that that meaning of "owner" must be rejected. If that meaning
is given, then cadit quuestio. But it is said we cannot accept that
construction. I confess that I have not been able to find much
difficulty in construing see. 55, if the broad rules of interpretation
are considered and adhered to. I will refer to the rule as stated by
Tindal, C.J., in The Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & F., 85, at p. 143,
as follows : - * My Lords, the only rule for the construction of Acts
of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the
intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of
the Statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more
can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and
ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best
declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises
from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been
held a safe mean of collecting the intention, to call in aid the
ground and cause of making the Statute, and to have recourse to
the preamble." I will read, also, the language of Willes, J., in
Christopherson vy. Lotinga, 33 L.J.C.P., 121, at p. 123. He refers
to "the general rule for the construction of a Statute which is
stated by Lord Wensleydale in Becke v. Smith, 2 M. & W., 195,
in these terms, viz, 'to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is
at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected
from the Statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or
repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified
so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.' I certainly
subscribe to every word of that rule, except the word ' absurdity,
unless that be considered as used there in the same sense as
"repugnance,' that is to say, something which would be so absurd
with reference to the other words of the Statute as to amount to
a repugnance."