A. True."
55 The evidence demonstrates that Mr Doyle had breached the prohibition placed upon him by the Supreme Court of Western Australia as a result of his previous breach of the Corporations Act, and had been acting as a director of APC throughout the period of the prohibition.
Offer made in bad faith
56 Mr Doyle and Mr Turner, directors of APC, advanced an offer to Sudojo as to the form of relief it would be prepared to agree to in the event the contract was proved to exist. The offer was that, in such an event, APC would arrange for the transfer of shares held by it in Platinum and by Doyle Capital in American Southwest, on the basis that Sudojo would give up its claim for damages [Letter of 31 January 2008 from APC's lawyers to Sudojo's lawyers, D4].
57 What APC did not tell Sudojo was that since termination of Sudojo's retainer, it had arranged for one of Platinum's principal assets, the Morokweng project, to be spun off into a separate company that it had created called Morokweng Nickel Pty Ltd (owned by APC and GAR) [T253.35]. Indeed suspiciously, this hive off took place in December 2007, only weeks before the offer was made.
58 Further, APC did not tell Sudojo that it was in the process of transferring APC's shares in Platinum to GAR.
59 As at the date of termination of Sudojo's retainer, APC owned 24 million shares in Platinum. This was 50% of the total issued capital of Platinum, the other 50% being held by GAR. However in late 2007 APC was proposing to transfer the whole of its remaining 50% stake in Platinum to GAR in return for some shares in GAR, the effect of which would be to leave APC with no shares in Platinum at all, even though a percentage of those shares were the subject of Sudojo's claim.
60 Mr Turner knew about the impending transfer of Platinum shares to GAR [T158.33-159.7]. Mr Turner accepted that what he was proposing through the offer of 31 January 2008 was that APC would consent to an order for the transfer of shares in Platinum Mining to Sudojo in circumstances where APC was in the process of transferring those shares to GAR [T160.6].
61 When it was put to him that the offer of 31 January 2008 had been made in bad faith, Mr Turner dissembled. He pretended for a moment that he thought that the parcel of Platinum shares to be transferred to GAR was somehow different from the parcel of shares that was the subject of Sudojo's claim [T158.35]. This made no sense, as further cross-examination demonstrated that he well knew that the shares being transferred to GAR comprised all of APC's shares in Platinum [T159.39-160.5].
62 Mr Doyle was also well aware of the impending transfer of the Platinum shares to GAR. He was a director of GAR at the time and knew full well what was happening in relation to the transaction. He conceded that the offer to Sudojo of January 2008 was made at a time when he was moving "full steam ahead" to transfer all of APC's shares in Platinum to GAR [T252.46-253.9].
63 As Sudojo has contended, neither Mr Doyle nor Mr Turner offered any real explanation for their and APC's aberrant behaviour. The offer of 31 January 2008 was clearly misleading, made in bad faith, and reflects very poorly on the credit of both witnesses.
64 Ultimately the holding is dictated by the findings of fact which are in turn heavily dependent on the findings of credit. Naturally both Mr Doyle and Mr Turner had significant interests in the outcome of the proceedings. Whilst this simply meant that their evidence required to be carefully monitored for inconsistency with the contemporaneous written material, the overwhelming reality is that their evidence was simply not credible: there were too many occasions when that evidence was simply untrue. Other factors of special significance have already been referred to in the reasons including the contemporaneous diary notes.
65 Sudojo has satisfied the Court that with the exception of clauses 4 and 5, the 22 February 06 letter correctly reflected the terms of the agreement reached on 17 January 2006. However the later conduct of Mr Doyle and Mr Turner amounted to agreeing to the whole of the content of the letter as binding the parties. Even had the later conduct not demonstrated the necessary consensus qua clauses 4 to 7 this would not have materially affected the finding that the 22 February 06 letter, insofar as clauses 1, 2 and 3 were concerned, correctly reflected the terms of the agreement reached on 17 January 2006.
66 This result is dictated by the objective determination of the parties' intent from their communications inter se. Using the Mahoney JA tests enunciated in Air Great Lakes [supra]: