT in its reasons to refer to, consider, or give reasons for rejection of the documents in question, constitutes jurisdictional error: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82].
26 In WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171, a claim was made on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution to the effect that, if returned to Iran, the appellant would be persecuted because of involvement with a reformist cleric. Subsequent to the RRT hearing the appellant provided a translated copy of two letters which, if genuine, corroborated the appellant's claim of involvementwith the cleric. One purported to be a letter from the cleric to the appellant's father, testifying to his relationship with the appellant. The RRT found that the appellant was not a credible witness, and was not prepared to accept either of the letters as genuine. It considered they were contrived to assist the appellant's claim. The RRT did not indicate to the appellant at any stage that it doubted at any stage the letters were genuine. Nor did it invite him to comment on that issue. The Full Court held that the letters were central to the appellant's claim, in that they were tendered as evidence of his relationship with the cleric. It noted that it may have been may have been possible to find that they were forgeries, but then it would have been necessary to hear the appellant in relation to this conclusion, as a matter of procedural fairness. The Full Court concluded that the appellant had shown that the purported decision of the RRT was affected by jurisdictional error, for not providing procedural fairness to the appellant by denying him an opportunity to answer the suggestion that the letters were not genuine.
27 In WAEJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 188, an Iranian national claimed to be in danger of persecution if returned to Iran because he was a member of an illegal group known as the "Movement for Freedom" which had been involved in student demonstrations. He said his work in this group had been to distribute literature, and claimed to have been arrested and detained for interrogation by officers of the Iranian Security Forces. On his review application, the appellant claimed that there had been a breach of the rules of natural justice because the RRT failed to give him an opportunity to deal with its concerns about the genuineness of a document the appellant had submitted in support of his application. The RRT stated that it held those concerns in light of the unsatisfactory nature of the appellant's evidence, and the timing of the provision of the document. At [52] the Full Court said:
"On its face the foregoing was a statement by the RRT that the document was not authentic. This was not a case where dishonesty on the part of the appellant had been demonstrated thereby providing support for the further conclusion that the appellant had arranged for the preparation, and tender of, a non-authentic, or forged, document which the RRT could disregard. There was no finding by the RRT that the evidence of the appellant was so discredited that any purportedly corroborative material presented on his behalf could be discarded without further analysis." (Emphasis added)
28 These emphasised words are apposite in the present circumstances.
29 The Full Court in WAEJ was of opinion that if the RRT did not in fact believe that the document was authentic, then it should have advised the appellant and his solicitor accordingly, and provided an opportunity to make the necessary inquiries to enable the appellant to produce further material to the RRT, or to otherwise satisfy the RRT in respect of the document.
30 In the present case, the documents in question are not mentioned in the RRT decision and no reason is given for rejection of any of the documents. It is apparent that if the documents were found to be genuine they would provide some corroborative evidence in support of the appellant's case. Accordingly, the appellant has been deprived of the opportunity of having the case he presented considered. Further, he was not alerted to the necessity to address the genuineness of the documents, nor given any opportunity to make submissions in respect of these documents, which were an essential part of his case. Accordingly, I am satisfied that there has been a denial of procedural fairness because the case presented by the appellant was not considered by the RRT, and information which on its face was significant and relevant, was simply not dealt with.
31 In relation to the other grounds raised by the appellant, I mention them only to reiterate my view that they do not appear to have any substance. The first was that the RRT did not find that the appellant was a refugee despite many evidentiary proofs. This goes to the merits and is a general objection. It is in a broad sense capable of including the three documents in question, but is cast in a very generalised manner. The second was that the procedures required to be observed under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in connection with the making of a decision, were not observed. However, this submission was not developed. The third was that the RRT ignored the merits of the claim and did not take into consideration the verdict from the Bangladesh country report. There is no indication or evidence that this unspecified country information was not taken into account. The fourth was that the RRT did not act in good faith. As noted below, there is no substance in this claim. The fifth was that the RRT misjudged the appellant's claim. This is a bald assertion. The sixth was that the RRT made a number of errors in deciding the fate of the appellant's claims. This is too generalised and does not assist the appellant.
32 The seventh ground raised by the appellant is that the RRT ignored relevant evidence, and that its finding in the face of contradictory independent evidence indicated actual bias and therefore jurisdictional error and a breach of procedural fairness. Although this ground is somewhat opaque and is imperfectly framed, and there is no substance in the claim of actual or imputed or inferred bias, I am persuaded that in substance the ground is sufficient to encompass the failure of the RRT to deal with the documentary evidence referred to above.
33 The final ground is simply a further assertion that the appellant is a genuine refugee. Again this does not advance the appellant's case.