By sec. 17 of the Sydney Harbour Trust Act 1900 all officers and servants necessary for the due administration of the Act are to be appointed by the Government on the nomination of the Commissioners but shall not be removed except on the recommendation of the Commissioners. It is provided that all appointments at daily or weekly wages (the plaintiff's appointment was one of these) shall lie in the sole power of the Commissioners. There was a further provision that all persons appointed were to be under the sole control and governance of the Commissioners. It was contended that it was apparent on these provisions that no contractual relation of employment between the Harbour Trust Commissioners and the plaintiff could exist. Whatever argument might be raised as to the position of employés nominated by the Commissioners and appointed by the Government, it is clear that in this case the plaintiff was in fact appointed by the Commissioners, he was solely under their control and guidance, and, if it became necessary to dismiss him, the dismissal would lie entirely in the Commissioners' hands. It is contended that, notwithstanding all this, the Harbour Trust Commissioners do not stand in any contractual relationship with the employés of the Harbour Trust - that in this respect there is no difference between the employés at daily and weekly wages and the other employés engaged in the work of the Trust. The Harbour Trust itself, it is contended, is merely an employé of the Government, and, therefore, merely a fellow employé under Government of all persons engaged in the work of the Trust. If that were the position, then, in accordance with the principle laid down in many cases, the Commissioners could not be under any contractual relationship with their fellow employés, and could not, therefore, be their employers within the meaning of the Employers' Liability Act. But, in face of the express provisions of the Act and its whole scheme and purport, it is impossible, in my opinion, to contend successfully that the principle laid down in those cases is applicable to a corporation charged with the duties, and having the status, of the Harbour Trust Commissioners under the Act. I entirely agree with the observations of my brother the Chief Justice on the sections to which he has referred. The object and effect of the legislation may be summarized in a few words. Its object is to hand over the control of, and responsibility for, the management of this great Department of the public service to a body with an independent corporate existence, enabled to hold property, to make contracts, to control employés, with an independent responsibility to the thousands of persons to whom it owes duties in the carrying out of its statutory functions, and with the rights, also, of independent responsible action in the assertion of its powers, in the carrying on the work of the Trust, and in the protection of the property which the Statute has vested in it. Although its revenues become part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund and its expenditure is defrayed entirely by parliamentary grants, it is set up by the Statute as the agent of the Government, but with an independent responsibility which impliedly constitutes it an agent, empowered to sue, and liable to be sued, in its corporate name in respect of all causes of actions arising out of the discharge of its duties. This implication, in my opinion, necessarily arises from the whole scheme of the Act, and its clearly expressed objects. I agree, therefore, that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court came to a right conclusion, and that the appeal must be dismissed.