Reasons why directions should be made in respect of Issue 1
47 Having regard to the above, the Administrators, in their capacity as administrators of RAHPL, propose to withdraw the Informal Proofs. The directions sought in respect of Issue 1 would provide protection to the Administrators in their respective capacities as administrators of each of RAPL and RAHPL.
48 The issue which is raised is an issue of construction which affects the reasonableness of the proposal of the Administrators to withdraw the Informal Proofs. It is quintessentially one which falls within the power of the Court to give directions to an administrator to guide him (or her) on matters of law or principle so as to protect him against accusations of acting unreasonably: see Sanderson v Classic Car Insurances Pty Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 115 at 117 (Young J).
49 The construction of cl 23.8(d) was fully debated by senior counsel for the Administrators and senior counsel for DSG, that company having been given leave to be heard as a creditor. The issue of construction of cl 23.8(c) was also addressed, although it was not at the forefront of the argument.
50 I accept, as was submitted by Mr Studdy SC, for DSG, that ordinarily the phrase "prove in competition" would connote the lodgement of a proof of debt for the purpose of obtaining a distribution or dividend in the winding up of a company. The words "in competition with" strongly suggest such a construction.
51 That was the sense in which McLelland CJ in Eq used the phrase "prove in competition with other creditors" in Re Nature Springs Pty Ltd (in liq) (1994) 13 ACSR 50 at 53. See also the use of the phrase "prove in competition with" by Tadgell J in Westpac Banking Corporation v Gollin & Co Ltd (in liq) [1988] VR 397 at 405.
52 However, it seems to me that the issues which their Honours considered in those cases were different from the issue of construction which arises under cl 23.8(d) of the Lease. In particular, the phrase "prove in competition with" in that clause must be considered in its full context. The terms of the clause do not merely preclude RAHPL from proving in competition with the Landlord if a liquidator is appointed. Rather, it extends the circumstances in which RAHPL is prevented from proving in competition with the Landlord to a wider range of insolvent events, including the appointment of an administrator, until all money payable to the Landlord is paid.
53 The question which then arises is whether the extension of the prohibition to all of those circumstances indicates a wider meaning of the phrase "prove in competition with" than it would have in the context of a proof of debt in a winding up. In my opinion it does have that effect.
54 This view seems to me to be supported by the observations of Austin J in Derwinto Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewis (2002) 42 ACSR 645 at [39]. The effect of his Honour's observations is that there is a distinction between a proof of claim for the purposes of voting at a meeting of creditors and a proof of debt for the purposes of obtaining a distribution under a deed of company arrangement. Regulation 5.6.23, being one of the relevant regulations in the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) to which Austin J referred, is particularly apt to support that distinction.
55 Mr Studdy submitted that the distinction to which Austin J referred supports the construction of cl 23.8(d) favoured by DSG. But in my opinion, it does not because the clause prevents RAHPL from proving in competition with the Landlord in relation to both voting at a meeting of creditors and proving for the purposes of obtaining a distribution.
56 There is some force in Mr Studdy's submission that proving for the purposes of voting is not proving in competition with the Landlord. That was at the heart of his submission as to the meaning of the clause. However, it seems to me that proving for the purposes of voting is nevertheless proving in competition with the Landlord within the meaning of the clause. To read the clause otherwise would, in my opinion, give no effect to the extension of the prohibition beyond the event of liquidation to other events including administration.
57 Distributions to creditors are not payable out of an administration. Distributions are payable to creditors in a winding up or under a deed of company arrangement if creditors vote to adopt such a deed proposed by a party in relation to a company in administration. This seems to me to suggest that cl 23.8 contemplates a prohibition upon the lodgement of a proof of debt for voting purposes at a meeting of creditors of RAPL. It also indicates in my view that the competition with the Landlord arises from the mere lodgement of the proof. It is true that mere lodgement of such a proof will not necessarily mean that RAHPL will vote in a contrary manner to the Landlord. But the competition with the Landlord arises from the assertion of an entitlement to attend and vote. In my opinion that is sufficient to attract the operation of cl 23.8(d).
58 This seems to me to be a businesslike construction of the Lease in the sense referred to by the High Court in Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Pty Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522 at [15] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). The objective purpose of cl 23.8 considered as a whole is to prevent RAHPL from asserting a claim or right which may have the effect of competing with the Landlord's right to recover moneys due to it from RAPL, so long as any such money is payable to the Landlord in connection with RAPL's tenancy. A proof of claim for the purpose of voting at a meeting of creditors to consider the future of RAPL is the assertion of such a right.
59 I accept that the effect of the construction which I prefer will have the serious consequence of preventing RAHPL from voting on the question of whether RAPL should enter into a DOCA or be placed into liquidation. There is a dispute between senior counsel for the Administrators and senior counsel for DSG as to the calculation of RAHPL's percentage of the creditor claims. On either view of the figure, the effect of the construction which I prefer is to leave the outcome of the meeting to the votes of a minority of creditors.
60 But that seems to me to be the effect of cl 23.8(d). The fact that the result may be an inconvenient one does not seem to me to be in conflict with the principle that requires a businesslike interpretation. That requires attention to the language used by the parties, the commercial circumstances which the document addresses and the objects it is intended to secure. I have endeavoured to address those considerations in what I have said above.
61 I do not consider there to be ambiguity in the clause. Accordingly, there is no room for the operation of the principle that ambiguous contractual provisions should be considered in favour of a surety: see Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Aust) Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 549 at 561.
62 As to the Administrator's submission on cl 23.8(c), in my opinion, the better view is that the informal proof of debt constitutes the making of a claim or the enforcement of a right against RAPL. That construction is supported by the language of cl 23.8(c) and the objective purpose of cl 23.8 as set out above.
63 Regulation 5.6.23 of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) is of some importance in arriving at the construction. Paragraph (a) of that regulation provides that a person is not entitled to vote as a creditor at a meeting of creditors unless his or her debt or claim has been admitted or he or she has lodged with the chairperson of the meeting or the person named in the notice of meeting particulars of the debt or claim.
64 It seems to me to follow from this that the lodgement of a proof for the purposes of voting at a meeting, when seen in light of reg 5.6.23, has the consequences that cl 23.8 is designed to prevent. In particular, reg 5.6.23 shows that the lodgement of the proof constitutes the making of a claim against RAPL. It is also the enforcement of a right because without lodgement of the proof, RAHPL would not be entitled to vote as a creditor at the meeting. It is a first step in the enforcement of a right to vote, the actual entitlement arising from the admission of the proof that has been lodged.
65 In my opinion the contrary construction proposed by Mr Studdy is not correct. He submitted that cl 23.8 is concerned with the financial priority of the landlord over RAHPL as guarantor under the lease. This conclusion was said to follow from the concluding words of the clause, namely "until all money payable to the Landlord in connection with the Lease or the Tenant's Occupation of the premises is paid".
66 It is true that the concluding words state the condition which must be satisfied before the prohibitions set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) cease to apply. But the subject matter of the clause is not to be gleaned solely from the words contained in the qualifying condition. Rather it is to be gathered from the content of the prohibitions set out in paragraphs (a) to (d). As I said above, those prohibitions, and the qualifying condition in the clause, when read as a whole, show that the purpose of the clause is to prevent RAHPL from asserting rights in competition with the Landlord, which impacts on the Landlord's rights, until the Landlord has been paid in full.
67 Finally, in my opinion, the construction of cl 23.8(d) which I have accepted does not offend s 555 of the Act because that section is concerned with the ranking of debts and claims proved in a winding up.