However, to support the conviction it is necessary that the averment contained in the complaint should be prima facie evidence of the matter averred. If s. 243 (1) applies it does give the averment such an effect. But s. 243 (1) applies only to a taxation prosecution. A taxation prosecution is defined by s. 222 as meaning in Pt. VII "a proceeding by the Crown for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty under this Act". Section 243 is contained in Pt. VII. Section 251L is contained in Pt. VIIA which was introduced by Act No. 10 of 1943. But it is sufficiently clear that a prosecution for the offence created by s. 251L (1) is a prosecution for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty under this Act within the meaning of s. 222. If the prosecution in this case could be regarded as a proceeding by the Crown it would therefore be capable of falling within the definition which applies to s. 243. Section 233 (2) provides that where the penalty sought to be recovered does not exceed £500 the prosecution may be instituted in the name of the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner by information in a court of summary jurisdiction. Sub-section (1) of s. 233 refers to a taxation prosecution and the words in sub-s. (2) "the prosecution" mean "the taxation prosecution". The difficulty, however, is that the actual information in the present case was laid by the respondent Iliff and not by a Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner. Section 244 provides that where any taxation prosecution has been instituted by an officer in the name of the Commissioner the prosecution shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been instituted by the authority of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be. With an evident intention of complying with this provision the complaint was drawn as a complaint of Iliff, an officer of the Taxation Branch of the Department of the Treasury, in the name of and for and on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation under the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1959 for the State of Queensland. But does this comply with the provisions so as to bring the complaint within s. 233 and s. 243? It is Iliff's complaint. When he says that he makes it in the name of the Deputy Commissioner he must mean that he makes it for him. For a mere inspection of the complaint shows that it is not in the name of the Commissioner. Apparently the formula "in the name of and for and on behalf of" is used simply to mean "on behalf of". At all events it is not in his name. Indeed the proceedings have been headed as between the appellant Stuckey and the respondent Iliff. Unfortunately the form adopted does not comply with s. 244 (1). It becomes the complaint of the officer and not the complaint of the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner notwithstanding that such a complaint may be instituted by the officer under the authority of the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner. The distinction may be regarded as refined and of little practical significance, but the effect is that, although the complaint states that it is a complaint in the name of and for and on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner, it is the complaint of Iliff and unfortunately, unless it falls within s. 244, it cannot fall within s. 243 because to fall within s. 243 it must be a taxation prosecution, and to be a taxation prosecution it must fall within s. 222. It follows that the complainant could not avail himself of the averment provisions of s. 243 to support a complaint in the form which he adopted. Perhaps it may be the good fortune of the appellant but on the state of the record he is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint. Accordingly the appeal should be allowed and the conviction quashed. In lieu of the conviction the complaint should be dismissed.